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Thesis summary  
 
This thesis challenges the consensual scholarly expectation of low EU impact in Central Asia.  
In particular, it claims that by focusing predominantly on narrow, micro-level factors, the 
prevailing theoretical perspectives risk overlooking less obvious aspects of the EU‟s power, 
including structural aspects, and thus tend to underestimate the EU‟s leverage in the region. 
Therefore, the thesis argues that a more structurally integrative and holistic approach is 
needed to understand the EU‟s power in the region. In responding to this need, the thesis 
introduces a conceptual tool, which it terms „transnational power over‟ (TNPO). Inspired by 
debates in IPE, in particular new realist and critical IPE perspectives, and combining these 
views with insights from neorealist, neo-institutionalist and constructivist approaches to EU 
external relations, the concept of TNPO is an analytically eclectic notion, which helps to 
assess the degree to which, in today‟s globalised and interdependent world, the EU‟s power 
over third countries derives from its control over a combination of material, institutional and 
ideational structures, making it difficult for the EU‟s partners to resist the EU‟s initiatives or 
to reject its offers. In order to trace and assess the mechanisms of EU impact across these 
three structures, the thesis constructs a toolbox, which centres on four analytical distinctions: 
(i) EU-driven versus domestically driven mechanisms, (ii) mechanisms based on rationalist 
logics of action versus mechanisms following constructivist logics of action, (iii) agent-based 
versus purely structural mechanisms of TNPO, and (iv) transnational and intergovernmental 
mechanisms of EU impact. Using qualitative research methodology, the thesis then applies 
the conceptual model to the case of EU-Central Asia. It finds that the EU‟s power over 
Central Asia effectively derives from its control over a combination of material, institutional 
and ideational structures, including its position as a leader in trade and investment in the 
region, its (geo)strategic and security-related capabilities vis-à-vis Central Asia, as well as the 
relatively dense level of institutionalisation of its relations with the five countries and the 
positive image of the EU in Central Asia as a more neutral actor. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction        
 
Although the European Union‟s (EU) overall engagement with Post-Soviet Central Asia long 
remained limited, the past decade has seen the EU‟s role in the region gradually evolve from 
that of little more than an invisible and arguably ineffective aid donor to that of a full-fledged 
external actor. At the height of this evolution, the EU launched a comprehensive strategy for 
an extensive partnership with the region in June 2007, officially labelled „The European 
Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership‟.1 The fact that the EU managed to 
rally Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan behind this ambitious 
initiative might lead one to question whether the EU‟s power in Central Asia should not be 
underestimated and also whether the EU exerts at a minimum a certain amount of external 
power vis-à-vis the region. This proposition is reinforced, inter alia, by the observation that 
the EU-driven initiative comes at a time when other powerful external actors are also actively 
seeking closer ties with the five Central Asian republics. Russia and China, in particular, are 
pursuing an agenda of increased engagement towards their energy-rich and geo-strategic 
neighbours in Central Asia. Given their advantageous location in the immediate 
neighbourhood of the Central Asian states and their close links as well as good understanding 
with the local regimes, Moscow and Beijing‟s influence over the region is generally expected 
to outweigh that of Brussels. Hence, the fact that the Union nevertheless managed to get 
approval from the five Central Asian states to start a comprehensive partnership and enhance 
cooperation adds to the suggestion that the EU‟s leverage over the region should not be 
underestimated. This is reinforced further still when we consider that the EU‟s strategy - 
unlike China‟s and Russia‟s cooperative deals with the Central Asian republics - includes 
strengthened cooperation on areas that are highly sensitive for Central Asia‟s authoritarian 
regimes, such as democratisation and the promotion of human rights. If we are indeed to 
assume that the Union has notable leverage in its relations with the region, it is important to 
examine to what extent this assumption relates to existing theoretical and empirical 
considerations of the EU‟s engagement with Central Asia. This is the subject of the next 
section. 
 
1.1. EU-Central Asia: a premature literature in need of theoretical expansion 
 
With the literature on EU-Central Asia relations consisting of merely a handful of studies up 
until 2007 (e.g. Kavalski, 2007a & 2007b; Matveeva, 2006; Warkotsch, 2006), the launch of 
                                                 
1
 From hereafter „EU Strategy‟.  
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the EU Strategy for Central Asia has triggered increased scholarly interest in the EU‟s 
involvement in Central Asia (e.g. Cooley, 2008; De Pedro, 2009; Djalili & Kellner, 2008; 
Efegil, 2007; Hoffmann, 2010; Kassenova, 2007; Melvin, 2008a&b; Warkotsch, 2009). Yet, 
the literature remains fairly underdeveloped, particularly from a theoretical point of view. 
Thus far, there have indeed been only few attempts at approaching the EU‟s engagement with 
Central Asia through a theoretical lens (Crawford, 2008; Kavalski, 2007a, 2007b; Warkotsch, 
2006, 2009). Apart from those few studies, Central Asia is also mentioned in such 
theoretically informed accounts as Schimmelfennig‟s work on „Europeanisation beyond 
Europe‟ and Youngs‟ consideration of the EU‟s external democratisation policy, but only 
alongside a host of other regions and countries (Schimmelfennig, 2007; Youngs, 2008). With 
respect to the EU‟s impact on Central Asia as accounted for or expected in the literature - 
including in the wider literatures of international relations (IR) and EU integration - the 
picture looks rather bleak. On the one hand, IR scholars often simply tend to overlook the EU 
in their assessments of power relations and external agency in Central Asia (e.g. Carlson, 
2007; Chenoy & Patnaik, 2007; Deyermond 2009, Laumulin, 2007; Wolfe, 2005). 
Interestingly, however, since the launch of the EU Strategy, the involvement of the EU in 
Central Asia is increasingly mentioned alongside that of such influential actors as China, 
Russia, Iran, Turkey and the U.S. (Boonstra, 2008a; De Pedro & Esteban, 2009; Kazantsev, 
2008, 2009; Omarov & Usubaliev, 2008; Varbanets, 2008; Yuldasheva, 2008). While these 
IR accounts generally appreciate and acknowledge the EU‟s enhanced engagement with 
Central Asia, they do not necessarily give a huge amount of credit to the EU‟s current power 
over the region. Some point out that the Strategy comes too late for the EU to be able to 
provide an effective counterbalance to Russia and China‟s substantial leverage (e.g. Boonstra, 
2008a: 72). Or as De Pedro claims, “[the EU‟s] capacity to exercise influence does not match 
its level of involvement, greatly limiting its potential” (2009: 114). Kavalski, in turn, contends 
that the EU‟s involvement in Central Asia testifies to its position as a regional actor with 
global aspirations, which it acquired following the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the bipolar world order (Kavalski, 2007a). Moreover, by arguing that the “fragmegration2 of 
the Central Asian region appears to have reclaimed its position as the testing ground for the 
grappling international agency of actors vying for global outreach”, Kavalski asserts that the 
EU is just as much involved in the „New Great Game‟3 as other regional players with global 
aspirations, such as India and China (2007a: 855; Hatipoglu, 2006). 
                                                 
2
 Kavalski adopts the term „fragmegration‟ from Rosenau, 2003. 
3
 The term „New Great Game‟ recently emerged in the literature as scholars and practioners observed that the 
growing external interest in Central Asia is reminiscent of the 19
th
 century „Great Game‟ between Great Britain 
and Russia. For more on the New Great Game and the implications for the EU, see chapter 5 
                                                               - 13 - 
 
On the other hand, an expectation of low impact emerges also from the field of EU 
studies, where scholars predict a limited influence based on the observation that the prospect 
of EU membership, considered as the EU‟s most effective foreign policy tool, cannot be used 
in the case of Central Asia (e.g. Schimmelfennig, 2007; Smith, 2004; Zielonka, 2006). 
Schimmelfennig, for instance, in his first attempt to theorise Europeanisation beyond Europe, 
argues that the EU is tied vis-à-vis non-candidate countries because it cannot use the most 
important incentive for compliance: the prospect of membership (Schimmelfennig, 2007). 
According to the extant literature, the fact that the EU‟s most effective mechanisms for 
encouraging institutional changes and conditional reforms are not available for its 
engagement with Central Asia particularly affects the EU‟s scope to exert soft power and 
promote liberal norms in this challenging part of the former Soviet Union (Atac, 2008; 
Cooley, 2008; Kavalski, 2007a, 2007b; Schimmelfennig, 2007; Warkotsch, 2006; Youngs, 
2008). As Cooley (2008: 1182) clarifies, 
 
[d]espite an ambitious set of initiatives, the EU‟s instruments of engagement are 
limited compared to those that it can wield over accession countries or even countries 
that can be engaged through the European Neighbourhood Policy. Without a credible 
and clearly articulated set of incentives to comply with the values side of the EU 
strategy, there is little desire within the Central Asian states to engage with Brussels 
seriously over issues of democratic governance and human rights. 
 
Focusing on the EU‟s engagement with the region from a normative power perspective, 
Kavalski affirms this line of expectation and adds that the EU‟s inability to link its demands 
for reform in the region with the dynamics of the EU‟s integration process is “likely to 
diminish the potential leverage of Brussels and curtail its ability to exercise its normative 
power” (2007a: 844).  
Quite noticeably, a disproportional amount of scholarly attention in the field of EU studies 
is paid to the EU‟s efforts to promote values-based norms in Central Asia rather than to other 
aspects of the EU‟s engagement with the region, such as trade relations, security involvement, 
institutionalised cooperation and governance export. The promotion of democracy and human 
rights appears to be particularly appealing (e.g. Crawford, 2008; Melvin, 2009b; Schatz, 
2006; Warkotsch, 2006, 2009). Here the literature is unanimous: despite the democratisation 
rhetoric of EU policy statements and an extensive range of instruments, the EU‟s promotion 
of democracy and human rights in Central Asia is largely inadequate (Crawford, 2008; 
Melvin, 2009b; Warkotsch, 2006, 2009).  
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1.2.  The EU‟s power over Central Asia: towards a (re-)theorisation 
 
Interestingly, a similar picture of low impact and limited potential seems to dominate the 
literature of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (e.g. Maier & Schimmelfennig, 
2007). As Lavenex highlights, most scholarly analyses “draw relatively bleak conclusions on 
the [EU‟s] potential for promoting policy diffusion and more comprehensive political change 
in neighbouring countries, [t]he main reason [being] that without the membership perspective, 
the ENP countries may not be motivated to undertake domestic reforms” (2008: 938). 
However, rather than simply accepting that the EU‟s external influence over non-candidate 
countries will remain limited in the absence of accession conditionality, Lavenex challenges 
conventional analytical approaches by proposing a different way of conceiving of the ENP. 
She claims that much of the academic debate on EU external relations and the ENP is too 
much inspired by the experience of Eastern enlargement and, as a result, “conceives of 
external influence in terms of the Union's ability to induce third countries' adaptation to 
predetermined EU norms and regulations” (Lavenex, 2008: 938). As an alternative, she 
introduces a more structural perspective on EU external influence, which scrutinises the 
institutional extension of sector-specific governance frameworks beyond EU membership. 
Among other things, Lavenex finds that networks can be mobilised as alternative instruments 
of policy transfer, thus compensating for weaknesses of strategic conditionality and concludes 
that extended network governance represents a hitherto neglected structural dimension of the 
ENP.  
The present study has a similar starting point in that it challenges the consensual 
scholarly expectation of low EU impact in Central Asia and argues in favour of using a 
structurally integrative approach to the study of the EU‟s influence over the region. The thesis 
claims that the predominant theoretical perspectives are not sufficient to grasp the full extent 
to which the EU‟s influence over the Central Asian states constitutes - like in many other 
cases of the EU‟s relations with third countries (see e.g. Holden, 2009) - a complex and multi-
faceted process that encompasses structural dimensions. In particular,  it contends that the 
prevailing approaches are too narrowly focused on (i) neorealist concepts of power, such as 
the possession of economic and military capabilities (Kazantsev, 2008, 2009; Laumulin, 
2007; Omarov & Usubaliev, 2008; Varbanets, 2008) or on (ii) concepts and issues initially 
developed to study the EU‟s influence in Central and Eastern Europe (a region that apart from 
its communist past bears only remote resemblances with Central Asia) (e.g. 
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Schimmelfenning, 2007)
4
, and/or (iii) on the normative aspects of the EU‟s involvement in 
Central Asia, in particular the promotion of democracy and human rights (Crawford, 2008; 
Kavalski, 2007a, 2007b; Warkotsch, 2006, 2009; Youngs, 2008).
5
 By focusing predominantly 
on narrow, micro-level factors, those theoretical perspectives risk overlooking less obvious 
aspects of the EU‟s power, including structural aspects, and thus underestimating the EU‟s 
leverage in the region.
6
 Therefore, this study explores an alternative working hypothesis, 
assuming that the EU‟s power is less clearly delineated and observable (and measurable) than 
predominant scholarly discussions of the EU‟s engagement with the region allow. In 
particular, this thesis claims that a more structurally integrative and holistic approach is 
needed to understand the EU‟s power in the region. However, rather than rejecting the 
theoretical perspectives on which the existing studies draw, the thesis appreciates their 
strengths and distils elements that it finds wanting when it comes to understanding the EU‟s 
power over Central Asia. Accordingly, whilst disapproving of an overly parsimonious 
approach and maintaining that on their own the predominant approaches have insufficient 
explanatory value in relation to the object of inquiry, the thesis incorporates aspects of the 
respective perspectives in its attempt to develop a more structurally integrative explanatory 
model.
7
 In doing so, the thesis reflects Holsti‟s claim that the “study of international relations 
and foreign policy has always been a somewhat eclectic undertaking” (1989: 40; see also 
Holden
8
, 2009). 
Central to the doctoral research is the premise that analyses of power need to 
distinguish between and account for both the relational and the structural level on which 
power is exerted (see e.g. Strange, 1988). In responding to this need and in view of the 
theoretical concerns identified above, the doctoral research introduces a conceptual tool, 
which it terms „transnational power over‟. Inspired by debates in International Political 
Economy (IPE), in particular new realist and critical IPE perspectives, and combining these 
views with insights from neorealist, neo-institutionalist and constructivist approaches to EU 
external relations, the concept of „transnational power over‟ (TNPO) is an analytically eclectic 
device, which helps to assess the degree to which, in today‟s globalised and interdependent 
world, the EU‟s power over third countries derives from a combination of material, 
                                                 
4
 It should be noted that in his most recent work Schimmelfennig acknowledges the limits of such an accession-
centred approach. In this context, Schimmelfennig has cooperated with Lavenex on further developing a new 
governance-based approach as a theoretical framework to study the EU‟s impact on countries without the 
prospect of EU membership (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009). See infra. 
5
 While the first claim applies to the perspectives used in the above-mentioned studies from the field of IR, the 
second and third claim apply to the above-mentioned approaches from the field of EU studies. 
6
 As regards the point that some studies primarily focus on neorealist concepts of power, it is important to note 
that this does not serve to suggest that neorealism - dubbed „structural realism‟ - is a „micro-theory‟. 
7
 Chapter 3 outlines in detail which elements are distilled from these approaches and for which purpose. 
8
 Holden (2009) advances a similar view in the context of the EU‟s external relations and foreign policy. 
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institutional and ideational structures, making it difficult for the EU‟s partners to resist the 
EU‟s initiatives or to reject its offers. In challenging the predominant expectation of low EU 
impact in Central Asia, the thesis hypothesises that the EU‟s ability to rally the Central Asian 
republics behind its ambitious partnership initiative testifies to the EU‟s power projection 
over the region. This power projection draws on the EU‟s influential position across a 
combination of material, institutional and ideational structures. The EU‟s power, in turn, is 
reinforced through the course of the implementation of the EU‟s partnership initiative. The 
main purpose of the thesis is, then, to both: develop conceptually and explore the empirical 
applicability of this TNPO framework; and in so doing examine concretely to what extent the 
EU‟s power over Central Asia effectively derives from a combination of material, 
institutional and ideational structures (as posited by the TNPO approach), enabling the EU to 
conclude the partnership, and the extent to which this has in turn reinforced the EU‟s power 
over the region.  
Given the evolutionary character that this working hypothesis attributes to the EU‟s 
power over Central Asia, it is important to qualify the time frame under investigation. As will 
be clarified below, the EU‟s interests and presence in Central Asia remained rather low-key 
and insignificant until 2001. Therefore, the thesis examines the working hypothesis in relation 
to events and activities occurring between 2001 and 2010, with 2010 being the time of 
writing.
9
 Within the selected time frame, two analytical periods are distinguished, notably the 
pre-Strategy period (2001-June 2007) and the post-Strategy period (July 2007-2010). To 
explain this distinction: since the hypothesis theorises the launch of the EU Strategy in June 
2007 both as an outcome of the EU‟s power over Central Asia and as an important basis to 
further strengthen that power, the EU Strategy simultaneously marks the end point of the first 
analytical period and the start point of the second analytical period. However, since the EU 
Strategy was launched fairly recently, the thesis is faced with an empirical limitation in that at 
this early stage, notably only three years after the launch, the question of whether the EU 
Strategy has reinforced the Union‟s leverage cannot yet be fully assessed. Nevertheless, as 
will be outlined in more detail below, the thesis attempts to partially overcome this limitation, 
through the separate consideration of both instances of „potential‟ reinforcement of the EU‟s 
power and evidence of „actual‟ reinforcement. 
To sum up the key contribution of the thesis: the research presented in this thesis seeks 
to generate new theoretical perspectives and provide fresh empirical findings for the literature 
on EU-Central Asia relations. In particular, it seeks to contribute to the development of the 
                                                 
9
 The EU‟s engagement with the region prior to 2001 is covered in Chapter 4, which outlines the contextual 
background of EU-Central Asia relations. 
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theoretical debate on the EU‟s power over the region, arguing in favour of using a structurally 
integrative approach. In addition, given that several of the theoretical concerns addressed by 
this study also apply to the literature of European integration, and particularly EU external 
relations, at large
10
, it is hoped that the thesis will also induce new insights into the scholarly 
understanding of other cases and areas of the EU‟s external relations, a contribution that 
would build on and position itself alongside the works of Holden (2009), Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan (2008) and Lavenex (2008), among others. 
 
 
1.3. Methodology and research design 
 
1.3.1. Iterative research cycle 
 
A genuine contribution to the literature requires research to be underpinned by theoretical 
claims, an analytical model and a methodology that are internally coherent. In order to 
achieve such coherence, the study follows what is termed here an „iterative research 
approach‟. In practice, this implies that the analysis proceeds by way of a dialogue between 
theory and evidence (see e.g. Hay, 2002: 47), and as such serves the purpose of the project: to 
present a theoretically informed and empirically supported account of the EU‟s power in 
Central Asia. More specifically, by pursuing an iterative approach, the thesis seeks to engage 
in negotiating a constructive dialogue between theoretical propositions from the fields of IR, 
IPE and European integration, and the complex empirical reality of the EU‟s power over 
Central Asia. After the elaboration of the theoretical argument and the explanatory framework 
(i.e. the TNPO framework), the thesis proceeds to examine the validity of the theoretical 
claims articulated in relation to the EU‟s power over Central Asia. To this purpose, the study 
relies on in-depth first- and second-hand empirical research, using qualitative research 
methods. As the aim is to offer a „reasoned, empirically-supported, argument‟ rather than a 
„measurement‟ of the EU‟s power, to borrow Holden‟s words, causality is understood here 
not in terms of „positivistic atomism‟, but rather in terms of the correlations between the key 
concept, notably TNPO, and „social facts‟, with the collected data being interpreted 
theoretically through the TNPO-based framework (Holden, 2009: 23). Although fully aware 
of the trade-off that exists between the predictive capacity and explanatory power of 
simplified and law-like assumptions on the one hand, and eclecticism and the capacity to 
encapsulate the nuance and complexity of the reality (including the indeterminacy of political 
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 To what extent these concerns apply to the wider literature of EU studies is clarified in Chapter 2. 
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processes) on the other, the thesis thus chooses to pursue an approach that falls markedly in 
the latter category, as reflected both in the proposed framework for analysis and in the 
methodological tools selected to apply the theoretical model (Hay, 2002: 35-36).  
As the TNPO concept is designed to analyse the external power of the EU, it is useful 
to identify at this stage what the thesis exactly understands by the „EU‟. Put differently, 
before expounding on the methodological tools used in  conducting the doctoral research, it is 
necessary to highlight how the thesis defines the EU. Moreover, how we define the EU also 
has implications for the contours of the empirical analysis. In essence, the thesis views the EU 
as an international organisation sui generis with some state-like properties, which operates 
through a hybrid system of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism (cf. Bretherton & 
Vogler, 2006; Manners, 2002: 240). Among other things, such an understanding of the EU 
implies that EU Member States‟ bilateral relations with third countries are left out of the 
picture. Hence, the thesis will only consider EU Member State engagement with third 
countries (i.c. the Central Asian states) when it directly relates to or is conducted within the 
framework of the EU‟s external policies and relations, most notably within the framework of 
the EU‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
 
 
1.3.2. Methodological tools 
 
The data analysis relies primarily on the qualitative research method of process-tracing. In 
line with the iterative research approach of the analysis, process-tracing essentially constitutes 
a step-wise procedure, which places the researcher within a learning process at various levels 
- methodological, theoretical and meta-theoretical - and constantly pushes the researcher to 
reflect upon the connection between the theoretically expected patterns and the empirical 
findings (Checkel, 2008). In terms of data collection, the analysis draws on a triangulation of 
observations from elite interviewing and documentary research of both primary and 
secondary sources. To obtain a detailed mapping study of how the EU‟s power over Central 
Asia is manifested across the two subsequent periods, the study relies on a content analysis of 
the relevant official documents (i.e. bilateral agreements and official documents from the EU 
institutions and the Central Asian republics). In turn, elite interviewing of relevant European 
and Central Asian actors is used not only to supplement the data obtained through the 
documentary analysis but also to examine the actors‟ external perception of the EU‟s power 
over Central Asia. The latter is particularly salient for the empirical analysis of the ideational 
structure in the TNPO framework, since this parameter - as presented in Chapter 3 - captures 
the projection of power based on such ideational aspects as values, beliefs, norms, culture and 
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identity. Lastly, the research relies on a documentary analysis of secondary sources, including 
academic and press publications. This serves mostly to complement the empirical data 
retrieved from the interviews and primary documents, and - where necessary - to fill 
remaining empirical gaps. Before we present the structure of the thesis, it seems useful to 
highlight the practicalities of the data collection, as it forms the basis of the empirical analysis 
that is to support the main argument. 
 
1.3.3. Data collection in practice 
 
For the documentary analysis, a wide range of primary sources were consulted, which can be 
categorised in three groups: (i) legally-binding agreements and treaties, (ii) documents from 
the EU institutions as well as from EU member states, and (iii) documents from the Central 
Asian republics. The first category consists mainly of the bilateral agreements concluded 
between the EU and the states of Central Asia, and in particular the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). The second category, i.e. EU documents, can be divided 
into documents from the EU institutions and documents from the EU member states. The 
former represent the largest group of the primary documents consulted. It includes official 
documents, project descriptions and evaluations, press releases and speeches, stemming 
principally from the Council (including the rotating Presidency of the Council), the EU 
Special Representative for Central Asia, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission. Most of these sources are available on the websites of the respective EU 
governing institutions. The websites of DG Relex, DG Trade, DG DEV and the Delegation of 
the European Commission to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (since early 2010, this 
Delegation has split into three separate fully-fledged „EU‟ Delegations, which now each have 
their own website) are a source of information in itself, as they provide significant 
background data on their specific areas of cooperation with Central Asia. Conversely, 
documents from EU member states take up a relatively marginal proportion of the primary 
sources consulted. In this category, empirical materials have been drawn from national 
documents and government websites of EU member states. The third and final category, i.e. 
Central Asian documents, consists mainly of official documents, government publications, 
press releases and public speeches. Most of these sources can be accessed on the websites of 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Central Asian states. In some cases, additional 
information is available on the websites of their respective Missions to the EU. As mentioned 
above, the empirical research is also informed by a documentary analysis of secondary 
sources. Broadly speaking, three sorts of secondary sources have been used, notably (i) media 
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sources, (ii) academic publications, and (iii) reports and briefings from NGOs and research 
institutes. An overview of some of the most frequently used secondary resources can be found 
in Appendix 1. 
As mentioned above, first-hand empirical material has also been retrieved through 
elite interviewing.
11
 In total, 45 interviews were conducted over a period of nine months, 
running from 30 October 2007 until 11 July 2008.
12
 Interviews were held in seven cities 
(Berlin, Brussels, Antwerp, Tashkent, Bishkek, Almaty and Astana), spread across five 
countries (Germany, Belgium, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan). Respondents were 
selected according to two criteria: (i) their representativeness of a particular actor category, 
and (ii) their relevance within the overall field of EU-Central Asia relations and cooperation, 
and/or their involvement/role in the EU Strategy. Based on these two broad criteria, the 
interviewees can be categorised in five groups, consisting each of two or three subgroups: 
Group 1: officials from the EU institutions: 1.a) EU officials charged with maintaining 
diplomatic contacts with the Central Asian republics and/or involved in EU policy-making 
towards Central Asia and/or responsible for implementation of policies, initiatives and formal 
arrangements in place with Central Asia; 1.b) EU officials involved in drafting, presenting 
and/or implementing the EU Strategy; Group 2: officials of EU member states: 2.a) officials 
of EU member states with specific interests in the region; b) officials of EU member states 
with an outspoken view on or significant role in the EU Strategy; Group 3: Central Asian 
officials: 3.a) national officials involved in maintaining diplomatic relations with the EU 
and/or responsible for implementation of policies, initiatives and formal arrangements in 
place with the EU 3.b) national officials involved in drafting and/or implementing the EU 
Strategy; Group 4: practitioners from International Organisations (IOs) with offices and 
activities in Central Asia: 4.a)  practitioners from IOs having similar projects/approaches in 
the region to those used by the EU; 4.b) practitioners from IOs with whom the EU (closely) 
cooperates in Central Asia; Group 5: Central Asian and European societal actors: 5.a) Central 
Asian academics, including political scientists with scholarly expertise on the EU; 5.b) 
Central Asian societal actors, including business organisations and NGOs involved in EU-
funded projects; 5.c) European societal actors with local projects in Central Asia.  
Most interviews were held under strict assurances of confidentiality. Therefore, only 
the name of the institutions or organisations represented by the interviewees is published.
13
 
                                                 
11
 For useful guides on elite interviewing methodology, see e.g. Bryman (2008: 436-457) and Odendahl & Shaw 
(2002). 
12
 It should be noted that one interview was held at a much later stage, i.e. in June 2010.  
13
 In a limited number of cases, the interviewee‟s function or position within the institution is added. For an 
overview of all the interviews, see Appendix 2.1. 
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Moreover, for the most part, paraphrasing is used rather direct quoting.
14
 Transcriptions of the 
written notes taken during the interviews are available on file, along with the names and 
details of all persons interviewed. The interviews were semi-structured, with the questions 
varying according to the individual context of the country, institution or organisation of the 
respondent. For the interviews with Central Asian officials, a basic set of 18 questions was 
used, which was each time supplemented with a number of issues unique to the context of the 
Central Asian country in question. This basic set of 18 questions centred around four themes: 
(i) the country‟s perception of the EU, including the power of the EU, (ii) the EU Strategy, iii) 
the three constitutive elements of TNPO, notably the material, institutional and ideational 
structures, and (iv) the country‟s cooperation with Russia, India, the U.S., China, among other 
external actors. For the full questionnaire, see appendix 2.3. It seems useful to note that, as the 
nine-month process of interviewing went on, questions were added to the questionnaire, while 
others - i.e. less relevant ones - were dropped. Moreover, the semi-structured nature of the 
interviews implied that respondents did not necessarily comment on all the questions and that 
they were free to bring up additional issues. Therefore, the questionnaire in the appendix is 
only indicative and just serves to suggest the type of questions asked to the Central Asian 
officials. In practically all of the 45 interviews, questions were raised that either explicitly or 
implicitly referred to the central argument of the thesis, as well as to the proposed framework 
for analysis, notably the TNPO model and its three main parameters. As indicated above, the 
reputational method was applied to examine the actors‟ perceptions of the EU‟s power in 
Central Asia.  
A final point that requires some further clarification concerns the field work conducted 
in Central Asia. Due to time restraints, it was not possible to visit all five Central Asian 
countries, which meant that a selection had to be made. In order to guarantee that the selected 
countries would be sufficiently representative of the region as a whole, it was decided to visit 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. As the most populous of the five Central Asian 
republics and with EU sanctions imposed on the country from 2006 to 2009, Uzbekistan 
could hardly be left out when deciding which countries to visit. Moreover, together with 
Turkmenistan, the country has the most autocratic presidential regime in the region, and is - 
arguably - the EU‟s toughest partner in the region. In turn, although Turkmenistan shares with 
Kazakhstan an abundance of energy resources attracting considerable EU interest, Kazakhstan 
was chosen over Turkmenistan, not only because it is the most pro-EU country in the region, 
but also because of its recent economic boom, which has brought with it a prosperity hitherto 
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 Hence, I fully carry the responsibility for any inaccuracies that may have occurred in documenting the 
interview responses. 
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unseen in Central Asia. Conversely, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, who both are small, 
mountainous and landlocked, are the poorest countries in the region. Once labelled an „isle of 
democracy in Central Asia‟, and still the most liberal country in the region, Kyrgyzstan was 
chosen over Tajikistan, whose development remains rather fragile. As a final remark, it is 
important to note that it was during the course of the five-week field trip across the three 
selected countries that the idea emerged of incorporating the notion of „countervailing factors‟ 
into the TNPO framework. Responses triggered by some of the questions in the interviews 
during the field trip, combined with the experience of observing the object of inquiry „on the 
ground‟, revealed a need to elaborate the theoretical model so that countervailing factors 
could be accounted for.  
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
As the backbone of the present study, the iterative research approach presented above 
evidently informs the structure of the thesis. As such, in line with the iterative approach, Part 
one covers the theoretical considerations and claims presented in the thesis. It consists of two 
chapters, an introductory theoretical chapter (Chapter 2) and a main theoretical chapter 
(Chapter 3). In concrete terms, Chapter 2 lays the basis for the theoretical framework that is 
developed at length in Chapter 3 and subsequently applied in the empirical part of the thesis. 
The chapter does so by embarking on an investigative itinerary through existing theoretical 
propositions, reviewing a number of studies that have in common the promotion or use of 
structurally integrative approaches. Following this in-depth review, the chapter concludes 
with an outline of the insights retrieved, particularly in view of providing a sound basis for the 
theoretical argument and model that guide the remainder of the thesis. 
Drawing on the theoretical insights gained in Chapter 2, the third chapter then 
introduces the conceptual tool and explanatory model that will be used to guide the 
subsequent, empirical study. Chapter 3 consists of two main parts. The first part presents the 
thesis‟s key conceptual approach, which is referred to in the thesis as „transnational power 
over‟ (TNPO). In the second part, the TNPO concept is embedded into a structurally 
integrative framework of analysis, which is then further developed as the explanatory model 
that will be applied in the empirical chapters.  
Part two of the thesis constitutes the empirical exploration of the thesis‟s theoretical 
propositions. It comprises six chapters: one introductory, background empirical chapter 
(Chapter 4), four main empirical chapters (Chapters 5-8) and a supplementary empirical 
chapter (Chapter 9). Ahead of the principal empirical analysis of the EU‟s TNPO over Central 
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Asia, Chapter 4 presents a broad overview of the contextual background of the EU‟s 
engagement with the Central Asian republics. It sheds light on the EU‟s involvement in 
Central Asia, illuminating the Union‟s interests and presence in the region since the countries‟ 
independence from the former Soviet Union until the launch of the EU Strategy in June 2007. 
In doing so, the chapter highlights the underlying motives of the EU‟s pursuit of TNPO vis-à-
vis the Central Asian states. The final section of the chapter identifies a number of 
„countervailing factors‟. In further explaining the „context‟, this section indicates that the 
EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia might be hampered - possible weakened - by the intervening 
effects of a series of countervailing forces, which may relate both to internal factors, i.e. 
intrinsic to the EU, and external factors, i.e. extrinsic to the EU. 
Chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8, in turn, constitute the first step in the empirical exploration of 
the thesis‟s working hypothesis, and focus on the extent to which the EU wields TNPO over 
Central Asia, in particular for the period 2001-2007. In concrete terms, these four chapters 
explore the extent to which the EU‟s power over the Central Asian republics in 2001-2007 
effectively derived from a combination of material (Chapter 5), institutional (Chapter 6) and 
ideational (Chapter 7) structures and the interaction between them (Chapter 8). In doing so, 
the chapters draw extensively on the „TNPO toolbox‟ developed in Chapter 3 in order to trace 
and examine intergovernmental and transnational mechanisms of EU impact across the three 
structures identified in the discussion of TNPO in Chapter 3.  
 Chapter 9 represents the remaining two steps of the empirical exploration of the 
thesis‟s working hypothesis, which are each covered in a separate section in the chapter. The 
first part of the chapter, which covers Step 2 of the empirical exploration, considers the EU‟s 
launch of a new partnership with Central Asia. In doing so, it outlines the EU‟s Strategy that 
underlies the partnership initiative with Central Asia, thereby discussing the relevance of the 
Strategy in relation to the EU‟s TNPO accumulation vis-à-vis the region. The second part of 
the chapter, in turn, which covers Step 3 of the empirical exploration, examines whether and 
to what the extent the implementation of the partnership initiative enhances the EU‟s TNPO 
over Central Asia.  
As the final chapter of the thesis, the Conclusion draws some general conclusions 
whilst presenting some final considerations. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of 
the main strengths and shortcomings of the thesis. 
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PART ONE – INTRODUCING ‘TRANSNATIONAL POWER OVER’ 
 
Chapter 2 – Towards a structurally integrative approach for analysing the 
EU’s power in Central Asia 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter showed that the literature does not give much credit to the EU‟s power 
in Central Asia, largely because future EU membership, the EU‟s most powerful tool, is off 
limits for the Central Asian countries. However, the chapter contended that the theoretical 
approaches used so far to examine the EU‟s impact in the region are not sufficient to 
understand the full extent to which the Union wields power over the Central Asian republics. 
In particular, it was claimed that the predominant perspectives fail to account for the structural 
dimensions of the EU‟s influence. Instead, they are narrowly focused on (i) neorealist 
concepts of power, such as the possession of economic and military capabilities, or (ii) 
concepts and issues initially developed to study the EU‟s influence in Central and Eastern 
Europe, such as norm compliance through conditionality, and/or (iii) normative aspects of the 
EU‟s involvement in Central Asia, in particular the promotion of human rights and 
democracy. By fixating on narrow, micro-level factors, the extant literature risks overlooking 
less obvious aspects of the EU‟s power, including structural aspects, and thus underestimating 
the EU‟s leverage in the region. Therefore, the present thesis argues in favour of using a more 
structurally integrative and holistic approach to analyse and understand the EU‟s power in 
Central Asia.
15
 
The aim of this chapter is to intimate the importance of adding a structural dimension 
to the analysis of the EU‟s influence over the Central Asian states, and, by extension, of its 
influence over third countries in general. Put differently, this chapter posits the claim that an 
analysis of the EU‟s external power needs to account for both the relational and the structural 
level on which power is exerted. It will do so by providing and drawing on an instructive 
review of relevant studies from across the discipline of political science
16
. As such, the 
chapter seeks to lay the basis for the theoretical framework that will be introduced in the next 
chapter and that will be applied in the following empirical chapters as part of the attempt to 
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 It is important here to clearly distinguish „structurally integrative‟ approaches from „structuralist‟ approaches, 
such as Marxism and dependency theory. While the latter focus predominantly on the structural level of analysis, 
structurally integrative approaches seek to account for both the relational and the structural level of analysis, 
thereby working eclectically with agent-focused and structural perspectives (e.g. Payne, 2000). 
16
 The studies in question are mostly from the fields of IR, IPE and European integration. 
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analyse the EU‟s power over the Central Asian republics. Following this introductory section, 
the chapter will embark on an investigative itinerary through existing theoretical propositions, 
reviewing a number of studies that have in common the promotion or use of structurally 
integrative approaches. Following this in-depth review, the chapter will conclude with an 
outline of the insights retrieved, particularly in view of providing a sound basis for the 
theoretical argument and model that are to guide the remainder of the thesis. 
 
 
2.2. Adding a structural dimension to the analysis of EU external power 
 
In building the theoretical foundations of the thesis‟s argument and framework of analysis, 
this section addresses two key issues that remain central to discussions of social science: the 
concept of power and the agent-structure - or micro-macro - divide. In tracing a logical link 
between these two conceptual issues with respect to the EU‟s external power, this section 
focuses on a number of insightful studies, thereby going from diverging understandings of 
power to theoretical propositions regarding structural power and the agency-structure 
dichotomy, whilst highlighting structurally integrative approaches to the EU‟s external 
involvement and impact. 
 
2.2.1. Relational versus structural power 
 
As Lukes indicates, in assuming power to be relational and asymmetrical, social scientists 
tend to reduce power to its „exercise‟ and/or „vehicle‟ (2005: 70 & 73). As such, power can 
only mean “the causing of an observable sequence of events” (the exercise fallacy), or 
“whatever goes into operation when power is activated” (the vehicle fallacy) (Lukes, 2005: 
70). Reducing power to its „vehicle‟ has led academics to equate power with power resources, 
such as wealth and status, or military forces and weapons. Reducing power to its „exercise‟, in 
turn, has led behavioural political scientists, such as Dahl (1957), to equate power with 
success in decision-making. This understanding of power, identified as the first dimension or 
„first face‟ of power, and still widely applied within IR scholarship, assumes that being 
powerful is to win, or “to prevail over others in conflict situations” (Lukes, 2005: 70; see also 
Keukeleire, 2002). Indeed, when the term „power‟ is used in IR studies, usually, it implicitly 
refers to direct or „relational‟ power, most commonly defined as “the power of one actor to 
get another actor to do something it would not otherwise do” (Keukeleire, 2002; Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 24).  
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In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, growing dissatisfaction with the 
predominant neorealist accounts of power instigated the emergence of conceptions of 
structural power, in particular within IPE (e.g. Caporaso, 1978a&b; Gill & Law, 1988; 
Krasner, 1982; Strange, 1988). These conceptualisations were aimed at widening the notion 
of power by encompassing structural explanations for how power in the international realm 
operates.
17
 Indeed, central to those conceptions was the claim that orthodox approaches to IR 
unnecessarily limited our understanding of power and of how it is exercised in the 
international system by concentrating almost exclusively on direct, agent-focused forms of 
power and on the „relational power‟ of one state over another (e.g. Strange, 1987; 1988).18 In 
extending his regime analysis, Krasner (1982; 1985) was one of the first to embrace the 
notion of structural power, which he termed „metapower‟, and which referred to states‟ 
indirect institutional power. According to Krasner, regimes
19
 and normative structures can, 
after a certain amount of time (i.e. following a „time-lag‟) become independent sources of 
influence, and can thus be used as instruments to exercise power over other states (Krasner, 
1982: 499). Metapower, in this view, thus refers to the ability to change the institutions 
themselves, or as Guzzini puts it, the ability to change the rules of the game (1993: 451). 
Conversely, relational power captures “the ability to change outcomes or affect the behaviour 
of others within a given regime” (Krasner, 1985).  
Although critical of Krasner‟s rational-choice and state-centric approach and 
assumptions, Strange picked up on his conceptual distinction between metapower and 
relational power, only to integrate it into her own distinct theory of structural power. Largely 
developed to refute the neorealist argument of America‟s “hegemonic decline” (e.g. Keohane, 
1986), Strange‟s conception of structural power served to support her claim that U.S. power 
was not declining. She contended that this could not be observed through a traditional IR lens, 
as it was power itself and its distribution that had changed in light of the changing global 
economy (Strange, 1987). Strange was soon labelled an „unorthodox realist‟ for arguing that 
international power, being increasingly diffuse and involving a whole new range of (non-
state) actors, had become much more difficult to observe, its structural dimensions being less 
visible and less clearly delineated than the conventional notions of power. In studying the 
conditions of hegemony in the face of globalisation and growing interdependence, Strange 
(1989) proposed that global leadership requires both relational and structural power. In this 
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 Interestingly, these critiques of neo-realism were inspired by the „faces of power‟ debate in political theory, 
which was largely replayed in IR. For more details, see Guzzini (1993). 
18
 See also Wendt‟s criticism of mainstream IR for failing to take into account the underlying social structures in 
which states are embedded, which he identified as being a more subtle form of power (Wendt, 1987; 1999: 97).   
19
 In Krasner‟s influential definition, „regimes‟ are defined as “sets of principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner, 1982: 186).  
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regard, she defined relational power - principally reflecting neorealist thought - as the 
capabilities of a hegemon vis-à-vis other actors in the system, and its ability to get others, by 
persuasion or coercion, to do what they would not otherwise do (Strange: 1989: 165). 
Structural power, in Strange‟s conceptualisation, refers to a different dimension of 
capabilities, denoting a hegemon‟s capacity to create essential rules, norms and modes of 
operation for various dimensions of the international system.  Put differently, structural power 
implies that a party‟s relative power in a relationship will be greater if that party is also 
determining the surrounding structure of the relationship (Strange, 1988: 25). More generally, 
Strange defines structural power as an actor‟s “power to decide how things shall be done, the 
power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people or relate 
to corporate enterprises” (1988: 25). This definition comes close to Hay‟s understanding of 
power as context-shaping, which denotes the ability to determine the „context‟, i.e. the range 
of possibilities of others, or in Hay‟s words, “the parameters of what is socially, politically 
and economically possible for others” (2002: 185).20 As Hay explains, “to define power as 
context-shaping is to emphasise power relations in which structures, institutions and 
organisations are shaped by [actors] in such a way as to alter the parameters of subsequent 
action” (2002: 185). Similarly, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan assert that in altering the 
context in which other actors operate, an actor‟s use of structural power can lead to 
fundamental and enduring changes in the actions, behaviour and identity of other actors 
(2008: 24). Drawing on Strange‟s definition of structural power, they describe structural 
power as “the authority and capacity to set or shape the organising principles and rules of the 
game and to determine how others will play that game” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 
24).  
Strange (1988) heuristically divided the concept of structural power into four primary 
structures, i.e. production, security, finance and knowledge, which she identified as the four 
societal needs in the contemporary world economy.
21
 Following an IPE logic, structural 
power can then be defined as the ability to shape and determine the structures of the global 
political economy (GPE) within which others, i.e. states as well as non-state actors, operate 
(Strange, 1988: 24-25). This conceptual division into four structures indicates, among other 
things, how Strange conceived of structural power as going beyond the traditional IR realm of 
material features to encompass non-physical factors. Moreover, as clearly reflected in 
Strange‟s (1988: 25) above-menioned definition, her conception of structural power goes also 
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 Hay points out that „structure‟ in the sense of „context‟ refers to the setting within which social, political and 
economic events occur and acquire meaning; Agency, on the other hand refers to „action‟, i.e. political conduct 
(2002: 95-96).  
21
 It should be noted that this aspect of Strange‟s theory will not be further expounded upon here, mainly because 
the thesis does not directly draw on this four-structure division. 
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beyond IR‟s state-centric tradition, which typically characterises such models as Waltz‟s 
(1979) neo-realism and Keohane‟s (1986) regime theory. In asserting that the power over 
outcomes in the GPE cannot be limited to that exercised by and over governments only, 
Strange (see e.g. 1988; 1989) theorised that global functions were being provided as the result 
of the growing „transnationalisation‟ of non-territorially linked networks, which she 
conceived as an interplay of deliberate and non-intentional effects of decisions and non-
decisions made by governments and other actors. In an eloquent article in International 
Organization, Strange (1989) argued that the international system was managed by a 
„transnational empire‟, with the U.S. at its centre. Through this metaphor she sought to 
demonstrate that, although actors in the U.S. might not always intend or be able to control the 
impact of their actions, international structures are organised in such a way that decisions in 
some countries are systematically tied to and affect actors in other countries (Strange, 1989). 
In other words, the U.S. position and sheer weight within the global political economy at the 
time granted certain American actors a great deal of non-intentional power to which actors 
outside the U.S. had no choice but to adapt their behaviour. Crucially, this „deeper‟ or „purely 
structural‟ form of structural power22, as Holden (2009: 12-13) labels it, implies that the way 
in which the structures of the international system and/or GPE are organised indirectly 
privilege certain actors and are thus asymmetric.  
The latter reading of structural power is central to such structuralist approaches as neo-
Marxism, neo-Gramscianism and world systems theory, which are all based on the 
assumption that power - being structural in nature - can operate without active and/or 
intentional agency. As pointed out by Guzzini, this understanding of power represents a third 
(and final) conception of structural power that emerged at the time as a critique of neo-
realism, and aims at capturing the “impersonal bias” of power relations in the international 
system, which systematically favours certain actors over others due to the specific positions or 
roles that they hold within the system (1993: 461-463; also see Guzzini, 2000). This structural 
power is „impersonal‟ - or „purely structural‟ to follow Holden‟s typology again - in that the 
origin of the produced power effect is not located at the agent-level. As Holden specifies, this 
type of structural power automatically constitutes power in that it does not require conscious 
agency to be exploited (2009: 22). An interesting case in point is Gill and Law‟s (1988; 1989) 
understanding of structural power. While harking back to Lukes‟s three-dimensional 
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 Holden distinguishes between „purely structural‟ forms of structural power and agent-focused forms of 
structural power (2009: 12-13). 
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conception of power
23, Gill and Law‟s critical approach to IPE is centred on a distinction 
between overt, covert and structural power, with the latter referring to “both material and 
normative aspects, such that patterns of incentives and constraints are systematically created” 
(1988: 97). In their understanding, the exercise of structural power in the international system 
is thus twofold, i.e. material and normative. As they specify, the material aspect of structural 
power, i.e. capital, is exercised through markets (Gill & Law, 1989: 480-1). The normative 
aspect of structural power, on the other hand, is embedded in the transnational historical bloc 
of power relations, whose discourse and practice subordinate dependent classes and pre-empt 
their opposition (Gill & Law, 1988; 1989). Although Strange‟s approach is markedly less 
structuralist in that it also provides for an agent-based dimension of structural power, it is this 
preoccupation with the structures of production and knowledge as important determinants of 
structural power that Gill and Law and other critical theoretical IPE scholars share with 
Strange‟s understanding of power. Identifying two more structures, i.e. security and finance, 
Strange asserts that what is common to all four structures of the GPE is that the dominant 
power within the international system is able to pursue goals by changing the range of choices 
open to others within the respective structure, not just through coercion or by putting direct 
pressure on them, but equally by pre-empting or co-opting their consent (1988: 29-31). 
 
2.2.2. Structural power of the EU 
 
Although widely accepted as seminal in IR and IPE, Strange‟s theory of structural power has 
attracted only a scattered number of academic followers in the field of EU studies, including 
in the subfield of EU‟s international involvement (e.g. Holden, 2009; Keukeleire, 2002; 
Tayfur, 2003).
24
 In fact, structurally integrative approaches as a whole remain largely 
underexplored in studies of European integration.
25
 Fully aware of this latent gap in the 
literature and convinced of the explanatory potential of a more structure-oriented perspective, 
Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008) and Holden (2009) have both greatly enriched the field in 
this regard by highlighting the importance and usefulness of Strange‟s conceptual distinction 
between relational and structural power. Both studies are based on the assertion that the 
predominant approaches for analysing power and foreign policy remain inadequate to 
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 In his seminal work „Power: A Radical View‟, Lukes (1974) claimed that power had a third dimension, 
arguing that, beyond the decision- and non-decision-making processes, power may also stem from the actions or 
inactions implicated in the shaping and manipulating of other actors‟ preferences.  
24
 Studies from IR and IPE that have drawn on Strange‟s theory of structural power are e.g. Burges (2009), 
Helleiner (2005) and Payne (1994). It is worth adding here that various scholars have sought to review and 
reflect upon Strange‟s work, often from their own theoretical and/or ontological viewpoints. See e.g. Cox (1996), 
May (1996) and Tooze (2000). 
25
 Compared to structurally integrative approaches, structuralist approaches have an arguably more established 
academic basis among EU scholarship (e.g. van Apeldoorn, 2006; Cafruny & Ryner, 2003). 
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examine less obvious and observable aspects of the EU‟s power (Holden, 2009) and foreign 
policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). The latter claim that, despite many IR scholars 
readily acknowledging the complexity of present-day international relations, foreign policy is 
still predominantly studied against a conventional, one-sided understanding of the notion; as a 
result, other - less obvious - dimensions of foreign policy tend to be overlooked or neglected 
(Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 19).
26
 In introducing a more updated and inclusive notion 
of foreign policy and largely inspired by Strange‟s theory, Keukeleire & MacNaughtan argue 
strongly in favour of a structural approach, albeit as part of a comprehensive framework, 
which accounts for both a „conventional‟ understanding of foreign policy and a „structural‟ 
understanding of foreign policy. As such, they seek to illustrate that the capacity to „structure‟ 
the global environment and influence long-term developments has become at least as 
important as the ability to strengthen capabilities (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 26). 
They define structural foreign policy as a foreign policy that “conducted over the long-term, 
seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental 
structures” (2008: 25).27 Keukeleire & MacNaughtan thus identify five structures, with the 
latter structure representing immaterial issues. By adding this fifth structure, they highlight 
that foreign policy must look beyond the material realm of military security or economic well-
being to account for less tangible aspects, such as culture, beliefs and identity and legitimacy, 
as these “shape the perception and behaviour of actors, influence how they define their 
interests and what kind of role they want to play in the international system” (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 25). Applied to the case of the EU, conventional foreign policy captures 
those policies that fall under the „intergovernmental approach‟ of EU foreign policy-making 
(cf. Pillar II), while structural foreign policy stands for those policies that are decided upon 
according to the „Community approach‟ (cf. Pillar I) (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 11-
12 & 29-30). Hence, in practical terms, the former encapsulates the EU‟s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), while the latter encompasses the vast array of the EU‟s external 
relations policies.  
Holden (2009), in turn, focuses on one particular strand of that vast array, notably EU 
aid policy. He seeks to demonstrate that the EU‟s various aid policies can be understood as an 
attempt by the EU to gain structural power. More generally, he contends that the EU has 
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 See Appendix 3.1. for an overview of both the dominant and the other dimensions of foreign policy as 
identified by Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008). 
27
 The notion of structural foreign policy has also been conceptualised by Telò, who defines it as a policy that 
affects “particularly the economic and social structures of partners (states, regions, economic actors, 
international organisations, etc.) [and] is implemented through pacific and original means (diplomatic relations, 
agreements, sanctions and so on), [of which the] scope is not conjunctural but rather in the middle or long range” 
(Telò, 2001: 26). 
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always possessed structural power to an extent, and that its external policies serve to further 
develop this (Holden, 2009: 30). Holden‟s use of the notion of structural power is in several 
ways the result of his search for both a conceptual tool that can capture “a deeper sense of 
power than direct, easily observable (and measureable) definitions” (2009: 5), and a 
conception of power that is stronger than those offered by social constructivist approaches, 
which he suggests tend to underplay the issue of power (2009: 10). In importing Strange‟s 
theory of structural power to the field of EU studies, he asserts that the concept - albeit in a 
slightly adapted version - is very well-suited for analysing the EU‟s external relations 
policies, not least since it captures the complexity and fragmentation that characterise the EU, 
as well as the depth and comprehensiveness of its external involvement (2009: 3-5 & 7-8). In 
Holden‟s view, the concept also offers a stronger and more nuanced alternative to social 
constructivist tools to study EU influence. Echoing the point we made in the introductory 
chapter, Holden explains that the constructivists‟ excessive focus on the EU‟s spread of norms 
and values risks blinding us to the importance of other - including more material - 
configurations of power and the broader political impact of the EU‟s engagement with third 
countries, such as the economic effects of its aid (Holden, 2009: 2 & 9-10 & 30).
28
  
Moreover, central to Holden‟s analysis of EU aid policy is the principle that there are 
two forms of structural power, namely an agent-focused type and a purely structural one (see 
supra). In relation to the EU, Holden describes the former type as the capacity of the EU to 
gain institutional leverage or economic and political weight, enabling it to shape the decisions 
of partner countries, while the latter type of structural power would eventually result in a 
wholesale liberalisation and Europeanisation of the targeted country or region (Holden, 2009: 
22 & 29). Interestingly, as a starting point for his analytical framework, Holden (2009: 10) 
draws on Barnett and Duvall‟s comprehensive understanding of power as “the production, in 
and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their 
circumstances and fate” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 42). In essence, this definition has two 
strengths. On the one hand, it opens up the scope of power analysis to include non-traditional 
and/or non-coercive forms of power, such as economic and discursive power. Importantly, it 
does so without being too broad as to lose its analytical applicability. On the other hand, the 
definition also allows for a wider range of the potential outcomes that result from the exercise 
of power. That is, it goes beyond the neorealist understanding of power as the ability to 
control and obtain certain outcomes (e.g. Baldwin, 1979) to encapsulate the ability to 
determine the conditions or terms of reference for other actors, which neatly captures that 
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 It is important to note that sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism, along with the rational-choice and 
historical variants, arguably dominates the contemporary study of European integration (see e.g. Pollack, 2004: 
153-4). 
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subtler sense of power that Holden (2009) seeks to grasp in relation to the EU‟s aid policies. 
Holden (2005) implicitly refers to this form of EU influence in his empirical study of the 
EU‟s aid programmes in the Southern Mediterranean, especially when arguing that via the 
conclusion of association agreements with Mediterranean partner countries “the EU has set 
the agenda, the rules of the game and the discourse beforehand, […] and holds all the cards in 
terms of inducements of aid and trade” (Holden, 2005: 25). In Holden‟s view, the conclusion 
of association agreements thus enabled the EU to direct these countries along the path that the 
EU had devised (2005: 27). As Holden (2009) asserts in his ensuing monograph on EU aid 
policy, it is in shaping and controlling this path of political and economic liberalisation that 
the EU seeks to increase its structural power through aid (Holden, 2009). 
 
2.2.3. New governance perspectives and the structure-agency dichotomy 
 
Importantly, another recent development in the scholarly study of EU external relations, 
which provides an additional, albeit distinct, avenue for a more structure-oriented way of 
conceiving of the EU‟s influence, is the integration and application of new governance 
perspectives. Still a nascent literature, this strand of EU studies proves to have substantial 
potential in opening up the analysis of EU power beyond accession conditionality (see e.g. 
Bauer et al., 2007; Lavenex, 2004; Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; 
Schimmelfennig & Wagner, 2004). In reaction to traditional accounts of EU foreign policy 
(e.g. Hill, 1993; Smith, 2003), the term „external governance‟ has emerged as an alternative 
tool for capturing the EU‟s influence, and in particular, to analyse how the EU despite the 
absence of accession conditionality manages to extend parts of its acquis communautaire 
towards its neighbourhood (Lavenex, 2004: 681; Schimmelfennig & Wagner, 2004). 
According to Magen, this emergent strand can be situated within what she considers the latest 
„developmental phase‟ in European integration scholarship, which is primarily concerned 
with the impact of the EU - be it as a supranational system, actor, process, model or symbol - 
on the legislation, institutions and policies of third countries and international organisations 
beyond Europe (2007: 362). As Magen holds, this body of literature
29
 converges on the 
discussion of  “whether and how EU institutions, rules, policy-making processes and broader 
international „actorness‟ […] constitute independent variables that impact the legal, 
regulatory, an  administrative structures and conduct of entities well beyond the EU's borders” 
(2007: 365). As such, these studies seek to provide evidence of the EU‟s „transformative 
engagement‟ beyond enlargement, also referred to as „EU governance export‟ or „external 
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 Apart from the afore-mentioned external governance strand, this body of literature includes such studies as De 
Bièvre (2006), Grugel (2004), Magen (2006), Prange-Gstöhl (2009) and Szymanski & Smith (2005). 
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Europeanisation‟ (Magen, 2007: 366). Conceptualised by Youngs (2005), „EU transformative 
engagement‟ involves the establishment and gradual development of formal comprehensive 
relations
30
, which encapsulate regularised cooperation, dialogue and monitoring (supported by 
financial assistance, technical aid and conditionality) on a wide range of subjects, and which 
are essentially aimed at encouraging far-reaching economic, political and social change in 
third countries partner states.   
Returning to the explanatory potential of EU external governance approaches as a 
structural perspective on EU power, a key proponent of this emergent strand, Lavenex (2008) 
investigates EU impact on the neighbouring countries in terms of establishing sectoral 
governance networks as a basis for regulatory approximation and organisational inclusion of 
ENP countries. As highlighted in the previous chapter, Lavenex (2008) challenges the 
predominant view of limited EU impact in non-candidate neighbouring countries beyond the 
so-called golden carrot of membership, contending that the academic debate on EU external 
relations and the ENP has drawn too much on the experience of Eastern enlargement, and, 
hence, is heavily fixated on the conditional transfer of the acquis. Using an external 
governance perspective, she therefore conceives of the ENP in a more structural way, 
distinguishing between “hierarchical policy transfer through conditionality”, i.e. the main 
mode of external governance in EU enlargement politics (see Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 
2004) and “horizontal network governance”, which Lavenex identifies as a more structural 
mode of exerting EU influence (2008: 941). As she specifies, the former mode is “hierarchical 
in the sense that it works through a vertical process of command - where the EU transfers 
predetermined, non-negotiable rules - and control - where the EU ensures compliance through 
regular monitoring mechanisms” (Lavenex, 2008: 941). Conversely, the network mode of 
governance allows for the extension of norms and rules in a process-oriented, horizontal, 
voluntaristic and inclusionary manner (Lavenex, 2008: 943). Crucially, this mode may 
contribute to a de-politicisation of cooperation, as the actors involved are experts and 
technocrats, who are not guided by their country‟s national interests. Moreover, it also allows 
for functionally specific forms of organisation, such as agencies (e.g. the European 
Environmental Agency), coordinating bodies (e.g. Europol), or less formalised policy 
networks (e.g. the DABLAS Initiative)
31
 (Lavenex, 2008: 943). In addition, being voluntary 
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 For instance, through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Newly Independent States of the 
former Soviet Union, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the ENP, the Stabilisation and Association process in 
the Balkans and the Cotonou convention. 
31 The DABLAS initiative was launched by the European Commission in 2001 to provide regional 
environmental cooperation for the wider Black Sea Region. DABLAS aims to coordinate the actions of the 
Black Sea and Danube Commissions, the Black Sea and Danube countries, bilateral donors as well as 
international financial institutions. 
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and process-oriented in nature, network constellations constitute a fertile ground for 
mechanisms of impact based on socialisation, social learning and communication 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Bauer et al., 2007). Network governance may well 
omit the formal, traditional levels of decision-making and policy-making and may forsake the 
traditional incentive-based tools for rule adoption; however, as pointed out by Slaughter, 
“behind the facade of technical adjustments for improved coordination  [...] and uniformity of 
standards lie subtle adjustments” of domestic laws (Slaughter, 2004: 59). As suggested by 
Lavenex, the subtle creation of joint regulatory structures through network governance thus 
constitutes a hitherto neglected structural dimension of EU influence over the ENP countries 
(2008: 952). 
The analytical potential of Lavenex‟s (2008) governance-based model for examining 
the EU‟s rule and policy transfer beyond accession conditionality is further expanded in 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009; also see 2010). Interestingly, they highlight a third 
structural mode of external governance, i.e the market mode. As the final basic form of 
external governance beyond hierarchy and networks, market governance captures the 
dynamics of regulatory approximation through market competition, thus representing only a 
loosely and informally institutionalised kind of interaction. Regulatory adaptation occurs here 
either directly, notably as a result of the principle of mutual recognition as applied in the EU‟s 
internal market - whereby the most competitive products and services prevail - or indirectly, 
owing to the EU‟s „presence‟ (cf. Allen & Smith, 1990; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006) and the 
interdependence of third countries with the EU‟s internal market and its process of regional 
governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009: 799). As pointed out by Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, the market mode may affect states, induced to harmonise their domestic 
rules and policies to those of the EU, as well as societal actors, in particular business 
associations and firms, which have no choice but to follow the EU‟s regulations and standards 
if they want to participate in the EU market (2009: 799). 
In sum, while the external governance literature within the field of EU studies is still 
in an exploratory phase, these new governance-based approaches, as a more structural 
alternative to the traditional perspectives of EU influence, may have considerable potential in 
terms of their analytical relevance for a more holistic understanding of EU power. In this 
regard, it is important to emphasise that on their own those governance perspectives will not 
be sufficient to fully capture EU power. The same goes for the above-mentioned conceptions 
of structural power, which only become meaningful when subsumed into an integrative 
framework, which also considers relational power. Or to reverse the central claim of this 
chapter, power lies not only in the systemic imperatives that determine agents‟ actions, but 
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also in the relational interaction of agents (see e.g. Guzzini, 1993: 474). The thesis‟s 
assumption that the analysis of power, as a comprehensive account of power phenomena, 
should consider both the relational and the structural level on which power is exerted, as well 
as the interplay between both levels, finds support in the long-running debate in the social 
sciences concerning the duality between structure and agency, i.e. the so-called structure-
agency problem.
32
 Here Giddens (1995) and Hay (2002) both point to the need to overcome 
this persistent juxtaposition in established theories of power. To cite Hay, “what is required is 
a mode of analysis [...] capable of reconciling structural and agential factors within a single 
explanation” (2002: 113). In a same vein, Giddens proposes that agent-focused theories and 
structuralist approaches can be seen to be complementary (1995: 49-50). Similarly, rather 
than studying the EU‟s external agency solely through their notion of structural foreign 
policy, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan develop a comprehensive conceptual framework based 
on a „structural foreign policy - conventional foreign policy‟ continuum, which encompasses 
both conventional and „neglected‟ - i.e. structural - dimensions of foreign policy (2008: 19 & 
335).  
The relationship between structure and agency is also considered - although more 
implicitly - in Young‟s (1991) discussion of structural leadership in institutional bargaining at 
the international level. In processes of institutional bargaining, Young views the link between 
structural power and bargaining leverage as stemming from the existence of asymmetries 
among the participants or stakeholders (1991: 289). As a distinct type of leadership, 
„structural leadership‟ then reflects an actor‟s ability to translate structural power into 
bargaining leverage so as to reach agreement (1991: 289).
33
 To conclude, an inspirational case 
in point of a structurally integrative analysis is Payne‟s (2000) study of U.S.-Caribbean 
relations. Payne responds here to the need to develop an integrative analysis by purposively 
combining parsimonious, agent-focused approaches with structuralist theories (2000: 81-2). 
In the context of Payne‟s enquiry into U.S.-Caribbean relations, this translates into working 
eclectically with propositions drawn, on the one hand, from comparative public policy 
analysis and, on the other, from critical IPE theories, in casu neo-Gramscianism. As Payne 
specifies, by embedding agent-oriented concepts inside structuralist propositions, he seeks to 
come to a better understanding - than offered by either classical realism or structuralism, or 
even more subtly pluralist approaches - of the possibilities for action open to both state and 
non-state actors in the structural situation of the U.S.-Caribbean relationship (2000: 73). In 
                                                 
32
 For relevant discussions of the structure-agency dichotomy in IR, see Bieler & Morton (2001), Wendt (1987) 
and Wight (2006). 
33
 It should be noted that Young conceives here of structural power through a neorealist lens, notably as power 
based on the possession of material resources. In this way, he defines structural leaders as experts in translating 
the possession of material resources into bargaining leverage (Young, 1991: 288). 
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this way, Payne traces signs of a broad “shift in the dominant modalities of interstate 
linkages” in the sense that the essence of the contemporary U.S.-Caribbean relationship “has 
now been reconfigured as a series of interlocking transnational and transgovernmental policy 
communities (here drawing on Keohane & Nye, 1989) in which different actors within the 
U.S. state/society complex and within various Caribbean state/society complexes (here 
drawing on Cox, 1981; 1987) engage each other in different policy arenas where there are no 
automatic priorities” (Payne, 2000: 82). This leads him to conclude that, in re-engaging with 
the Caribbean since the end of the 1980s onwards, the U.S. has gradually emerged as a 
„regional hegemon‟ through a mixture of coercive and consensual forms of control, with the 
Caribbean being entangled within common patterns of trade, financial flows, migration and 
narcotics movements. 
 
 
2.3. Lessons learnt: presenting five theoretical building blocks 
 
In order to provide a sound basis for the theoretical argument and model that are to inform the 
empirical analysis of the thesis, this section will distil a distinct set of insights from the 
investigative itinerary outlined above. Together, these insights will form the theoretical 
foundations for the conceptual tool and explanatory framework that will be introduced in the 
next chapter. Overall, the above reflections can serve to make five points. To begin with, it is 
essential to acknowledge how power over the last few decades has changed in light of the 
deep transformation of the international realm owing to enhanced interdependence and 
globalisation, as well as the end of the Cold War. Indeed, being increasingly diffuse and 
involving a whole new range of (non-state) actors, the exercise of power at the international 
level has become much more difficult to observe, its dimensions being less visible and less 
clearly delineated. Among other things, this implies that the analysis of power can no longer 
focus solely on the state-to-state level, but also needs to consider transnational relations and 
the role and involvement of non-state actors. At the same time, the recent transformation of 
the international system also entails that the use and/or possession of structural power has 
gained more momentum. 
This brings us to a second, related insight. That is, the analysis of power, as a 
comprehensive account of a power phenomenon, can no longer adopt a purely agent-focused 
approach, and instead also needs to account for the structural dimensions of power. Structural 
power is less tangible than agent-based power, and involves more than coercive capacity, as it 
includes unstated assumptions about standards and rules. As explained by Strange, the 
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possessor of structural power can “change the range of choices open to others, without 
apparently putting pressure directly on them to take one decision or to make one choice rather 
than others” (1988: 31). However, in drawing simultaneously on agent-focused and structural 
perspectives, it is important to consider that agency and structure are complementary and, 
even mutually dependent in that they may have a reinforcing effect upon each other. 
Therefore, it is essential to develop an integrative analytical framework, which, on the one 
hand, incorporates the relational and structural level on which power is exercised, and, on the 
other, considers the interplay between both levels. In essence, whereas the relational level 
captures the relational interaction of the agents involved, the structural level depicts the 
context within which this interaction takes place. Or to use the power typology, while 
„relational power‟ concerns the ability to obtain a certain outcome or affect the behaviour of 
others (cf. to get them do something they would not otherwise do), „structural power‟ refers to 
the ability to shape and control the structures within which the others operate and which 
determine the range of options available to them (cf. the rules of the game). As suggested by 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008), it is not a matter of possessing or not possessing 
structural power, but rather a matter of gradation, in the sense that relational and structural 
power form the two sides of a continuum. As Keukeleire (2002) puts it: 
At one side of the continuum, an actor can possess structural power in the sense that this actor 
can indeed decide what the rules of the game are (with the other actor having only one option 
to choose). At the other side of the continuum, an actor can possess only limited structural 
power in the sense that this actor can only influence to a limited extent the rules of the game 
that will be used by other actors. 
 
Moreover, as Strange asserts, since structural power can be defined in gradual terms - both 
conceptually and in practice, it can be interpreted as influence, which leaves some degree of 
freedom for the actors subject to it (Strange, 1988: 25-31, emphasis added). Building on this 
insight, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan define their notion of structural foreign policy as a 
foreign policy that “conducted over the long-term, seeks to influence or shape sustainable 
political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures” (2008: 25; emphasis added; 
also see Therborn, 2001: 92). In other words, the terms „influence‟ and „structural power‟ can 
- under the right conditions - be used interchangeably. 
A third basic insight that can be distilled from the above literature review is that 
structural power exists in more than one form. Indeed, to follow Holden‟s (2009: 12-13) 
typology, structural power is either „purely structural‟ or „agent-based‟. Capital, for instance, 
possesses structural power that is purely structural, as capital automatically constitutes power, 
independent of intentional agency. In this case, a structure thus implicitly empowers certain 
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actors - whilst possibly disempowering others - without the involvement of conscious agency. 
Conversely, agent-based structural power, as the term suggests, involves agency in the sense 
that the origin of the produced power effect is located at the agent-level. In this case, an actor 
intentionally shapes or affects the structures within which others operate. 
Fourthly, in defining structural power - whether in its agent-based or purely structural 
form - as the control over structures, it is important to discern the nature of these structures. In 
this respect, three broad categories of structures can be identified: material structures (social-
economic, financial and security), institutional structures (political and legal/contractual), and 
ideational/mental structures (values, norms, beliefs, identity and culture).
34
 Crucially, this 
categorisation can only be based on a perception of structures as not constraining, but 
enabling or facilitating. Perceiving structures in terms of an enabling environment thus 
suggests that control over the structure(s) provides advantages and opportunities to the 
possessor of structural power - in contrast to the actor(s) subject to it - including for his/her 
use of relational power. 
 While the four preceding points relate mainly to the study of power in IR more 
broadly, a fifth and final reflection specifically regards the integration of structural 
perspectives in the study of the EU‟s external power. In the review presented above, it was 
demonstrated that structure-oriented approaches, when embedded in a comprehensive, 
integrative framework, offer a much-needed and useful tool to arrive at a more profound 
analysis of the EU‟s external impact. In this regard, two sorts of conceptual tools stand out: 
the notion of structural power, and the structural modes of EU external governance. As 
Holden (2009) aptly argues, the concept of structural power is well-suited for analysing the 
EU‟s external relations policies, not least since it captures the complexity and fragmentation 
that characterise the EU, as well as the depth and comprehensiveness of its external 
involvement. Moreover, the concept also provides a stronger and more nuanced alternative to 
predominant social constructivist approaches to study EU influence, as the notion goes 
beyond the impact of the EU‟s export of norms and values to also account for more material 
configurations of power and the broader political impact of the EU‟s engagement with third 
countries. In turn, the emergent literature on EU external governance proves to have 
substantial potential in opening up the analysis of EU power beyond accession conditionality. 
As a more structural alternative to the traditional perspectives of EU influence, EU external 
governance approaches highlight the indirect impact on third countries that may derive from 
the EU‟s internal market and the EU‟s establishment of sectoral governance networks, 
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 The idea of heuristically categorising structures draws mainly on Strange (1988) as well as Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan (2008) (see supra). However, the three-structure categorisation proposed here clearly diverges 
from the categorisations offered in these two studies. For more on the proposed categorisation, see chapter 3.  
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notably as a basis for regulatory approximation. In sum, both conceptual approaches may 
provide for the structural perspectives required in order to analyse the EU‟s power over third 
countries through a more integrative analytical lens, which accounts for both the relational 
and the structural level on which its power is exercised, as well as the interplay between them.  
Drawing on these five theoretical insights, the next chapter will introduce the 
conceptual tool and explanatory model that will be used to guide the subsequent, empirical 
study. 
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Chapter 3 – The EU’s ‘transnational power over’: introducing a 
structurally integrative framework 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In challenging the consensual scholarly expectation of low EU impact in Central Asia, the 
thesis has so far argued for the importance of adding a structural dimension to the analysis of 
the EU‟s power over the Central Asian states, and, by extension, to the analysis of the EU‟s 
power in terms of its external relations with third parties in general. More particularly, 
following the claim that the predominant theoretical approaches in the literature on the EU‟s 
involvement in Central Asia are not sufficient to fully grasp the EU‟s influence in the region, 
it was argued that an analysis of the EU‟s external power needs to account for both the 
relational and the structural level on which it is exerted, as well as accounting for the 
interplay between the two levels. In view of offering a structurally integrative approach, and 
hence a tool that is more adequate to study the EU‟s power over Central Asia than offered by 
those prevailing perspectives (neorealism, rationalist and sociological institutionalism, and 
constructivism), the aim of this chapter is to introduce the conceptual approach and theoretical 
framework that will be used to investigate the central hypothesis and thus to inform the 
empirical analysis in subsequent chapters. However, rather than being bluntly rejected, the 
predominant theoretical perspectives are in fact incorporated in the proposed explanatory 
model, which seeks to combine elements from these agent-focussed approaches with insights 
from structural perspectives, notably from new realist IPE
35
 and EU external governance 
perspectives. In developing a holistic, structurally integrative framework of analysis, this 
chapter thus works eclectically with arguments drawn, on the one hand, from neorealism, neo-
institutionalism and constructivism, and on the other, from the EU external governance 
literature and new realist IPE. In doing so, it takes into account the five theoretical building 
blocks that were constructed on the basis of the review presented in the previous chapter. 
The chapter consists of two main parts. The first part presents the thesis‟s key 
conceptual approach, which is referred to in the thesis as „transnational power over‟ (TNPO). 
In the second part, the TNPO concept is embedded into a structurally integrative framework 
of analysis, which is then further developed as the explanatory model that will be applied in 
the empirical chapters. The first part starts with an explanation of the chosen terminology of 
„transnational power over‟, indicating how the term responds to the need to address the 
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 New realist IPE captures Strange‟s arguably radical ontology of IPE, which she herself came to call „a new 
realist ontology of global political economy‟. See Strange (1997). 
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specific theoretical concerns identified above. In particular, it shows how the concept reflects 
the structural dimensions of power, which may be transnational in nature and exist both in an 
agent-focused and a purely structural form. The next section focuses on the aspect of 
„transnational‟ and indicates which tools will be used to trace and assess transnational 
mechanisms of EU impact. The chapter then goes on to identify TNPO as consisting of three 
structures, which are the main parameters of the concept: a material structure (TNPO1), an 
institutional structure (TNPO2) and an ideational structure (TNPO3). In identifying the three 
parameters, the chapter develops their respective analytical value and demonstrates how these 
conceptual devices each draw on specific aspects of the theoretical approaches mentioned 
above. The next section then considers the types of overlap that may occur between the three 
TNPO structures. The first part of the chapter concludes with providing an operational 
definition of the TNPO concept. The second part of the chapter embeds the concept into an 
integrative framework of analysis, and then presents the newly developed explanatory model. 
After further considering the conditions under which TNPO might occur and operate, the 
second part concludes with a detailed outline of how the TNPO framework will be used to 
examine the thesis‟s working hypothesis. Ahead of the thesis‟s empirical analysis, the chapter 
ends with a brief overview of the analytical value and usefulness of the TNPO concept and 
corresponding framework. 
 
 
3.2. Introducing TNPO 
 
3.2.1. TNPO: the term behind the concept 
 
This section clarifies the adoption of the label „transnational power over‟. In doing so, it 
indicates how the term responds to the need to address the specific theoretical concerns 
identified above. In particular, it shows how the concept reflects the structural dimensions of 
power, which, as the thesis assumes, can be transnational in nature and exists both in an 
agent-focused and a purely structural form. The section concludes by offering a provisional 
definition of the notion. 
The denomination of „transnational power over‟ in essence consists of a synthesis of 
two distinct attributes: „transnational‟ and „power over‟. „Power over‟ captures the basic 
understanding of power as a relational exercise, which has led many to equate the term with 
„relational power‟, typically defined as the ability of one actor to get another actor to do 
something he would not otherwise do (see above). This can also be described as „direct agent-
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based power‟, in that this type of power is exercised by an agent directly over another agent. 
However, as outlined in the previous chapter, agent-based power can also be exercised 
indirectly over another agent, in that power may be exercised over the structures within which 
other agents operate and which determine their possibilities and choices. In short, „power 
over‟ does not only stand for direct agent-based power (exercised over agents), but may also 
capture indirect agent-based power (exercised over structures), denoted above as „agent-based 
structural power‟. In fact, this reading of „power over‟ comes close to Lukes‟s (2005) use of 
the term, which is central to his three-dimensional model of power. Indeed, by distinguishing 
a third face of power, Lukes sought to demonstrate that A‟s power over B not only derives 
from easily observable processes of decision-making (first face) and agenda-setting (second 
face), but may also operate at a deeper, less visible level, in that A may exercise power over B 
by “influencing, shaping or determining his very wants” (Lukes, 2005: 27). In sum, it is this 
structural reading of „power over‟, i.e. agent-based power exercised directly over structures 
and indirectly over agents, that is reflected in the thesis‟s concept of „transnational power 
over‟. 
„Transnational‟, in turn, as another distinct attribute of power, reflects the extent to 
which power is no longer exercised solely at the state-to-state or intergovernmental level, but 
increasingly involves non-state players, such as civil society organisations and corporate 
actors, as well as international - and even supranational - organisations. Moreover, as 
highlighted in the previous chapter, the term „transnational‟ has also been conceptualised to 
indicate how power can be exercised without the active or intentional intervention of an agent 
(cf. the example of capital). Thus, apart from being an attribute of agent-based power, 
„transnational‟ can also be an attribute of purely structural power. An in-depth outline of the 
element of transnational is provided in the next section. 
To summarise, in representing a synthesis of two intrinsic features of power in 
contemporary international relations, the term „transnational power over‟36 (i) encapsulates 
power that is exercised over structures as well as in direct relations, and (ii) goes beyond a 
narrow focus on the state level to also consider the role of non-state actors. As such, it is 
obvious that the concept of TNPO closely follows two key principles of Strange‟s new realist 
ontology (1996; 1997; 1999).
37
 More generally, it is clear at this stage that the notion is based 
on a multidimensional and analytically eclectic approach. Indeed, while the next few sections 
will elaborate at greater length the principal contours of the notion are already apparent, to the 
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 „TNPO‟ from hereafter. 
37
 That is, her new realist ontology centres inter alia on the suggestion that the state is no longer the only 
significant actor, as well as on the need to account for structural power, along with the identification of structures 
(in casu security, finance, production, knowledge) through which power is exercised. 
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point where a provisional definition can be formulated. Above all, TNPO is a theoretical 
framework that seeks to assess the extent to which an actor‟s power over another actor derives 
from his/her control over a constitutive mix of structures, which determine the range of 
options available to the other actor. As will be outlined in detail below, it concerns an actor‟s 
influence across three structures, notably a material, an institutional and an ideational 
structure. In other words, TNPO encompasses A‟s indirect power over B through her/his 
control over a constitutive mix of material, institutional and ideational structures, which 
shape or set the context within which B operates and in which s/he relates with A. This makes 
it, for instance, difficult for B to resist initiatives or reject offers proposed by A.  
As the next step in presenting the TNPO concept, the following section focuses on the 
„transnational‟ dimension of TNPO and, in particular, on the mechanisms that will be relied 
upon to trace and assess this dimension. 
 
 
3.2.2. Understanding and operationalising the „transnational‟ dimension of TNPO 
 
The above definition of the TNPO concept only holds on the assumption that power, whether 
intentional or unintentional, active or passive, has a substantial transnational dimension. This 
assumption is necessary in order to encapsulate the emergent complexity of global life, and in 
particular to account for the fact that globalisation and interdependence have significantly 
blurred the divide both between private and public and between the distinct levels of 
governance (local, regional, national, supranational, interregional, international, etc.). 
Crucially, this divide is blurred to the point where transnational forces interact with or exist 
alongside traditional intergovernmental relationships. As mentioned above, Strange was 
among the first scholars to observe that international power became increasingly diffused 
while global functions were provided as the result of the growing „transnationalisation‟ of 
non-territorially linked networks, which she conceived of as an interplay of deliberate and 
non-intentional effects of decisions and non-decisions made by governments and other actors 
(Strange, 1987, 1988). This implies that structural power is increasingly located in or emerges 
from transnational economic and financial groups, networks and markets, as well as flows of 
capital, technology, ideas and information (see e.g. Castells, 2000; Strange, 1988). However, 
the thesis‟s assumption that power may be transnational in nature is not to suggest that the 
state system is no longer prevalent or that it will cease to exist or that governments have lost 
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their power to a new transnational capitalist elite (cf. a new „global ruling class‟38). Rather, 
the assumption that power has a transnational dimension serves to acknowledge that we 
cannot fully understand the influence of a state(-like) actor
39
 over another state(-like) actor, if 
we limit our study to the analytical level of the intergovernmental relationship between the 
two actors. Indeed, we need to consider that, while the sovereignty of states remains largely in 
tact
40
, national borders open up through tourism, travel, migration, labour markets, free trade, 
the internet, etc., thus creating a multiplicity of transnational relations and networks. In the 
longer run, further globalisation of standards and practices - e.g. of educational standards and 
practices through the convergence of educational systems - is likely to continue to bring 
worldviews and behavioural practices closer to each other. In addition, the 
transnationalisation of civil societies as a result of the processes of globalisation may 
indirectly shape the conditions of international cooperation, which can be reflected in states‟ 
subsequent official policies.  
Based on the above line of thinking, the thesis‟s use of the word „transnational‟ 
follows the classical definition of „transnational relations‟, understood as cross-border 
interactions and exchanges, in which at least one actor or interaction partner is 
nongovernmental (Keohane & Nye, 1971: xii; Risse-Kappen, 1995: 3). Above all, this 
comprehensive understanding of „transnational‟ allows us to focus the analysis on the EU as a 
governmental actor, while tracing and assessing the agency of nongovernmental actors and 
networks, which either interacts with or exists alongside the EU‟s agency. In this regard, the 
thesis distinguishes three broad sources of transnational relations that may contribute to the 
EU‟s influence over a third country: (i) EU cooperation projects centred on engagement with 
local non-state actors, including NGOs and business associations (cf. „domestic 
empowerment‟; see more below). It should be noted that these EU aid projects may also 
involve or rely on cooperation with European societal actors (e.g. NGOs, business 
associations, education institutions) that are active in the countries in question, (ii) direct 
engagement of European societal actors with state and/or non-state actors in a partner country, 
for instance through trade or investment or through the provision of democratic assistance 
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 See e.g. Robinson‟s (2004) conception of a „new capitalist class‟, which - from a typical neo-Marxist point of 
view - consists of individuals who, regardless of their nationality, tend to share similar lifestyles and interact 
through expanding networks of the „transnational state‟. In Robinson‟s view, this new form of state does not 
have a centralised form as historically developed modern nations do, but exists in both transnational institutions 
(e.g. IMF and World Bank) and the transformation of current nation states. This leads Robinson to conclude that 
hegemony will increasingly be exercised not by a particular nation state but by the new global ruling class. 
39
 The notion of „state-like‟ as a distinct property of an actor serves to refer to an entity like the EU, which 
possesses state-like features. See more below. 
40
 Obviously, a major exception here is the partial transfer of sovereignty in the framework of regional 
integration, as epitomised by the EU. 
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(e.g. by NGOs)
41
, (iii) unintentional and/or passive sources of EU impact (cf. purely structural 
power) deriving from the EU‟s „presence‟ or from third countries‟ interdependence with the 
EU‟s system of regional governance and the single market (see more below). Taken together, 
these three different sources of transnational relations and cooperation frameworks may 
constitute significant transnational forces and networks, which need to be taken into account 
when examining the EU‟s influence over the Central Asian countries, and over third countries 
and regions in general.  
Apart from these three primary categories, there are of course several other possible 
transnational sources of EU impact, including labour migration, tourism, western media and 
educational exchanges. Some of these are studied in Schimmelfennig and Scholtz‟s (2008) 
examination of EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood. In analysing the 
impact of the EU‟s use of political conditionality on democratisation in its neighbouring 
countries, the authors also attempt to offer an alternative explanation by evaluating to what 
extent democracy-promoting influences in the region may stem from transnational 
interactions. In terms of channels and instruments of transnational linkages, the authors point 
to economic exchanges, such as trade and investment, personal interactions through various 
means of communication, tourism and academic exchanges, as well as cultural and 
informational influences via the media, churches or cultural performances (Schimmelfennig 
& Scholtz, 2008: 192). As regards the impact of these interactions and exchanges on 
democratisation, they differentiate between short-term and long-term effects. On the one 
hand, transnational exchanges can have an immediate impact on the political struggle between 
pro- and anti-democratic forces in the country. Such short-term effects may come, for 
instance, from news reporting in foreign or overseas newspapers and broadcasts or from 
external financial and technical support for the opponents. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz also 
highlight international demonstration effects generated by successful democratic transitions in 
another country, which may encourage the democratic opposition and counter-elites to push 
for democratisation. This is closely related to Bunce and Wolchik‟s (2009) claim that 
diffusion of successful electoral revolutions in the postcommunist world may occur because 
of the existence of transnational networks, which support the spread of this model and bring 
together likeminded domestic and international actors.
42
 On the other hand, transnational 
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 In this context, see e.g. Adamson (2003). Among other things, Adamson highlights that NGOs from western 
liberal democracies, including EU member states, have come to the region from the mid-1990s onwards mostly 
in order to encourage the development of an indigenous civil society, the strengthening of human rights norms, 
environmental protection and women‟s rights.  
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 As the authors indicate, their case studies of transnational networks all displayed a similar composition, each 
bringing together Western democracy promoters, domestic opposition parties, local societal groups, and regional 
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exchanges can also work indirectly and in the longer term. The intensification of trade, for 
instance, may increase a society‟s affluence and cause societal actors to demand civil liberties 
and political rights (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008: 193). As the authors further illustrate, 
“[i]t also brings people from established democracies in contact with people from non-
democratic countries, thus facilitating the spread of ideas and change of attitudes” (ibid.). 
Moreover, non-economic interactions, such as cultural and academic exchanges, can also 
result in long-term effects, since these may “increase the level of education as a social 
requisite of democracy or constitute a channel for transmitting beliefs and desires that favour 
democratisation” (ibid.). Drawing on Schimmelfennig & Scholtz‟s model of external 
democratisation, Freyburg (2009) uses what she refers to as the „linkage model‟ to examine 
whether cross-border interaction and transnational exchange may shape state officials‟ 
preferences of certain forms of administrative standards and practices and whether they 
consequently may trigger processes of voluntary democratic change. To this purpose, 
Freyburg  (2009) distinguishes two dimensions of linkage: social linkage, or „flows of people 
across borders‟, and communication linkage, or „flows of information across borders‟. As she 
clarifies, bureaucrats‟ understanding of appropriate governance may not only be influenced by 
personal experiences made with democratic modes of decision-making during education- or 
work-related stays in Western democracies, but they may also become familiarised with 
democratic governance at home via frequent consultation of Western media. 
While the insights provided by Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008) and Freyburg 
(2009) shed further light on the transnational dimension of EU impact, it is important to note 
that for purposes of analytical convenience and due to space limitations, the thesis will 
examine only those sources of transnational impact that fall within the three categories 
identified above, notably (i) EU cooperation projects centred on engagement with local non-
state actors, including NGOs and business associations (cf. „domestic empowerment‟; see 
more below), and possibly involving cooperation with European societal actors (e.g. NGOs, 
business associations, education institutions) that are active in the countries in question, (ii) 
direct engagement of European societal actors with state and/or non-state actors in a partner 
country, for instance through trade or investment or through the provision of democratic 
assistance (e.g. by NGOs), (iii) unintentional and/or passive sources of EU impact (cf. purely 
structural power) deriving from the EU‟s „presence‟ or from third countries‟ interdependence 
with the EU‟s system of regional governance and the single market.43 Moreover, since it is 
                                                                                                                                                        
"graduates" of electoral triumphs. The latter assume that their experiences are relevant to opposition parties in 
nearby countries “where such revolutions are needed, but have not yet occurred” (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009: 17). 
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 Sources of transnational impact that fall outside of the categorisation may nevertheless be considered to the 
extent that they overlap with one of the three categories.  
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not straightforward, both from an empirical and a methodological point of view, to examine 
transnational relations and networks that are established exclusively between societal actors, 
the empirical analysis will focus mostly on the first and third category, and only marginally 
on the second one (the attempt to do justice to which is beyond the scope of the present 
thesis).  
In terms of the analytical tools used to trace and assess the transnational dimension of 
the EU‟s TNPO, it is possible to draw on insights from the extant literature on 
Europeanisation dynamics beyond the EU‟s border.44 Particularly inspirational is 
Schimmelfennig‟s (2007)  attempt to conceptually map pathways of Europeanisation beyond 
Europe. Through his mapping exercise, Schimmelfennig (2007) seeks to propose ways of 
theorising Europeanisation mechanisms in countries without any realistic membership 
perspective. Crucially, in reviewing the prevalent concepts and perspectives, he concludes 
that these all emphasise that Europeanisation may operate through intergovernmental and 
transnational channels alike. That is, they all suggest that pathways of Europeanisation may 
differ depending on whether they work through intergovernmental interactions or through 
transnational processes via societal actors in the target state. Presenting a four-by-four table
45
 
of the different mechanisms of EU impact, Schimmelfennig (2007) adds two other 
dimensions according to which Europeanisation may vary: EU-driven versus domestically-
driven pathways, and processes following a logic of consequences versus those following a 
logic of appropriateness. Based on these two distinctions, Schimmelfennig (2007) retrieves 
several notions capturing transnational mechanisms of EU impact (see table in Appendix 3.2). 
Many of these concepts appear useful to analyse the transnational dimension of the EU‟s 
TNPO, most notably domestic empowerment, competition, societal lesson-drawing, 
transnational socialisation, transnational social learning and societal imitation. In what 
follows, we will see that these notions, as a significant part of the approach, can be used to 
capture the nuances of the transnational dimension of TNPO. 
In considering each of these transnational means by which the EU is able to have an 
impact, it is important to examine closer the two additional dimensions that Schimmelfennig 
(2007) uses for mapping the different mechanisms of Europeanisation. As mentioned, on the 
one hand, the suggested mechanisms of EU impact can differ depending on whether they are 
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 Traditionally, Europeanisation is understood as the impact of European integration on EU member state 
policies, practices and politics (Radaelli, 2003; see also Vink, 2003). However, the term is also increasingly used 
to capture domestic effects of European integration in non-EU member states. Accordingly, the dynamics of 
Europeanisation can be broadly defined as patterns for the promotion of the EU model of inter- and intra-states 
relations (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005), or as “a process of change in national institutional and policy 
practices that can be attributed to European integration” (Lavenex & Uçarer, 2004: 219). 
45
 This table can be consulted under Appendix 3.2. 
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EU-driven or domestically driven. Processes of Europeanisation that are driven by the EU are 
based on the provision of EU incentives to third country actors. By contrast, processes of 
Europeanisation that are domestically driven capture instances of rule adoption or policy 
adaptation that occur without inducement from the EU. In this case, domestic actors - 
independently from EU action - become favourable to convergence or compliance with EU 
norms and rules, for instance because they believe compliance or convergence will improve 
their domestic situation (see e.g. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 8-9). On the other 
hand, Europeanisation mechanisms can vary depending on which logic of action the rule 
transfer or norm diffusion follows, i.e. the strategic logic of consequences, or the cultural 
logic of appropriateness.
46
 As Schimmelfennig (2007) highlights, this distinction is 
particularly prevalent in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier‟s (2005) analysis of 
Europeanisation dynamics in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which 
suggests three alternative models of EU impact in these countries.
47
 In a typical rationalist 
tradition, their first model, i.e. the external incentives model, assumes that Europeanisation 
operates according to a logic of consequences, in that rule adoption or policy adaptation is 
based on the extent to which EU threats and rewards alter the strategic cost-benefit 
calculations of third country actors (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 10-11). 
Conversely, the second model draws on a sociological approach, assuming that 
Europeanisation may be induced by „social learning‟. Following a logic of  appropriateness, 
Europeanisation is driven here by the identification of the target states with the EU and the 
extent to which the latter manages to persuade them of the legitimacy of the EU rules and 
norms (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 18-20). In turn, the third model, i.e. lesson-
drawing, may follow either logic of action. Considered as the „ideal type‟ of voluntary rule 
transfer (in contrast to more coercive forms, such as conditionality), „lesson-drawing‟ occurs 
in reaction to domestic dissatisfaction with current policies in the target country, which 
induces policy-makers or societal actors to learn from the experiences in the EU. 
Europeanisation is based then on their perception that the EU rules are appropriate solutions 
to their domestic problems (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 20-21). This resembles the 
mechanism of „communication‟, which Bauer et al. (2007) define as “a governance mode that 
brings about change as a result of voluntary information exchange and mutual learning 
between policy-makers in EU-sponsored networks”.  
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 For a detailed account of „logic of appropriateness‟ versus „logic of consequences‟, see March and Olson 
(1989; 1998). Also see Vink (2003). 
47
 By incorporating both logics into their theoretical framework, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) thus 
attempt to bridge the rationalist/constructivist divide that persists within the literature (Orbie, 2009: 151-3). 
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Since the three models described by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) may also 
operate through transnational channels, i.e. through EU engagement with local societal actors, 
Schimmelfennig‟s (2007) mapping exercise includes three notions that represent the 
transnational equivalent of the respective mechanisms: domestic empowerment, societal 
lesson-drawing and transnational social learning.  To start with, „domestic empowerment‟ is a 
EU-driven mechanism in the sense that it is the EU that provides incentives to local societal 
actors. Whereas intergovernmental bargaining produces a „top-down‟ process of regulatory 
adaptation, the empowerment of domestic civil society actors aims to achieve change from the 
„bottom-up‟. Schimmelfennig explains in an earlier article that by providing transnational 
incentives the EU seeks to use rewards to mobilise societal groups and corporate actors in a 
target state in order to apply pressure on their government to change its policy (2005: 832).
48
 
In turn, „transnational social learning‟, or „transnational socialisation‟, covers an EU-driven 
process whereby societal actors are persuaded into favouring EU norms or rule. The attempt 
at persuasion will be successful, if the civil society actors consider those norms or rules 
legitimate and if they identify themselves with the EU to the point where they take these 
norms or rules for granted. In sum, while domestic empowerment covers, for instance, the 
EU‟s provision of financial and technical assistance to societal actors in the target countries 
(cf. incentives or reinforcement by reward), „transnational social learning‟ refers to EU-
sponsored mechanisms of dialogue held with societal actors in the target countries, which 
may start, for instance, with very modest expectations of introducing the vocabulary of 
democracy and human rights in the discourse of the societal actors.  
Traces of both types of transnational processes can be found in the EU‟s policies 
towards most of its third partners. This appears to be particularly the case of its policies 
towards partner countries in the Mediterranean, East Asia and Latin America 
(Schimmelfennig, 2007). As Youngs finds in his study of EU policies towards the 
Mediterranean and East Asia, the “profile of EU democracy assistance funding in the two 
regions suggested a bottom-up approach, oriented overwhelmingly to civil society support, 
and in particular human rights NGOs” (Youngs 2001a: 192; also see Youngs 2001b: 362). 
Similarly, the EU has been trying to develop direct links with societal actors in Latin 
America, where it has only limited leverage for using political conditionality (Grugel, 2004: 
612). Finally, the mechanism of „societal lesson-drawing‟ is domestically driven in that local 
societal actors are drawn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction with the domestic status quo.  
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 However, Schimmelfennig stresses that transnational reinforcement by reward is only effective if the costs of 
putting pressure on the government are lower for the societal actors than the expected community rewards, and if 
they are strong enough to force the government to adapt to the community norms and rules (2005: 832). 
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They favour certain EU rules or norms because they perceive them as solutions to their 
domestic problems either based on rationalist calculations or based on the appropriateness of 
the EU solutions.  
Interestingly, in a recent update
49
 of his conceptual mapping of Europeanisation 
beyond Europe, Schimmelfennig (2009) places the mechanism of „lesson-drawing‟ only 
under the logic of appropriateness, whilst inserting another - albeit similar - concept under the 
logic of consequences, i.e. „externalisation‟. Introduced to the literature by Lavenex and 
Uçarer (2004), the notion of „governance by externalisation‟ represents a structural mode of 
EU external governance. As Schimmelfennig (2009) explains, the notion captures the extent 
to which the EU‟s impact derives from its „presence‟ rather than from its direct actions (cf. 
Allen & Smith, 1990; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). As Schimmelfennig (2009) puts it: 
In this view, […] the EU‟s impact on third countries is a result of its capacity as an important 
system of regional governance and has an indirect (sometimes even unintended or 
unanticipated) effect on internal regulations and policies.  
„Governance by externalisation‟ most visibly derives from the EU‟s internal market and 
policies, encapsulating respectively the market mode of governance, described by Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig (2009; see supra) and the competition mode of governance
50
, presented 
by Bauer et al. (2007). As highlighted in chapter two, these types of governance may not only 
affect governments, induced to adapt their existing rules and policies to those of the EU, but 
also local societal actors, in which case Schimmelfennig (2009) uses the label of 
„transnational externalisation‟. For instance, if foreign companies want to enter the EU‟s 
market, they may have no choice but to adopt EU rules or standards (e.g. on product 
standards). Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) differentiate between „negative externalities‟ and 
„unilateral policy emulation‟. Following a rationalist logic of action, the former process 
occurs when third countries adapt to EU rules because ignoring or violating them would entail 
net costs (Lavenex & Uçarer, 2004: 21). Conversely, in the latter case, regulatory adaptation 
occurs because third country governments or societal actors perceive an EU rule as superior 
and adopt it in order to deal more efficiently with domestic issues. A related notion is 
„imitation‟. This involves a high degree of adaptation, with „inspiration‟ being at the other end 
of the adaptation scale. As pointed out by Lavenex and Uçarer, “in between are different 
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 The updated table that Schimmelfennig provides in his article can also be consulted under Appendix 3.2. 
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 This concept of competition is not to be confused with the neo-realist notion of „security competition‟, or 
„geostrategic competition, among great powers. See more below. 
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forms of emulation or combination, which involve the selective adoption of specific elements 
of the EU policies” (2004: 422).51   
 
Figure 1: Toolbox for analysing intergovernmental and transnational mechanisms of EU TNPO 
Note: (1) Security competition, or geostrategic competition; (2) Competition as a mode of governance 
 
To summarise the above, the toolbox (see Figure 1) that has so far been established in 
order to capture the transnational dimension of TNPO centres on two distinctions:  EU-driven 
versus domestically driven mechanisms, and rationalist versus constructivist logics of action. 
Moreover, most of the transnational mechanisms have an intergovernmental equivalent (see 
Figure 1, p.51; also see below). However, referring back to one of the thesis‟s theoretical 
building blocks, a third distinction can be added, notably „agent-based‟ versus „purely 
structural‟ mechanisms of TNPO. In this light, „externalisation‟ and „transnational 
externalisation‟ clearly constitute purely structural sources of impact. As demonstrated above, 
such mechanisms as „negative externality‟ and „competition‟ encapsulate how the EU may 
wield power over third country governments or companies independently of intentional or 
conscious EU agency. Overall, purely structural pathways of EU impact capture instances of 
EU influence resulting from its presence and third countries‟ interdependence with (or 
dependence on) the EU‟s internal market and its system of regional governance. It should be 
noted, however, that the single market can serve as a tool of agent-based structural power. 
Indeed, in some cases the EU purposively uses access to its internal market as a bargaining 
chip to obtain concessions in other domains (see e.g. Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006; see more 
below). In addition, the EU‟s „presence‟ - described by Bretherton and Vogler as a 
consequence of its being (2006: 27 & 33) - may constitute a form of attraction or magnetism. 
This is „purely structural‟, in that the EU‟s impact arises from the appeal of its rules or norms 
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 Lavenex and Uçarer note that “the most complete form of adaptation may be referred to as copying and 
involves full transfer of policy principles, instruments, programmes and institutional structures” (2004: 422). 
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(cf. unilateral emulation, imitation, lesson-drawing) or, more generally, from the attraction of 
its model as a regionally (economically and politically) integrated group of liberal 
democracies (Schimmelfennig, 2007; see also Haughton, 2007; Leonard, 2005; see more 
below).  
By contrast, the mechanisms of „domestic empowerment‟, „transnational socialisation‟ 
and „transnational social learning‟ - as well as their respective intergovernmental equivalents - 
are indicative of agent-based structural power (see Figure 1, p.51). All three represent sources 
of impact that are based on EU-initiated engagement with third country non-state actors. In 
other words, the EU‟s power in these cases is a result of intentional EU agency towards local 
societal actors (or towards domestic elites in case of the intergovernmental equivalents). The 
agency relies either on the provision of material incentives - i.e. domestic empowerment -  or 
on persuasion through dialogue - i.e. transnational socialisation and transnational social 
learning. In light of the three-part categorisation of transnational relations identified above, it 
is important to note that agent-based structural power here is not necessarily limited to agency 
of the EU as a governmental (or state-like) actor, but may also - indirectly - stem from the 
agency of EU societal actors. Indeed, the activities and involvement of EU non-state actors in 
third countries may contribute to the EU‟s overall TNPO over these countries.52  
A final point regards the fact that the division between transnational and 
intergovernmental pathways of TNPO is in essence a fine line. Indeed, as suggested by the 
interrupted line in Figure 1 between the columns comprising the intergovernmental 
mechanisms and the transnational ones respectively, there is no absolute division line between 
intergovernmental and transnational. The mechanism of „externalisation‟ in the 
intergovernmental column, for instance, clearly has a transnational dimension, especially 
when it operates through the anonymous market. To illustrate, the governance mode of 
„competition‟ reflects EU transnational impact on third countries through market pressures: if a 
third country wants its companies to fully participate in the EU‟s market, then those market 
pressures may stimulate domestic institutional and/or legislative change in accordance with 
EU rules and practices depending on the country‟s need to modify certain laws and/or 
improve the functional effectiveness of its institutional arrangements. Another case in point is 
EU-driven socialisation of Central Asian officials. The EU‟s attempts at socialisation are 
more likely to have impact if the officials in question have been involved in transnational 
exchanges, such as an education stay in a western democracy or regular use of western media 
(cf. social and communication linkage, see Freyburg, 2010).  
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 However, as mentioned previously, the empirical chapters will focus mostly on the EU as a governmental 
actor and will only marginally consider the role of European societal actors. 
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The following two sections expand on the extent to which the approach based on the 
notions in the toolbox described above, and presented in Figure 1 (p.51), can help to trace and 
assess transnational and intergovernmental instances of TNPO across the three TNPO 
structures and their respective overlap. 
 
3.2.3. The three TNPO structures 
 
As already suggested in the concept‟s provisional definition, TNPO is a theoretical 
framework that seeks to assess the extent to which A wields power over B through A‟s 
control over a constitutive mix of three structures. For the purposes of exposition, these 
structures are referred to here as TNPO1, TNPO2 and TNPO3. As the next step in the thesis‟s 
introduction of the concept of TNPO, this section presents those three constituent elements of 
TNPO and outlines which transnational as well as intergovernmental mechanisms are 
operational within them.  
The first structure over which it is possible for A to exert influence is the material 
structure, labelled here „TNPO1‟. „Material‟ refers here to what is perhaps most concisely 
described by the (neo)realist notion of material capabilities. TNPO1 underscores the neorealist 
proposition that the relative distribution of capabilities, together with certain goals (e.g. 
survival, security, prosperity), leads to a specific social programming, which compels states to 
act in certain ways (e.g. self-regarding, power-seeking) (Sørensen, 2008: 6-8).  
The second structure over which it is possible for A to exert influence is the 
institutional structure, labelled here „TNPO2‟. TNPO2 draws on a range of institutionalist 
approaches, which converge on the proposition that „institutions matter‟. This notion of an 
institutional structure comprises two subcomponents, a micro-level (TNPO2micro) and a macro-
level (TNPO2macro). The former subcomponent captures different forms of institutionalised 
cooperation and dialogue. The macro-level, in turn, is to the extent to which an actor draws 
influence over another actor from its predominant position within a particular international 
institution or regime.  
 The third structure over which it is possible for A to exert influence is the ideational 
structure, labelled here „TNPO3‟. TNPO3 encompasses such intangible factors as beliefs, 
values, norms, identity and legitimacy. In other words, it is ideational in the sense that it takes 
ideas, normative interpretations and mental constructs seriously and regards them as causally 
important in their own right.  
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3.2.3.1. TNPO1:  material structure 
 
The first structure over which it is possible to exert influence is the material structure, labelled 
here „TNPO1‟. As noted, „material‟ refers here to materialism in the physical understanding of 
the term, as captured in the common (neo)realist notion of „material capabilities‟. Realism 
contends that states selfishly pursue their national interests and posits that the most important 
resources in the pursuit of national interests are material capabilities, most notably economic 
and military resources. Realism thus conceives the exercise of power in terms of a 
preponderance of such material resources. In turn, the notion of „material structure‟ is equally 
ubiquitous to realism and neorealism, which theorise that the international system and how 
power operates within it is determined by the material structure. Mearsheimer argues that the 
distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world 
politics; for (neo)realists, some level of security competition among great powers is inevitable 
because of the material structure of the international system (1995: 91).
53
 As pointed out by 
Sørensen, when neorealists such as Waltz refer to “the „material structure‟ of the international 
system, they mean that the material structure (i.e. the relative distribution of capabilities) plus 
certain goals (survival, security, prosperity) lead to a specific social programming that 
compels states to act in certain ways (self-regarding, power-seeking, wary of others), or risk 
destruction” (2008: 6-8). In addition, neorealists contend that in competing for power, states 
will often engage in „balancing‟ to contain the influence of the dominant power(s) and thus to 
„rectify‟ the balance of power in their favour (see e.g. Waltz, 1979). Whilst rejecting 
(neo)realism‟s obsessive preoccupation with the state, the present thesis shares the above 
beliefs to the extent that it assumes (i) the EU‟s policy towards Central Asia - and by 
extension its external policies at large - to be shaped by self-interest considerations
54
; (ii) the 
EU to be vying for greater influence over Central Asia, given that the policy objectives 
derived from those self-regarding calculations
55
 involve enhancing EU power over the region; 
and as a result, (iii) the EU to be engaged in „competition‟ for influence in Central Asia. 
Hence the inclusion of the neo-realist notion of „competition‟ in the TNPO toolbox (see 
Figure 1, p.51). „Security competition‟, or „geostrategic competition‟, and the ensuing 
mechanism of „balancing of power‟, is an agent-based form of structural power, which clearly 
draws on a rationalist logic of action, with the third country weighing off the advantages and 
                                                 
53
 For neorealism from a IPE angle, which focuses on economic capabilities as the main explanatory variable in 
international relations, see e.g. Gilpin, 1987. 
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 It should be noted that the EU‟s external policies are arguably not shaped by self-interest alone, but rather by a 
combination of self-interested and normative considerations. As Magen puts it, “[t]he driving rationale behind 
[...] the engines of EU‟s international actorship can be interpreted as stemming from both normative-ideational 
and rationalist, strategic factors” (2007: 381).  
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 These are covered in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, Section 5.2. 
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disadvantages of forming an „alliance‟ – i.c. any form of cooperation - with the EU in the 
latter‟s attempt to balance the influence of another - i.e. more dominant - actor.56 
 Assuming that structural power is based on the possession of material resources, 
regime theorist Oran Young argues that a „structural leader‟, which he identifies as one of 
three types of leaders in institutional bargaining, is a negotiator who is able to translate a 
state‟s structural power into bargaining leverage as a means of reaching agreement on the 
terms of the constitutional contract (1991: 289). In Young‟s words, “structural leaders are 
experts in translating the possession of material resources into bargaining leverage cast in 
terms appropriate to the issues at stake in specific instances of institutional bargaining (1991: 
288). Crucially, Young adds that “[in] a general way, it makes sense to view the link between 
structural power and bargaining leverage as stemming from the existence of asymmetries 
among the participants or stakeholders in processes of institutional bargaining” (1991: 289). 
This point is central to TNPO1 in that it assumes that the EU‟s material capabilities, such as 
the size and strength of its market, result in asymmetric relationships and third countries‟ 
dependence.  
 However, before we move on to identify TNPO1, or the material structure, it is 
important to note that material power is not limited to the „capability‟ of an agent, which is in 
line with the neo-realist understanding of power. Indeed, material power can also occur due to 
asymmetric flows of goods, finance, etc, in line with much of the literature referred to in 
Chapter 2, including Susan Strange‟s work and neo-Gramscian perspectives, which considers 
structural power in terms of flows of goods, finance and the resultant gravitational pull of core 
economic entities. 
In identifying TNPO1, or the material structure, let us first consider the EU‟s foremost 
material resource, the single market. The sheer size and strength of the EU‟s internal market 
leads to a gravitational attraction and inherently asymmetric trading relationships, in 
particular with neighbouring and/or weak trade partners, such as the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) group of states (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). The possibility to include or 
exclude third countries to the single market is already a powerful tool, let alone the possibility 
of framing the terms of reference within which this possible market access is to take place. 
Although the EU officially maintains the language of „partnership‟ and „equal footing‟, in 
practice, its preponderant market power enables it to force its pre-agreed positions upon 
interested trade partners (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 78-79).  
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On the one hand, the internal market provides the EU with agent-based structural 
power. This is captured in Meunier and Nicolaïdis‟s (2006) study of the EU‟s common trade 
policy. As they observe, the EU is not only a trade power, or „power in trade‟, but also a 
„power through trade‟. That is, while the EU remains a major power in trade based on the 
strength of its internal market as well as the collective character of European trade policy and 
the efficiency of its institutions in negotiating lucrative commercial deals, the EU has been 
increasingly “using access to its huge market as a bargaining chip to obtain changes in the 
domestic policies of its trading partners, from labour standards to human rights, and more 
generally to shape new patterns of global governance” (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). Tying 
market access to domestic changes often involves the use of conditionality (see more below).  
On the other hand, the power that derives from the internal market can be purely 
structural. Useful tools to capture this dimension of the EU‟s market power are the above-
mentioned mechanisms of externalisation (negative externality and unilateral policy 
emulation), transnational externalisation, and the market and competition modes of 
governance (see above). These purely structural pathways of EU impact help to understand 
how EU internal rules - even without conscious EU agency - spill over to third countries. For 
instance, as already highlighted above, if firms want to export to the EU, the exported 
products need to be in accordance with the EU‟s rules or standards, such as environmental 
and safety standards. The REACH regulation on chemicals and their safe use
57
, for example, 
affects all the companies that wish to export chemicals to the EU. 
Beyond the single market, and inherently related to this, the EU draws power from its 
dominant position as an economic giant. An important contributor to the EU‟s economic 
weight is of course the euro, which has become a reserve currency in many parts of the world. 
As Holden notes, “[a] strong currency is in itself a form of structural power” (2009: 188). 
Other material „resources‟ and „capabilities‟ that fall within the sphere of TNPO1 are - in no 
particular order - the provision of development and financial aid (e.g. loans and technical 
assistance), technological competence, and military and security-related capabilities. 
Obviously, the military and security-related capabilities barely stand comparison with the 
EU‟s economic and commercial strength, especially since the EU‟s security and defence 
policy remains rather limited in scope. By contrast, the EU‟s development policy is highly 
elaborate, and is intentionally used by the EU to increase its influence worldwide, and in 
particular its structural power (Holden, 2009). Moreover, just like access to the EU‟s market, 
development aid and financial assistance are offered as an incentive, set on the condition that 
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third country governments follow the EU‟s demands for political and economic reforms. 
Central to the rationalist logic underpinning the „external incentives model‟ (see above), this 
modus operandi is captured by the intergovernmental mechanism of conditionality. Reflecting 
the use of the carrot or the stick, conditionality exists both in a positive, incentives-based form 
and in a negative, punitive form. Positive conditionality is based on a reward in return for the 
fulfilment of a predetermined condition. In most cases, the reward concerns a tangible 
material benefit, such as the provision of technical or financial assistance, or preferential 
access to the single market. Conversely, negative conditionality metes out a punishment if a 
specific obligation is omitted. The punishment may consist of the withdrawal of one or more 
material benefits, or of the imposition of sanctions. Typical examples include the suspension 
of a bilateral agreement - or part of the agreement -, the imposition of an arms embargo, and 
the application of a visa ban for certain members of the governing elite. As highlighted by 
Warkotsch (2009: 254), reinforcement by reward or punishment can also be social or 
symbolic, i.e. through rhetorical action by means of EU public statements (e.g. Council 
declarations). Equally based on the strategic calculation approach, rhetorical action on the 
side of the EU aims at either praising a country‟s record of conformance or publicly 
condemning it in case of non-compliance. The use of conditionality through reinforcement 
was omnipresent in the EU‟s enlargement policy towards the CEECs. Indeed, as commonly 
known, the accession countries had to adopt the EU‟s entire legislative body of, or acquis 
communautaire
58
, as a precondition for membership.  
Already from the earliest days of the EU‟s involvement in Eastern and Central Europe, 
aid was given to the CEECs on the condition of committing to political and economic 
reforms. Later on, the same logic was also introduced in the EU‟s relations with countries 
beyond its immediate borders. However, there are clear limits to the impact and use of 
conditionality to promote domestic change in third countries. As clarified by Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier (2005) in their study of the Europeanisation of the CEECs, (accession) 
conditionality can only work in cases where the benefits of the material rewards offered by 
the EU exceed the domestic adaptation costs. In this regard, the authors observed inter alia a 
marked difference in adaptation costs between democratic conditionality and acquis 
conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 671-2). That is, unlike democratic 
conditionality, acquis conditionality “does not concern the political system and bases of 
political power as such, governments generally do not have to fear that the costs of rule 
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 In accordance with the EU‟s Glossary of Definitions, „the Community acquis‟ is the body of common rights 
and obligations, which bind all the member states together within the EU. As Petrov (2008) notes, it is constantly 
evolving and comprises not only EU primary, secondary binding and non-binding legislation but also the 
European Court of Justice‟s case law. See EU Glossary available online via 
<europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm>. 
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adoption in individual policy areas will lead to a loss of office. Costs are thus unlikely to be 
prohibitive” (ibid.). By contrast, the adoption of liberal political norms, such as human rights, 
democratic elections, open contestation for office and the rule of law, implies a loss in 
autonomy for the third country governments. As Schimmelfennig and Scholtz point out, if the 
use of conditionality is to be efficient, then “[t]hese political disincentives need to be balanced 
in kind by tangible incentives such as military protection or economic assistance to improve 
the security and the welfare of the state” (2008: 6). Therefore, many scholars claim that 
beyond the group of credible candidates for EU membership, the EU does not have sufficient 
leverage to constrain the sovereignty of third country governments effectively by applying the 
instrument of political conditionality, either as incentive or punishment (see e.g. Holden, 
2009: 182; Schimmelfennig, 2009: 20-21; Zielonka, 2008: 477-181). However, irrespective of 
the limits of conditionality, aid itself remains a strong tool for the EU to exert power over 
third countries. Or as Holden puts it: 
 
The aid itself is a direct intervention to inject finance and expertise (and prestige) to local 
institutions, which it favours and ensures contact between European and local elites. 
Regardless of the specific effects of aid, EU aid is an important process in itself; it forms 
relationships between EU institutions/personnel and their counterparts and inserts the EU into 
the national/regional context (2009: 182). 
 
A final point that needs to be made in the context of the EU‟s provision of aid regards its civil 
society assistance. A substantial part of the EU‟s aid goes to civil society actors, such as 
NGOs and business associations. This modus operandi can be captured by the transnational 
mechanism of domestic empowerment. According to a rationalist instrumental logic, civil 
society assistance may help to change the domestic opportunity structure in favour of societal 
actors with independent incentives to adopt EU rules and helps to strengthen their bargaining 
power towards the government or towards societal or political opponents (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2004: 664). 
The last step in our identification of TNPO1 has a strong realist orientation, not least 
since it focuses on the EU as a strategic actor and its reliance on security capabilities. Realists 
view national security as the primordial national interest. Accordingly, in pursuing national 
security, states rely on their material capabilities, most notably economic and military 
capabilities (see e.g. Morgenthau, 1978). Applied to the EU, this means that the EU is above 
all concerned with safeguarding the EU‟s external security, and in the first place, with 
guaranteeing stability alongside its borders. As the EU distinguishes itself internationally by 
favouring non-military means to advance its interests (cf. the EU as a „civilian power‟), the 
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Union relies primarily on economic and other civilian instruments to guarantee its security 
(see e.g. Orbie, 2006, 2008; Telò, 2006). However, even in the current post-Cold War era the 
EU is not exempt from the need to recourse to military - be it exclusively defensive - 
instruments to reach certain „hard security‟ objectives, in particular to reduce the kind of 
security threats that emerge from weak or failed states and from (post)conflict zones (cf. the 
European Security and Defence Policy). Indeed, irrespective of the fact that the EU does not 
(yet) have a fully-fledged „EU army‟ and that it cannot participate in NATO military actions 
under the EU flag, its interests do encompass hard security goals. With respect to TNPO1, this 
suggests that the EU thus also seeks to wield influence over third countries by gaining control 
in the security domain, inter alia, by relying on its security capabilities. In essence, however, 
in pursuing its external security interests, the EU resorts to a mix of soft security (or civilian) 
and hard security (or military) tools (see more below). A final aspect of the security 
dimension of TNPO1 is geostrategic actorness and the ensuing balance-of-power logic that an 
actor may follow, another key element of realist thought (see e.g. Mearsheimer, 1995). 
Although the EU is usually hesitant to publicly present itself as a (geo)strategic actor, thereby 
seeking to distance itself from the other major international powers, the U.S. and Russia, and 
increasingly, China, it is in many ways involved in (geo)strategic power politics. Indeed, in 
practice, the EU does not eschew the balance-of-power logic in its external relations. This 
implies that in pursuit of a specific security objective, the EU may effectively calculate how a 
potential move may affect its relative power position. A clear illustration of such calculation 
practices can be found in the EU‟s relations with its eastern neighbourhood, where the EU is 
attempting to further expand its influence sphere, especially in view of limiting Russia‟s 
influence over the region. 
In sum, the above outline has sought to demonstrate that material factors are an 
important determinant of the EU‟s TNPO. Broadly speaking, these material factors 
encompass trade, economic, aid and security capabilities. Together, they make up the material 
structure of TNPO, i.e. TNPO1. However, the extent to which the EU can influence third 
countries cannot be explained by a focus on material aspects alone. Rather, as will be clarified 
in the following subsections, the EU‟s TNPO derives from its dominant position across a 
combination of structures - the material structure being one of them, alongside an institutional 
and ideational structure - and the overlap between the structures. 
 
 
 
 
                                                               - 60 - 
 
3.2.3.2. TNPO2: institutional structure 
 
The second structure over which an actor can exert influence is the institutional structure, 
labelled here „TNPO2‟. This notion draws on a varying range of institutional approaches, 
which converge on the proposition that „institutions matter‟.59 TNPO2 is further divided into 
two subcomponents: a micro-level and a macro-level. The former subcomponent captures 
different forms of institutionalised cooperation and dialogue. The macro-level, in turn, is the 
extent to which an actor draws influence over another actor from its predominant position 
within a particular international institution or regime. In light of this division, it is worth 
pointing to the conceptual distinction between „institutions‟ and „institutionalisation‟. 
„Institutions‟ can be considered as the rules of the game of a particular group, and are 
classically understood as the formal rules, standard operating procedures and organisations of 
government (see e.g. Smith, 2004: 26). However, according to new institutionalist thought, an 
institution also encompasses informal norms, routines and conventions (see e.g. Hall & 
Taylor, 1996). „Institutionalisation‟, in turn, is the “process by which those norms, or shared 
standards of behaviour, are created and developed” (Smith, 2004: 26). Having specified the 
conceptual difference between „institutions‟ and „institutionalisation‟, let us now consider the 
two subcomponents of TNPO2. 
The micro-level of TNPO2, or TNPO2micro, encompasses different forms of 
institutionalised cooperation and engagement. These include both formal contractual 
(including treaty-based) formats of institutionalisation established as part of the EU‟s 
relations with third countries, and less formal and less integrated (including ad hoc) formats 
of institutionalisation, often held at the bureaucratic or technocratic level rather than at the 
high political level. As such, TNPO2micro covers practically all existing types of EU 
institutionalised cooperation with third countries, ranging from formal political dialogue as 
established through bilateral and bi-regional agreements (e.g. inter-regional dialogue with the 
Southern African Development Community since 1994, and bilateral dialogue with CIS 
countries through the Cooperation Councils, Cooperation Committees and Parliamentary 
Cooperation Councils established via the PCAs), over human rights dialogues and civil 
society dialogues, to meetings between bureaucrats or technocrats (e.g. seminars, info 
sessions, training sessions, twinning). Moreover, TNPO2micro also includes the physical 
presence of the EU in partner countries. This concerns both the long-term presence and 
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behaviour” typically characterises new institutionalism and “must be understood primarily as a reaction to post-
war behaviouralism and rational choice, which approach politics from a rather atomised conception of the 
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activities of Commission delegations (EU delegations from 2010 onwards), EU Special 
Representatives and embassies of EU member states in the partner countries, and the 
occasional presence of such EU actors as the troika of foreign ministers (attending formal 
meetings) and EU Commissioners (e.g. through formal visits). The micro-institutional power 
that the EU wields through TNPO2micro assumes that the denser the institutional relationship 
between the EU and a third country is the larger the EU‟s TNPO over the country will be. 
However, although an unmissable part of TNPO, TNPO2micro hardly exists on its own. Indeed, 
more often than not, it tends to interact with TNPO1 and/or TNPO3. Put differently, 
TNPO2micro predominantly appears in the overlap with either one or both of the other two 
structures (see below). Therefore, the institutional approaches that underlie the micro-level of 
TNPO2 as well as the mechanisms that can be used to grasp it will be outlined in the section 
that deals with TNPO overlap, notably section 3.2.4.  
TNPO2macro, the second subcomponent of TNPO2, is located at the macro-level of 
international relations, rather than at the more case-specific institutional micro-level of 
bilateral or bi-regional contractual (or other) relations. In particular, it concerns the power that 
an actor (i.c. the EU) may have over another actor based on the former‟s dominant position 
within an international regime
60
 or international institution. To some extent, this point chimes 
with historical institutionalist propositions, which emphasise the asymmetries of power that 
arise from the way in which institutions work (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938). In addition, it 
echoes Krasner‟s regime theoretical understanding of structural power as the power to shape 
the rules of institutions and regimes (see supra). In Krasner‟s view, international regimes and 
normative structures can, after a certain amount of time (i.e. following a „time-lag‟) become 
independent sources of influence, and can thus be used as instruments to exercise power over 
other states (1982: 499). The EU actively promotes multilateralism and does so, primarily, in 
an attempt to protect itself from globalisation; however, in doing so, the EU acts as an agent 
of the very process of globalisation (see e.g. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 17-18). 
Because of its formidable trade power and substantial economic strength, the EU contributes 
to globalisation particularly through its trade policy and its support for a global free market 
economy and neo-liberal international order, including through the WTO, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
61
 Moreover, as exemplified by its WTO agenda, 
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 In Krasner‟s influential definition, „international regimes‟ are defined as “sets of principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner, 1982: 
186). This definition is intentionally broad and covers human interaction ranging from formal organisations, e.g., 
OPEC, OECD, to informal groups, such as the group of major banks formed during the developing world debt 
crisis.  
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 The EU also does so, inter alia, through its initiatives to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with emerging 
trade partners and through its attempts to create free trade areas with other regions of the world. 
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the EU‟s attempts at shaping and managing globalisation are based on its own regulatory 
models (see e.g. De Bièvre, 2006; Meunier, 2007; Young & Peterson, 2006). As Holden 
writes, “the WTO is more than a series of, inevitably „crisis-ridden‟, negotiations, and is an 
accumulated body of law, which the EU has had a major role in shaping” (2009: 188).  
However, the EU also has a significant say in other areas of global governance. As 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan point out, the EU “has played a pivotal role in the development, 
adoption and implementation of important new multilateral legal instruments, such as the 
Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and various disarmament regimes 
and initiatives” (2008: 302).  In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, the EU used 
“active diplomacy to encourage a broad set of smaller players as well as a crucial large power 
- Russia - to follow its path” (ibid). Similarly, because of its influential voice within the 
WTO, the EU can rely on its leverage to encourage non-member countries of the WTO to 
apply for membership and start the preparation process for accession. However, the number 
of cases in which the Union is an active member of an international organisation or regime 
remains limited due to reluctance from EU member states and third countries to grant this 
privilege to the EU.
62
 Nevertheless, even in cases where the Union is not a member, but is 
represented by all or nearly all its member states, it often attempts to reach a common EU 
position, which gives it a substantial amount of leverage, e.g. in the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE). 
To sum up, the above outline highlighted to what extent institutional factors need to be 
taken into account when considering the EU‟s TNPO. Whether at the macro-level of 
international relations (TNPO2macro) or at the more case-specific institutional micro-level of 
bilateral or bi-regional contractual relations (TNPO2micro), the EU derives a significant amount 
of leverage from institutional factors. While TNPO2macro is the extent to which an actor such 
as the EU draws influence over another actor from its predominant position within a particular 
international institution or regime, TNPO2micro captures different forms of institutionalised 
cooperation and dialogue. The latter include both formal contractual (including treaty-based) 
formats of institutionalisation established as part of the EU‟s relations with third countries, 
and less formal and less integrated (including ad hoc) formats of institutionalisation, often 
held at the bureaucratic or technocratic level rather than at the high political level. TNPO2 
thus fully underpins the proposition that institutions matter in the study of political power. 
However, a third and final structure is yet to enter the picture in order to break the silence on 
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 For an overview of the international organisations of which the EU is a member, see Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan (2008: 303). 
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the relevance of ideas as an independent variable of the EU‟s TNPO. This is dealt with in the 
next subsection. 
 
3.2.3.3. TNPO3: the ideational structure 
 
The third and final structure over which an actor can exert influence is the ideational 
structure, labelled here „TNPO3‟. It encompasses such intangible factors as beliefs, values, 
norms, identity and legitimacy. In other words, TNPO3 is ideational in the sense that it takes 
ideas, normative interpretations and mental constructs seriously and regards them as causally 
important in their own right.
63
 It is useful to start the discussion by referring to Krastev and 
Leonard‟s claim that the new world order is determined not just by the balance of „hard 
power‟, i.e. the ability to use economic or military power to coerce or bribe countries to 
support you, but by the balance of what Nye has famously termed „soft power‟ (Krastev & 
Leonard, 2007; also see Leonard, 2005). Originally defined in very broad terms as „non-
command power‟, Nye‟s concept of soft power encapsulates the ability of a state to get what 
it wants through attraction, rather than through coercion and payment, arising from the appeal 
of its culture, political ideals and policies (Nye, 1990, 2004). Although initially designed for 
the U.S., the notion of soft power can also be used to capture the magnetic pull of the EU.
 64
 
From a Lukesian point of view, attraction or magnetism can be seen as a form of „passive 
power‟. In the case of the EU, for instance, part of its transformative power, understood here 
as the power to enable domestic change within third countries
65
, rests on the passive leverage 
that it draws from its attractive single market and its success as a regionally - economically 
and politically - integrated group of liberal democracies (Haughton, 2007; Leonard, 2005; 
Therborn, 2001, Vachudova, 2001). Related to this is the attraction stemming from the so-
called „European dream‟ and the „European way of living‟, which reflect the high level of 
prosperity and quality of life associated with the EU, including high living standards and 
efficient social welfare systems (see e.g. Bretherton &Vogler, 2006). Also the fact that the EU 
is characterised by a legacy of peaceful relations and successful reconciliation appeals to 
external partners.  
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 For an influential study of the role of ideas in foreign policy, see Goldstein & Keohane (1993). 
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 McCormick even uses Leonard‟s (2005) notion of „soft new world order‟ to argue that the EU has become a 
superpower: the EU has become ideally suited to exercise influence in the post-modern international system, 
which it “draws from promoting values, policies and goals that appeal to other states in a way that aggression 
and coercion cannot” (2006: 6).  
65
 Note that another understanding of „transformative power‟ refers to the ability to translate one kind of power, 
e.g. structural power, into another form of power, e.g. bargaining power.  Cf. the notion of the „fungibility‟ of 
power (Baldwin, 1989). 
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Moreover, the EU seems to have a rather benevolent and non-threatening image 
compared to other international powers, including the U.S., and is increasingly accepted 
around the globe as a source of authority on several public policy issues (see e.g.  Holden, 
2009: 184). As Holden explains, “[s]ignificant here is that many do not perceive it as an actor 
in the sense that major states are viewed, thus its own webs of control have tended to elicit 
less paranoia and resistance than these other actors” (2009: 188-9). As mentioned previously, 
the EU‟s magnetic pull stems from its presence, rather than from its intentional agency, which 
constitutes a purely structural form of structural power. Similarly, (non)governmental actors 
in third countries may be drawn to the EU‟s rules or norms independently of intentional EU 
agency, as is encapsulated by such mechanisms as unilateral emulation, (societal) imitation, 
(societal) lesson-drawing (see Figure 1, p.51). At the same time, however, norms and values 
are also spread through conscious efforts by the EU, thereby testifying to agent-based 
structural power. This duality is captured in Ian Manners‟s (2002) concept of normative 
power, which illustriously represents the ideational underpinnings of the EU‟s soft power. 
Indeed, Manners‟s framework of normative power depicts the EU as a changer of norms in 
international relations based on combination of its very existence and conscious agency, 
notably by projecting its internally shared principles and norms onto its external partners 
(Holden, 2009: 9; Manners, 2002: 252). The structural properties of the concept reveal a 
particular affinity with critical perspectives. It is not surprising therefore that Manners‟s 
concept of normative power is partly inspired by Galtung‟s (1973) notion of ideological 
power, which the latter developed to support his claim that the European Community at the 
time already wielded a substantial amount of structural power not only thanks to its economic 
leverage but also to its ideological power. Defined as the power of ideas, Galtung asserted 
that ideological power is “powerful because the power-sender‟s ideas penetrate and shape the 
will of the power-recipient” (1973: 33 & 36). To some extent, this is echoed in Haukkala‟s 
(2008) contemporary claim that the EU can be considered as a regional normative hegemon in 
its near abroad; drawing on Manners‟s definition of normative power as the ability to shape 
conceptions of normal in international relations, Haukkala argues that the EU “is using its 
economic and normative clout to build a set of highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that 
help to facilitate an active transference of its norms and values” (Haukkala, 2008; Manners, 
2002: 239). This leads Haukkala (2008) to approach the EU‟s normative power in terms of its 
ability to influence other states to the extent that they willingly internalise norms and values 
promoted by the EU, as is mostly clearly the case in its neighbourhood.  
In turn, such a critical understanding of normative power can be easily linked to the 
neo-Gramscian notion of „consensual power‟, even more so since neo-Gramscians have used 
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this concept in connection with hegemony.
66
 Neo-Gramscians maintain that the most effective 
means of domination is based on consent gained through the creation of common sense, in 
contrast to the - in their view - inefficient means of domination based on coercive power (see 
e.g. Cox, 1981, 1987; Gill & Law, 1989).
67
 In a similar vein, Manners differentiates 
conceptually between a „civilian power Europe‟, whereby the EU is primarily using economic 
power as a form of coercion, and a „normative power Europe‟, whereby the EU is a 
“normative power of an ideational nature characterised by common principles” (2002: 239). 
As he further clarifies, “[i]n civilian power terms, the instrumental role of economic power is 
central to the approach, whereas in normative power terms what is more important is the 
degree to which international economics are domesticated into concerns about distributive 
justice” (Manners, 2000). When it comes to pinpointing the norms and principles propagated 
by the EU
68, Manners (2002: 240) identifies four „core‟ norms, which form a central part of 
the EU‟s vast body of laws and policies, namely peace, democracy, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights and the fundamental freedoms, as set out in article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and incorporated in the EU‟s various external policies and strategies. 
In addition, Manners designates four „minor‟ norms, i.e. social progress, combating 
discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (ibid.). Departing from the 
proposition that Europeanisation consists of “the external projection of internal solutions”, 
Schimmelfennig (2007), in turn, not only considers the EU‟s export of its constitutional 
norms, but also of its model of regionalism as well as its “multilaterally managed regulatory 
framework for liberal markets”, or “neoliberal economic model” seen in a more critical 
perspective.
69
 It is worth noting that the EU‟s attempt to disseminate its regionalist model can 
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 Cox, for instance, defines hegemony as “dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an 
order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact 
ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading social classes but at the same time 
offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful” (Cox, 1987). 
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 In making this statement, they draw on the collection of Gramsci‟s work presented in his „Prison Notebooks‟, 
which itself elaborates on the Marxist concept of ideology. Gramsci asserted that in the social formations of the 
West it was „culture‟ or „ideology‟ that constituted the mode of class rule, secured by consent by means of the 
bourgeoisie‟s monopoly over the ideological apparatuses (Gramsci, 1971). He demonstrated how the ruling class 
dominated the working class by imposing their world-view on them through the exploitation of religion, 
education, popular national culture and – in the case of industrialised economies - capitalism, and have it 
accepted as „natural‟ or „common sense‟. 
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 It is noteworthy that the EU‟s dedicated promotion of norms such as human rights and democracy is a fairly 
recent phenomenon and only became prominent in the 1990s (see e.g. Balfour, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2007). As 
Schimmelfennig (2007) remarks, it is the global political changes of the time (the end of the Cold War, the wave 
of democratisation) combined with the “concomitant institutional enhancement of the EU as an international 
actor (the Common Foreign Security Policy – CFSP agreed in the Maastricht Treaty) that seem to have spurred 
the explicit definition and promotion of the EU model beyond Europe”. 
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 Schimmelfennig (2007) rightly questions here what is distinctly „European‟ in the principles and norms 
exported by the EU. As he points out, “whereas it may be granted that regionalism is a unique feature of EU 
external relations, democracy, human rights and market economy are Western principles that are propagated by 
non-EU Western countries (such as the United States) and other international organisations (e.g., the Council of 
Europe or the OECD) as well.  
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be observed in the EU‟s tendency to design its policies and strategies for regional groupings 
of countries rather than for individual states (Schimmelfennig, 2007). 
 In examining which factors shape EU norm diffusion, Manners (2002) suggests six 
different modes. Interestingly, these six factors appear to represent a combination of purely 
structural and agent-based structural power, or of „power by example‟ and „power by 
relations‟ in Manners‟s (2002) words. The first mode is „contagion‟, which captures the 
completely unintentional diffusion of ideas and norms from the EU to other political actors. A 
case in point of this mode is the way in which the EU represents a model of regional 
integration for other regions. The second mode is „informational diffusion‟, which stems from 
the largely passive normative power present in EU strategic communications, such as new 
policy initiatives, and declaratory communications, including Presidency démarches from the 
EU rotating Presidency. The third mode is „procedural diffusion‟, which operates through the 
institutionalisation of the EU‟s relations with third countries. This involves “initiating and 
institutionalising regular patterns of communication or partnership, for example through 
accession procedures, stabilisation and/or association agreements, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, African, Caribbean and Pacific relations, and Strategic Partnerships” 
(Manners, 2009: 3). As we shall see in the next section, procedural diffusion is a typical case 
of overlap between TNPO2 and TNPO3. The fourth mode, „transference diffusion‟, also 
reflects a type of TNPO overlap, this time between TNPO1 and TNPO3. Transference 
diffusion operates either through trade, or through aid and technical assistance, such as 
through the PHARE programme in the former accession countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the European Development Fund (EDF) in the ACP countries. The fifth mode is 
„overt diffusion‟, which results from the physical presence of the EU in partner countries. 
Overt diffusion concerns the promotion of principles and norms through the presence of 
Commission delegations (EU delegations from 2010 onwards) and embassies of EU member 
states in the partner countries. Again this mode is an overlap of TNPO, notably between 
TNPO2 and TNPO3 (see below). The sixth and final mode determining EU norm diffusion is 
the „cultural filter‟. As Manners (2002) explains, this factor mediates the impact of 
international norms and political learning in third countries and, as such, leads to learning, 
adaptation or rejection of the diffused norms. To illustrate the „cultural filter‟, he points to the 
EU‟s promotion of democratic norms in China and of human rights in Turkey.  
The final mode chimes with Goldstein and Keohane‟s claim that worldviews “are 
embedded in the symbolism of a culture and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse” 
(1993: 8). Even more so, it corresponds with the mechanism of „social learning‟ (see Figure 1, 
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p.51). According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, this mechanism incorporates the 
perception that the EU is “the formal organisation of a European international community 
defined by a specific collective identity and a specific set of common values and norms” 
(2004: 667). Whether a third country internalises the EU‟s projected norms then depends on 
the degree to which it regards them as appropriate in light of the collective identity, values 
and norms (ibid.). This brief overview of the variety of factors contributing to the way in 
which EU norms are disseminated reveals the affinity of Manners‟s normative power model 
with social constructivism, with its emphasis on the importance of shared norms, discourse 
and identity, normative suasion and socialisation processes. Manners (2009: 3) indicates 
himself that normative power should be perceived as „persuasive‟ in the actions taken to 
promote norms and as „socialising‟ in the impact of these actions. As will be indicated in 
detail in the next section, such mechanisms as socialisation and social learning (see Figure 1, 
p.51) can indeed be used to capture how the EU‟s partners internalise the projected norms 
based on their value-judgements of the appropriateness or legitimacy of the norms.  
To summarise, the above outline highlighted to what extent ideational factors need to 
be taken into account when considering the EU‟s TNPO. In essence, it sought to demonstrate 
that ideational factors constitute an important determinant of the EU‟s TNPO. However, while 
TNPO3 was conceived here in its ideal type, in practical terms, it is often used together with 
material incentives, such as financial assistance, and/or with institutional elements, such as 
political dialogue. This insight brings us to the following section, which focuses on the extent 
to which the EU‟s TNPO also derives from the overlap between the three TNPO structures. 
 
3.2.4. Overlap between the three TNPO structures 
 
As already apparent from the previous section, there seems to be considerable overlap 
between the three TNPO structures. Indeed, while TNPO1, TNPO2 and TNPO3 are the 
material, institutional and ideational structures in their purest forms, in practical terms, they 
are often found to interact with each other. This is particularly true for TNPO2micro, which is 
present in two different overlaps, notably in TNPO2micro-3 and TNPO1-2micro-3. To grasp the 
overlap between the structures, rational institutionalist and sociological institutionalist 
approaches are drawn upon as well as EU external governance perspectives. Amongst other 
things, this involves going back to our toolbox (see Figure 1, p.51), thereby demonstrating 
which intergovernmental and transnational mechanisms of EU impact can be used to trace 
instances of overlap between the TNPO structures. As highlighted, the toolbox distinguishes 
between a rationalist perspective, which assumes that third country actors adhere to a „logic of 
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consequentiality‟, and a social constructivist approach, which assumes that third country 
actors follow a „logic of appropriateness‟. As such, TNPO1-3 falls mostly within the former 
logic, which maintains that political outcomes are brought about by strategically calculating 
actors seeking to maximise given interest. Conversely, TNPO2-3 can be best explained by the 
latter logic, which upholds that outcomes are based on value-based judgements of norms as 
either appropriate or inappropriate behaviour (see e.g. Boekle et al., 1999). Moreover, the 
section will also indicate that overlap between the structures testifies to a combination of 
purely structural and agent-based structural power.  
It is important to note that it is not always straightforward to trace distinct patterns of 
overlap between the TNPO structures, as it may be difficult to detect the exact boundaries of 
the overlap. For instance, it is often hard to distinguish TNPO2-3 from TNPO1-2-3 and vice 
versa. By the same token, it is virtually impossible to observe TNPO1-2micro, as the overlap 
between those two structures is nearly always bound to interact with TNPO3. As such, overlap 
between TNPO1 and TNPO2micro appears to exist almost solely in theory. To clarify, by and 
large, TNPO1-2micro encompasses the extent to which EU aid constitutes a direct intervention in 
third countries‟ domestic structures and to which the assistance ensures contact between the 
two Parties, thereby establishing  relationships between the EU and the third country that 
become institutionalised in one way or other (see e.g. Holden, 2009: 183). In practice, 
however, such direct EU intervention hardly ever occurs without deliberate attempts by the 
EU to push through domestic reforms that are inspired by or draw on the EU model. In short, 
TNPO1-2micro thus appears to be inherently linked to TNPO3. Some scattered instances of 
TNPO1-2micro may be observed where this is not the case, but these are very rare and will not 
be covered in the present chapter. In contrast to TNPO1-2micro, overlap between TNPO1 and 
TNPO2macro is more easily observable and does not necessarily interact with TNPO3. 
Nevertheless, compared to the other types of TNPO overlap, TNPO1-2macro is only a minor 
case of overlap, and will therefore be dealt with only briefly. In conclusion, given the 
apparent difficulties to trace the overlap between the three TNPO structures, the delineations 
of overlap presented below should be regarded as tentative rather than definitive. Moreover, 
this implies that the instances of overlap suggested in the thesis are indicative rather than 
exhaustive. 
 
3.2.4.1. TNPO1-2: overlap between TNPO1(material) and TNPO2micro/macro(institutional) 
 
As mentioned, it is hardly possible to observe TNPO1-2micro because the overlap between those 
two structures is nearly always bound to interact with TNPO3. As such, overlap between 
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TNPO1 and TNPO2micro appears to exist almost solely in theory. In contrast, overlap between 
TNPO1 and TNPO2macro does not necessarily interact with TNPO3 and is thus more easily 
observable. Even so, instances of TNPO1-2macro are not that common and are largely confined 
to the security realm. Instances of overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO2macro are most likely to 
occur in instances of how the EU may rely upon regional security organisations to gain more 
influence over third countries in the security domain. This concerns two types of regional 
security organisations: regional security organisations in which the EU is represented 
indirectly - notably through a substantial membership of EU member states -, such as in the 
OSCE and NATO, and regional security organisations in which the EU is not represented, 
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
70
 the GUAM Organisation for 
Democracy and Economic Development
71
, and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
(CSTO)
72
. With respect to the former case of TNPO1-2macro, EU member states that are 
members of a regional organisation, most notably the OSCE and NATO, will often attempt to 
reach a common EU position within the organisation. This may provide the EU with a 
substantial amount of leverage, allowing it, inter alia, to indirectly co-determine outcomes of 
the organisation‟s decision-making procedures.  Examples of this kind of overlap include the 
EU‟s support for Ukraine‟s recent accession to NATO and for Georgia‟s current bid to join 
NATO, support which significantly frustrates Russia. With respect to the latter case of 
TNPO1-2macro, in turn, the EU tends to engage with „rival‟ security organisations, such as the 
SCO, GUAM and CSTO, attempting to secure some kind of cooperation, whether in the form 
of dialogue or in the form of actual joint security activities. The underlying goal of such 
engagement attempts by the EU is to balance the influence of these organisations, and in 
particular the influence of the dominant member countries within the respective organisations, 
in the security domain. 
 
 
3.2.4.2. TNPO1-3: overlap between TNPO1(material) and TNPO3(ideational) 
 
One way in which the EU attempts to diffuse ideas, principles and norms is by coupling them 
with or channelling them through the provision of such material incentives as market access 
and financial assistance (cf. Manners‟s notion of „transference diffusion‟, see above). By the 
same token, the EU draws on its formidable trade power to promote non-trade issues, 
including such principles and norms as sustainable development and respect for social rights. 
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 The member countries of the SCO are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
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 GUAM comprises Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. 
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 The CSTO consists of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Belarus. 
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These two examples point to the interaction of ideational and material factors that may occur 
between TNPO1 and TNPO3. The overlap between both structures largely constitutes agent-
based structural power, as the overlap derives mostly from conscious EU agency. Yet, in 
some cases, the overlap clearly testifies to structural power that is purely structural in nature. 
A case in point is when producers and/or legislators in a third country experience the 
necessity to adopt EU product standards as a result of competitive pressures (cf. the notion of 
„competition‟, see above). The remainder of this subsection outlines the different kinds of 
overlap that may occur between TNPO1 and TNPO3. 
 To begin with, the provision of technical and financial assistance appears to be a 
potent tool in the EU‟s efforts to export its internal practices, norms and rules, which are often 
aimed at affecting enduring change in the domestic environment of the targeted countries. As 
Petrov highlights, technical assistance provided under the auspices of EU funded assistance 
programmes comprises a variety of activities, ranging from investment in infrastructure to 
assistance in legal drafting and education (2008: 50-51). More in particular, EU technical 
assistance covers, among other things, the exchange of expertise and know-how, the provision 
of early information, especially on relevant legislation, the organisation of seminars and 
training activities, assistance in drafting national legislation in accordance with the acquis, 
and the modernisation and restructuring of specific sectors (e.g. agriculture, agro-industrial) in 
consistency with the EU rules and standards (Petrov, 2008: 50-51). This illustrates that the 
EU‟s assistance programmes go far beyond the traditional use of development aid and have 
become highly interventionist and reformist. As Holden concludes, “this is a prime example 
of how structural power goes beyond creating dependency in developing countries to include 
shaping legal and institutional frameworks” (2009: 18). In financing and implementing this 
wide range of assistance activities in third countries, the EU thus encourages specific 
institutional and legal reforms of those countries‟ domestic frameworks in accordance with 
the EU‟s own regulatory frameworks, allowing the EU to expand its own governance model 
and regulatory system. Moreover, if successful, this „export‟ of regulatory norms and EU-
modelled practices is functionally convenient for the EU. To illustrate, transposing the acquis, 
whether in full or in part, contributes to the establishment of a favourable regulatory climate 
in the recipient country, therefore facilitating direct foreign investment by European firms and 
encouraging the mutual liberalisation of markets (Petrov, 2008: 34; also see Prange-Gstöhl, 
2009: 5301). A clear example can be found in the EU‟s energy security policy. In view of 
safeguarding its energy security, the EU is increasingly encouraging far-reaching rules-based 
governance reforms in neighbouring energy producing and transit countries, modelled on the 
EU‟s internal energy market and governance rules (Youngs, 2007: 2). The EU does so in 
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order to “extend transparency, efficiency and certainty beyond the EU‟s frontiers - crucial to 
helping the long term investments necessary for our energy security” (Ferrero-Waldner, as 
quoted in Youngs, 2007). The Baku initiative, launched in 2004, testifies to this overall aim. 
As Youngs points out, it is aimed at “driving energy sector reform in the [Caspian] region, 
around EU regulatory standards - once again using Europe‟s internal market as a template” 
(2007: 3). So far, the EU has already provided considerable funding and investment for 
energy infrastructure development in the region. Similarly, the Interstate Oil and Gas 
Transport to Europe Programme (INOGATE) programme serves already to modernise and 
develop energy transport infrastructure in 18 South-East European and former Soviet 
countries.  
 Insofar as such EU assistance packages offer tangible material benefits to partner 
countries, norm adaptation and rule compliance may occur as a result of a positive cost-
benefit assessment by the third countries. That is, when offered the possibility of assistance, 
the latter weigh up the costs and benefits of the proposed or required norm adaptation in view 
of their material interests and political preferences (see e.g. Warkotsch, 2009). Accordingly, 
they comply with the EU‟s rules73 and norms if the domestic adaptation costs are smaller than 
the benefits of the material rewards (cf. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier‟s external incentives 
model). Material reinforcement mechanisms can also be used indirectly through the 
transnational channel to mobilise societal actors (e.g. human rights NGOs or corporate actors) 
in the target state to put pressure on their government to change its policy and adapt to the 
suggested community norms and rules (cf. domestic empowerment). Over the years, civil 
society support has become an integral part of the EU‟s democracy and human rights 
promotion policy (see e.g. Balfour, 2006: 118; Youngs, 2001a & b). For transnational 
reinforcement to be effective, it follows that the costs of putting pressure on the government 
should be smaller than the expected community rewards (Schimmelfennig, 2005). However, 
as Schimmelfennig concludes from the experience of the former candidate states in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEECs), the main channel of international reinforcement in the CEECs 
is intergovernmental, because “societies are too weak vis-à-vis the states, and electorates are 
too volatile, to serve as effective agents” of domestic change through material reinforcement 
(2005: 828).  
Reinforcement mechanisms can also be punitive rather than rewarding. In this 
perspective, for a partner country to conform with the EU‟s rules and norms, the costs of the 
EU‟s punishment need to exceed the costs of domestic adaptation. As mentioned previously, 
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 Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier‟s understanding of „EU rules‟ covers a broad range of issues and structures. To 
name just a few, they comprise rules for regulation in specific policy areas, rules of political, administrative and 
judicial process, and rules for the set-up and competences of state and sub-state organisations (2005: 7). 
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the EU also uses intangible symbolic forms of rewards and sanctioning, notably through 
rhetorical action (see e.g. Warkotsch, 2008: 228; Manners, 2009: 3). For instance, EU 
statements (e.g. Council declarations) often serve to publicly praise a country‟s norm 
adaptation or condemn its non-compliance (cf. naming and shaming). While the EU 
frequently resorts to this kind of symbolic punishment in case of norm violation, it is less 
tempted to apply material forms of sanctioning, such as aid reduction, arms embargoes and  
visa bans (see e.g. Youngs, 2001a, 2001b). Indeed, although the EU uses conditionality to 
promote democracy
74
, amongst other norms, it often shies away from imposing punitive 
measures in reaction to norm violation (Schimmelfennig, 2007; Youngs, 2001a). As Youngs 
explains, “European policy-makers [see] a more positive, incentives-based form of 
conditionality as more legitimate and potentially more effective” than the use of sticks 
(Youngs 2001a: 192). This is based on the belief that cooperative engagement is more 
conducive towards enticing democratisation than an approach of isolation (see e.g. Balfour, 
2006: 119).
75
 This belief applies especially to the EU‟s policies for countries without a 
membership prospect. Put differently, in the EU‟s relations with non-candidate countries, 
conditionality is not a decisive policy tool for EU norm diffusion (see e.g. Schimmelfennig, 
2009; also see above). The range of democracy and governance projects that the EU funds 
and implements in these partner countries is indeed more cooperative than coercive; most of 
these assistance programmes are voluntary and agreed with recipient countries, many of 
which are governed by non-democratic regimes (Youngs, 2009: 897). However, in the 
absence of (effective) conditionality, rule transfer and norm diffusion seem even less likely at 
first sight. For instance, the proposed governance reforms might be controversial in the eyes 
of the domestic governments. However, as we will see further on, given the limits of 
conditionality, the EU increasingly resorts to external governance by transgovernmental 
networks and functional modes of cooperation in order to transfer its governance model, and 
thus to disseminate such values as transparency, accountability and participation. In this 
perspective, the EU does not directly promote democratic norms of governance as politically 
sensitive norms, but instead tends to diffuse them through functionally-oriented sectoral 
cooperation (Freyburg, 2010; see also Freyburg et al., 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 
2009). 
 So far, we can conclude that the overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3 largely 
constitutes agent-based structural power, as it derives mostly from conscious EU agency. Yet, 
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75
 As we shall see in the empirical chapters, this belief is not always shared among all the EU member states. 
That is, some member state governments often prefer the use of material sanctions in cases where clear norm 
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there are cases where the overlap between the two structures testifies to structural power that 
is purely structural in nature. As captured by the market and the competition modes of 
governance, it concerns cases where the EU‟s impact on third countries derives from the 
„presence‟ of its internal market rather than from its conscious actions. Governments or 
societal actors are induced to adapt domestic policies and regulations to those of the EU. 
Following a rationalist logic of action, they do so because ignoring or violating the EU‟s rules 
and regulations would entail net costs (cf. negative externality). For instance, if foreign 
companies want to enter the EU‟s market, they may have no choice but to adopt EU rules or 
standards (e.g. product standards). 
 A final type of overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3 occurs entirely via the 
transnational channel and is even more indirect than in the case of domestic empowerment 
through material reinforcement, in that the agency does not lie at the level of the EU, but at 
that of European companies. The overlap perceives foreign direct investment (FDI) from 
European businesses as a form of people-to-people contacts through which EU norms and 
best practices are promoted. In other words, this final type of TNPO1-3 encompasses the 
extent to which FDI from European companies allows for „transnational socialisation‟ (see 
toolbox in Figure 1, p.51) of domestic work force into EU labour and social rights as well as 
the European business environment and technological excellence, thereby exposing local 
labour force to European working conditions as well as to EU business practices, including 
participation in decision-making, accountability and transparency. The overlap rests on the 
assumption that the presence of European firms in EU partner countries will produce spillover 
effects to improve the socio-economic climate from the bottom-up, and thus expand EU 
influence through the export of the EU‟s technical excellence and its socio-economic model 
(see e.g. Denison, 2009; Peyrouse, 2009a). This might be particularly relevant as a 
complementary - or even alternative - mechanism of EU norm diffusion in third countries 
where traditional mechanisms of EU impact, including political conditionality, are either 
absent or inefficient, especially in states governed by non-democratic regimes. How then is 
this type of TNPO1-3 manifested? To begin with, in working with local labour force in their 
foreign plants, European companies share their advanced knowhow and technical excellence 
and efficiency.
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 More importantly, however, another area of European expertise that is 
exported is the preoccupation with social capital.
77
 As clarified by Peyrouse, this 
preoccupation reflects the European corporate philosophical credo, associated with the 
European quality of life, that “the greatest wealth of a country or a company stems from its 
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 It would be naive to assume that this applies to all the European companies that work abroad with local labour 
force.  
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development of human potential, not only its profit-making ability” (2009a: 13). Denison 
specifies the content and implications of the EU preoccupation with social capital, indicating 
that “[European] companies build into their commercial offers the norms and tools of long-
term political and social development, through comprehensive packages of targeted training, 
education and welfare provision with clear linkages and impact beyond the [business] sector” 
(2009: 10-11). Denison expounds on the long-term, reformist effects of the export of these EU 
best practices for the domestic or local socio-economic climate, and suggests that the 
companies‟ contribution might even transcend the development of a more efficient local 
labour force, planting the seeds of a middle-class “likely to engender broader social progress” 
(ibid.).  
 
3.2.4.3. TNPO2-3: overlap between TNPO2micro/macro(institutional) and TNPO3(ideational) 
 
In constituting the interaction between institutional and ideational factors, TNPO2-3 
encompasses the extent to which „institutions matter‟ as the site for socialisation through 
dialogue. The overlap can be observed at both the micro-institutional and macro-institutional 
level, although it occurs predominantly at the former level. In essence, TNPO2micro-3 
encompasses modes of rule transfer and norm diffusion based on EU-initiated processes of 
communication and social learning. In contrast to the interaction between TNPO1 and TNPO3, 
overlap between TNPO2micro and TNPO3 thus largely follows a logic of appropriateness, 
capturing how third country actors internalise EU norms not because they calculate the 
consequences of the norm adaptation but because they feel that norm conformance is „the 
right thing to do‟. As Manners (2009: 3) argues, normative power implies the use of 
persuasive action, which involves constructive engagement, the institutionalisation of 
relations, and the encouragement of dialogue between the parties. The theoretical mechanism 
underlying processes of socialisation suggests that, through constructive dialogue, the 
socializee (i.e. the third country) is persuaded by the legitimacy of the socialiser‟s (i.e. the 
EU) interpretations of the world and changes its identity and interests accordingly (Checkel, 
2005: 812; also see Warkotsch, 2009: 252). As the outsider fully internalises the projected 
norm, norm diffusion through persuasive action is assumed to be more sustainable than norm 
compliance resulting from strategic calculation, which might end when the incentive 
structures changes (Checkel, 2005: 813; Warkotsch, 2009: 252).
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 However, for normative suasion to be successful, certain conditions need to be met. As Warkotsch indicates, 
these include that “educational practices have to be carried out consistently, over a reasonably long period of 
time” (2009: 253). 
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Socialisation is a key instrument of the EU‟s democracy promotion agenda. As 
Youngs observes in this regard, the “EU‟s strategy [is] characterised by an aim to develop 
deeply institutionalised patterns of dialogue and cooperation as means of socialising political 
elites into a positive and consensual adherence to democratic norms” (Youngs, 2001b: 193 & 
195). According to Youngs, “the socialisation approach is designed to create opportunities for 
„imitation and demonstration effects‟ and starts with very modest expectations of introducing 
the vocabulary of democracy into domestic discourse and inducing elites to at least pay lip 
service to democracy” (Youngs, 2001a: 359). Put differently, by including the issue of 
democracy in institutionalised relationships, the EU puts the issue on the table. The EU can 
then try to involve government representatives from the partner country in a dialogue, 
“unleashing a dynamic of socialisation around democratic norms” (Youngs, 2001a: 359). 
Once actors are persuaded of the legitimacy or appropriateness of the socialiser‟s 
interpretations, they begin to truly internalise the external principles and values. Accordingly, 
Freyburg (2009) defines democratic socialisation as “a process of attitude change toward 
democratic governance as a consequence of exposure to democratic rules and decision-
making practices”. Exposure to and familiarisation with normative principles is built in in the 
wide range of dialogue venues that the EU has devised for its relations with partner countries 
(cf. Manners‟s notion of procedural diffusion, see above). First and foremost, the EU formally 
institutionalises its cooperation with third countries and groups of countries through bilateral 
and regional agreements.
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 The latter ensure the progressive development of formal 
comprehensive ties encompassing regularised cooperation on a wide scope of subjects, 
including trade, competition, justice and home affairs, education, transport, environment, 
regulatory standards, human rights and democracy. As these agreements constitute the legal 
framework of the institutionalised cooperation, they take centre stage in terms of providing 
formal dialogue mechanisms. That is, they establish permanent institutional set-ups for 
regular meetings, such as technical committees and sub-committees. Political dialogue takes 
place at various governance levels, ranging from the level of high-ranking politicians and 
decision-makers, through that of senior bureaucrats as well as lower-ranking officials, to the 
parliamentary level. Moreover, political dialogue forums can also be brought into being in a 
more ad hoc fashion, which could then still be institutionalised formally at a later stage, for 
instance through the conclusion of a strategic partnership with the country or region in 
question.  
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 EU bilateral agreements and regional arrangements include the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in 
the Western Balkans, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with the Newly Independent States 
of the former Soviet Union, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), the Russia Common Strategy, the Cotonou Convention with the ACP countries, and the bilateral trade 
cooperation and development agreements concluded with, inter alia, South Africa and Mexico. 
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In addition, the EU disposes of a whole array of dialogue mechanisms as part of the 
cooperation programmes that are designed to encourage and support the implementation of 
the commitments made under the formal agreements. Most of these dialogue mechanisms 
draw on the assumption that for socialisation to be successful, “educational practices have to 
be carried out consistently, over a reasonably long period of time” (Warkotsch, 2009: 253). In 
this light, EU socialisation efforts can be seen as attempts to “teach” partner countries the 
ideas and norms underlying the EU‟s policies in order to persuade them that these norms and 
values are appropriate, and encourage them to internalise the projected norms and rules 
(Schimmelfennig, 2009) (cf. „social learning‟, and Manners‟s notion of „cultural filter‟). As 
such, the EU engages in socialisation processes, amongst other things, by organising 
exchange programmes bringing third state officials on short-term trips to the EU and by 
funding conferences, seminars and partnership programmes. In Latin America, for instance, 
Grugel has observed that the EU seeks to spread its principles of regional integration and 
good governance through “research funding, seminar programmes, and the creation of a fund 
to provide for the regular exchange of ideas within Latin America, in imitation of its own 
policies” (2004: 612). However, as mentioned earlier, third country internalisation of the 
projected norms - following a logic of appropriateness - depends on the extent to which the 
country identifies with the EU - as the formal embodiment of a European international 
community - and the extent to which it perceives the projected rules and norms as appropriate 
in light of this collective identity (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 667). One type of 
transgovernmental cooperation that has so far been largely overlooked in the literature, but 
which may appear particularly suited for socialising officials from authoritarian states into 
democratic modes of governance is Twinning, an EU assistance instrument that establishes 
transbureaucratic cooperation between a sub-unit of public administration in an EU member 
state and the equivalent institution in a partner country (Freyburg, 2009, 2010). As Freyburg 
(2009) clarifies, the aim of Twinning is to offer the administrative expertise and (technical) 
know-how of European practitioners to third state public administrations. In the run-up to the 
Eastern enlargement of 2004 and 2007, Twinning proved very efficient for transposing the 
acquis to the accession countries. Following this success, Twinning also became an 
instrument for exporting the acquis to countries without a membership prospect; it is now 
widely used in the EU‟s neighbourhood for approximating domestic legal and administrative 
standards to those of the EU “as a means to manage interdependence and foster integration 
below membership” (Freyburg et al., 2009). An additional asset in the context of the ENP is 
the aptitude of Twinning projects for transferring democratic modes of governance. In 
socialisation terms, Twinning projects are expected to expose officials in third country 
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administrations to “rules and norms incorporated in the corporate identity of the respective 
socialisation entity”, in this case European liberal democracies, “and to render them more 
susceptible to democratic governance” (Freyburg, 2010). In practice, this implies attempting 
to trigger attitudinal change in the administrative culture of the partner countries by building 
up intensive working relations through which third country practitioners are exposed to key 
democratic rules and decision-making practices inherent to European bureaucracies, including 
public participation transparency and accountability. As we shall see below, this use of 
Twinning for democratisation purposes should be situated within a wider strategy of the EU 
to transfer modes of democratic governance through transgovernmental cooperation at the 
sectoral level. 
Importantly, alongside the various dialogue mechanisms designed for third state 
officials, the EU‟s national and regional cooperation programmes also provide numerous 
opportunities for dialogue with civil society. Dialogue with societal actors is particularly 
relevant in the context of the EU‟s democracy promotion strategy, which considers a pluralist 
and independent civil society as a crucial aspect of democracy building and human rights 
awareness building (see e.g. Balfour, 2006: 118). The profile of EU democracy assistance 
funding confirms this claim, with civil society support receiving a considerable share of the 
resources, oriented particularly to human rights NGOs
80
 (Balfour, 2006: 118; Youngs, 2001a: 
362; Youngs, 2001b: 192). As captured by the mechanisms of „transnational socialisation‟ 
and „transnational social learning‟ (see toolbox in Figure 1, p.51), the dialogue venues set up 
under the EU‟s democracy promotion policy also serve to socialise and persuade „outsiders‟, 
this time members of society instead of members of the regime. As Adamson clarifies, the 
aim is to “convince the local population of the benefits of creating independent civil society 
organisations and interest groups, and attempt to socialise members of society [...] to prioritise 
such issues as human rights concerns, press freedom, and other components of liberal 
democracy” (2003: 22). To conclude, it is important to point out that EU socialisation power 
is executed also through the EU‟s presence „on the ground‟. Acting as residential 
representatives of Brussels in the partner countries, the EU delegations, EU Special 
Representatives and, to a lesser extent, the embassies of EU member states all contribute to 
the provision of first-hand dialogue opportunities with third countries (cf. Manners‟s notion of 
„overt diffusion‟, see above). Since a significant part of their task is to engage in dialogue 
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 This overwhelming attention paid to secular NGOs of the western advocacy type also points to a weakness of 
the EU‟s policy, notably its narrow identification of indigenous civil society (Balfour, 2006: 118; also see 
Adamson, 2003). Moreover, in partner countries governed by non-democratic regimes, the EU often feels 
constrained in its civil society promotion actions, in the sense that it feels like it has no choice but to cooperate 
with civil society organisations (CSOs) that are engaged in non-political services only, or more generally, with 
CSOs tolerated by the government (see e.g. Schimmelfennig, 2009: 18). 
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with local officials and societal actors, their relevance in terms of socialising the „outsider‟ 
should not be overlooked. 
At this stage, it is clear that TNPO2micro-3, in the form of rule transfer and norm 
diffusion based on EU-initiated processes of communication and social learning, constitutes 
agent-based structural power, as those dialogue processes of socialisation are driven 
consciously and deliberately by the EU. It is noteworthy that this makes it fully distinct from 
behavioural adaptation as a result of „lesson-drawing‟ or „unilateral policy emulation‟ (see 
Figure 1, p.51). They do not occur in the overlap, but fall entirely under TNPO3 and reflect a 
purely structural type of structural power, as norm compliance is induced by domestic factors 
rather than by pro-active EU norm promotion. However, we cannot draw a fully conclusive 
picture of TNPO2-3, without covering the overlap occurring at the macro-institutional level. 
As mentioned previously, the EU does not only encourage bilateral and regional dialogue, but 
also multi- and plurilateral dialogue. As Manners points out (2009: 3), persuasion in the 
external promotion of norms also involves the encouragement of multi- and plurilateral 
dialogue. In order words, the EU also attempts to diffuse its norms and values through 
persuasive action and dialogue at international institutions. The EU‟s wide-spread policy of 
actively supporting institutionalised multilateralism promotes the EU as a partner and a 
teacher (cf. social learning). As Holden suggests, in this way, the EU tries to “encourage 
patterns of behaviour, modes of thinking and modes of governance favourable to [its] 
interests, seeking a world based on liberal capitalist and multilateral values where its 
economic weight and institutional expertise give it a central role” (2009: 19). That the EU 
attempts - and quite often succeeds -  to gain a central position in influential international 
institutions and establish forms of global governance favourable to its values and modes of 
operation, is above all clear from its dominant role in the WTO (see above). The EU‟s ability 
to use the WTO as an instrument to spread its regulatory system is perhaps most concretely 
exemplified in the case of the WTO accession process. As a loyal member of the working 
parties set up for guiding the accession process of applicant countries, the EU has huge 
leverage over future WTO member states, which as a requirement for accession have no 
choice but to alter their domestic legal and economic institutional frameworks in accordance 
with EU demands raised in the pre-accession talks.
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As highlighted above, the EU also has a significant say in other areas of global 
governance and has played a crucial role in the development and adoption of important new 
multilateral legal instruments, such as the Kyoto Protocol, the ICC and several disarmament 
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regimes and initiatives. Even in cases where the EU itself is not a member of the organisation, 
but is represented by all or nearly all its member states, it attempts to use the institution as a 
multilateral dialogue venue for diffusing its values and norms. For instance, the EU regularly 
uses the multilateral level (e.g. the OSCE and the COE) to reinforce its attempts at norm 
diffusion by conferring prestige or shame upon a norm compliant or norm violating state (see 
e.g. Manners, 2009).
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 At these multilateral venues, EU attribution of prestige may vary from 
public declarations of praise to support of membership, whereas EU attribution of shame may 
involve the use of symbolic sanctioning or public condemnation, e.g. through EU declarations 
at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. Moreover, in its bilateral cooperation settings, the 
EU often links its projected rules and norms with the corresponding or overarching 
international ones, such as those from the OSCE and the UN. The fact that this linking 
increases the legitimacy of the projected rules and norms has proved to contribute to the 
likelihood of adaptation (Freyburg et al., 2009; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 668).  
Before moving on to the next - and final - type of TNPO overlap, it is important to 
stress that, as noted in the introduction to the present section, it is not always straightforward 
to trace distinct patterns of overlap between the TNPO structures given the relative fuzziness 
of the boundaries of TNPO overlap. This is most obvious in the case of TNPO2-3 and TNPO1-
2-3, which are often hard to distinguish from one another.  
 
 
3.2.4.4. TNPO1-2-3: overlap between TNPO1(material), TNPO2(institutional) & TNPO3(ideational) 
 
TNPO1-2-3 encapsulates instances of overlap between all three TNPO structures. Although this 
final type of TNPO overlap may also apply to the macro-institutional level of TNPO2 rather 
than to the micro-institutional level, this section only focuses on instances of overlap applying 
to the micro-institutional level, and thus only outlines overlap between TNPO1, TNPO2micro 
and TNPO3.
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 In the most basic - and most comprehensive - respect, TNPO1-2-3 encompasses 
the extent to which EU cooperation agreements with third countries both establish 
institutionalised relationships and offer options for the provision of technical and financial 
assistance, which in turn serve to diffuse norms and values and/or to export parts of the acquis 
into the legal orders of the partner countries (see e.g. Petrov, 2008: 46). In the same context, it 
also captures how these EU agreements offer options for the formalised incorporation of 
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interesting account, see Ambrosio (2008). 
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conditionality, which also serve to diffuse norms and values and/or to export parts of the 
acquis into the legal orders of the partner countries. Since the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993, political conditionality has been introduced to all new EU 
agreements with third countries, notably through the mandatory inclusion of an essential 
elements clause (see e.g. Balfour, 2006: 118; Petrov, 2008: 46; Schimmelfennig, 2007). The 
clause stipulates that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law are essential 
elements of the cooperation agreement, as both an objective and a condition of the 
institutionalised relationship. In case of violation of the essential elements, the legal terms of 
the agreement permit the EU to take appropriate measures, such as suspension or termination 
of the agreement. The introduction of the essential elements clause in its cooperation 
agreements has allowed the EU to put democracy, human rights and the rule of law at the 
forefront of its political dialogue with third countries. At the same time, however, the EU has 
been rather reluctant to terminate or suspend an agreement, whether in part or in full, in 
response to a country‟s violation of the essential elements clause. This joins up with the EU‟s 
overall reluctance to impose punitive measures in reaction to norm violation (see above). 
However, this does not undo the observation that the EU‟s strategy of democratic 
conditionality towards non-candidate countries has so far been inconsistent, with the EU 
imposing sanctioning measures mostly on ad hoc basis and “without any coherence or 
vigour” (Youngs 2001a: 357). Based on the seemingly variable application of political 
conditionality, several authors have argued that, despite the essential elements clause, a 
consistent use of political conditionality appears to be overshadowed by security and stability 
concerns (Youngs, 2004; Crawford, 2005; Warkotsch, 2006). In fact, some even go as far as 
suggesting that this is true for the EU‟s overall democracy promotion and human rights 
policy, which apart from conditionality comprises efforts at socialisation and domestic 
empowerment (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 16-17). For instance, with regard to the EU‟s human 
rights policy, Youngs states that security-related concerns have pushed the EU‟s policy more 
in the direction of the general promotion of international stability and have entailed a “state-
oriented capacity-building bias” (Youngs 2004: 424). Inconsistency of the EU‟s policy due to 
stability and security concerns is directly related to the fact that many of the EU‟s non-
European partner countries are governed by authoritarian or autocratic regimes; that is, while 
compliance with the EU‟s normative standards is politically costly for such governments, the 
EU can often not afford to isolate or anger them in view of strategic interests. The EU is 
aware that if the political costs of compliance with its democratic norms are not balanced out 
by the benefits of its economic or diplomatic rewards or the additional costs of punishment, 
non-democratic third states are unlikely to agree to conform to the projected norms. In turn, 
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the low consistency of the EU‟s political conditionality approach may negatively affect the 
policy‟s effectiveness. As Holland notes, the “seemingly variable application of conditionality 
[…] detracts from the EU‟s international credibility and influence” (2002: 135). However, to 
compensate for the limits and failures of the EU‟s traditional democracy promotion policy, 
the EU increasingly resorts to a more indirect way of transferring democratic principles, i.e. 
through transgovernmental cooperation at the sectoral level. 
This alternative, more indirect model of democratisation, termed „democratic 
governance promotion‟ (see e.g. Freyburg et al., 2009), constitutes a second type of TNPO1-2-
3. Here the overlap is based on the assumption that the “intensifying web of association 
relations between the EU and associated third countries introduces a new form of democracy 
promotion through sectoral cooperation” (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 19). As already mentioned, 
the EU uses Twinning projects not only to export parts of the acquis, and thus to approximate 
domestic legal and administrative standards to those of the EU, but also to expose third 
country officials to democratic modes of governance. This indirect use of Twinning for 
democratisation purposes should be seen within a wider EU approach aimed at promoting 
democracy in a more indirect fashion, notably through transgovernmental, technical 
cooperation at the sectoral level, or as Freyburg et al. put it, “through the „back-door‟ of joint 
problem-solving” (2009: 917). As such, democratic governance promotion differs from 
traditional democracy promotion in that it is targeted at the level of sectoral, bureaucratic 
policy-making rather than at the level of the general polity and political institutions, including 
elections, parties and parliament (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 18). It represents the subtle 
diffusion of democratic norms of governance common to administrative policy-making 
practices in western liberal democracies, such as horizontal and vertical accountability, 
transparency and stakeholder and general participation (Freyburg et al., 2009). In other words, 
the EU attempts not just to “externalise its material acquis rules for regulating public policy 
in each sector of political cooperation between the EU and its neighbouring countries, but also 
procedural rules on how sectoral policies and actors are made transparent, accountable and 
participatory” (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 18; emphasis in original). The underlying assumption 
is that democratisation of sectoral governance - as stimulated indirectly through 
transgovernmental sectoral cooperation - may spill over into a third country‟s general polity 
“by inculcating democratic values, norms and habits on societal and bureaucratic actors and 
creating a demand for far-reaching democratisation of the entire political system” 
(Schimmelfennig, 2009: 19). Assessing the democratisation potential of EU 
transgovernmental functional cooperation with ENP countries, Freyburg et al. (2009) find that 
the EU does succeed in incorporating democracy-specific provisions in domestic legislation 
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and that this is more likely when the provisions are strongly codified in the acquis and are 
linked to the overarching international norms. However, they also observe that the 
implementation of the adopted rules into administrative practice is weak or even absent, 
pointing to a substantial gap between the adaptation of legislation and its application.  
Within the literature, EU democratic governance promotion falls within the emergent 
strand of EU external governance, where it tends to be used alongside the notion of „network 
governance‟. As highlighted in the previous chapter, a key proponent of the emergent 
literature on EU external governance, Lavenex (2008) has challenged the predominant view 
of limited EU impact on the neighbouring countries in the absence of accession conditionality 
by focusing on socialisation through „network governance‟, which she claims is more 
effective than hierarchical policy transfer through conditionality. Network governance 
constitutes a third and final
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 type of TNPO1-2-3. Closely related to the second type of TNPO1-
2-3, notably democratic governance promotion, this final type of TNPO1-2-3 captures the extent 
to which the EU manages to export material acquis rules through transgovernmental 
cooperation at the sectoral level. The network mode of governance differs significantly from 
policy transfer through conditionality, although both modes are used to approximate third 
country legal and administrative standards to those of the EU. To begin with, whereas 
„governance by conditionality‟ is hierarchical in the sense that it works through a vertical 
process of command, where the EU transfers predetermined, non-negotiable rules, „network 
governance‟ allows for the extension of norms and rules in a process-oriented, horizontal, 
voluntaristic and inclusionary manner (Lavenex, 2008: 941-3). In particular, it captures the 
EU‟s “attempt to establish stable communication between sectoral experts in the framework 
of the ENP subcommittees and the possibility of such sectoral experts participating in EU 
agencies and programmes” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009: 798). Moreover, as the actors 
involved are experts and technocrats, who are not guided by their country‟s national interests, 
policy transfer through network governance resorts to a de-politicisation of cooperation. This 
point largely corresponds with Magen‟s observation that in promoting domestic reform that 
might be politically sensitive, the EU attempts to avoid or lower suspicion among the 
governing elites by using depoliticised, technocratic phrasing, and in particular the legalistic 
language of the acquis (Magen, 2007: 390-1). In short, the EU increasingly couches 
politically sensitive reforms in 'low politics' terms. Or as Magen puts it: 
 
Rather than wielding the rhetoric of 'liberty' or 'freedom' in North Africa and the Middle East, 
or speaking overtly of 'transformational diplomacy', use of the acquis communautaire […] acts 
                                                 
84
 As mentioned above, it is important to note that the instances of TNPO overlap suggested in the thesis are 
indicative rather than exhaustive. This implies that there might be more than three types of TNPO1-2-3. 
                                                               - 83 - 
 
as a means of promoting EU interests while blunting the danger of resistance to external 
intervention.  Indeed, Commission officials engaged in the design and pursuit of the ENP 
stress the tactical advantages of promoting what amount to highly intrusive demands on 
national sovereignty through formally depoliticised and legalised language (2007: 391).
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In addition, network governance also allows for functionally specific forms of organisation, 
such as agencies (e.g. the European Environmental Agency), coordinating bodies (e.g. 
Europol), or less formalised policy networks (e.g. the DABLAS Initiative) (see previous 
chapter). Crucially, being voluntary and process-oriented in nature, network constellations 
constitute a fertile ground for mechanisms of impact based on socialisation, social learning 
and communication (see toolbox in Figure 1, p.51). In sum, network governance may well 
omit the formal, traditional levels of decision-making and policy-making and may forsake the 
traditional incentive-based tools for rule adoption; yet, as highlighted by Slaughter,  “behind 
the façade of technical adjustments for improved coordination  [...] and uniformity of 
standards lie subtle adjustments” of domestic laws (Slaughter, 2004: 59). In the ENP, this 
subtle creation of „joint regulatory structures‟ through network governance applies to 
cooperation in several areas, including environment, migration, transport and economic 
policies (Lavenex, 2008). In the area of internal security, for instance, Lavenex and 
Wichmann (2009) find that the EU increasingly resorts to network governance in order to 
obtain the ENP countries' participation in the realisation of the EU‟s internal security project, 
thereby extending its internal transgovernmental networks to ENP countries. Interestingly, as 
noted by the authors, although on paper the EU‟s approach allows for “horizontal patterns of 
co-owned cooperation”, in practice, the integrative potential of the policy networks is 
undermined by “the lack of mutual trust and institutional incompatibilities in ENP countries” 
(Lavenex & Wichmann, 2009). Thus, what is supposed to be extended network governance is 
in reality “an attempt at unilateral policy transfer by 'softer' means” (ibid.). 
 To summarise, TNPO1-2-3 encompasses three types of overlap involving all three 
TNPO structures. Clearly, all three types are agent-based structural power, as they are driven 
by conscious EU agency. However, while the first type of TNPO1-2-3 captures a direct form of 
TNPO overlap, the latter two reflect more indirect forms of interaction between the three 
structures. Indeed, the first type captures the extent to which EU cooperation agreements 
allow for options for the incorporation of conditionality, which in turn serve to promote 
norms and principles and/or to export parts of the acquis. In contrast, the second type of 
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TNPO1-2-3 encompasses the extent to which EU agreements allow for the promotion of norms 
and principles, and in particular democratic governance norms, not through direct political 
leverage at the intergovernmental level (i.e. in the form of conditionality), but through 
transgovernmental cooperation at the sectoral, bureaucratic/technocratic level. Similarly, 
although in a somewhat less indirect fashion, the third and final type of TNPO1-2-3 grasps the 
extent to which EU agreements allow for the export of material acquis rules through 
transgovernmental cooperation at the sectoral, bureaucratic/technocratic level. Importantly, in 
view of the EU‟s power over non-candidate countries, and in particular over states governed 
by non-democratic regimes, the latter two types of TNPO1-2-3 appear to constitute more 
promising sources of influence than the type of TNPO1-2-3 involving the direct, 
intergovernmental channel of conditionality. It will be interesting to see in the empirical part 
of the thesis to what extent this applies to the Central Asian republics. 
 The remainder of the present chapter first provides an operational definition of the 
TNPO concept. It then integrates the notion in an analytical model, which will serve to guide 
the empirical analysis of the thesis. Drawing on the definition of TNPO and the hypothesis 
derived earlier on from the theoretical overview, that section will also specify the core 
mechanisms and conditions under which TNPO is expected to operate. The chapter ends with 
an outline of how the TNPO framework will be used to examine the hypothesis in the 
empirical part of the thesis.  
 
 
3.2.5. Defining TNPO 
 
In providing an operational definition of the TNPO concept, it is useful to return to the 
provisional definition given in section 3.2.1. According to the provisional definition, TNPO is 
a theoretical framework that seeks to assess the extent to which an actor‟s power over 
another actor derives from his/her control over a constitutive mix of three structures, which 
determine the range of options available to the other actor. As outlined in detail above, this 
constitutive mix of structures comprises three structures, notably a material, an institutional 
and an ideational structure. Moreover, the term „constitutive‟ also reflects the considerable 
level of overlap occurring between the structures. In other words, TNPO serves to assess the 
extent to which an actor‟s power over another actor derives from his/her control over a 
material, an institutional and an ideational structure and the interaction between the structures, 
which, ceteris paribus, determine the range of options available to the other actor. 
Importantly, such a definition of TNPO can only work based on the assumption that (i) 
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power, whether intentional or unintentional, active or passive, can be transnational in nature; 
that (ii) structures have an „enabling‟ or „facilitating‟ impact; and that (iii) structures shape 
and determine the context within which actors operate and relate with each other (see Hay, 
2002; Holden, 2009; Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 27). Accordingly, it is essential to 
consider that TNPO constitutes power wielded not directly over another „actor‟, but directly 
over the underlying „structures‟ that determine the range of options available to that other 
actor. TNPO thus constitutes power wielded by an actor indirectly over another actor. This 
proposition has led us to define TNPO as follows: TNPO encompasses A‟s indirect power 
over B through his/her control over a constitutive mix of material, institutional and ideational 
structures, which shape or set the context within which B operates and in which s/he relates 
with A. This makes it, for instance, difficult for B to resist initiatives or reject offers proposed 
by A. Put differently, A‟s TNPO over B facilitates his/her capacity to obtain a desired 
outcome from B. In more operational terms, the concept can be defined in the following way: 
TNPO is the degree to which an actor in the international realm wields power over another 
actor through his/her control over a constitutive mix of material, institutional and ideational 
structures, which shape or set the context within which the other actor operates and in which 
the two relate with each other. It is important to stress that TNPO in essence constitutes a 
form of agent-based structural power, in the sense that it encompasses A‟s capacity to affect 
the underlying structures of B‟s political, legal, socio-economic and security environment, in 
line with A‟s interests (see more below). However, A‟s control over the structures, and the 
interaction between them, goes beyond agent-based structural power, as it may also derive 
from purely structural mechanisms of impact (e.g. externalisation, societal lesson-drawing, 
etc). Indeed, in some cases, A is empowered by a structural force irrespective of A‟s 
conscious or intentional agency. Hence, it is accurate to state that A‟s control over the three 
TNPO structures, and the interaction between them, derives from a combination of agent-
based and purely structural mechanisms of impact. 
Having offered an operational definition of the TNPO concept, it is necessary to 
emphasise that concepts usually do not have an objective meaning independent from the 
theoretical or conceptual frameworks within which they are used (see e.g. Gale, 1998). A 
concept such as TNPO thus becomes much more meaningful when embedded in a framework 
of analysis. Therefore, in the next section an analytical model will be developed based on the 
notion of TNPO. Once developed, the framework of analysis should help us to demonstrate 
how an actor such as the EU can rely on its TNPO to obtain a favourable outcome, which in 
turn strengthens the EU‟s TNPO. 
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3.3. Introducing the TNPO framework 
 
3.3.1. Developing a TNPO framework of analysis 
 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the thesis argues strongly in favour of using a 
comprehensive, integrative understanding of power. This is above all reflected in the 
definition of the TNPO concept (see above). However, in order to use such a comprehensive 
notion in view of our attempt to gain a more accurate, holistic understanding of the EU‟s 
power vis-à-vis Central Asia, it is necessary to integrate the concept into a framework of 
analysis. In embedding the TNPO concept into an analytical model, it is essential to 
incorporate the two main features of TNPO. On the one hand, this means that the framework 
needs to account for the distinction between the relational and the structural level on which 
power is exercised as well as for the interplay between the two levels (cf. the central premise 
of the present thesis). On the other hand, this means that the model needs to encompass the 
extent to which TNPO is made up of three structures with considerable overlap. To those 
ends, we will draw on insights
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 from, amongst others, Hay (2002), Giddens (1995) and 
Young (1991) on the interplay between structure and agency, as well as on Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan‟s (2008) concept of structural foreign policy. Let us start with considering the 
relationship between structure and agency, or in Hay‟s words, the relationship between 
„context‟ and „conduct‟ (Hay, 2002). Agency in the sense of „conduct‟ refers to political 
action (Hay, 2002: 95-96). By contrast, structure in the sense of „context‟ refers to the setting 
within which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning; as Hay 
explains, “by appealing to a notion of structure to describe context, political scientists are 
referring to the ordered nature of social and political relations - to the fact that political 
institutions, practices, routines and conventions appear to exhibit some regularity or 
„structure‟ over time” (2002: 94).  
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the thesis‟s central proposition that the analysis 
of power, as a comprehensive account of power phenomena, should consider both the 
relational and the structural level on which power is exerted as well as the interplay between 
them, finds support in the structure-agency debate in the social sciences. Here Hay asserts that 
“what is required is a mode of analysis [...] capable of reconciling structural and agential 
factors within a single explanation” (2002: 113). To illustrate this point in the field of EU 
studies, it is useful to refer to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan‟s conceptual study of EU foreign 
policy (2008). Rather than studying the EU‟s external agency solely through their notion of 
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structural foreign policy, they develop a comprehensive conceptual framework based on a 
„structural foreign policy - conventional foreign policy‟ continuum, which encompasses both 
conventional and „neglected‟ - i.e. structural - dimensions of foreign policy (2008: 19 & 335). 
In line with Hay‟s proposition, Giddens (1995) argues that agent-focused theories and 
structuralist approaches can be seen to be complementary: on the one hand, resources, treated 
as structural elements of social systems, are drawn upon by actors in the instantiation of 
interaction (1995: 49-50). The power relations sustained in the regularised practices 
constituting social systems can be considered as reproduced relations of autonomy and 
dependence in interaction (ibid.). Domination, on the other hand, understood here as the sway 
that actors have over others and over the material world they inhabit, then refers to the 
structured asymmetries of the resources drawn upon and reconstituted in such power relations 
(ibid.). This corresponds with Wendt‟s constructivist claim that the interests and capabilities 
of states are determined by the underlying social structure in which states are embedded and 
which, in Wendt‟s view, is “constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts” (1999: 97). 
As Holden points out, the proposition that agents and structures are co-constitutive is the 
essence of the „structuration principle‟ (2009: 12). This also includes the link between agency 
and purely structural power. To illustrate this, Holden refers to how the global economic 
system after the World War II was largely shaped by U.S. agency, notably via its 
development of international economic governance institutions, European integration (cf. 
Marshall plan) and Japan‟s economic recovery (ibid.). In other words, the U.S. developed a 
system “whose structural qualities would privilege” the role of the U.S. (ibid.). An additional 
theoretical insight in considering the relationship between structure and agency and how they 
interact, can be derived from Young (1991). As already mentioned, according to Young, the 
essential feature of what he labels „structural leadership‟ lies in the ability to translate 
structural power into bargaining leverage as a means of reaching agreement (1991: 288-289). 
Young adds that “it makes sense to view the link between structural power and bargaining 
leverage as stemming from the existence of asymmetries among the participants or 
stakeholders in processes of institutional bargaining” (ibid.). In addition, he asserts that 
“bargaining leverage is necessarily relational; the important thing is what an actor stands to 
lose or gain relative to what others stand to lose or gain from institutional bargaining” (ibid.). 
This serves to indicate that any examination of the outcomes in institutional bargaining “need 
to rest on an assessment of the relative, in contrast to the absolute, circumstances of the 
participants”, i.e. of the relational in contrast to the structural level (Young, 1991: 289).  
As mentioned above, the juxtaposition of structure and agency is also overcome in 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan‟s (2008) conceptual study of EU foreign policy, in particular 
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through their understanding of how structural foreign policy complements and interacts with 
conventional foreign policy. However, their conceptual framework is also inspirational for the 
second key feature of TNPO, in that it identifies various structures, notably material structures 
(social-economic and security), institutional (political and legal), as well as mental (e.g. 
values, identity and culture) structures. Moreover, their framework enables an extension of 
the analysis of foreign policy beyond the (inter)state-level to include the transnational level, 
which involves, inter alia, business and civil society actors (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 
2008: 25-29). In addition, their approach suggests that it is not a matter of possessing or not 
possessing structural power, but rather a matter of „gradation‟. That is, they see their 
framework as a continuum with several gradations of structural foreign policy and structural 
power. As Keukeleire (2002) puts it: 
 
At one side of the continuum, an actor can possess structural power in the sense that this actor 
can indeed decide what the rules of the game are (with the other actor having only one option 
to choose). At the other side of the continuum an actor can possess only limited structural 
power in the sense that this actor can only influence to a limited extent the rules of the game 
that will be used by other actors. 
 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan‟s conceptual continuum ranges from a “high degree of 
structural foreign policy” to “absence of a structural foreign policy” (2008: 255-297). This 
conceptual gradation allowed them to observe that the intensity of the EU‟s structural foreign 
policy varies considerably from region to region, and that in some cases the extent of 
structural foreign policy towards these regions is rather limited or even completely absent.  
Having outlined the propositions and approaches that we find insightful for developing 
the TNPO model, let us now set out the framework. This should be viewed as an initial 
attempt to depict the way in which TNPO might be considered to operate and will be further 
explored, developed and possibly refined in the subsequent empirical chapters. In this sense, 
the TNPO model introduced in this chapter forms a starting point for the empirical 
exploration of the EU‟s influence vis-à-vis Central Asia, as well as for any possible further 
theoretical development as a result of that empirical investigation, in accordance with the 
iterative research approach outlined in the introductory chapter. Above all, the TNPO 
framework should be helpful in demonstrating how an actor such as the EU can rely on its 
TNPO to obtain a favourable outcome from a partner country (or region), which in turn 
strengthens the EU‟s TNPO. The framework thus assumes that relational and structural power 
are complementary, or even mutually dependent. To recapitulate the definition of TNPO, the 
notion helps to assess the degree to which an actor in the international realm wields power 
over another actor through his/her control over a constitutive mix of material, institutional and 
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ideational structures, which shape or set the context within which the other actor operates and 
in which the two relate with each other. As mentioned above, this definition only holds on the 
assumption that power, whether intentional or unintentional, active or passive, can be 
transnational in nature. This allows us to consider the observation that globalisation and 
interdependence have significantly blurred the divide between private and public, as well as 
between the distinct levels of governance (international, interregional, supranational, regional, 
national, local), to the point where transnational forces interact with or exist alongside 
traditional intergovernmental relationships. In turn, the word „degree‟ in the definition reflects 
an element of „variation‟. That is, the degree of TNPO that an actor wields may not only vary 
from country to country and from region to region, but is also likely to be subject to change 
over time. It follows that an actor‟s TNPO increases the more control s/he has across the three 
constitutive structures. Put differently, since TNPO consists of the combined effect of the 
actor‟s control over these three structures, his/her TNPO increases the more influential s/he is 
in each of them. By the same token, having only a limited control over a particular TNPO 
structure noticeably undermines the actor‟s overall TNPO. A further outline of the conditions 
under which TNPO occurs and operates is provided below. Let us now first have a look at the 
depiction of the TNPO model. 
 
Figure 2: TNPO framework 
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As depicted in the diagram (Figure 2), the TNPO framework identifies two broad 
phenomena of influence, thereby reflecting the production of a mutually enhancing effect. 
More in particular, the framework distinguishes between the relational (1) and the structural 
(2) sphere in which the power phenomena occur, whilst accounting for the interplay between 
the two spheres. Most centrally, the diagram depicts how an actor‟s TNPO derives from his 
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control over a constitutive mix of three structures (TNPO1, TNPO2 and TNPO3) and from the 
possible interaction between them (TNPO1-2, TNPO1-3, TNPO2-3 & TNPO1-2-3). The 
phenomenon depicted by the upper arrow then indicates how the actor‟s TNPO enables him, 
in the relational sphere, to obtain a favourable outcome from another actor (cf. definition of 
relational power: A‟s ability to get B to do something he would otherwise not do). At the 
relational level, the actor thus relies on his TNPO as a resource in order to affect a (political) 
outcome. Put differently, TNPO is translated into relational power. Usually, this process will 
involve bargaining of some sort. In turn, the phenomenon depicted by the lower arrow 
indicates how the desired outcome subsequently reinforces A‟s TNPO over actor B. This 
occurs at the structural level, since A‟s favourable outcome seeks to influence the context - 
i.e. the TNPO structures - within which actor B operates and in which he relates with A. In 
sum, agency and structure are depicted as being mutually constitutive. This also implies an 
element of „gradation‟ in the sense that the extent to which the obtained outcome is 
favourable to actor A depends on the degree to which he wields TNPO over B. In turn, the 
extent to which A‟s TNPO is reinforced by the obtained outcome equally depends on the 
degree to which the outcome is favourable to A. Of course, it is possible that another - 
unidentified - variable also contributes towards the attainment of the desired outcome. For 
instance, the occurrence of an unplanned event, which may suddenly improve political 
relations between the two parties, and which may thus positively affect the mood during the 
bargaining process. Other such unidentified variables may include aspects related to specific 
features of those involved in the bargaining process, such as strong leadership capabilities or 
personal relationships between negotiators. However, in view of presenting insights that are to 
some extent generalisable, the thesis needs to abstract political reality and therefore rules out 
the possible enabling impact of unidentified variables, and thus assumes that all else is held 
constant.
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 In other words, the thesis assumes that there is no enabling impact other than the 
effect of the identified independent variables.  
 
 
3.3.2.Conditions under which TNPO operates 
 
Before moving on to outline how the TNPO model will be used to examine the thesis‟s 
hypothesis, it is necessary to further specify some of the features of TNPO as well as the 
conditions under which TNPO occurs and operates. In doing so, this section partly draws on 
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the features that Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 27) attribute to their notion of 
„structural foreign policy‟. To begin with, the structures that an actor aims at influencing, 
shaping or creating in pursuit of TNPO are not only viable in the short run, but are equally 
sustainable in the long run (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 27). Moreover, because the 
actor needs to ensure that the TNPO structures have a relatively permanent quality, 
establishing or affecting these structures within which the other actor operates can be more 
difficult and can take more time than affecting the behaviour of that actor in a specific 
situation (ibid.) In addition, the actor‟s TNPO can only be effective and sustainable if it is 
comprehensive and if it simultaneously focuses on the various TNPO structures (material, 
institutional and ideational) and mechanisms of impact (both the transnational and 
intergovernmental channels). As pointed out by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, being 
comprehensive requires the use of a wide range of instruments (2008: 27). The latter 
condition, together with the condition that TNPO requires a sustained effort over the long 
term, indicates why the EU - more than individual states - is an apt actor to pursue TNPO.  
 As already pointed out, an actor‟s TNPO increases the more control s/he has across the 
three constitutive structures. Put differently, it is the combined effect of his influence over the 
three constituent elements that makes up the his TNPO over the other actor and that 
determines the extent to which he is able to obtain a desired outcome from the other. Applied 
to the EU, this means that the more TNPO the EU has over a third country or region, (i) the 
easier it will be for the EU to obtain a desired outcome from this third party, and (ii) the more 
favourable the outcome will be for the EU. For instance, in a case where the EU‟s TNPO is 
very strong - with the EU being highly influential across the three TNPO structures -, the 
desired outcome will not only be easily obtained, the outcome will also be extremely 
favourable to the EU, in the sense that the third party accepts the EU‟s proposal on the table 
across the board. Conversely, in a case where the EU‟s TNPO is rather limited in scope - with 
the EU having only a significant sway over one or two of the TNPO structures -, the desired 
outcome will be more difficult to obtain and will be less favourable to the EU. That is, the 
third party is likely to ask the EU to make compromises, and may attempt to make pay-offs; 
the EU may have to downgrade the contents of the proposal, for instance by removing or 
reformulating „sensitive‟ issues.  
As a final step in presenting the TNPO concept, the next section will outline how 
exactly the TNPO model can be used to examine the thesis‟s central hypothesis. 
 
 
 
                                                               - 92 - 
 
3.3.3. Examining the hypothesis via the TNPO framework 
 
As noted above, TNPO essentially constitutes a form of agent-based structural power, in the 
sense that it encompasses actor A‟s capacity to affect, in line with A‟s interests, the context 
within which B operates and in which B relates with A. Applied to our topic of inquiry, this 
means that the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia constitutes a form of agent-based structural 
power, in the sense that it encompasses the EU‟s capacity to affect, in line with its interests, 
the context within which the Central Asian states operate and in which they relate with the 
EU. As will be indicated in the empirical chapters, the EU‟s policy towards Central Asia is 
shaped to a considerable extent by self-interest considerations, which suggests that the EU has 
clear interests in further accumulating TNPO over Central Asia. As will be shown in the next 
chapter, the EU‟s strategy for a new partnership with the region encapsulates the policy 
objectives deriving from these self-interest considerations. Taking that for granted, the aim of 
the empirical chapters is then to explore not „why‟, but „to what extent‟ the EU exercises and 
accumulates TNPO vis-à-vis Central Asia. More specifically, the aim is to use the TNPO 
framework in order to verify the viability of the thesis‟s hypothesis, which was previously 
formulated as follows: the EU‟s ability to rally the Central Asian republics behind its 
ambitious partnership initiative testifies to the EU‟s power projection over the region. This 
power projection draws on the EU‟s influential position across a combination of material, 
institutional and ideational structures. The EU‟s power, in turn, is reinforced through the 
course of the implementation of the EU‟s partnership initiative. By using the TNPO 
framework (see Figure 3, p.93), the hypothesis can be reformulated in the following way: the 
extent to which the EU wields TNPO over Central Asia has enabled the EU to conclude an 
ambitious partnership with the five Central Asian states, which in turn reinforces the EU‟s 
TNPO over Central Asia. In verifying the viability of this proposition via the TNPO model, 
the first step is then to examine in concrete to what extent the EU‟s power over Central Asia 
effectively derives from a combination of material, institutional and ideational structures and 
the overlap between them. To do so, we will draw extensively on our TNPO toolbox (see 
Figure 1, p.51) in order to trace and evaluate intergovernmental and transnational mechanisms 
of EU impact across the three TNPO structures. The second step consists of examining to 
what extent the EU‟s TNPO has enabled the EU to conclude the partnership with the five 
Central Asian republics. In concrete, this means that we need to evaluate (i) to what extent the 
obtaining of the „desired outcome‟, i.e. the partnership, was facilitated by the EU‟s TNPO, 
and (ii) to what extent the outcome is favourable to the EU. The third and final step is then to 
assess whether and to what extent the obtained outcome, i.e. the partnership, in its turn 
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reinforces the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. To that end, we need to evaluate (i) to what 
extent the EU Strategy is being successfully implemented and (ii) to what extent the 
implementation of the strategy enhances the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. In order to assess 
to what extent the EU‟s control over the three TNPO structures is further strengthened, we 
will again use the TNPO toolbox (Figure 1, p.51) to trace and evaluate intergovernmental and 
transnational pathways of EU impact. 
 
Figure 3: Examination of the hypothesis via the TNPO framework 
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 As depicted in Figure 3, the TNPO framework allows us to account for the distinction 
between the relational (=1) and the structural (=2) level on which the EU‟s power over 
Central Asia operates, as well as for the interplay between the two levels. The upper arrow 
depicts the translation of the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia into a desired outcome, notably 
the launch of a partnership with Central Asia. In turn, the lower arrow depicts how the 
implementation of the partnership initiative subsequently reinforces the EU‟s TNPO over the 
region, notably by further shaping and affecting the context - i.e. the TNPO structures - within 
which the Central Asian states operate and relate with the EU. 
 
 
3.4. Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has sought to offer a structurally integrative approach in its search for a 
conceptual tool and framework that are more adequate to study the EU‟s power over Central 
Asia than those offered by the prevailing theoretical perspectives (neorealism, rationalist and 
sociological institutionalism, and constructivism). In particular, the aim of the chapter was to 
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introduce an analytical approach that allows the thesis to challenge the consensual scholarly 
expectation of low EU impact in Central Asia. However, rather than bluntly rejecting the 
predominant theoretical perspectives, the chapter in fact suggested to incorporate some of the 
theories‟ propositions in developing a model that combines elements from agent-focussed 
approaches with insights from structural perspectives, notably from new realist IPE and EU 
external governance perspectives. As such, the chapter thus worked eclectically with 
arguments drawn, on the one hand, from neorealism, neo-institutionalism and constructivism, 
and on the other, from the EU external governance literature and new realist IPE. In doing so, 
it took into account the five theoretical building blocks presented in the previous chapter. 
Central to the thesis‟s theoretical argument is the claim that an analysis of power, in casu an 
analysis of the EU‟s power over Central Asia, needs to account for the distinction between the 
relational and the structural level on which power operates, as well as for the interplay 
between the two levels. To account for this, the chapter introduced a conceptual tool - and 
corresponding model -, which it labelled „transnational power over‟ (TNPO). Rather than 
being a theory, TNPO provides a conceptual frame that serves to broaden and, arguably 
enhance, our understanding of the EU‟s power over the Central Asian states, and over third 
countries in general. The concept is an analytically eclectic device, which serves to assess the 
degree to which, in today‟s globalised and interdependent world, the EU‟s power over third 
countries derives from its control over a constitutive mix of material, institutional and 
ideational structures, making it difficult for the EU‟s partners to resist its initiatives or reject 
its offers. The element of „transnational‟, as suggested by the term, is a crucial part of the 
TNPO concept in that the notion assumes that power, whether intentional or unintentional, 
active or passive, can be transnational in nature. In order to trace and assess transnational and 
intergovernmental mechanisms of EU impact across the three TNPO structures and their 
respective overlap, the chapter constructed a toolbox, which centres on three analytical 
distinctions: (i) EU-driven versus domestically driven mechanisms, (ii) mechanisms based on 
rationalist logics of action versus mechanisms following constructivist logics of action, and 
(iii) agent-based versus purely structural mechanisms of TNPO. Once the TNPO concept had 
been fully defined and dissected, the chapter proceeded to integrate it into a framework of 
analysis. In sum, the chapter argued that the TNPO concept and corresponding model is 
useful for the following reasons: 
 Whilst assuming that structures provide an „enabling‟ environment, the TNPO model 
defines power as context-shaping. 
 In considering the importance of structural factors, the TNPO model accounts for both 
the relational and the structural level on which power is exercised, whilst capturing the 
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dialectical relationship between the two levels. As such, the TNPO model presents 
structure and agency as being mutually constituent. 
 The TNPO concept works eclectically with on the one hand rigorous, parsimonious 
approaches, and on the other, structuralist approaches. 
 The TNPO concept strikes the right balance between on the one hand neorealist 
approaches that preclude any role for normative factors, and on the other, social 
constructivist (or sociological institutionalist) approaches that undermine the impact of 
material factors by being preoccupied exclusively with the EU‟s normative objectives 
(e.g. democracy promotion). 
 
Having presented the theoretical part of the thesis, the aim is now to empirically explore the 
thesis‟s theoretical claim. This is the subject of the following chapters. 
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PART TWO – THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ‘TRANSNATIONAL POWER 
OVER’ CENTRAL ASIA 
 
Chapter 4 – Contextual background: the EU’s motives and limits for 
accumulating TNPO over Central Asia 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Ahead of the empirical analysis of the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia, it is useful to start the 
empirical part of the thesis with a broad overview of the contextual background of the EU‟s 
engagement with the Central Asian republics. This chapter therefore aims to shed light on the 
EU‟s involvement in Central Asia, illuminating the Union‟s interests and presence in the 
region since the countries‟ independence from the former Soviet Union until the launch of the 
EU Strategy in June 2007. In doing so, the chapter seeks to highlight the underlying motives 
of the EU‟s pursuit of TNPO vis-à-vis the Central Asian states. At the same time, the chapter 
identifies a number of „countervailing factors‟. In further explaining the „context‟, it indicates 
that the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia might be hampered - possible weakened - by the 
intervening effects of a series of countervailing forces, which may relate both to internal 
factors, i.e. intrinsic to the EU, and external factors, i.e. extrinsic to the EU. 
The chapter shows that post-Soviet Central Asia remained outside of the EU‟s main 
sphere of interest until the early 2000s, tucked away in the outskirts of Europe‟s eastern 
periphery. This lack of interest was reflected in the relatively low level of EU engagement 
with 1990s post-Soviet Central Asia. Moreover, European aid provided to the five Central 
Asian states was considerably lower than the means given by the EU to the other countries of 
the former Soviet bloc. In 2001, the Union even intended to reduce its assistance to Central 
Asia. However, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September and the launch by the United 
States of its large-scale military operation in neighbouring Afghanistan, the region was 
suddenly put in the spotlight, revealing its geostrategic importance. This therefore provided an 
initial trigger for increased European political interest in this peripheral zone. The second part 
of the chapter, in turn, points to the existence and impact of countervailing forces that may 
mediate the EU‟s TNPO over the Central Asian countries. Indeed, the EU‟s TNPO  might be 
hampered - possible weakened - by the intervening effects of a series of countervailing forces. 
These relate both to internal factors, i.e. intrinsic to the EU, and external factors, i.e. extrinsic 
to the EU. The group of external countervailing forces consists of factors that are intrinsic to 
the third party, in casu the Central Asian states, as well as factors that are extrinsic to them. 
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The chapter comprises two parts. The first part is structured chronologically, thereby 
identifying two stages of EU involvement in Central Asia in the period 1991-2007: a stage of 
relatively limited EU interest and involvement (1991-2000), and a stage of gradually 
increasing engagement as a result of the EU‟s growing geostrategic interests in the region 
(2001-2007). Culminating in the launch of an ambitious EU strategy for a partnership with 
Central Asia, this second stage indicates that the EU‟s policy towards the region has been 
increasingly shaped by self-interest. In light of the thesis‟s theoretical claim, this suggests that 
by 2007 the EU had clear interests in further accumulating TNPO over Central Asia. In turn, 
the second part of the chapter identifies countervailing factors that may mediate the EU‟s 
TNPO over the Central Asian countries, which relate both to endogenous and exogenous 
factors. 
 
 
4.2. The first decade of EU involvement in Central Asia: 1991-2000 
 
4.2.1. Early post-Soviet Central Asia: a non-priority for the EU 
 
This subsection discusses the EU‟s policies towards the former Soviet bloc in the wake of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. It shows that while the policies were designed to build ties 
with the former Soviet bloc countries and help them on the path of transition, they 
distinguished rather heavily between the different post-Soviet states. As such, the Central 
Asian republics received only a fraction of the attention paid by the EU to the group of former 
socialist countries. Above all, the limited involvement of the EU in 1990s Central Asia 
mirrored its scarce interests in this peripheral and rather unknown region.  
Following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the EU conducted a conceptual 
redivision of the former Soviet bloc. In practice, this implied that the EU formulated two 
distinct policy agendas for two very different groups of countries, closely reflecting the EU‟s 
foreign policy priorities at the time. On the one hand, the Union extended the already existing 
assistance programmes „Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies‟ 
(PHARE) to those countries in Central and Eastern Europe likely to join the EU in the 
medium-to-long term, notably Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. These states were not only geographically closer to the EU, but 
they were also more dependent on the Union in comparison with the other countries of the 
former Soviet bloc. Moreover, and partly as a result of this, they were also more inclined to 
comply with the conditions imposed by the EU. On the other hand, the Union created a new 
assistance programme for the remaining group of former Soviet states, i.e. „Technical 
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Assistance for the Common Wealth of Independent States‟ (TACIS).88 Both PHARE and 
TACIS provided technical and financial assistance to support these countries‟ transition 
towards market economies and democracies. However, the PHARE beneficiaries received 
more than double the amount spent on the TACIS programme.
89
 This clearly indicates that 
Central and Eastern Europe was much more important for the EU‟s 1990s foreign policy than 
the other countries of the former Soviet bloc (Hughes, 2007: 76-96). In addition, the EU also 
made a clear categorisation within the group of TACIS beneficiaries, with Russia and the 
Ukraine being prioritised over the others and receiving around 50% of the total TACIS 
budget.  
 As a next step in its conceptual redivision of the former Soviet bloc, the EU 
institutionalised the policy-oriented disconnection of Central and Eastern Europe from Russia 
and the other former soviet bloc countries. It did so by concluding „Europe Agreements‟ with 
the Central and Eastern European candidate member states and Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs) with the TACIS beneficiaries countries, including the Central Asian 
countries. While the Europe Agreements were aimed at integrating the partner countries into 
the EU, the PCAs served mainly just to strengthen the EU‟s bilateral ties with the TACIS 
countries and to develop broad cooperation. Replacing the 1989 Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement with the Soviet Union, PCAs were concluded with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 
1995, and with Uzbekistan in 1996.
90
 A PCA was signed with Turkmenistan in 1998, but the 
agreement is not yet enforced as the ratification process remains frozen (see more below). The 
conclusion of a PCA with Tajikistan was delayed until 2004 due to the civil war and 
subsequent perceptions of instability (see more below).
91
 The overall goal of the PCAs was to 
provide a broad framework of economic and political cooperation with the former Soviet 
states, supporting them in their transition towards open market economies and political 
democracies. Yet, although the PCAs with the Central Asian countries provide for the 
establishment of political dialogue
92
, covering human rights, constitutional reform and 
regional issues, they are primarily economically and technically oriented, with their political 
and institutional framework being less elaborate than that of other PCAs, particularly those 
with Russia and Ukraine (Matveeva, 2006: 85; Petrov, 2002). Still, the PCAs with the Central 
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 The TACIS beneficiaries included Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
the five Central Asian states. 
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 In the period 1990-1999, the EU spent ca. EUR 10,200 m. on PHARE and EUR 4,200 m. on TACIS (Hughes, 
2007).  
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 These three PCAs entered into force in July 1999 for an initial period of ten years, automatically renewable on 
an annual basis thereafter. 
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 The PCA with Tajikistan entered into force in January 2010. Previously, an Interim Agreement on Trade and 
Trade-related Matters between the EU and Tajikistan had been in force since May 2005. 
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 As we will see in more detail in chapter 6, the PCAs provide for three political dialogue structures, the 
„Cooperation Council‟, the „Cooperation Committee‟ and the „Parliamentary Cooperation Committee‟. 
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Asian republics provide the legal basis for cooperation across a wide range of sectors, 
including trade, economic cooperation, legislative approximation to EU norms and standards, 
and improvement of the business and investment climate. 
 In sum, the EU‟s conceptual redivision of the former Soviet bloc in the 1990s meant 
that the former Soviet states - except for the three Baltic states - were placed in the category 
of „outsiders‟. These states were to constitute the EU‟s eastern periphery, with whom 
contractual relations would not go beyond the level of „partnership‟. Situated at the most 
outward point of this eastern periphery, the Central Asian republics triggered only little 
interest from Brussels throughout the 1990s, even less so since the EU considered Central 
Asia as the most backward region in the former Soviet Union, and as the least inclined to 
adopt European norms and values (Kassenova, 2007). Indeed, while the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and 
Uzbek leaderships were enthusiastic about forging stronger relations with the EU when 
signing the EU-initiated PCAs, their enthusiasm was only marginally reciprocated, especially 
as the EU‟s political engagement with the region remained low-key. 
 
 
4.2.2. Generous but invisible 
 
 
The EU may well have provided relatively small amounts of assistance to Central Asia in 
comparison with its aid to other parts of the former Soviet bloc; nevertheless, the Union has 
grown out to be the largest donor in Central Asia (Djalili & Kellner, 2008). At the same time, 
however, the EU‟s engagement with the region remained low in terms of visibility. Moreover, 
assessments of the impact of the EU‟s assistance programmes were mixed. Other donors in 
Central Asia, including the U.S. and the UN, were also criticised for the limited impact of 
their aid programmes, but they did not suffer from the same lack of visibility as the EU did.  
The European Commission opened its first delegation office in Central Asia in 1994, 
in Almaty, the then capital of Kazakhstan. The delegation was charged with implementing 
part of the EU‟s technical and financial assistance in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.
93
 Later on, the Commission opened a regionalised office in Bishkek and in 
Dushanbe, supervised by a chargé d‟affaires and subject to the head delegation in 
Kazakhstan.
94
 At the time, the Commission was already represented in Dushanbe, through the 
Central Asian office of the European Commission Humanitarian Office‟s (ECHO). This 
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 In 2006, the Commission moved the head office of the Delegation to Astana, Kazakhstan‟s new capital, with 
the remaining desks in Almaty functioning as a regional office. 
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 The office in Dushanbe opened in May 2004. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 
2009, the Commission delegation in Kazakhstan as well as the regionalised offices in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
became fully accredited „EU Delegations‟, each headed by an EU ambassador. 
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regional office opened in 1993 in order to coordinate the EU‟s provision of humanitarian aid 
to Tajikstan and Kyrgyzstan. ECHO assistance was generally provided to the most vulnerable 
parts of the population, usually living in disaster-prone areas, and consisted, among other 
things, of drugs, food and medical supplies.
95
 In Kyrgyzstan, humanitarian aid was provided, 
for instance, in 1994 and 1995 to help people after floods and earthquakes. In Tajikistan, 
ECHO assistance was delivered throughout the civil war, which lasted from 1992 until 1997, 
unlike TACIS, which was halted after only a few months due to security risks owing to the 
start of the war in 1992. By 1995, the domestic situation was deemed safe enough for TACIS 
to resume. From 1996 onwards, the Central Asian states have also been beneficiaries of the 
ECHO programme „Disaster Preparedness ECHO‟ (DIPECHO), designed for natural disaster 
preparedness. After the Tajik civil war, the EU continued to deliver humanitarian aid to 
Tajikistan, supplemented with technical assistance under TACIS and other aid programmes.
96
 
As an instrument introduced shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, TACIS 
was designed to “promote the transition to a market economy and to reinforce democracy and 
the rule of law in the partner States” (Council, 1999). TACIS in 1990s Central Asia was 
mostly aimed at economic development, capacity building of government services and  
poverty reduction (European Commission, 2002). From 1994 onwards, TACIS was also used 
to fund Tempus projects in Central Asia, aimed at supporting the modernisation of higher 
education through cooperation with universities from EU Member States. Apart from TACIS 
and ECHO, a range of other EC instruments were introduced in the 1990s to assist the Central 
Asian countries. Local NGOs and media, for instance, have been sponsored through the 
European Initiative (now Instrument) for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), although 
the number of projects remained scarce until the mid-2000s. In turn, food security aid has 
been provided through the „Food Security Programme‟. Moreover, the EU has been delivering 
macro-financial assistance. This has included one-off targeted assistance for the impact of the 
1998 Russian economic crisis. In addition, the five Central Asian countries were granted 
preferential access to the EU‟s market under its „Generalised System of Preferences‟ (GSP).  
Next to these national assistance programmes, the EU established a number of 
regional and transboundary programmes, dealing with transport, energy, environmental issues 
and drugs trafficking. Two of these programmes even go beyond the region of Central Asia 
                                                 
95
 International Crisis Group (2006) reports that between 1992 and 2004 Tajikistan was given around EUR 155 
million in humanitarian aid for public health, food security, and transport issues (aviation, security, road and rail, 
and infrastructure) and sanitation.  Between 1992 and 1999, Kyrgyzstan was given EUR 20 million in assistance 
from ECHO. 
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 However, due to a deadly incident involving a TACIS expert who had been kidnapped, the EU‟s technical 
assistance to Tajikistan was suspended from 1998 until 2000. The other assistance programmes, including 
ECHO, EIDHR and FSP, remained operational. 
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and encompass other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and in 
particular countries bordering the Black and Caspian Seas. The first region-wide programme 
was the „Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia‟ (TRACECA), established at a conference 
in Brussels in 1993. The programme foresees the construction of a vast east-west corridor 
connecting the EU to the three South Caucasus and five Central Asian states via the Black and 
Caspian Seas. It provides both technical aid and infrastructure rehabilitation projects, adding 
up to a value of EUR 110 million in 1993-2002. In turn, the „Interstate Oil and Gas Transport 
to Europe‟ programme (INOGATE) was established in the mid-1990s as part of EU efforts to 
strengthen its energy security. The programme is based on an umbrella agreement concerning 
the integration of oil and gas transport systems, signed by no less than 21 countries. An EC 
regional programme that is exclusive to Central Asia is the „Central Asia Drugs Action 
Programme‟ (CADAP), originally a French initiative launched after a 1996 declaration by 
President Chirac. Following French promotion and assessment efforts, the programme was 
adopted by the Commission, which established CADAP in early 2001. Aimed at supporting 
the Central Asian states at fighting drugs trafficking across their borders, CADAP comprises 
“legal advice, training, strengthening law enforcement capacities, forensics and intelligence 
gathering together with preventative measures, such as anti-drug projects in prisons” 
(Matveeva, 2006: 88-89).  
With EU assistance between 1991 and 2002 totalling around EUR 944 million, the EU 
grew out to be the largest donor in the region (European Commission, 2002: 12). However, 
this cumulative amount conceals the paradox that, despite being the most generous donor in 
the region, the Union was a rather invisible development actor in Central Asia, especially in 
comparison with other donors, including the U.S., the UN and Asian and Muslim 
development agencies. Moreover, assessments of the impact of the EU‟s assistance 
programmes were mixed. One of the problems was the breadth of the objectives and 
programmes, which negatively affected the time delivery, effectiveness and follow-up of the 
projects (European Commission, 2002). Another obstacle was that reform in the Central 
Asian states was slower than in most other CIS countries, amongst other things due to limited 
administrative and technical capacity. Crucially, this indicated that the Central Asian states 
faced problems that went beyond matters of „transition‟ for which TACIS was not adequately 
equipped. As a first step in accommodating for the special needs of the Central Asian 
countries, the Commission introduced its Food Security Programme to the region in 1996 to 
address problems of inadequate access to food in impoverished parts of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. The programme is based primarily on the provision of budget support to ministries 
and government agencies to implement reforms, in particular in the areas of agriculture, social 
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protection and state statistical agencies. However, many donors concur that there are serious 
limits to budget support when used for promoting reform in a poor country such as Tajikistan 
(International Crisis Group, 2006: 16). Following an extensive review of its assistance to the 
region, the Commission acknowledged and addressed many of the shortcomings of its 
assistance, both in relation to limited effectiveness and to limited visibility, as envisaged in its 
Regional Strategy Paper for Central Asia for the period 2002-2006 (European Commission, 
2002). Amongst other things, the Commission responded to the need to concentrate its 
assistance on a much more limited number of priorities and programmes and to strengthen 
dialogue, both on regional cooperation and on TACIS priorities, including through the PCA 
dialogue mechanisms (ibid.). 
 
 
4.3. From an invisible donor to a strategic player: 2001-2007 
 
In the political and diplomatic sphere, the EU was even more invisible than it was in its 
aiddelivery. Between 1991 and the early 2000s, EU diplomatic activity in the region was 
limited to the visits of only a handful of European officials. This further confirms the 
observation that 1990s Central Asia hardly appeared on the radar of the EU and its Member 
States. In what follows, we will see that the terrorist attacks of 11 September and the 
subsequent launch of the military operation in Afghanistan suddenly drew European attention 
to the region. Nevertheless, it took until 2004 before the EU as a whole woke up to the fact 
that relations with Central Asia needed to be intensified and that it had to become a more 
visible actor in this geostrategically significant region.
97
 
 The terrorist attacks of 11 September and the subsequent launch of the military 
campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan were a turning point in how the EU viewed 
Central Asia. In granting a new geostrategic importance to the Central Asian states, these 
events mobilised the political will in the EU to increase funding for and enhance engagement 
with the region, including in fields related to the EU‟s security. Following on from the 
Council conclusions of 17 October and 19 November 2001 and the EU Troika visit at 
Ministerial level to Central Asia, the General Affairs Council of 10 December 2001 called for 
a strengthening of relations with the region, inter alia, by enhancing “political dialogue with 
all countries in Central Asia” and by “targeting assistance to a reduced number of priority 
areas, including poverty reduction, social and economic development, good governance, 
environment and water management” (Council, 2001a). Moreover, the Council stated that 
action needed to be considered concerning border control and border management, and that 
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full use of CADAP needed to be taken to combat drug trafficking in the region (ibid.). 
Accordingly, the European Commission‟s Central Asia Strategy Paper for 2002-2006 
stipulates that the core objectives of assistance for the region comprise the promotion of 
stability and security, and support to the five countries in their pursuit of sustainable 
economic development and poverty reduction (European Commission, 2002: 17). In 2002,  
the Commission opened a „Europa House‟ in Tashkent in order to coordinate the EU‟s 
assistance programmes in Uzbekistan, but as a liaison office, the Europa House has no formal 
authority. The new Strategy Paper focused on three priority areas: (i) support for institutional, 
legal and administrative reform, (ii) management of natural resources and development of 
infrastructure networks, and (iii) support in addressing the social consequences of transition. 
An important goal of the 2002-2006 Strategy Paper was to focus the TACIS bilateral 
programmes on “poverty reduction policies and programmes and on key trade and investment 
reforms in convergence with the EU while promoting civil society and democratisation” 
(European Commission, 2007a: 16-17). To this end, a large component of the bilateral 
programmes consisted of „Small Project Programmes‟, including policy advice projects, civil 
society support programmes (IBPP), Managers‟ Training programme, Customs, Statistics, 
Tempus and EIDHR (ibid.). By using a regional strategy paper, encompassing cooperation 
with the entire region, rather than individual country strategy papers, the Commission 
introduced a new framework for assistance to the Central Asian states through a regional 
approach in order to respond more adequately to the challenges faced by the region, as well as 
to increase effectiveness, coherence and the overall impact of the assistance (European 
Commission, 2007a: 17). The approach reflected the extent to which the Commission 
struggled with ongoing debates over how to perceive Central Asia, i.e. as a unified region or 
as five distinct countries. However, once the implementation of the projects under the new 
framework was well under way, the Commission soon discovered the flaws of the new 
approach. On the one hand, it realised that in being involved in small-scale projects across a 
very wide range of areas, its assistance was still too broad and too scattered, which negatively 
affected the coordination and effectiveness of the overall impact.
98
 On the other hand, the 
Commission realised that the regional dimension of the new approach, whilst very suitable for 
certain issue areas, was overemphasised, and that, as a result, its approach was not sufficiently 
adapted to the reality on the ground.
99
 These shortcomings were gradually addressed by 
responding more readily to the individual needs and situation of the five countries and were 
fully taken into account in the formulation of the next strategy paper. Indeed, as we shall see 
                                                 
98
 Author‟s interviews at the regional office of the (then) Commission delegation in Almaty on 19 May 2008 and 
at the head office of the (then) Commission delegation in Astana on 28 May 2008. 
99
 Ibid. 
                                                               - 104 - 
 
in more detail below, the current EC Strategy Paper for Central Asia, i.e. for the period 2007-
2013, pursues a more balanced dual track of bilateral and regional cooperation, pursuing a 
regional approach for problems occurring across or involving all five countries, including 
water resources management, transport infrastructure and anti-drugs trafficking, whilst 
following a bilateral, tailor-made approach for individual national issues. Moreover, 
cooperation is now focused on a limited number of „focal sectors‟, including rule of law and 
education.  
Not to forget, the EU‟s TACIS assistance under the 2002-2006 Strategy Paper also 
made several notable and durable achievements, including in the areas of institutional 
capacity and governance, and trade and development. In this regard, the EU‟s technical 
assistance was particularly effective in issues related to regulatory reforms. Independent 
evaluations indeed showed that TACIS made a significant contribution to regulatory 
convergence and legislative approximation in those areas (see e.g. DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG, 
2006). Moreover, the Commission launched the programme „Border Management in Central 
Asia‟ (BOMCA) in 2003, designed to strengthen border management and facilitate legal trade 
and transit between the five countries.
100
 Nevertheless, although boosted by the 2001 events, 
the EU‟s interest in the region remained relatively limited, and was mainly concentrated with 
the Commission and those member states that had troops stationed in the region, including 
France and Germany. In support of NATO‟s military campaign in Afghanistan, the latter two 
had opened a military base in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan respectively. A new and arguably 
stronger impetus came from the EU‟s eastern enlargement in 2004 and the inclusion of the 
three South Caucasian countries into the ENP. As this brought Central Asia geographically 
closer to the EU („the neighbours of our neighbours‟)101, this second call for intensified ties 
with the Central Asian states should be placed against the background of the EU‟s overall 
concern with bringing stability and prosperity to its borderland states (see e.g. Kassenova, 
2007, 2008). As laid down in the European Security Strategy of 2003, the latter is crucial if 
the Union is to safeguard its own security (Council, 2003). An important part of the EU‟s 
response to face security threats in Central Asia are the BOMCA and CADAP programmes. 
In May 2004, the Commission decided to link BOMCA to CADAP, and merged the two 
programmes into one policy framework, which “represents the practical expression of the 
EU‟s strategic interest in supporting the security and stability of the Central Asian region”.102 
Later that year, the Commission, together with fifteen states from the Black Sea and Caspian 
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regions, launched the „Baku Process‟, a ministerial-level initiative that links up with 
TRACECA and INOGATE. Participants pledged to hold regular ministerial conferences on 
energy and transport, and discuss increased harmonisation of the two sectors.
103
 The initiative 
revealed the EU‟s interest in integrating Central Asian states in broader EU policies pursued 
under the ENP to support regional cooperation and integration.  
A third - related - impetus for increased engagement with Central Asia was triggered 
by the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan 
in May 2005. Both events crushed European hopes of successful colourful revolutions taking 
place in Central Asia following such events in the Ukraine and Georgia.
104
 As such, the EU 
recognised that stability in the region was frail and that genuine democracy and good 
governance would not emerge in Central Asia without increased external involvement.
105
 In 
addition, the need to become more active in the region gained further urgency because of the 
growing risk that the precarious situation in Afghanistan - where NATO was (and is) still 
struggling to contribute to peace and security - could destabilise the Central Asian 
neighbouring countries. At this point, the EU came to acknowledge that it was time to take 
new measures, recognising that the outcome of TACIS in Central Asia, although generally 
beneficial, fell somewhat short of expectations (see e.g. De Pedro, 2009). In particular, the EU 
realised that despite being the largest donor in the region, its involvement had so far had a 
limited effect, both in terms of the transformation of the countries and in terms of the 
enhancement of the EU‟s influence and visibility. A first step in increasing the EU‟s political 
engagement with and visibility in the region came in July 2005 with the appointment of a EU 
Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia.
106
 His task is to coordinate the EU‟s 
activities in the region as well as to further develop a EU policy for Central Asia in close 
cooperation with the Council. Moreover, in representing the EU in the region, his function is 
to strengthen the Union‟s diplomatic ties with the Central Asian states and other relevant 
actors operating in the region (Quigley, 2007). A second move to enhance political 
engagement followed in March 2007, with the formal establishment of the „EU Troïka - 
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wake of the overthrow of President Bakijev earlier in the year. 
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Central Asia‟, an annual meeting at foreign ministerial level between the EU and the five 
Central Asian republics. This regional political dialogue setting is quite unique, in that it is 
currently the only international forum where all five Central Asian states are formally 
reunited at such a high political level. The forum already existed informally since December 
2004, established as a follow up to the visit of then Commissioner for External Relations, 
Chris Patten, to Central Asia in March 2004.
107
 The overall aim was to reunite the five 
countries around one table and contribute to building confidence and mutual trust between 
them. The forum also served to support the Commission‟s regional assistance strategy, 
enabling the Commission to discuss issues of common concern directly with the countries. 
A final incentive for stronger ties with Central Asia emerged from the gas conflict 
between Russia and the Ukraine in early 2006, which revealed the need for the EU to scale 
back its energy dependency on Russia. The EU‟s search for alternative oil and gas suppliers 
quickly led it to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which were both viewed as potential partners 
in the EU‟s attempt to diversify its energy supplies. Related to this, enhanced EU involvement 
in the region was also necessary in order to counterbalance the strong influence of the 
region‟s big neighbours, Russia and China. A monopolisation of Central Asia by both states 
was to be avoided, because it would jeopardise not only the EU‟s chances of getting direct 
access to the region‟s energy resources but also the Central Asian countries‟ - already slow - 
progress towards genuine democracy and political pluralism. At this point, the EU came to 
acknowledge the need to devise a strategic document that would support and enhance the 
EU‟s role in Central Asia in line with its interests. Officially tasked by the European Council 
in December 2006 to draft an EU political strategy for Central Asia, Germany seized its 
presidency of the EU in the first six months of 2007 as an opportunity to use its political 
weight in the Union and its strong ties with the Central Asian countries in order to step up the 
EU‟s relations with the region and launch an ambitious strategy for a partnership. Endorsed 
by the European Council in Brussels on 22 June 2007, the final version of the Strategy was 
presented to the Central Asian states at the EU Troïka - Central Asia meeting in Berlin on 30 
June 2007, the last day of the German Presidency. Reflecting an attempt to develop a 
comprehensive and long-term approach to upgrade relations with Central Asia, the Strategy 
provides a framework for enhanced cooperation, building inter alia on the existing PCAs and 
outlining joint goals to foster closer relations in the political, economic, and trade, as well as 
cultural and educational spheres. As mentioned above, the document presents both a bilateral 
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 Before March 2007, the forum had met four times: in Bishkek in December 2004, in Brussels in June 2005, 
and in Almaty in April and June 2006. While the first three rounds were held at political directors level, the latter 
one was held at ministerial level. The items on the agenda included trade and economic cooperation, justice and 
home affairs (migration and drug trafficking) and environment and water management (Matveeva, 2006: 90-91). 
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and a regional dimension of cooperation, taking into account the lessons learnt from its 
previous assistance initiatives. The regional pillar aims specifically at cooperation on cross-
boundary issues, including anti-drugs trafficking, water management, energy and transport. 
The bilateral dimension, in turn, allows for a more „tailor-made‟ cooperation with the five 
republics, which specifically considers the countries‟ individual needs. This carefully 
considered balance between the regional and bilateral pillar of cooperation is also reflected in 
the EC Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013, which 
provides a substantial support to the Strategy. The „Development Cooperation Instrument‟ 
(DCI), the Commission‟s new development aid instrument, was scheduled to replace TACIS 
in Central Asia in 2007 as part of a major overhaul of EC external assistance.
108
 However, due 
to several delays in the implementation of a number of EC projects in Central Asia, TACIS 
remained operative after 2007 until all the projects were completed. To implement the 
Strategy, the Commission more than doubled its budget for the region, and released plans to 
have a fully accredited delegation in each of the five countries. Additional funding comes 
from a number of EU member states, which have committed themselves to launch new 
projects under the framework of the Strategy. France and Germany, for instance, are the lead 
coordinators in developing the „EU Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia‟, which aims at 
supporting reforms and sharing experiences between the EU and the Central Asian Republics 
in the area of legal and judicial reforms. Progress of the implementation of the Strategy is 
discussed annually with the Central Asian foreign ministers at the EU Troïka - Central Asia. 
To summarise, while the EU‟s overall engagement with Post-Soviet Central Asia long 
remained limited, the past decade has seen the EU‟s role in the region gradually evolve from 
that of little more than an invisible and arguably ineffective donor to that of a full-fledged 
external actor. The EU‟s desire to attain a greater presence and visibility in Central Asia 
culminated in the launch of an ambitious EU strategy towards the region, which the Union 
hopes will lead to a comprehensive partnership, encompassing enhanced cooperation in the 
political, economic and trade, as well as cultural and educational spheres. 
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 The 2007 overhaul of EC external assistance implied that the more than 30 funding mechanisms were 
condensed into six: DCI, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), pre-accession 
assistance, stability instrument, humanitarian aid and macro-financial assistance. The DCI is now the EU‟s 
principal development instrument for development projects in partner countries, excluding Russia and the 
countries that fall under the ENP, which are now supported through ENPI. Nevertheless, building upon past and 
ongoing initiatives, including TRACECA and INOGATE, ENPI is also being used to finance a number of  large 
projects that involve Central Asian states alongside countries from the South Caucasus or Black Sea region. 
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4.4. Countervailing factors 
 
In further explaining the „context‟, this section points to the existence and impact of 
countervailing forces that may mediate the EU‟s TNPO over the Central Asian countries. 
Indeed, the EU‟s TNPO might be hampered - possible weakened - by the intervening effects 
of a series of countervailing forces. These relate both to internal factors, i.e. intrinsic to the 
EU, and external factors, i.e. extrinsic to the EU. The group of external countervailing factors 
includes factors that are intrinsic to the third party, in casu the Central Asian states. In 
outlining these contextual factors, this section starts with a brief comparative classification of 
the Central Asian states, with particular attention to their political regimes and the socio-
economic context.  
 
4.4.1. Comparative classification of the Central Asian states
109
 
 
4.4.1.1. Political regimes  
 
A cursory examination of political systems in Central Asia leads to one unmistakable 
conclusion: the region suffers from an acute democratic deficit.
110
 By any number of 
measures - those of Freedom House, the Voice and Accountability Scores of the World Bank, 
the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the various indicators in the Polity datasets - the states 
of Central Asia rank among the least liberal, open and democratic in the world. With the 
exception of Kyrgyzstan, which in the early 1990s was touted as an “island of democracy” in 
the region (Anderson, 1999), this has held true throughout Central Asians‟ experience as 
independent states. Any number of explanations - historical, cultural, socio-economic, elite 
dynamics, the external environment - can be invoked, indicating that the region‟s 
authoritarian regimes are “overdetermined”.111 However, while sharing a number of typical 
features, the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia differ in pluralism. Whereas 
Turkmenistan‟s and Uzbekistan‟s rank as extremely repressive, Kazakhstan‟s and Tajikistan‟s 
tend to be a bit “softer,” at times relying more on co-optation than outright coercion, whilst 
Kyrgyzstan has had moments of relative political liberalisation coupled with political 
instability linked to attempts by Presidents Askar Akaev (1991-2005) and Kurmanbek Bakiev 
(2005-2010) to impose stronger presidential rule. As such, some would classify the regimes 
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 This subsection is based on a draft version of Bossuyt & Kubicek (2011). 
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  In the wake of constitutional reforms and October 2010 elections in Kyrgyzstan that were judged free and 
fair by outside observers, Kyrgyzstan may emerge - again - as an oasis in an authoritarian desert. However, given 
the political and ethnic violence in the spring of 2010, it is far from certain that political stability, let alone 
democracy, is assured.  
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  For a useful review of various perspectives, see Kubicek (2010).  
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by dividing the region “into a more semi-authoritarian north-eastern tier and an authoritarian 
or even dictatorial governed south-western tier; the former consisting of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the latter of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan” (Warkotsch, 2009: 
249). 
Moreover, the Central Asian states - like many other new states - tend to struggle with 
the issue of “stateness”. Examples of “stateness” problems in the region are numerous: 
difficulties in constructing national mythologies to foster identification with the state (Marat, 
2008; Ilkhamov
 
, 2005); the 1992-1997 civil war in Tajikistan; sporadic ethnic violence 
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan that reached new heights in 2010;  political 
violence in Uzbekistan; and the persistence of corruption and „clan politics‟ that work against 
national unity and state capacity. The World Bank‟s Governance Indicators on political 
stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law all touch upon aspects of “stateness” 
and state capacity. As indicated in Table 1, scores for most Central Asian states -Kazakhstan 
being the main exception - are very low. Fears of internal conflict and instability, in turn, 
contribute to the lack of democracy in the region by giving the leaders a rationale - notably 
order and stability - to centralise authority and prevent the emergence of an opposition.  
 
  Table 1: Governance Indicators in Central Asia, as percentile rank among all countries 
                 Source: World Bank Governance Indicators; data initially retrieved for Bossuyt & Kubicek (2011) 
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 A particular aspect of stateness that can be observed in Central Asia - and which is 
equally common for new states - is a strong concern over sovereignty. Recognising the 
relative weakness of their states and having a natural desire to establish their states as 
recognised, empowered actors in the global agenda, state leaders in the region tend to be very 
touchy upon actions that threaten their sovereignty. In the early 1990s, concern with state-
building and sovereignty became an important preoccupation of the local regimes, precluding 
international cooperation even at a regional level. The clearest illustration is the “positive 
neutrality” stance of Turkmenistan (see e.g. Anceshi, 2008). After the so-called “colour 
revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003-2005, there was a renewed 
emphasis in the region on resisting outside pressure to support “sovereign democracy”, a 
Russian notion that found resonance in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan, where presidents were nervous about a repetition of Kyrgyzstan‟s 2005 “Tulip 
Revolution” in their countries (Isaacs, 2010; Fumagalli & Tordjman, 2010). 
Another typical - and arguably problematic - feature of the Central Asian countries‟ 
political landscape is that civil society remains a relatively weak political actor (see e.g. 
Adamson, 2002, 2003). True, a variety of organisations have emerged in Central Asia, often 
linked to mahallas (neighbourhood organisations), guilds, and waqfs (foundations) and mostly 
Islamic in nature, filling in to provide social services to people in need (ibid.). However, 
because of the dominance of clan structures and patronage politics, many associations (e.g. 
trade unions, business groups) are more interested in becoming a part of the system than 
pressing for political change. Many groups also tend to be apolitical and small in size, often 
more interested in working (and obtaining funds) from international partners than pressing an 
agenda against their Central Asian governments (Buxton, 2009). Those associations that do 
advocate more political issues such as human rights have found themselves repressed - as in 
the case of „Sunny Uzbekistan‟ in 2005-2006 (see e.g. Stevens, 2010) - or marginalised  - as 
in the case of the state-initiated National Commission for Democratization and Civil Society 
in Kazakhstan in 2004. Kyrgyzstan, however, is an exception in the region in that it has a 
relatively vibrant civil society. Yet, even there, civil society groups, especially western-
backed ones, have at times faced harassment or repression from the government.  
 
4.4.1.2. The socio-economic context  
 
Central Asia was traditionally the most underdeveloped region of the Soviet Union. With the 
exception of Kazakhstan - which was much more integrated into the Soviet industrial 
economy and which experienced steep economic growth in the 2000s -, the average level of 
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wealth remains markedly low. As demonstrated in Table 2, large numbers of Central Asians 
subsist on less than two dollars per day, revealing a very high degree of poverty. As indicated 
in the table, overall levels of prosperity in most states in the region compare unfavourably to 
those in other states in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and North Africa. In turn, the extent to 
which the five states differ in size and resource endowments largely corresponds with their 
difference in national wealth. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have no hydrocarbon resources, and 
are the poorest countries in the region. Uzbekistan has the largest population and has some 
gas reserves. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have substantial energy reserves, and are the most 
prosperous countries in Central Asia.  
 
Table 2:   Economic indicators in Central Asia 
Source: UN Human Development Report, 2009; data initially retrieved for Bossuyt & Kubicek (2011) 
 
 In contrast, the five countries differ much less with regard to their political economy.  
The overall inequality indicators for most Central Asian states may well compare favourably 
to those of the other countries listed in Table 2 (albeit still being high by continental European 
standards); however, control over the most valuable resources in all five Central Asian 
countries - hydrocarbons, pipelines, mines, power generation, large industrial enterprises - is 
subject to neo-patrimonial or patronage politics controlled by the president and his immediate 
family and clan. Political power in Central Asia is defined by the ability of leaders to control 
these patronage pyramids, which have been attributed as a hold-over of Soviet times, a result 
of economic shortages and an over-reliance of natural resources in the country‟s economic 
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profile, the weakness of formal political institutions and cultural practices in the region that 
pre-date Soviet rule (Collins, 2002, 2004, 2006; Ishiyama, 2002).  
 
 
4.4.2. Internal and external countervailing factors 
 
The above comparative classification of the Central Asian countries suggests that the 
domestic context of the five states may pose limits to the EU‟s TNPO over the region. Indeed, 
several of these contextual factors, such as the authoritarian nature of the regimes, may indeed 
be expected to act as intervening variables constraining the scope of the EU‟s TNPO. Clan 
politics in the Central Asian states, for instance, may pose limits to what the EU can do in 
terms of democratisation in the region, as it rests upon unelected and unaccountable informal 
institutions, shuts off would-be rivals from economic (and thereby political) resources, and 
often operates  in opposition to the rule of law. The problem in Central Asia is not so much 
inequality per se, but the structures set up by the authorities to perpetuate that inequality to 
their advantage. Market-based reform – i.e. one of the goals promoted by the EU (see Chapter 
5) – is very limited unless new economic elites emerge to challenge the status quo, as high-
value sectors continue to be reserved for those who have demonstrated loyalty to the 
president. The EU‟s reform-based agenda is thus likely to encounter such limits given the 
elites‟ interest in preserving patronage networks and a more personalised approach to politics. 
Another example of the possible constraining impact of the domestic context relates to the 
states‟ resource endowments, which could affect the ability of the EU to encourage political 
change in the countries concerned. Larger states with more resources - i.e. Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan - will, ceteris paribus, likely be less susceptible to pressure from the EU than 
smaller states with fewer resources - i.e. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
In addition, however, we may also expect an intervening - possibly weakening  - 
impact on the EU‟s TNPO from factors that go beyond the countries‟ domestic context, such 
as the EU‟s complex institutional set-up and its conflicted nature (e.g. diverging preferences 
of EU Member States), or the strong competition that the EU encounters in the region from 
Russia and China. Hence, the thesis argues that any account of the EU‟s TNPO must be true 
to how the EU‟s power might be mediated – possibly weakened – by contextual factors. In 
accounting for the possible intervening impact of countervailing factors, the thesis 
distinguishes between “internal countervailing factors” and “external countervailing factors”. 
The former are factors that are intrinsic to the EU, such as the nature of the European 
Commission as a slow, bureaucratic actor, or the fact that EU competence on Central Asian 
affairs is a shared competence and hence subject to impact from disagreement between the 
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Member States based on their diverging preferences. „External‟ countervailing factors, in turn, 
are factors that are extrinsic to the EU. These consist of factors that are intrinsic to the third 
party, in casu the Central Asian states (cf. domestic contextual factors), as well as factors that  
 
Figure 4: Illustration of interaction between internal & external countervailing factors  
                     
                           Internal  CF                  <------->             External CF 
                     Interaction 
 
       a) -Multi-level complex EU policy-making                          c) Increased involvement 
          -shared competence on CA affairs                                         of China & Russia  
          -EC is slow bureaucratic actor                                                in Central Asia 
 
               Interaction                                                            Interaction 
         
          b) -Clash of interests between EU actors                           d)  The region houses 
              -Diverging preferences between EU actors                         authoritarian regimes,                                                                                                                         
              -EU interests trump EU values                                            to whom China & 
                                                                                                           Russia‟s model of 
           development appeals 
                             more than the European 
            model of development 
                           
 
are extrinsic to the third party. The former, for instance, may relate to the neo-patrimonial 
structure of the countries‟ political economy, the fact that they have a weak civil society or the 
authoritarian nature of the regimes. The latter, in turn, may stem, for instance, from the strong 
competition that the EU encounters in the region from Russia and China. Importantly, internal 
and external countervailing factors may be expected to interact (see Figure 4).  
In responding to the need to take the possible constraining impact of contextual factors 
into account, attention will be paid throughout the empirical chapters to how the EU‟s TNPO 
is affected – if at all – by internal and external countervailing factors. 
 
 
4.5. Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter comprised two parts. The first part outlined the EU‟s relations with the five 
Central Asian states, tracing the Union‟s involvement and interests in the region from 1991 
until today. The first showed how the EU‟s conceptual redivision of the former Soviet bloc in 
the early 1990s meant that the Central Asian states were placed in the category of „outsiders‟, 
i.e. the states in the EU‟s eastern periphery, with whom contractual relations would not go 
beyond the level of „partnership‟. Situated at the most outward point of this eastern periphery, 
1990s Central Asian triggered little interest from the EU. The second part, however, showed 
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how the EU‟s engagement with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan gradually rose to a new level in the last decade, evolving from an invisible and 
arguably ineffective donor to a more fully-fledged and strategic actor. While the EU‟s limited 
engagement with Central Asia was boosted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September and the 
subsequent military campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, it was not until the 2004 
Eastern enlargement that the Union as a whole started discussing the need for increased 
involvement in Central Asia. Subsequent efforts by the Union to scale up its cooperation with 
the Central Asian republics and become a more visible actor in the region included the 
appointment of a EU Special Representative for Central Asia and the establishment of an EU 
Troïka - Central Asia, and culminated in the launch of an ambitious EU Strategy for Central 
Asia. The Strategy was triggered largely by a need to develop cooperation more 
commensurately with the region‟s geo-strategic and geo-economic relevance for the EU. In 
particular, the chapter demonstrated that the EU‟s interests in Central Asia relate to matters of 
stability, security and diversification of energy resources. 
 In further explaining the „context‟, the second part of the chapter pointed to the 
existence and impact of countervailing forces that may mediate the EU‟s TNPO over the 
Central Asian countries. Indeed, the EU‟s TNPO might be hampered - possible weakened - by 
the intervening effects of a series of countervailing forces. These relate both to internal 
factors, i.e. intrinsic to the EU, and external factors, i.e. extrinsic to the EU. The group of 
external countervailing factors consists of factors that are intrinsic to the third party, in casu 
the Central Asian states, as well as factors that are extrinsic to them. The former, for instance, 
may relate to the neo-patrimonial structure of the countries‟ political economy, the fact that 
they have a weak civil society or the authoritarian nature of the regimes. The latter, in turn, 
may stem, for instance, from the strong competition that the EU encounters in the region from 
Russia and China. 
Having outlined the motives of the EU‟s pursuit of TNPO over Central Asia in the 
present chapter, as well as the countervailing factors that may limit the EU‟s TNPO over the 
region, the aim of the following chapters is to explore „how‟ and, and in particular, „to what 
extent‟ the EU exercises and accumulates TNPO vis-à-vis Central Asia. More specifically, the 
aim is to use the TNPO framework to explore the viability of the thesis‟s working hypothesis: 
that the EU‟s ability to rally the Central Asian republics behind its ambitious partnership 
initiative testifies to the EU‟s power over the region. This power draws on the EU‟s 
influential position across a combination of material, institutional and ideational structures. 
The EU‟s power, in turn, is reinforced by the implementation of the EU‟s partnership 
initiative. Based on the TNPO framework (see Figure 3, p.93 in Chapter 3), the working 
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hypothesis can be reformulated as follows: the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia has enabled the 
EU to conclude an ambitious partnership with the five Central Asian states, which in turn 
reinforces the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. In exploring the viability of this proposition, the 
first step (Chapters 5-8) is to examine concretely to what extent the EU‟s power over Central 
Asia effectively derives from its control over a combination of material, institutional and 
ideational structures and the interaction between them. To do so, we will draw extensively on 
the TNPO toolbox (see Figure 1, p.51 in Chapter 3) in order to trace and evaluate 
intergovernmental and transnational mechanisms of EU impact across the three TNPO 
structures. The second step (Chapter 9 - part 1) then consists of examining to what extent the 
EU‟s TNPO enabled the EU to enter into an ambitious partnership with the five Central Asian 
republics. In concrete terms, this means that we need to evaluate (i) to what extent the 
obtaining of the „desired outcome‟, i.e. the partnership, was facilitated by the EU‟s TNPO, 
and (ii) to what extent the outcome is favourable to the EU. The third and final step (Chapter 
9 - part 2) is then to assess whether and to what extent the obtained outcome, i.e. the 
partnership, in turn has reinforced the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. In order to realise that 
end, the thesis seeks to evaluate (i) to what extent the EU Strategy is being successfully 
implemented and (ii) to what extent the implementation of the Strategy enhances the EU‟s 
TNPO over Central Asia. This evaluation will again be conducted with reference to the TNPO 
toolbox, which serves to trace and evaluate intergovernmental and transnational pathways of 
EU impact. 
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Chapter 5 – The EU’s TNPO1 over Central Asia 
 
 
The remainder of the thesis serves to empirically explore the extent to which the EU exercises 
and accumulates TNPO vis-à-vis Central Asia. More in particular, the aim is to verify the 
viability of the thesis‟s working hypothesis: the EU‟s ability to rally the Central Asian 
republics behind its ambitious partnership initiative testifies to the EU‟s power projection 
over the region. This power projection draws on the EU‟s influential position across a 
combination of material, institutional and ideational structures. The EU‟s power, in turn, is 
reinforced based on the implementation of the EU‟s partnership initiative. Chapters 5, 6, 7 
and 8 constitute the first - and main - step in the thesis‟s empirical exploration of this 
proposition (Figure 5). Chapter 9 presents steps two and three, using the TNPO framework to 
examine how the partnership concluded with the five Central Asian states (step two) in turn 
reinforces the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia (step three). As the first step in the empirical 
exploration of the working hypothesis, Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 focus on the extent to which the 
EU wields TNPO over Central Asia, in particular for the period 2001-2007 (see below). In 
concrete terms, together, these four chapters thus aim to explore to what extent the EU‟s 
power over the Central Asian republics in 2001-2007 effectively derived from a combination 
of material, institutional and ideational structures and the interaction between them. In doing 
so, the four chapters will draw extensively on the TNPO toolbox (see Figure 1, p.51 in 
Chapter 3) in order to trace and examine intergovernmental and transnational mechanisms of 
EU impact across the three structures identified in the discussion of TNPO in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 5: Step 1 of the thesis’s empirical exploration 
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and the subsequent military operation in Afghanistan triggered an initial move towards 
increased engagement with the region. The hypothesis is therefore examined mostly in 
relation to events and activities occurring after 2000.
112
 Based on the hypothesis, which 
singles out the EU Strategy as a key variable, two analytical periods are distinguished, the 
pre-Strategy period (2001-June 2007) and the post-Strategy period (July 2007-2010), with 
2010 being the time of writing and thus not a real end date. As explicated in Chapter 1, the 
working hypothesis theorises the launch of the EU Strategy in June 2007 both as an outcome 
of the EU‟s power over Central Asia and as an important basis to further strengthen that 
power, which implies that the EU Strategy simultaneously marks the end point of the first 
analytical period and the start point of the second analytical period. In short, this explains why 
the present chapter, as the first step in the empirical exploration of the hypothesis, focuses 
mostly on events and activities occurring in 2001-June 2007, i.e. the pre-Strategy period. 
As mentioned, the next four chapters together make up the first – and main – step of 
the empirical exploration of the working hypothesis. Step 1 of the thesis‟s empirical 
exploration is structured as follows. After this introductory section, the present chapter covers 
the empirical examination of the EU‟s TNPO1 over Central Asia. The chapter finds that the 
EU‟s TNPO1 over Central Asia derives in particular from its position in the region as a leader 
in trade and investment, its considerable provision of development and financial aid to the 
five states and its (geo)strategic and security-related capabilities vis-à-vis the region. Next, 
Chapter 6 presents the EU‟s TNPO2 over the Central Asian states. It is divided into two 
sections, examining respectively the EU‟s micro-institutional power - or TNPO2micro - and the 
EU‟s macro-institutional power - or TNPO2macro - over the region. Subsequently, Chapter 7 
offers an empirical exploration of the EU‟s TNPO3 over Central Asia. This chapter assesses 
the EU‟s „magnetic pull‟ over the Central Asian countries, in terms of their attraction to the 
EU‟s norms, standards and values. In addition, it also examines the EU‟s image and symbolic 
power in the region. Finally, Chapter 8 examines the different cases of interaction of the EU‟s 
TNPO over Central Asia. This chapter starts by exploring the overlap between TNPO1 and 
TNPO2, followed by the overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3, the overlap between TNPO2 and 
TNPO3, and finally the overlap between TNPO1, TNPO2 and TNPO3. Chapter 8 concludes with 
a summary of the main empirical findings and a brief reflection upon the significance of the 
findings in view of the thesis‟s aim to offer a more holistic understanding of the EU‟s power 
over the Central Asian republics.  
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5.1. Introduction 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, the first TNPO structure, TNPO1, is the ability of the EU to 
utilise and influence the material structure, with „material‟ referring to materialism in the 
physical understanding of the term, as captured by the (neo)realist notion of „material 
capabilities‟. In contending that states selfishly pursue their national interests, realism posits 
that the most important resources in the pursuit of national interests are material capabilities. 
Realism thus conceives the exercise of power in terms of a preponderance of material 
capabilities, most notably economic and military resources. As Young suggests with respect 
to institutional bargaining and international negotiations, a state may attempt to translate the 
possession of such material resources into bargaining leverage cast in terms appropriate to the 
issues at stake in specific instances of institutional bargaining (1991: 288). Crucially, Young 
adds that “[in] a general way, it makes sense to view the link between structural power and 
bargaining leverage as stemming from the existence of asymmetries among the participants or 
stakeholders in processes of institutional bargaining” (1991: 289). This point is central to 
TNPO1 in that it assumes that the EU‟s material capabilities, such as the size and strength of 
its market, result in asymmetric relationships and third countries‟ dependence. In sum, this 
chapter will thus explore to what extent the EU derives TNPO over the Central Asian 
republics from its possession and use of material capabilities. Following this introductory 
paragraph, the chapter will first examine to what extent the EU derives power over Central 
Asia from its dominant position as an economic giant, in general, and from its single market 
and foreign investment strength, in particular. This will be followed by an assessment of the 
extent to which the EU draws power over the region from its provision of development and 
financial aid to the five states. The final group of material resources that will be explored are 
the EU‟s security-related and (geo)strategic capabilities vis-à-vis the region. 
 
 
5.2. Trade and investment 
 
The EU draws a substantial amount of power in the international realm from its dominant 
position as an economic giant. An important contributor to the EU‟s economic weight is the 
monetary union with its single currency. The euro is a reserve currency in many parts of the 
world, including in Central Asia. “A strong currency is in itself a form of structural power”,  
as Holden notes (2009: 188). Moreover, the EU is a global leader in investment. The EU is 
the largest investor in many countries around the world, although that still does not compare 
to what is by far the largest contributor to the EU‟s economic weight, the single market. The 
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sheer size and strength of the EU‟s internal market not only leads to a gravitational attraction 
but in many cases also to inherently asymmetric trading relationships, in particular with 
neighbouring and/or weak trade partners. This also applies to the Central Asian states: whilst 
the EU is their principal or one of their principal trade partners, the Central Asian republics 
are rather insignificant trade partners for the EU. This subsection focuses on the EU‟s position 
as a trade and investment leader in Central Asia. It will first outline the EU‟s trade relations 
with the region - thereby exploring the implications for the EU‟s TNPO1 -, before having a 
look at the EU‟s direct investments in the Central Asian states.  
 
5.2.1. Trade  
 
Irrespective of the current trade volume between the two regions, the Central Asian 
governments view the EU above all as a formidable „trade power‟.113 In concrete, this means 
that they see the EU, on the one hand, as “an actor to be reckoned with”, and, on the other, as 
an actor that offers a lot of potential in terms of increasing trade flows as well as securing 
investment opportunities in their respective economies.
114
 The latter is crucial for the 
countries‟ attempts to diversify their one-sided, resource-based economies, which preclude 
any real chance of long-term economic stability.
115
 At the same time, the energy-rich states 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and - although to a lesser extent - Uzbekistan, also strongly 
welcome the EU‟s interest in gaining direct access to their gas reserves. The EU already buys 
large stocks of hydrocarbons from Central Asia, but mostly indirectly. That is, Central Asian 
gas arrives in the EU via Russia and the Ukraine, with Russia fully in control of the transit 
routes and using this monopolistic transit control to exert leverage over the countries at both 
ends of the pipelines (see e.g. Prange-Gstöhl, 2009).
116
 The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of 
January 2006 revealed the EU‟s need to decrease its energy dependency from Russia and by-
pass Russia for its oil and gas supply.
117
 Considering that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and  
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 Author‟s interviews at the Diplomatic Mission of Kazakhstan to the EU in Brussels on 4 February 2008, at 
the Diplomatic Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the EU in Brussels on 5 February 2008, at the Diplomatic Mission of 
Uzbekistan to the EU in Brussels on 11 February 2008, at the Diplomatic Mission of Turkmenistan to the EU in 
Brussels on 13 March 2008, at the Diplomatic Mission of Tajikistan in Brussels on 20 March 2008, at the Uzbek 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Tashkent on 2 May 2008, at the Kyrgyz MFA in Bishkek on 8 May 2008 
and at the Kazakh MFA in Astana on 27 May 2008. 
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 Ibid. 
115
 Kazakhstan‟s exports consist mostly of oil, minerals, steel, iron and grain. Kyrgyzstan‟s exports comprise 
mainly gold and cotton. Turkmenistan exports mostly gas and cotton, while Uzbekistan mainly sells cotton, gas 
and gold. Tajikistan‟s exports consist largely of aluminium and cotton. See “World Development Indicators”, 
World Bank, <www.worldbank.org>. See Appendix 5 for an overview of the countries‟ main import and export 
products and their share in the countries‟ overall imports and exports. 
116
 This also applies to Central Asia‟s oil exports, but to a lesser extent. About 85 per cent of the oil exports of 
Kazakhstan, the region‟s main oil producer, pass through Russia (Boonstra, 2008: 76). 
117
 As Denison (2009: 5) notes, EU attempts to develop commercial energy cooperation with the region long 
predated the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of January 2006. In fact, plans to diversify energy supplies go back to the 
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Uzbekistan are still largely dependent on Russia for their hydrocarbon exports and energy 
infrastructure, they share with the EU a strong interest in diversifying energy routes. 
However, as we will see further on in the chapter, the EU‟s aim of providing the Central 
Asian energy producers with viable export opportunities has increasingly appeared to be a 
tough challenge, not least since the Central Asian states tend to be very pragmatic when it 
comes to the export of their energy resources, and their foreign policy in general (see below). 
Moreover,  the Central Asian governments‟ energy diversification policy is aimed to a large 
extent at pressing Russia - and in particular its national gas company Gazprom - to pay higher 
prices for their gas, an approach that has already paid off (see e.g. Boonstra, 2008a; Cooley, 
2008; Dreyer, 2009; Youngs, 2007).  
While the Central Asian states will continue to need the EU - with its proposed 
construction of new energy routes bypassing Russia - in order to secure higher prices for their 
gas from Gazprom, energy relations between the EU and Central Asia seem to have become 
characterised by asymmetric interdependence in favour of the latter (see more below). By 
contrast, the EU‟s overall trade relations with the region display exactly the opposite 
asymmetry. As is clear from Table 3 (p.121), while the EU is Central Asia‟s principal trade 
partner,
118
 accounting for nearly a third of the region‟s external trade in 2007,119 the Central 
Asian states are rather insignificant trade partners for the EU (Bossuyt, 2009; Peyrouse, 
2009a). In absolute terms, the discrepancy in trade power between the EU and Central Asia is 
huge, and each of the Central Asian countries is dependent on the EU market. Of the five 
countries, Kazakhstan is most dependent on the single market, with the EU being 
Kazakhstan‟s first trade partner. Trade with the EU represented almost 40 percent of the 
country‟s total external trade in 2007.120 Simultaneously, Kazakhstan is the EU‟s largest trade 
partner in the region. In the last decade, EU trade with Kazakhstan has increased dramatically, 
rising from about EUR 4 billion (0.2 percent of total EU-27 trade) in 1999 to EUR 19.5 
billion (0.7 percent of total EU-27 trade) in 2007, when Kazakhstan ranked 29
th
 in the list of 
the EU‟s trade partners (see Table 3, p.121).121 However, EU trade with Kazakhstan is heavily 
dominated by oil and gas. Hydrocarbons accounted for more than 80 percent of the EU‟s 
                                                                                                                                                        
introduction of the TACIS programme in 1991, which subsequently materialised with the initiation of 
INOGATE in 1995 and the launch of the Baku Initiative in 2004. 
118
 At EU Member State level, the largest contribution to the trade volume between the two regions comes from 
Germany and Italy, followed by France, the UK and the Netherlands (Eurostat, 2008). See Appendix 5 for more 
detailed figures. Interestingly, trade between Central Europe and Central Asia is rapidly increasing (see 
Peyrouse, 2009c). 
119
 In 2007, Central Asia‟s trade with the EU amounted to US$30 billion, compared to US$21 billion with Russia 
and ca. US$18 billion with China (Peyrouse, 2009c). 
120
 Source: European Commission, EU-Kazakhstan bilateral trade relations, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/kazakhstan/index_en.htm, last accessed 20 June 2009. 
121
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imports from the country in 2007.
122
 In fact, the EU‟s imports from the region as a whole are 
dominated by a few commodities, in particular oil, gas, metals and cotton. While the EU‟s 
exports to Kazakhstan are becoming increasingly diversified, its exports to the entire region 
remain concentrated in the areas of machinery and transport equipment, which represented 
more than half of the EU‟s exports to Central Asia in 2007.123  
 
Table 3: Imbalance in EU-Central Asia trade (2007) 
Source: European Commission (2009); Peyrouse (2009a) 
 
On the whole, EU trade with the other four Central Asian states remains very modest. 
Nevertheless, the EU is one of the main trade partners of all four countries, but it is not their 
first trade partner (see Table 3). Depending on the country, the latter position is held by either 
Russia, China or Kazakhstan.
124
 Yet, as Kazakhstan is the region‟s economic and trade leader 
and accounts for nearly 85 percent of the EU‟s overall trade with Central Asia, the EU is 
nevertheless the region‟s first trade partner. It is not difficult to understand why the EU‟s 
trade with the Central Asian countries remains limited: the region is overall not an attractive 
market for EU companies. On the one hand, the market is relatively small: the region‟s total 
population amounts to just over 60 million and per capita GDP levels remain low, with the 
exception of Kazakhstan.
125
 Indeed, the majority of the Central Asian population continues to 
have a poor standard of living, with only Kazakhstan experiencing a certain level of 
prosperity.
126
 On the other hand, EU companies are often put off from entering the Central 
Asian market because of a number of persisting trade barriers, including tariff barriers, weak 
administrative and institutional capacity, cumbersome bureaucracy and regulation, landlocked 
location and weak transport infrastructure, underdeveloped industry and private sector, and 
incompetent and corrupt customs control (Bossuyt, 2009). Nevertheless, the last few years 
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resides in rural areas, where poverty is still rife. For the exact figures of the five countries‟ per capita GDP 
levels, see Appendix 5. For an interesting account of Kazakhstan‟s emerging middle class, see Daly (2008). 
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have seen a growing number of European companies exploring trade and investment 
opportunities in the region, also outside of the commodities sector (Bossuyt, 2009; Peyrouse, 
2009a, 2009c). Again, this has been mostly the case in Kazakhstan, which is not surprising 
given that it is by far the most developed country of the region; beyond the fact that its GDP 
per capita dwarfs that of the other four states, Kazakhstan has also implemented a number of 
far-reaching economic reforms, which have significantly contributed to its recent economic 
boom.   
  The EU‟s overall bilateral trade relations with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan have been governed by PCAs since their entry into force in 1999. The trade 
section in these three agreements stipulates that the Parties have non-preferential access to 
each other‟s markets, based on the principle of „most favoured nation‟. Moreover, in view of 
facilitating practical access to the single market for Central Asian products, the PCAs foresee 
gradual regulatory approximation of the partner countries‟ legislation and practices to the 
main trade-related EU acquis. These include technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary 
requirements, customs-related matters and protection of intellectual property rights (see e.g. 
Articles 52 and 66, Kazakhstan PCA). Between May 2005 and 31 December 2009, EU-
Tajikistan trade relations - pending ratification and entry into force of the PCA signed in 
October 2004 - were governed by an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters. 
This temporary agreement encompassed most of the PCA‟s trade-related provisions. 
Previously, trade relations with the country were based on the Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1989. EU bilateral trade relations with 
Turkmenistan are still governed by the latter agreement, pending the entry into force of an 
Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters. The Interim Agreement was ratified 
only recently, notably in 2010, following a long suspension of the ratification process due EU 
concerns over the human rights situation in the country. The agreement is expected to enter 
into force by the end of 2010.  
With Kazakhstan, the EU has had additional bilateral trade arrangements in place to 
regulate trade in some key products that are not covered in the PCA, notably steel products 
and textiles.
127
 As Kazakhstan is not yet a member of the WTO, the European Community 
negotiated a textiles agreement and a number of steel agreements, which set quantitative 
limits for certain steel products. The last steel agreement, which was in force in 2005-2006, 
increased quantitative limits by 70 per cent, providing Kazakh steel producers with 
significantly larger export opportunities. Since 2007, bilateral trade in steel has been based on 
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autonomous measures, mainly due to some apparent difficulties to conclude a new steel 
agreement.
128
 After the expiry of the textiles agreement in late 2004,
129
 an additional Protocol 
to the PCA was negotiated, extending the provisions on trade in textiles. However, the 
Protocol still needs to be signed and ratified in order for it to enter into force. The European 
Community has also had a bilateral textiles agreement in place with Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan. However, despite the agreement‟s expiry at the end of 2004, the Parties involved 
have not yet decided whether or not to conclude an additional protocol to the PCA, like in the 
case of Kazakhstan. More recently, an agreement was signed between the European 
Community and the Kyrgyz Republic on certain aspects of air services, notably on 1 June 
2007. The agreement, which entered into force in April 2008, aims to give all EU air carriers 
non-discriminatory access to flight routes between the Community and Kyrgyzstan. The 
arrangement also seeks to bring bilateral air service agreements between both side in line with 
the EC‟s acquis. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 4, all five Central Asian states are 
beneficiaries of the EU‟s GSP. This trade arrangement grants the five countries preferential 
access to the EU‟s market in the form of reduced tariffs for their products. However, although 
the aim of the GSP regime is to develop a more diversified trade with the EU, the Central 
Asian republics have so far taken only little advantage of this EU instrument.
130
 Preferential 
imports from Tajikistan, for instance, have so far been heavily concentrated in one sector, 
notably textiles, although they also include some industrial products. According to the 
European Commission, which deplores this “enormous unused potential”, the problem is 
mainly Central Asian governments‟ lack of advanced knowhow and expertise in the field of 
trade regulation.
131
 In fact, this has also been one of the principal aspects hindering the states‟ 
progress on their regulatory approximation with the main trade-related EU acquis, as 
envisaged in the PCAs. Progress has been especially slow on their approximation with 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards, industrial standards and intellectual property rights. In 
the course of the last ten years, the European Commission has therefore gradually multiplied 
its trade-related technical assistance projects that are focused on support for PCA 
implementation. As the Commission explains, as long as the states do not comply with these 
requirements, they will not be able to significantly increase, and in particular, diversify their 
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on 9 April 2008. 
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quotas on textiles and garment (cf. multifiber arrangements) had to be removed. 
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exports to the EU.
132
 Next to a lack of knowhow on these often highly technical regulatory 
issues, another problem is that such regulatory adaptations require the Central Asian 
governments to implement domestic reforms, for which the necessary political will is quite 
often missing. Of the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan has made most progress on 
adapting its regulatory framework not only to the main trade-related EU acquis, but also to 
the needs of an open economy in general. In recent years, the Kazakh government has 
amended or replaced a large number of laws, including a Customs Code, new Tax Code, 
investment law and laws on franchising and licensing. Several other laws are in the process of 
being prepared or amended (see e.g. Hindley, 2008). As a result, Kazakhstan feels that it is 
entitled to being granted market-economy status by the EU, and has repeatedly asked the 
trade bloc to finally grant it this status.
133
 The EU, for its part, has announced that it is now 
only a technicality, as Kazakhstan - unlike the other Central Asian states - is very close to 
meeting all five criteria that the EU has set for meeting the conditions.
134
 Kyrgyzstan, in turn, 
despite initiating numerous reforms in the mid-1990s to develop a market economy and 
despite joining the WTO in 1998, has made less progress on complying with EU regulatory 
trade requirements (see more below). Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are lagging behind even 
more. 
 Another important aspect of the EU‟s trade relations with the Central Asian republics 
is the EU‟s continued support for the states‟ accession to the WTO. Of the five countries, 
Kyrgyzstan is the only state that has already acceded to the WTO. However, Kyrgyzstan does 
not exemplify the way to go. As the country rushed into joining the organisation without 
genuine and thoughtful preparation, Kyrgyzstan has been struggling to comply with WTO 
requirements and rules, mainly due to its limited institutional and legislative capacity (see e.g. 
Hindley, 2008; see more below). This is much in the same way as it struggles to comply with 
the EU regulatory requirements as envisaged in the PCA (see above).
135
 The EU has set WTO 
membership as a pre-condition for closer bilateral trading and investment relations. The EU 
has done so because it views WTO membership as the best way for the Central Asian states to 
strengthen their economies, to arrive at a deeper integration into the international trading 
system, and - not to forget - to facilitate European access to their markets. To support the 
countries‟ accession to the WTO, the EU provides considerable technical assistance for 
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legislative institutional reform in accordance with the accession requirements. The EU does 
so, inter alia, because it upholds that WTO accession will have a more profound effect on the 
countries‟ trade and economic welfare if it is accompanied with further institutional and 
legislative reforms.
136
 The lack of such reforms in the case of Kyrgyzstan is one of the 
reasons why the country, despite committing to fully complying with and fully respecting the 
WTO requirements and rules at the time of its accession, has a poor record of WTO 
compliance and has experienced only a marginal increase in economic and trade welfare since 
its accession in 1998 (Hindley, 2008). As we will see further on in the chapter, in the case of 
Kazakhstan, the EU does not only provide substantial trade-related technical assistance, but it 
also plays a major role in the WTO Working Party established to overlook and steer the 
country‟s accession process, which is now nearing completion.137 Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 
which applied in 1994 and 2001  respectively, are significantly less advanced in their 
accession to the WTO. This is not surprising given that compared to Kazakhstan trade 
liberalisation and economic reform have been considerably less comprehensive, especially in 
Uzbekistan, which, amongst other things, applies import substitution in numerous sectors. 
Turkmenistan, for its part, showed only little or no interest in joining the WTO until 2006, 
when the sudden dead of its autocratic ruler Saparmurat Niyazov paved the way for a more 
open foreign policy under Niyazov‟s successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. The 
country is now in the process of preparing an application for WTO accession, and talks 
between Turkmenistan and the WTO secretariat have already taken place in this regard.
138
 
The EU has been encouraging Turkmenistan to apply for WTO accession.
139
 
 In outlining the trade relations between the EU and Central Asia, we have highlighted 
Central Asia‟s seemingly asymmetric dependence on the EU market. Before moving on to 
explore the EU‟s position as an investment leader in the region, it is useful to consider, in 
conclusion, the political potentialities inherent in the given pattern of (inter)dependence and 
the implications for the EU‟s power. At the most basic level, the EU draws considerable 
leverage over the Central Asian republics simply from its influential position as the largest 
market in the world. In this regard, it is clear that the EU‟s possibility to include or exclude 
the Central Asian countries to the single market is a powerful tool. Moreover, the EU‟s power 
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also derives from its possibility to frame the terms of reference within which this possible 
market access is to take place. Although the EU maintains the language of „partnership‟ and 
„equal footing‟, its preponderant market power has indeed enabled the EU to force pre-agreed 
positions upon its trade partners in Central Asia, most notably through the conclusion of 
PCAs, the countries‟ participation in the EU‟s GSP regime and the WTO accession process 
(cf. agent-based structural power).
140
 It is important to note that the extent to which the EU 
has managed to do so varies from country to country. In addition, as we shall see in the 
section covering overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3, there is yet another way in which the 
EU derives power from its single market, notably through „governance by externalisation‟, 
which encompasses purely structural modes of EU impact (cf. Chapter 3). „Governance by 
externalisation‟ captures, for instance, how Central Asian governments may be induced to 
adapt their existing rules and policies to those of the EU, independently of deliberate EU 
action (see below). Nevertheless, the picture of the EU‟s power in and through trade needs to 
be balanced, and this on two accounts. On the one hand, EU-Central Asia trade is dominated 
by hydrocarbons. As mentioned, the EU has significantly less leverage in this area, up to the 
point where its bilateral energy relations with Central Asia are increasingly characterised by 
asymmetric interdependence in favour of the latter. On the other hand, the trade-related 
commitments of the Central Asian republics made under the PCAs, the GSP regime and their 
WTO accession process have often failed to translate into actual progress or implementation. 
The main reasons behind this failure are limited institutional capacity and the lack of political 
will. 
 
5.2.2. Foreign direct investment  
 
The EU is one of the principal sources of foreign investment in Central Asia. Kazakhstan, in 
particular, has benefited from substantial European FDI flows in the last decade, largely 
thanks to its booming hydrocarbon sector. FDI inflow in Kazakhstan totalled US$7.3 billion 
in 2006, nearly half of which came from the EU, making the EU the country‟s single largest 
investor (Hindley, 2008; Peyrouse, 2009a). In 2007, FDI from the EU further increased and 
amounted to 54 per cent of the country‟s total FDI inflow. In the other four Central Asian 
states, FDI inflows from Europe have been more moderate, although there has been a constant 
increase (Bossuyt, 2009). In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the EU also continues to have the 
largest share of foreign investment. In the other states, the EU competes closely with China 
and Russia. China, in particular, is poised to become the region‟s main source of foreign 
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investment. In the last few years, Central Asia have seen a dramatic increase in investment 
flows from China, directed mainly at extraction and mining as well as infrastructure. The EU 
Member States that are most active in the region are the United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands. Except for Germany, those Member States are represented mostly 
in the Central Asia‟s extraction and mining sector. Hence, it is not surprising that energy 
giants Shell, BP, ENI, GDF Suez and Total are the largest investors in Central Asia, and in 
particular in Kazakhstan. The extraction and exploration industry is generally the main 
beneficiary of foreign investments across the region. Nevertheless, European FDI in Central 
Asia is not limited to the activities of a number of multinationals operating in the oil and 
sector. There is also a large number of European companies active in the supply, 
petrochemical and processing sectors of the hydrocarbon industry
141
, including companies 
that provide goods and services that aim at minimising the harm towards the environment. 
Moreover, there is a growing interest from European investors in sectors that have little or no 
connection with the energy industry. The UK and Germany, for instance, are one of the 
largest foreign investors in the Kazakh agriculture sector. As a result of its economic boom, 
Kazakhstan‟s FDI flows have become increasingly diversified. The construction sector has 
become one of the largest beneficiaries of foreign investment.
142
 Other important sectors that 
attract European investment are the agriculture sector, including food processing, the financial 
sector, the telecom sector and the transport sector (Bossuyt, 2009).  
 Unlike trade, investment matters have largely been a EU Member State competence 
until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which conferred exclusive competence on 
foreign direct investment to the EU (see TFEU, Art. 207(1) & Art. 3(1)). Until December 
2009, investment relations were thus not governed by agreements signed by the EU, but by 
agreements signed bilaterally between EU Member States and Central Asian states. 
Kazakhstan, for instance, has bilateral investment treaties in place with seventeen EU 
Member States. These investment treaties tend to be largely similar to one another, usually 
guaranteeing free access to the domestic market for investments as well as non-discrimination 
vis-à-vis other investors. In addition, they tend to include a provision on the prohibition of 
dispossession as well as a clause on the procedures for dispute settlement. These investment 
treaties may well provide protection against some cases of abuse of foreign investors. 
Nevertheless, they cannot avoid the persistence of widespread corruption at local and national 
levels. One of the biggest problems in this regard is the lack of a fully-functioning and 
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independent judiciary. In the Central Asian states, the judiciary more often than not tends to 
serve as an arm of the executive branch rather than as an enforcer of contracts and a guardian 
of property rights. The fact that this leaves many European investors vulnerable for abuse and 
constitutes a major deterrent for further investment is one of the reasons why the EU has 
come to treat the rule of law as one of the key priorities of its involvement in the region (see 
more below).
143
 Kazakhstan, which is generally considered the most advanced of the five 
countries, was ranked 150th out of 180 countries in Transparency International‟s Corruption 
Perceptions Index for 2007.
144
 The Kazakh government is known for frequently challenging 
contractual rights and amending legislation to favour domestic investors over foreign ones. 
Given that Kazakhstan is still one the region‟s better performers in attracting outside 
investment, it is no surprise that all of the Central Asian states are ranked in the list‟s bottom-
forty of most corrupt countries in the world.
145
 In practice, this means that every foreign 
investor, independent of the size of their Central Asian investments and activities, will be 
confronted with some kind of corruption. Next to the widespread corruption, the arbitrariness 
of the Central Asian regimes and administrations and the limited economic and political 
liberties in general
146
 mar Central Asia‟s investment climate and discourage many European 
firms from making major investments in the region.
147
  
In sum, the EU is one of Central Asia‟s main sources of foreign investment. Despite 
considerable investment barriers, the region has been attracting increased flows of investment 
from the EU. The energy sector is the primary beneficiary of European investments. 
Nevertheless, European interest in other sectors is steadily growing, especially in Kazakhstan. 
While investment matters - unlike trade - are for the most part still a Member State 
competence rather than an EU competence, the EU draws significant leverage over the region 
from the volume of European investments taken in their totality. It is clear that investment 
relations are characterised by asymmetric interdependence in favour of the EU. Although the 
EU is increasingly competing with other major sources of foreign investment, in particular 
China, the Central Asian states are likely to remain dependent on the EU for the inflow of 
investments, especially in view of their economies‟ need of diversification. In addition, as we 
shall see in the section that covers overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3,  European FDI in the 
                                                 
143
 Author‟s interview with the then Acting Head of Delegation of the EC Delegation to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, in Astana on 30 May 2008. 
144
 Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International, available at <www.transparencyinternational.org>. 
145
 Ibid. 
146
 For exact data, see e.g. the rankings of Freedom House regarding i.a. political freedom, freedom of press and 
civil liberties, available at  <www.freedomhouse.org>. 
147
 Another investment barrier is the region‟s underdeveloped transport and logistics infrastructure. Together 
with the fact that Central Asia is a predominantly landlocked region, this significantly raises transaction costs for 
EU companies investing in the region.  
                                                               - 129 - 
 
region also contributes to the EU‟s influence over the Central Asian republics at a more subtle 
level, notably as a form of people-to-people contacts through which EU norms and best 
practices are promoted. 
 
 
5.3. Financial and technical assistance 
 
As a second step in exploring the extent to which the EU derives TNPO over the Central 
Asian republics from its possession and use of material capabilities, this subsection examines 
the extent to which the EU draws power over the region from its provision of technical and 
financial aid to the five states. Apart from being a world leader in trade and investment, the 
EU is also a major donor of aid and financial support, contributing to more than half of total 
world aid. Likewise, the EU is not only a major trade and investment actor in Central Asia, 
but it is also the region‟s single largest donor. Again, we can expect the EU to draw 
substantial leverage from the position it holds as Central Asia‟s principal donor. However, as 
noted in Chapter 4, despite being the largest donor, the EU‟s assistance to the region has been 
considerably lower than its aid to other parts of the former Soviet bloc. Moreover, the EU‟s 
engagement with the region has long remained low in terms of visibility. In addition, 
assessments of the impact of the EU‟s assistance programmes in Central Asia have been 
rather mixed. However, other major donors in Central Asia, such as the U.S. and the UN, 
whilst not suffering from the same lack of visibility as the EU did, have also been criticised 
for the relatively limited impact of their aid programmes (see e.g. International Crisis Group, 
2006). It is important to note that development policy is a shared EU competence. This 
implies that, next to the Commission‟s development assistance programmes and projects, EU 
Member States run their own bilateral development aid initiatives. This thesis focuses 
predominantly on the development aid that is organised at the EC level and only marginally 
considers Member State initiatives.
148
 
  
 
5.3.1. EC assistance to Central Asia as a material power resource 
 
In terms of resources spent on technical and financial aid to the Central Asian countries, the 
EU is the largest sponsor in the region, followed by the U.S. and Japan. Between 1991 and 
2006, the EC spent EUR 1.387 billion on bilateral assistance alone to Central Asia, inclusive 
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of assistance under the TACIS national programmes, humanitarian assistance, macro-
financial support and food security aid, and exclusive of assistance under the TACIS regional 
programmes  (European Commission, 2007a: 41-42). In comparison, in the same period, 
USAID, provided development and financial aid to Central Asia worth US$ 1.5 billion
149
. The 
five countries are all official development assistance (ODA) recipients. Since their 
independence in the early 1990s, ODA has gone in almost equal amounts to each of the states, 
with the exception of Turkmenistan (Pomfret, 2006: 13). Being the two smallest countries, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have thus received much higher assistance per capita (Pomfret, 
2006: 13). This fully reflects the fact that these two countries have been most in need of 
international assistance. Of the two, Tajikistan has experienced the highest dependence on 
foreign aid. Like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan is a small, landlocked country. However, compared 
to Kyrgyzstan, it is both more mountainous and more cut off from major markets. Moreover, 
the country endured more than five years of civil war, which left it “economically battered 
and politically quiescent ever since” (Melvin, 2008a). In 2006, the country‟s ODA made up 
11.6 per cent of its GDP (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008). It is also the largest beneficiary of EC 
assistance in the region. Tajikistan has received more than EUR 500 million in EC assistance 
since 1992 (European Commission, 2007a). As the second largest EC beneficiary in the 
region, Kyrgyzstan‟s dependence on EU aid is also considerable: in 2006, EC assistance 
accounted for over five per cent of the country‟s government budget (Warkotsch, 2009: 268). 
However, it is important to note that a considerable share of EC aid offered to Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan has consisted of humanitarian and food security assistance
150
, aid from which the 
other three Central Asian states have not or only occasionally benefited. Hence, the picture 
changes when looking at the TACIS allocations only. In 2006, for instance, Uzbekistan was 
the largest Central Asian beneficiary state of TACIS, with EUR 8 million, followed by 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, which both received EUR 6.5 million (see Table 4, p.132). With 
EUR 5 million, Kyrgyzstan was only the fourth recipient country, just ahead of Turkmenistan, 
which received EUR 4 million (see Table 4, p.132). This recipient ranking of TACIS 
remained more or less the same throughout 2002-2006. However, the allocation situation has 
been modified under the latest Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2010), with Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan now effectively being the main Central Asian beneficiary states of DCI, the 
successor to TACIS (European Commission, 2007a).  
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 For instance, between 1997 and 2004, Kyrgyzstan received EUR 74.5 million in  budget support from the 
EC‟s Food Security Programme (Matveeva, 2006: 86). 
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Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan‟s aid dependence on the EU has translated into a significant 
amount of EU leverage over the countries‟ ruling elites. Conversely, the EU - and virtually all 
other external donors for that matter - has had only a minor say on the development course of 
Turkmenistan. The country has been the least dependent on EU assistance, and on foreign 
assistance in general. Indeed, as Turkmenistan followed an increasingly isolationist course, it 
showed only little interest in receiving international assistance, with the despotic nature of 
Niyazov‟s regime resenting offers of ODA rather than encouraging them. Despite its political 
isolation and reluctance towards international cooperation, through TACIS, Turkmenistan 
received about EUR 11.75 million in technical assistance between 2001 and 2005, compared 
to EUR 22.4 million for Kazakhstan, one of the region‟s main TACIS beneficiaries (European 
Commission, 2005a). The gradual opening of the country following Niyazov‟s death in 2006 
has led to a more open stance towards foreign assistance, which has created opportunities for 
the EU to step in and expand its development assistance to the country. Compared to 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan has maintained much closer relations with the main international 
development actors, not least the EU. Nevertheless, the country has done so with a certain 
degree of reservation and distrust, fully in line with the autocratic nature of the Uzbek regime. 
The fact that the country did little to improve its poor record on economic and political reform 
has led to temporary suspensions of aid, including by the U.S. and the European Bank for 
Development and Reconstruction (EBRD) (Melvin, 2008a). Kazakhstan, in turn, presents yet 
a different case, in that the country has experienced an unprecedented economic growth since 
its oil boom of 1999, which - after a decade of economic disappointment - gradually pulled it 
further and further ahead of the other Central Asian countries. In the mean time, Kazakhstan 
was one of the main Central Asian recipient countries of TACIS (see e.g. Table 4, p.132). 
With its GDP now dwarfing that of the other four states, Kazakhstan, despite still being an 
ODA recipient, no longer needs development assistance in the same way as Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan do. In fact, the Kazakh government itself likes to stress that the republic is no 
longer in need of development assistance to the point where it has become a donor itself, 
seeking to contribute to the development of its Central Asian neighbours.
151
 At the same time, 
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 Author‟s interview at the Kazakh MFA in Astana on 27 May 2008, and address by the Kazakh Ambassador 
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the Kazakh government greatly appreciates the EU‟s provision of technical assistance152, 
especially in domains that are essential for the country‟s key goal of economic 
diversification.
153
 While Kazakhstan feels that it has advanced significantly on the path of 
development, it acknowledges that, as a relatively young nation with a persistent soviet 
legacy, it still faces serious shortcomings in key governance sectors, including transport, 
education and environment, for which it considers the EU‟s technical assistance - including its 
expertise and know-how - to be of tremendous value.
154
  
 
       Table 4: Indicative TACIS allocations to Central Asia in EUR million (2006) 
                        DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG (2006) 
  
To sum up, since the late 1990s, the Central Asian states have continued to welcome 
the provision of EU technical and financial assistance, although to varying degrees. Indeed, as 
the five states have experienced distinct trajectories of political and economic development 
since their independence from the Soviet Union, their need for and/or receptiveness towards 
EU assistance has come to vary substantially. Yet, all five countries share the EU as their 
primary donor, and seem rather eager to continue to receive EU assistance, whether in the 
form of only technical assistance, like in the case of Kazakhstan, or in the form of more 
comprehensive aid (e.g. also budget support, food security, etc), like in the case of 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In other words, the EU‟s position as a donor translates in a certain 
                                                                                                                                                        
states (which the EU nevertheless did, insisting on the importance of a regional approach, alongside a bilateral, 
tailor-made approach).  
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 EU „development‟ assistance typically includes e.g. direct budgetary grants for structural or sectoral reforms 
and adjustments in a recipient country. By contrast, EU „technical‟ assistance mostly comprises the provision of 
advice and training to public and private actors in the recipient country. For public actors, this may include the 
undertaking of feasibility studies for the construction of major infrastructure works, assistance on redrafting 
legislation, or technical aid to reform a ministry (e.g. advice on how to use specialised software for governmental 
use) with a special focus on improving the capacity to align with international legal frameworks. 
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 Author‟s interview at the Diplomatic Mission of Kazakhstan to the EU in Brussels on 4 February and at the 
Kazakh MFA in Astana on 27 May 2008. 
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amount of EU leverage, which varies in strength across the region: it is strongest in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, i.e. the most aid dependent countries, and weakest in Turkmenistan, i.e. the 
least open country. In-between, there are Uzbekistan, which has been a significant but often 
difficult recipient country, and Kazakhstan, the most advanced of all five countries. In order 
to gain further insights into the extent to which the EU‟s provision of technical and financial 
assistance to Central Asia constitutes a material power resource, the next subsection will 
outline the substance and scope of the EC aid offered to the region from 2002 to 2006. To do 
so, it will draw predominantly on the Central Asia Strategy Paper for 2002-2006
155
 - which 
includes the Central Asia Indicative Programme for 2002-2004 -, the Central Asia Indicative 
Programme for 2004-2006 and the Central Asia Strategy Paper for 2007-2013 (which 
encompasses an overview of past assistance).  
 
5.3.2. Substance and scope of EC assistance to Central Asia in 2002-2006 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, following the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent 
military operation in Afghanistan, the EU General Affairs Council of 10 December 2001 
called for an enhancement of relations with the Central Asian partner countries. Amongst a 
number of other things, the Council recommended to “target assistance on a reduced number 
of priority areas, including poverty reduction, social and economic development, good 
governance, environment and water management” (Council, 2001a). In addition, it also urged 
attempts to “combat drug trafficking” and “consider action on border control and border 
management” (ibid.). Accordingly, the TACIS Central Asia Strategy Paper for 2002-2006 
announced that the core objective of the EC‟s assistance would be “to promote the stability 
and security of the countries of Central Asia and to assist in their pursuit of sustainable 
economic development and poverty reduction” (European Commission, 2002: 3). In an 
attempt to provide a better response to the problems faced by the region and to enhance the 
effectiveness, coherence and overall impact of EC aid, the Strategy Paper introduced a new 
framework for TACIS in the five Central Asian countries, targeted more explicitly at a 
regional approach and based on a three-track scheme (see below). In view of the Council‟s 
policy recommendation to narrow the focus and work with a reduced number of priorities, the 
Strategy Paper identified three priority areas for cooperation: (i) support for institutional, legal 
and administrative reform, (ii) development of infrastructure networks and 
protection/management of natural resources, and (iii) support in addressing the social 
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consequences of transition (European Commission, 2002: 19). The three priority areas were 
chosen in accordance with TACIS Regulation No. 99/2000, adopted by the Council in 
December 1999, which stipulated that planning for each TACIS beneficiary state as well as 
for multi-country programmes had to involve selection of three out of the six areas of 
cooperation defined in the Regulation (Council, 1999: Art. 2.2). The Strategy Paper motivated 
the selection of the three priority areas by stating that these were areas where the EC “has a 
comparative advantage, with a longer time perspective in order to achieve the greatest 
impact” (European Commission, 2002: 18).  
Moreover, the new framework introduced in the Strategy Paper centred on a three-
track scheme for the TACIS assistance. Track 1 consisted of a „regional cooperation 
programme‟, aimed at promoting regional cooperation between the Central Asian countries. It 
was focused on areas where the EU has a strategic interest, including transport and energy 
networks, sustainable use of natural resources, implementation of international environmental 
conventions, and justice and home affairs (European Commission, 2002: 4). Track 2 
comprised a „regional support programme‟, addressing the Central Asian countries‟ main 
shared challenges to sustainable economic development and transition. The programme was 
implemented at national level in order to allow for a tailored approach, taking into account the 
countries‟ diverging levels of development.  Track 3, in turn, was focused on poverty 
reduction in two selected target zones across Central Asia, thereby providing support to the 
countries‟ objectives and commitments in light of their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) (ibid.). TACIS bilateral assistance under the 2002-2006 Strategy Paper was 
complemented by a series of other EC instruments, including humanitarian aid through 
ECHO, EIDHR, macro-financial loans and grants, direct budget support through the Food 
Security Programme and the EU‟s GSP. In terms of the allocations, the Strategy Paper 
earmarked 26 per cent of available resources in 2002-2006 for regional cooperation (Track 1), 
54 per cent for bilateral cooperation programmes (Track 2) and 25 per cent for poverty 
reduction schemes (Track 3) (European Commission, 2007a: 17). Between 2002 and 2004, 
annual EC allocations for TACIS projects amounted to EUR 50 million, i.e. double the 
amount of the annual allocations in the preceding two years (European Commission, 2007a: 
5). In 2005, allocations further increased, notably to EUR 66 million. This amount included 
EUR 15 million for Track 1 projects, EUR 33 million for Track 2 projects and EUR 18 
million for Track 3 projects (ibid.). In 2006, total allocations amounted to EUR 60 million, 
with Track 2 and Track 3 both receiving fewer funds compared to 2005 (cf. Table 4, p.132). 
Indeed, while the Central Asia Indicative Programme for 2005-2006 firmly built on the 
approach initiated under the Indicative Programme for 2002-2004, it gave further priority to 
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activities under Track 1, stepping up EC assistance for the cooperation between Central Asian 
countries, and in particular in the areas of justice and home affairs, the energy sector and 
environmental issues (European Commission, 2005a). At bilateral level, it strengthened the 
links between EC assistance and political dialogue in the framework of PCAs, particularly in 
the areas of trade and civil service (ibid.). For activities under Track 3, the 2005-2006 
Indicative Programme planned for poverty reduction schemes to be consolidated in 
comprehensive medium-term development plans and for complementarities between TACIS 
and the FSP to be enhanced. 
 Returning to the 2002-2006 Strategy Paper, the idea to introduce a regional 
cooperation programme (Track 1) was predicated on the belief that the Central Asian states 
face many shared challenges and that these are best addressed in collaborative frameworks to 
prevent increasing differences among the five countries (European Commission, 2002). The 
regional cooperation programme therefore aimed to promote good neighbourly relations and 
confidence-building between the Central Asian republics as an efficient way to deal with the 
main challenges and development problems faced by the region. According to the Strategy 
Paper, such common development and transition problems include “slow democratic 
transition, poor records of implementing human rights obligations, concern over Islamic 
radicalisation, the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, demographic pressures 
straining the capacity of social services, lagging implementation of market-oriented economic 
reforms, poor business and investment climates, widening income disparities and poverty” 
(European Commission, 2002: 4). Common challenges encompass concern over transnational 
crime and inefficient border management, as well as a need for both economic diversification 
and increased access to world markets and for more sustainable use of natural resources 
(ibid.). Interestingly, the selection of the objectives and priority areas of the EC‟s assistance in 
light of these development problems and challenges clearly reveal the extent to which the EU 
is concerned with new concepts of security, which focus more on „soft security threats‟, many 
of which tend to stem from such politically and economically weak states as the Central Asian 
states. In this sense, drawing on the EC assistance offered under the 2002-2006 Strategy 
Paper, it could be argued that the EU is “securitising the domestic political and economic 
structures” of the Central Asian countries and that in doing so “the EU is also claiming a right 
to shape these structures itself” (cf. Holden, 2009: 21). As will become clearer in the next 
paragraphs, this remark provides a further indication that TACIS was designed to serve the 
EU‟s interests, not least by inculcating structural changes amenable to its own interests (see 
e.g. Holden, 2009).  
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The selected priority areas of the regional assistance offered under the 2002-2006 
Strategy Paper reflected an interrelated focus on EU strategic interest and regional transition 
needs. To begin with, a primary goal of EC regional assistance was the development of  
“viable, secure, safe and competitive transport and energy routes” in order to promote trade 
and investment flows in Central Asia as well as between the EU and Central Asia (European 
Commission, 2002: 21). Assistance in the two priority areas of energy and transport focused, 
inter alia, on the harmonisation of conditions for transit with those of the EU and the 
harmonisation of oil and gas standards, the funding of feasibility studies and other small, non-
bankable components of road, maritime and rail infrastructure projects (European 
Commission, 2007a: 17). As mentioned in Chapter 4, regional cooperation in transport and 
energy networks was undertaken respectively within the framework of the TRACECA and 
INOGATE programmes. Between 2004 and 2006, the area of transport received around EUR 
29 million in assistance (ibid.). Activities included, for instance, a prefeasibility study for the 
development transport road Sari-Tash-Dushanbe-Termez, which would link Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and could stimulate development of the industry, agriculture and 
mountain tourism in the areas bordering the road (DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG, 2006). In 2005-
2006, support for the development and improvement of energy routes attracted some EUR 10 
million (International Crisis Group, 2006). Assistance in that two-year period included a 
technical audit of oil and gas pipelines, rehabilitation of gas transport systems, and in 
particular of the Bukhara-Tashkent-Bishkek-Almaty pipeline, and coordination of national 
energy policies. Between 2002 and 2006, a total of EUR 45 million was allocated for 
supporting INOGATE initiatives in Central Asia (European Commission, 2007a: 17). Another 
priority area under the Regional TACIS Programme was Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). In 
this area, assistance was focused on border management (via BOMCA), the fight against 
organised crime, and in particular against trafficking of drugs (via CADAP) and human 
beings, and migration and asylum management. Together, these three fields attracted a total of 
EUR 112 million in 2002-2006 (European Commission, 2007a: 18). Activities in these areas 
included support of the countries‟ efforts in reforming and modernising their national border 
management systems in line with EU practices, and the organisation of a migration and 
asylum system more in accordance with EU standards (ibid.). In this respect, Crawford 
remarks that “rather than promoting systems of legal justice within Central Asian states, such 
activities and expenditure relate more to the EU‟s own concerns and perceived self-interests 
with regard to limiting the impact on EU member states from organised crime, economic 
migration and asylum seeking originating from Central Asia” (2008: 179). This insight 
corroborates the finding that key EU policy documents, and most notably the European 
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Security Strategy (Council, 2003), preserve a key role for EU aid in guaranteeing the EU‟s 
security (see e.g Holden, 2009: 21). A further priority area of regional assistance in 2002-
2006 was the environment. In 2004-2006, EUR 60 million was committed to address 
environmental issues, and in particular water management (e.g. the Aral Sea, and trans-
boundary waters and river basin management), climate change, biodiversity and a more 
sustainable use of natural resources (European Commission, 2007a: 18). The environment is 
in fact an area in which the EC has been assisting the region since the early days of TACIS in 
1992. Similarly, the participation of the Central Asian states in the TACIS priority areas of 
transport (via TRACECA) and energy networks (via INOGATE) started in the 1990s. By 
committing more resources to the TACIS regional programmes, the Strategy Paper for 2002-
2006 thus attempted to further enhance the countries‟ participation in these regional schemes 
(see more below).  
EC bilateral assistance programmes under the Central Asia Strategy Paper for 2002-
2006 were allocated a total of EUR 142 million, inclusive of assistance under TACIS, the 
Food Security Programme (FSP) and the Exceptional Financial Assistance programme (EFA) 
(European Commission, 2007a: 19). In addition, considerable funding was provided through 
ECHO in the form of humanitarian and disaster preparedness assistance, in particular to 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Bilateral programmes under the Strategy Paper for 2002-2006 
consisted to a large extent of „Small Project Programmes‟, including policy advice projects, 
civil society support programmes, the Institution Building Partnership Programme (IBPP), 
Bistro
156
, Managers Training programme, TEMPUS, Customs, Statistics and EIDHR 
(European Commission, 2007a: 17). Almost 60 per cent of bilateral assistance under the 
Strategy Paper was committed to poverty reduction, the main priority area (ibid.). Poverty 
reduction activities included local development projects (via the FSP) as well as sector 
reform-oriented budget support (via the FSP)
157
 coupled to technical assistance (via TACIS). 
In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, for instance, national government support projects sought to 
reform and improve public financial management by combining budget support with technical 
assistance (ibid.). The second priority area was administrative, legal and regulatory reforms, 
alongside civil service reform and governance, which together received about 20 per cent of 
available resources (ibid.). Activities in this area, organised mainly in light of the PCA 
implementation commitments, were directed at institutional capacity-building and improved 
functioning of the rule of law, more in line with the legal frameworks of the EU. Activities 
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involved several of the Small Projects Programmes, including Bistro, IBBP, TEMPUS (higher 
education), the Managers Training programme and the TACIS Policy Advice Programme 
(ibid.). The latter programme, for instance, served to “provide a quick and flexible response to 
governments‟ emerging priorities and urgent needs in key areas of economic and social 
reforms” (ibid.). A noteworthy initiative that was implemented in all five countries was the 
project aimed at providing support to the reform of official statistics. In Uzbekistan, for 
instance, this project sought to improve existing external trade data in compliance with the 
requirements of the PCA, introduce international statistical methodologies, classifications and 
standards, and establish a system of social statistics to meet international requirements (DRN-
ADE-ECO-NCG, 2006).  
It is important to note that many of these assistance activities, including the regulatory 
convergence projects, concentrated predominantly on economic reforms and trade and 
investment-related measures. Since such reforms are crucial in view of enhancing the 
countries‟ economic performance and achieving a fully functioning market economy, this EU 
preoccupation with an improvement of the local trade and investment regulatory environment 
seems to point to a considerable degree of EU self-interest again, especially since many of 
these EU-led measures - in combination with the activities in the area of transport - would 
eventually greatly facilitate trade and investment opportunities for EU companies (cf. 
Crawford, 2008). At the same time, however, the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan in particular, made it clear to the EC on several occasions, especially during 
Cooperation Committee meetings - i.e. where implementation of PCA-related projects as well 
as the agenda of future cooperation are discussed at senior civil servant level -, that economic 
issues were to remain the principal area of bilateral cooperation and that they were not ready 
to engage seriously on matters that were not related to trade or economic affairs.
 158
 With 
respect to Uzbekistan, this was even more the case in the wake of the Andijan massacre in 
May 2005, when bilateral relations with the EU were glacial. Nevertheless, between 2002 and 
2006, several TACIS projects with an explicit democratisation focus were carried out, 
including in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (see more below). In turn, while it is noteworthy that 
EC bilateral assistance featured programmes targeted at civil society organisations, many of 
these „Small Project‟ programmes were also for a large part economically oriented, such as 
the „Managers Training‟ programme. A notable exception was civil society assistance 
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provided through EIDHR
159
, which explicitly supported projects targeting a more pluralistic 
political system and a more independent society, and involved the participation of many non-
economic actors, including NGOs and the media. However, from 1994 to 2004, EIDHR 
assistance in Central Asia remained limited to only a few projects a year (Crawford, 2008: 
180-184). Indeed, it was only in 2005 that the instrument became more fully applicable to the 
region and that the Central Asian republics became more regular EIDHR beneficiaries. Even 
so, despite a marked increase in the number of projects, funding for EIDHR assistance in 
Central Asia in 2005 and 2006 was still rather limited compared to EIDHR expenditure in 
other regions (ibid.). A considerably higher amount of resources for Central Asia was spent 
under ECHO, the EC‟s humanitarian aid programme. As mentioned, the main recipients of 
ECHO activities in Central Asia have been Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Since 2003, the region 
has also benefited from aid under DIPECHO, the natural disaster preparedness programme of 
ECHO. That year, EUR 3 million was committed for disaster preparedness in Central Asia 
(mainly in Tajikistan, and to a lesser extent in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), followed by EUR 
2.5 million in 2004 and EUR 3.5 million in 2005 (International Crisis Group, 2006: 15).  
A final source of EC bilateral assistance to the region is in the area of nuclear safety. 
Since the early 1990s, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have benefited from EC 
support for the improvement of nuclear safety as part of  the TACIS Nuclear Safety 
programme. The latter programme was allocated a total of EUR 1.3 billion (1,200 projects) 
between 1991 to 2006.
160
 A final assistance scheme proposed in the Strategy Paper is the pilot 
poverty reduction initiative in two-three selected target regions across Central Asia, offered 
under Track 3. With a total budget of EUR 15 million per year, the pilot scheme aimed at 
“reducing the potential for social conflict, strengthening local economies, improving equality 
of wealth distribution and strengthening of local government capacity to respond to 
community concerns” (DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG, 2006). The pilot scheme was based on a 
community-based and demand-driven approach embedded in comprehensive medium-term 
development plans for rural areas and the most vulnerable groups of the population. The 
target regions included the Ferghana Valley (i.e. a border area of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan) and the Khatlon region in southern Tajikistan. In the latter region, for instance, 
one of the projects sought to enhance individual incomes and improve living standards 
through community participation (cf. empowerment) and local government capacity building 
(cf. cooperative governance) (ibid.). 
                                                 
159
 It is worth noting that on 1 January 2007, as part of the overhaul of EC assistance in 2007, the „European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights‟ was replaced by the „European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights‟, the financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights. 
160
 Information retrieved from the website of the European Commission‟s Institute for Energy, available at 
http://nuclear.jrc.ec.europa.eu/tacis-insc/index.php, last accessed 19 September 2010. 
                                                               - 140 - 
 
5.3.3. EC assistance to Central Asia at country level 
 
In response to lessons learnt from past involvement in the region, the EC assistance under the 
Strategy Paper for 2002-2006 wanted to be better targeted towards specific sectors and issues 
where the Central Asian countries had expressed a clear interest in reform, and to increase 
TACIS‟ responsiveness to governments‟ commitment to the reform process (European 
Commission, 2002: 3). This aim was clearly reflected in Track 2 of  the Strategy Paper: 
although based on a regional approach that identifies the countries‟ main shared problems of 
transition and sustainable economic development, Track 2 was designed to be implemented 
via tailored national activities (European Commission, 2002: 4). Therefore, in order to fully 
examine the EC‟s aid to Central Asia as a material power resource, it is both necessary and 
useful to have a closer look at the EC‟s assistance to the region at country level. In doing so, 
this subsection first explores EC assistance offered to Uzbekistan, followed by aid delivered 
to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and, finally, Kyrgyzstan.  
As already mentioned, Uzbekistan was the main recipient country of TACIS in Central 
Asia in 2002-2006. Under Track 2 of the Strategy Paper, substantial allocations were given 
for further support to the implementation of Uzbekistan‟s commitments under the bilateral 
PCA. Generally speaking, this heading encompassed projects aimed at promoting economic, 
political and social development in line with the priorities set out in the PCA. The objectives 
included development of a sustainable secretariat, assistance in fulfilling international 
agreements, implementation of outstanding reforms in business law and trade policy, and 
engagement and strengthening of civil society (DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG, 2006). A key area of 
assistance was support to the country‟s economic transition to a market economy. Activities 
in this area included projects in support of the customs authorities, standardisation and 
certification processes, development of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and land 
registration (European Commission, 2007a). The EC also offered assistance in support of 
democratic reform. In the period 2003-2007, three democracy promotion-related projects 
were implemented, which were targeted at the process of parliamentary reform and capacity-
building. Together, the three projects were allocated a total of EUR 2.8 million (ibid.). In 
addition, Uzbekistan participated in the higher education programmes TEMPUS and Erasmus 
Mundus. In the framework of the latter programme, for instance, Uzbek exchange students 
came to Belgium in 2005 to follow an educational training at specialised colleges of Belgian 
educational institutions. Outside of the priorities set out in the PCA, considerable resources 
were allocated to the security sector, in particular through BOMCA. In 2002-2006, BOMCA 
activities in Uzbekistan included the construction of a training centre for the border guards at 
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Termez (at the Uzbek-Afghan border) and provision of border security infrastructure and 
equipment in Surkhandarya (at the Tajik border), which allowed the Uzbek government to 
resume its demining programme on the Tajik-Uzbek border (Matveeva, 2006: 90).  
Conversely, Turkmenistan was the smallest recipient of TACIS in Central Asia. The 
country received a mere EUR 15.25 million over the period 2002-2006. Activities were 
concentrated in the areas of customs and statistics, higher education, and support to rural and 
economic reform. The higher education sector, in particular, attracted a multitude of projects. 
Somehow remarkably given Turkmenistan‟s dictatorial rule by the late Niyazov, the EU 
managed to commit Turkmenistan to engage more seriously in higher education 
modernization and reform. The EU did so mostly by stressing that higher education is in 
essence an investment in human capital for the future. Activities in this area included 
operationalisation of the NATO Virtual Silk Highway system, establishment of Internet 
training centres at universities and higher education institutions and development of a 
common platform for a distance learning system in Turkmen higher education institutions. 
Turkmenistan was also allocated resources to participate in the Managers Training 
Programme (DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG, 2006).  
Compared to EC aid in Turkmenistan, the assistance offered to Kazakhstan was far 
more comprehensive. In line with the priorities set out in the PCA, the main areas of 
assistance in 2002-2006 were related to support to economic reforms (in particular, accession 
to the WTO, intellectual property rights, regulatory standards, and investment climate) and to 
reform of the public service and of the judiciary. Activities in the latter area, for instance, 
included support to notary reform, institutional development of the Court system, support to 
the judicial academy, support to the Ombudsman in Kazakhstan and support to developing a 
Child's Ombudsman. Projects in the area of civil service reform included an initiative focused 
on the development of standards for civil service provision in Kazakhstan, notably “by 
improving access to information on the government‟s activities, reinforcing the system of 
accountability, and strengthening complaint mechanisms” (DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG, 2006). 
Another PCA-related project was targeted at the development of competent local governance. 
The aim was to assist the Kazakh government in developing a strategic plan for 
decentralisation (ibid.). In addition, the country was allocated significant resources for higher 
education reform (through TEMPUS), development of transport networks (through 
TRACECA) and energy routes (through INOGATE), and progress on environmental issues. 
Activities in the areas of higher education reform included a project aimed at the development 
and monitoring of a quality insurance system for higher education in order to achieve a higher 
education system more in accordance with international standards. Projects in support of 
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transport networks included technical and financial assistance delivered through TRACECA 
for the development of port of Aktau, considered as central for capacity-building of 
Kazakhstan‟s economy, including for the export and transit of energy resources across the 
Caspian Sea. An important TRACECA project, which was also implemented at the port of 
Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan, was “Supervision and Training for the Supply of 
Navigational Aid Equipment”. This large-scale project was aimed at ensuring technical 
supervision of the supply navigational aid equipment and appropriate training measures for 
the using of the equipment delivered.
161
 
EC assistance offered to Tajikistan was even more extensive and relied on several 
complementary instruments to TACIS, in particular ECHO, FSP, EFA, and EIDHR. As 
already mentioned, Tajikistan has benefited from considerable humanitarian assistance under 
ECHO. Between 1992 and 2006, Tajikistan received more than EUR 160 million in 
humanitarian assistance.
162
 In 2002-2006, humanitarian support included food aid, nutrition 
(especially for malnourished children), agricultural inputs, irrigation works following the 
2000-2001 drought, food-for-work projects, medical and pharmaceutical supplies, medical 
training and health education, drinking water and sanitation (European Commission, 2006e). 
In 2004, for instance, ECHO provided emergency funding worth EUR 350,000 to support the 
people affected by the June 2004 torrential rains. Tajikistan has also been allocated food 
security aid since the 1990s. Between 1996 to 2006, EC food security aid granted through the 
FSP totalled EUR 39.5 million.
163
 Assistance on food security was provided mainly in the 
form of direct budget support combined with technical assistance to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Social Protection of Tajikistan. Moreover, in 2002-2004, the 
FSP supported several rural development projects implemented by well-established European 
NGOs with a budget of EUR 5 million (European Commission, 2006e), Tajikistan also 
benefited from macro-financial assistance provided through EFA, aimed at reducing 
Tajikistan‟s debt with the EC. For the period 2001-2004, Tajikistan was given a loan of EUR 
60 million and a grant of EUR 35 million (ibid.). Assistance under EIDHR, in turn, focused 
on the promotion of human rights, penal reform and prisoner‟s rights, democracy and good 
governance, media freedom, rule of law and security structures (police and armed forces) as 
well as conflict prevention. In 2003-2004, EIDHR activities in Tajikistan were allocated a 
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budget of EUR 300,000 (ibid.). With respect to activities implemented under TACIS in 2002-
2006, the main focus was on civil service reform, education, social development and 
protection programmes in the Ferghana valley, improvement of living standards in the 
southern and north-western rural provinces of the country (notably Khatlon and Sughd), i.e. 
through the pilot poverty reduction scheme, and an institutional reform support programme.
164
 
TACIS assistance delivered to the country in the five-year period amounted to  EUR 58.55 
million.
165
 Under Track 1, TACIS assistance to Tajikistan included border management (via 
BOMCA) and anti-drugs trafficking activities (via CADAP), support to environmental 
protection, projects to implement Tajikistan‟s global climate change commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol and a feasibility study for road sections of the Termez-Dushanbe-Sari Tash 
road. It is worth noting that BOMCA has been particularly active in Tajikistan, among other 
things because of the country‟s unsafe border with Afghanistan and the unexpected 
withdrawal of Russian border guards in 2005.
166
 BOMCA activities between 2003 and 2006 
included the construction of a training academy for border guards in the capital, Dushanbe, 
training-of-trainers seminars, development of manuals on visa management, purchasing of 
equipment for mobile units, establishment of dog units, and construction and reinforcement of 
border posts, especially along the eastern part of the Tajik-Afghan border (DRN-ADE-ECO-
NCG, 2006). TACIS activities in Tajikistan under Track 2 focused on civil service reform, 
improved customs management, support in the implementation of the TCA, support to the 
Ministry of Labour and the Statistics Committee, higher education reform and vocational 
training (European Commission, 2006e). In 2003, for instance, the project „Support to the 
Civil Service Reform‟ aimed at strengthening the National Department of State Services by 
conducting a review of existing legislation and regulations, as well as by teaching  needs 
analysis and assessing the need for remedial action. In addition, Tajikistan also benefited from 
assistance under a number of alternative EC financing schemes, including support to activities 
in de-mining, migration and the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (ibid.). In 2005, 
for instance, the EC supported a project aimed at surveying suspected mine contaminated 
areas and training of Tajik de-miners and supervisors. In 2004, Tajikistan received a grant of 
US$ 2.5 million by the „Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria‟, to which the 
EC is a major contributor (ibid.). 
 EC assistance offered to Kyrgyzstan in 2002-2006 was equally comprehensive as the 
aid to delivered to Tajikistan, although less substantial in terms of allocated resources. Like 
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Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan received support not only through TACIS but also through ECHO, 
EIDHR and FSP, amongst other instruments. The main priority area for assistance was 
poverty reduction, which was addressed, inter alia, through sector-oriented budget support 
and rural development schemes (European Commission, 2008d: 84). The FSP allocated direct 
budget support to the Kyrgyz government of approx. EUR 8.5 million per year, combined 
with technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Social Protection 
(ibid.). The overall aim was to achieve long-term food security and improved nutrition, and 
increase agricultural productivity and competiveness, whilst reducing the impact of transition 
and reforms. Another key area was support for the promotion of civil society and 
democratisation, implemented, inter alia, through EIDHR. Activities in this area included 
establishment of basic fundaments of the legal framework, reform of the judiciary, support of 
the prisoners‟ rights, media freedom, rule of law and conflict prevention (ibid.). Most other 
activities in 2002-2006 were implemented through TACIS. With a total budget of EUR 41.05 
million, assistance under TACIS focused on customs reform, education, social programmes in 
the Ferghana valley, support to civil service reform and an institutional capacity development 
programme.
167
 In the latter area, for instance, initiatives included support to the development 
of a national employment policy. It is important to note that several of the areas covered by 
the EC‟s technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan in 2002-2006 corresponded with the priorities set 
out in the PCA. This applies in particular to the assistance offered to support administrative, 
legal and regulatory reforms (mainly in trade and investment policies) and civil service 
reform and governance. In the area of civil service reform, for instance, projects aimed at 
improving legislation relating to the civil service, implementing a reorganisation of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Agro-processing (MAWA), introducing financial 
management reforms in other ministries similar to those implemented in MAWA, as well as 
strengthening the Civil Service Training and Retraining Centre in the Academy of 
Management (DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG, 2006). In the area of governance, EC assistance was 
targeted at strengthening local governance, notably in the form of capacity development and 
institutional analysis of the Ministry of Local Self Governance, so as to underpin the existing 
legal basis for local self-governance (ibid.). Another key objective was economic 
development, including private sector development. Activities in this area included a project 
on private sector development in the Issyk-Kul region and an initiative aimed at strengthening 
the non-banking financial sector. The former project was an initiative that worked through a 
network of business support agencies in order to promote start-ups and the expansion of small 
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businesses, especially in agro-processing and ecotourism (ibid.). The latter project, which was 
implemented in cooperation with other donors (notably the World Bank finance sector 
programme, the Asian Development Bank and USAID), sought to elaborate mortgage 
systems and legislation (ibid.). Under Track 1 of the 2002-2006 Strategy Paper, Kyrgyzstan - 
like the other four countries - benefited from technical assistance in the area of border 
management. Projects implemented through BOMCA included support to capacity building 
and supply of modern equipment, as well as support to reforming the national border 
management system (European Commission, 2008d: 85). In addition, the Kyrgyz Republic 
was also given assistance in the area of nuclear safety and in the fight against HIV/AIDS 
(ibid.). 
 
 
5.3.4. Effectiveness of EC assistance to Central Asia in 2002-2006 
 
Now that we have outlined the substance and scope of the EC assistance provided to Central 
Asia between 2002 and 2006, it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of the assistance in 
terms of the extent to which the EC programmes and projects reached their anticipated results 
and impact in the medium-long term. Therefore, the final part in our exploration of EC 
technical and financial assistance as a material power resource considers the effectiveness of 
the EC‟s aid offered to the Central Asian states in 2002-2006. In doing so, this subsection 
considers both the successes and failures of the assistance and its strengths and weaknesses, 
whilst providing insights into the explanatory factors underlying the effectiveness (or lack 
thereof) of the aid.  
 Overall, the EC‟s assistance to Central Asia from 2002 to 2006 seems to have yielded 
mixed results. On the one hand, the aid delivered to the region achieved some notable 
successes. According to the European Commission itself, independent evaluations and 
assessment of its aid found that its programmes in Central Asia were “most successful when 
addressing issues relating to an enabling regulatory environment for trade, business and 
investment” (European Commission, 2007a: 23). A significant contribution to regulatory 
convergence and legislative approximation was made particularly in Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan (European Commission, 2007a: 20 & 23). Other positive results included 
“strengthening the legal process, institution building, raising awareness of PCA norms and 
values, including to civil society, integration into world economy and reforming the 
economy” (European Commission, 2007a: 23). The positive results in these domains can in 
part be explained by the fact that these programmes correspond to the key areas of the EC‟s 
competence and/or areas in which the EC has recognised expertise, such as trade and 
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economic policy, central tax and budget reforms (European Commission, 2007a: 19; 
European Commission, 2008d). Another major contributory factor is the fact that cooperation 
in these fields is a key part of the PCAs and that the aid in most of these domains can build on 
the results of and the links developed under previous assistance. Related to this, the European 
Commission itself notes that “[t]he continued input of EU advisory assistance has kept the 
Central Asian states in the general transition reform process that started in the early 1990s 
with the Central European States that have since joined the European Union” (European 
Commission, 2007a: 24). A particularly useful tool in this regard was the TACIS Policy 
Advice Small Project Programme, which managed to provide “a quick and flexible response 
to governments‟ emerging priorities and urgent needs in key areas of economic and social 
reforms” (European Commission, 2007a: 19). As we shall see in more detail in the sections 
below, most Central Asian governments indeed made use of these advisory functions, 
regularly calling upon the EC‟s advice and help in drafting legislation and framing reforms.168 
Again, such assistance appeared most successful in focal areas of EC competence, including 
trade and economic policy, central tax and budget reforms (ibid.). 
 On the other hand, the EC‟s assistance to Central Asia encountered a number of 
setbacks and suffered from a few deficiencies, which sometimes compromised the intended 
results of the assistance. For starters, as a central feature of the EC assistance to the Central 
Asian countries in 2002-2006, the strong reliance on a regional approach soon appeared to 
have several limits in light of the reality of the Central Asian context, which revealed the need 
for a stronger national policy framework.
169
 This applied especially to the EC‟s reliance on a 
regional framework for the development and implementation of the bilateral assistance 
programmes (Track 2). That is, the regional support framework took the similarities between 
the five countries too much for granted and failed to sufficiently account for their diverging 
needs.
170
 Moreover, most regional programmes under Track 1, including BOMCA, CADAP, 
TRACECA and INOGATE, clearly confirmed the relevance of a regional cooperation 
framework for addressing a number of pressing cross-boundary issues, including transport 
links, the environment and border management, the regional programmes often failed to 
deliver due to the lingering political tensions between the states involved and a lack of 
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political will at government level (see e.g. European Commission, 2007a: 21-22; International 
Crisis Group, 2006: 24). Most reluctant to engage in regional cooperation initiatives have 
been Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, although the EC did manage to seal their participation in 
a number of its regional programme activities, including TRACECA and BOMCA. Alongside 
personal rivalries and jealousy, regional cooperation in Central Asia is undermined by the fact 
that the Central Asian republics are still trying to develop their own national and cultural 
identities, which translates in an obsession with safeguarding their national interests (see more 
below). Beyond unrealistic expectations of regional cooperation, some of the EC‟s regional 
programmes, and in particular TRACECA and INOGATE, had only a minor impact due to 
the limited amount of resources they had been allocated. In turn, BOMCA and CADAP, 
which - as the EU‟s flagship programmes in Central Asia - had been given more funding, 
managed to achieve some significant successes and largely achieved their anticipated results. 
However, a reality check and a quick look underneath the surface indicate that border 
management problems, and even more so, drugs trafficking issues, are there to stay as long as 
the region‟s primary ail, corruption, is not alleviated.171  
This brings us to problems and obstacles limiting the sustainability of the intended 
effects of EC assistance in the medium-long term. What most of these problems or obstacles 
have in common is that they entail negative consequences for the follow-up of the intended 
results and/or the implementation process after the completion of the EC projects, which is 
what has been referred to as an „implementation gap‟ (European Commission, 2008d). The 
latter points, inter alia, to the observation that new laws - including laws that were drafted 
with the help of the EU - are often not implemented accordingly, or not implemented at all. 
One aspect limiting the sustainability is indeed the high incidence of corruption in the 
region.
172
 However, in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, problems with sustainability of the 
assistance outcomes are also related to the countries‟ attitude of aid dependency. A large 
degree of aid dependency on the EU may well provide the EU with considerable leverage 
over these aid dependent countries (see above); however, their attitude of aid dependency 
prevents them from taking matters in their own hands and carrying out policy reform 
processes until the end. As one interviewee from the Commission illustrated, handing out 
computers and other ICT equipment, such as specialised software for government 
departments, to the Kyrgyz and Tajik governments comes with the risk that they will ask the 
EU for new equipment once the old installations are broken or outdated, or that they will ask 
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the EU to repair the equipment when it is broken.
173
 The Kyrgyz attitude of aid dependency 
was apparent during interviews with Kyrgyz government officials, with each of them 
declaring that they would like to see the EU distribute more technical assistance and budget 
support to the Kyrgyz government.
174
 This attitude is even stronger in Tajikistan. To give one 
example, the country would like to receive more direct budget support from the EU, but it has 
been very slow in actually implementing planned reforms of its national budget and financial 
system despite progress with public financial management reform being a distinct criteria set 
by the EU for receiving more budget support allocations (European Commission, 2005b).  
One problem with reform-oriented budget support that is recognised by the 
Commission is the difficulty in finding good indicators to measure progress (see e.g. 
International Crisis Group, 2006). Moreover, although direct budget reform was promoted as 
a new approach to conditionality, it has become clear that such conditionality to trigger 
structural adjustments is largely ineffective in the absence of complementary technical 
assistance to improve the government‟s institutional and administrative capacity (see above). 
Changing the attitudes of aid dependency might be a challenge that is in an another league 
altogether, but the EC has come to understand that sectoral budget reform needs to be 
accompanied by targeted technical assistance, which was already applied under the FSP in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2002-2006. More generally, the EC has been increasingly 
investing in capacity-building projects in the region in view of increasing the sustainability of 
its support and reducing countries‟ aid dependency. As we have seen above, several of the 
bilateral programmes under the Strategy Paper for 2002-2006 indeed consisted of providing 
assistance that centres on trainings (e.g. on collection and processing of official statistics), 
consultancy and the sharing of expertise (e.g. on how to improve their economic policy and 
trading environment). Capacity-building and institutional strengthening initiatives will remain 
indispensable if future EC assistance is to increase the sustainability of its intended effects. In 
Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the public finance management, “despite certain progress achieved 
with EC assistance, is still in the initial phase of reform, and further institution building and 
enhancement of capacity is required to improve decision-making, expenditure functions and 
restrain corruption” (European Commission, 2008d). Even in Kazakhstan, which is already 
far beyond the stage of needing logistical support such as computers and soft ware 
programmes, limited institutional capacity remains a problem, including the limited 
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competence of civil servants and of staff in general. As one interviewee clarified, this is 
particularly the case of the middle ranks of civil service and company management rather than 
at the senior ranks.
175
 Related to this, there is also a lack of competent local governance. Such 
assistance programmes as the Managers Training Programme and such projects as the local 
government capacity-building initiative and projects aimed at strengthening civil service 
training schools have been particularly designed to address this issue of lack of competence. 
Another problem undermining effective implementation is the lack of decentralised 
government.
176
 The latter is especially problematic in Kazakhstan, which covers an enormous 
territory. In order to tackle this problem, the EC has, for instance, organised a project aimed at 
assisting the Kazakh government in developing a strategic plan for decentralisation. In 
Kyrgyzstan, decentralisation of the administrative structures is now part of the government‟s 
agenda, but implementation of the administrative reform is advancing very slowly (European 
Commission, 2008d).  
However, the EU also had its share in the problems with the limited sustainability of 
some of its assistance offered to the region. To begin with, although revised under the 2002-
2006 Strategy Paper with the aim of being more concentrated and of involving only a number 
of focus areas, the TACIS bilateral programmes for 2002-2006 still consisted of too many 
„stand-alone‟ technical assistance projects, including in the area of institutional and 
administrative reform.
177
 As noted in an independent evaluation ordered by the Commission, 
“[t]hese actions often achieve good results at project level but have limited impact at sector 
and national policy level due to a lack of continuity and coherent long-term sector planning. 
Inevitably, this has had negative effects on sustainability” (ibid). More generally, moreover, 
TACIS, as the main assistance instrument, suffered from a lack of flexibility, being subject to 
a very time-consuming, unwieldy bureaucratic system, which in its turn was subject to a slow 
and intricate formal decision-making process.
178
 This seriously undermined the 
responsiveness of the aid delivery and even contributed to considerable time lag of TACIS‟ 
implementation
179
 in Central Asia (European Commission, 2007a: 21; European Commission, 
2008d: 21). In this regard, it was hoped that the new assistance instrument, DCI, would have a 
lot more scope in terms of flexibility and responsiveness to the countries‟ development needs 
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and the region‟s rapidly changing environment. In concluding this subsection, it is important 
to note that the other external donors active in Central Asia in 2002-2006 were hardly 
achieving any better results. Indeed, the performance of the assistance delivered by key 
western donors such as the U.S. and the UN agencies, was not rated any better and was to 
some extent considered even less effective than the aid offered by the EU. Moreover, they too 
were confronted with several problems, often similar to those faced by the EU (see e.g. 
Adamson, 2002, 2003; Schatz, 2008; Schatz & Levine, 2009). However, one aspect on which 
their assistance scored substantially better than the EU‟s aid did was the visibility of their 
programmes and activities. Indeed, while key donors such as the U.S. and the UN managed to 
make their assistance known among the local public, inter alia, through large publicity 
campaigns, the EC‟s aid remained largely unnoticed to the Central Asian population (see e.g. 
International Crisis Group, 2006; Matveeva, 2006). This lack of visibility increasingly 
worried the EU to the point where this became a priority issue in the EU Strategy of June 
2007, and hence also for the assistance that was to be delivered under the 2007-2013 Strategy 
Paper.
180
 In the mean time, a number of measures were already taken to enhance the visibility 
of the EU‟s assistance, including the establishment of closer contact between the EC 
Delegations and the local public (e.g. annual organisation of a European film week, 
organisation of school competitions and the public celebration of Europe Day), an increase in 
the number of consultation sessions with civil society, larger investments in publicity 
campaigns, and an upgrading of the EU‟s presence on the ground (see more below). 
To sum up the main findings of this subsection, the EU‟s aid delivery to Central Asia 
from 2002 to 2006 appears to have achieved some notable successes while at the same time 
encountering several setbacks and suffering from a number of deficiencies. The largest 
successes were achieved in the area of regulatory reform in the administrative and legal 
spheres. Yet, limited institutional capacity and lack of political will on the side of the Central 
Asian governments very often hampered the impact of the assistance in the longer run, 
including the actual implementation of the initiated reforms. Moreover, the assistance had its 
own shortcomings, especially in terms of the aid responsiveness and flexibility of TACIS, the 
main instrument.  
 
5.3.5. Concluding remarks 
 
This section served to assess the extent to which, from a TNPO1 perspective, the provision of 
aid is a material power resource, which contributes to the EU‟s TNPO over the Central Asian 
                                                 
180
 Author‟s interview at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Central Asia Division, in Berlin on 30 October 
2007. 
                                                               - 151 - 
 
countries. Irrespective of the limits encountered by the EU in providing assistance to the 
Central Asian countries, aid itself remains a strong tool for the EU to exert power over the 
region. This applies both from a TNPO1 perspective and from a TNPO overlap perspective. 
As demonstrated above, looking at it through a TNPO1 lens, the mere fact that the EU is 
Central Asia‟s main donor implies the existence of material asymmetries and provides the 
Union with a certain amount of leverage over the region, varying in strength across the five 
countries. In turn, the overlap of TNPO1 with other two TNPO structures accounts for a more 
sophisticated type of power-creating or power-enhancing aspects of EU aid, as captured in the 
TNPO toolbox (Figure 1, p.51). To quote Holden again, “[r]egardless of the specific effects of 
aid, EU aid is an important process in itself; it forms relationships between EU 
institutions/personnel and their counterparts and inserts the EU into the national/regional 
context. [...]. The aid itself is a direct intervention to inject finance and expertise (and 
prestige) to local institutions, which it favours and ensures contact between European and 
local elites” (2009: 182). Such power-creating and power-enhancing aspects of the EU‟s 
assistance to Central Asia will be explored below, in particular in the sections covering the 
overlap between TNPO1 and the other two TNPO structures, notably sections 8.1, 8.2 and 8.4.  
 
5.4. Security capabilities and (geo)strategic power game 
 
The final step in our exploration of the EU‟s control over TNPO1 vis-à-vis Central Asia has a 
strong realist orientation, not least since it focuses on issues that are central to realist thought: 
security capabilities and geostrategic power. Realists view national security as the primordial 
national interest. Accordingly, in pursuing national security, states rely on their material 
capabilities, most notably economic and military capabilities. Applied to the EU, this means 
that the EU is above all concerned with safeguarding the EU‟s external security, and in the 
first place, with guaranteeing stability alongside its borders. As the EU distinguishes itself 
internationally by favouring non-military means to advance its interests (cf. the EU as a 
„civilian power‟), the Union relies primarily on economic and other civilian instruments to 
guarantee its security. However, even in the current post-Cold War era the EU is not exempt 
from the need to recourse to military - be it exclusively defensive - instruments to reach 
certain „hard security‟ objectives, in particular to reduce the kind of security threats that 
emerge from weak or failed states and from (post-)conflict zones (cf. the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP)). Irrespective of the fact that the EU does not (yet) have a fully-
fledged „EU army‟ and that it cannot participate in NATO military actions under the EU flag, 
its interests do encompass hard security goals, including the successful implementation of key 
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NATO operations in which EU member states are participating. The present subsection 
focuses on the extent to which the EU attempts and manages to gain influence in the security 
domain. In what follows, it will be demonstrated that Central Asia holds a mix of soft security 
and hard security risks for the EU. Moreover, in light of Central Asia‟s geostrategic 
importance, it will be shown that the EU is involved in the so-called „New Great Game‟ that 
is being played out in the region, and that the Union pursues strategic power on the Central 
Asian chessboard (cf. the notion of „geostrategic competition‟ in the TNPO toolbox, see 
Figure 1, p.51), the rules of which, however, appear to be conditioned by the Central Asian 
states themselves. 
The fact that Central Asia borders Afghanistan as well as the EU‟s neighbouring 
countries to the East holds a multiple security risk for the EU, which has proved to be a vital 
incentive for the EU to enhance its engagement with the Central Asian republics and increase 
its influence over the region (see above). According to this logic, any factors that may 
provoke instability in the region are therefore to be addressed, such as extreme poverty, social 
unrest and lack of respect by the authorities for human and civil rights. Moreover, the region 
is home to a host of transnational security threats for the EU, including illegal migration and 
organised crime, in particular people and drugs trafficking. Not surprisingly, stability and 
security (including energy security) are the main strategic interests of the EU in Central Asia, 
as has been reiterated ever since the Council meeting of 10 December 2001 (Council, 2001a; 
also see e.g. Council, 2007b; Erler, 2007; European Commission, 2002; 2007a). In practice, 
this means that much of the EU‟s engagement with the region - from its political dialogue 
mechanisms to its various assistance programmes - should be seen in light of the EU‟s strong 
concern with security objectives. These include both hard security and soft security 
objectives. With respect to the former, the EU has so far not had any missions in Central Asia 
under the EDSP. Even so, the EU has obviously been very concerned with the successful 
implementation of NATO‟s International Stability and Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in 
Afghanistan. Of the EU‟s 27 Member States, no less than 25 are currently participating in the 
military operation in Afghanistan, with Cyprus and Malta being the only EU member states 
not contributing to the mission (see Table 5, p.153). The EU is not only concerned with 
avoiding potential spill-over of extremism from Afghanistan to Central Asia, but the region is 
also crucial as a transit and basing source for resupply of ISAF. Next to an American military 
base
181
 at the Manas airport in Bishkek, the region hosts two military bases run by European 
NATO members, notably a German base in Termez, Uzbekistan, and a French base at the 
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 It is important to note that the U.S. initially had a second military basis in the region, i.e. in Uzbekistan. 
However the Uzbek regime ordered the Americans to close down the basis after the U.S. government had 
dismissed the Uzbeks‟ violent response to the protests in Andijan in May 2005. 
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airport of Dushanbe, Tajikistan. In light of the ISAF mission, both EU member states signed 
basing agreements with the respective Central Asian countries. Since the launch of the ISAF 
mission, NATO members have also signed commercial transit agreements with the Central 
Asian states. Along with other EU diplomats, Pierre Morel, the EUSR for Central Asia, has 
been in close contact with NATO and has contributed to securing NATO‟s bid to guarantee 
the continued support of the Central Asian republics for the alliance‟s mission in 
neighbouring Afghanistan.  
 
 
Table 5: EU member states’ contributions to the ISAF mission per country (2010) 
Source: NATO website, see <http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php> 
 
Next to the ISAF mission, the EU shows a keen interest in working with Central Asian 
republics on the basis of other joint security interests, such as border management and drugs 
trafficking issues (Boonstra, 2009). The EU‟s border management programme, BOMCA, and 
its anti-drugs trafficking programme, CADAP, are indeed the two clearest indicators of the 
EU‟s direct involvement in the region as a security actor and its attempt to increase its 
influence in the security realm. Another aspect of the EU‟s involvement in the security 
domain in Central Asia regards the activities of the OSCE in the Central Asian states and the 
latter‟s membership of the regional organisation (see below in the section on TNPO2macro and 
its overlap). At the same time, however, the EU and the Central Asian states have been 
pursuing conflicting notions of security threats as well as diverging approaches on how to 
avoid and address them, with the Central Asian states being much closer to Russia and 
China‟s approaches and perceptions of security threats than to those of the EU and the OSCE 
(Boonstra, 2009). Very often, issues that the EU and the OSCE believe to be factors 
contributing to security and stability, such as further democratisation and an improvement and 
reform of the education sector and the judiciary, are considered security threats in the eyes of 
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the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, or rather, threats to the very survival of the regimes 
themselves (see e.g. Boonstra, 2009). As Kreikemeyer and Zellner (2007) illustrate, “[t]he 
differences are underscored each time there is an election, and the CIS gives high marks to the 
same elections that the OSCE finds seriously flawed, or at least still substantially lacking in 
freeness and fairness”. Another case in point, which applies particularly to Uzbekistan, is the 
fact that the Uzbek regime easily found support with Russia and China for its violent crushing 
of the peaceful protest march in Andijan in May 2005.
182
 In the context of their shared 
membership in the SCO, both regional powers stressed their common values with Uzbekistan, 
backing the Uzbeks‟ harsh response to what the regime called a „terrorist threat‟. In contrast 
to the U.S. and the EU, which asked for an independent investigation into the events at 
Andijan and strongly opposed the Uzbeks‟ heavy-handed crackdown on the situation, which 
in reality was just a peaceful protest march organised by a group of Uzbek Muslims, Russia 
and China fully supported the Uzbek government, mainly based on their shared concern with 
fighting „Islamic extremism‟ within their respective national territories183 (see e.g. Ambrosio, 
2008; Hall, 2008; Olcott, 2007; Stevens, 2010). Because of this clear divergence in notions of 
security and the perception of security threats between the EU and the Central Asian states, 
the EU sometimes takes a rather prudent stance when announcing potentially „sensitive‟ 
assistance goals to the Central Asian governments. While it is important to note that this does 
not apply across the board, the EU often avoids presenting its soft security-oriented 
programmes directly as such to its Central Asian partners, including projects on human rights 
awareness in the Kyrgyz police forces or its support to judicial reform in Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan. This was particularly the case in Uzbekistan in the aftermath of the Andijan 
events, when the Uzbek regime was very dismissive of any EC projects directly targeting 
improvements of the country‟s human rights and democratisation situation.184 
Russia and China‟s support of Uzbekistan‟s heavy-handed response to the Andijan 
protests point to an additional insight. That is, when Russia and China emphasise the idea of 
„common security values‟ in their relations with the Central Asian republics, inter alia 
through the shared membership in the SCO, then there is no doubt that this serves as a way to 
oppose western initiatives and alliances in Central Asia and counterbalance U.S. and EU 
influence in the region. This brings us directly to the final aspect of the EU‟s TNPO1, i.e. the 
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 Uzbek security forces allegedly shot dead hundreds of mostly unarmed protesters in Andijan that day. 
According to human rights groups and witnesses, more than 700 people were killed. The Uzbek government said 
that 187 people died and insisted that violence had been instigated by Islamic insurgents. See Alima Bissenova, 
“News Digest”, CACI Analyst, 16 May 2007. 
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 Cf. Russia‟s heavy-handed handling of the situation in Chechnya and China‟s hostile treatment of the Chinese 
Uygur population in the Xinjiang Province. 
184
 See e.g. lecture by Daniel Stevens, former project leader of TEMPUS project in Uzbekistan and former leader 
of commissioned assessments of EC projects in Uzbekistan, at SOAS in London on 21 January 2010. 
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EU‟s (geo)strategic power, and the balance-of-power logic that has underlied its involvement 
in Central Asia, in particular from 2005 onwards. As a rule, the EU tends to avoid to publicly 
present itself as a geostrategically motivated actor, thereby seeking to distance itself from 
other major international powers, most notably the U.S., Russia, and China. The EU does 
exactly this in relation with its engagement and interests in Central Asia. Indeed, EU 
officials
185
 hardly ever fail to indicate that the EU does not want to become embroiled in the 
regional power games
186
 that are being played out in Central Asia between Russia, China and 
the U.S., among other external actors
187
 (cf. the so-called New Great Game)
188
. Yet, by their 
very nature, the EU‟s geostrategic and security interests in the region, not least the EU‟s 
energy needs, unavoidably make the Union a competitor for „influence‟ over the Central 
Asian republics vis-à-vis those other external powers (cf. the notion of „geostrategic 
competition‟ in the TNPO toolbox, see Figure 1, p.51). Just like Russia and China seek to 
counterbalance the leverage of the EU and the U.S. and expand their own influence, the EU 
has become increasingly concerned with containing Russia and China‟s (re)new(ed) power 
hold over the region. Although this concern did not come overnight, it was reinforced to a 
large extent by Uzbekistan‟s rapprochement to Moscow and Beijing in the aftermath of the 
Andijan events in 2005 and further added to the EU‟s conviction that its strategic influence 
over the region had to be enhanced. In January 2007, External Relations Commissioner at the 
time, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, told Reuters that “failure to do so would leave Russia and 
China in a position to draw the five Central Asian republics further into their spheres of 
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 See e.g. speech by German Minister of State, Gernot Erler, “Towards a New EU Ostpolitik? Russia, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia”, speaking on behalf of the EU Presidency, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 
7 February 2007, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2007/070207-Erler-
EUOstpolitik.html, accessed on 18 August 2008; also see author‟s interview with political advisor to the EUSR 
for Central Asia, in Almaty on 20 May 2008. 
186
 A good example of such a „regional power game‟ is Kyrgyzstan‟s 2009 cat-and-mouse game with Russia and 
the U.S. over whether or not to renew the lease of the U.S. air base at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan. Russia was 
believed to be pressing (former) Kyrgyz President Bakiyev to shut down the American transit base - crucial for 
the NATO mission in Afghanistan - in exchange for considerable financial and economic support. Yet, after 
months of speculation and despite a vote in the Kyrgyz Parliament ordering the Americans to leave the base, 
Bakiyev decided in July 2009 that the U.S. transit base could remain operational after all. 
187
 Following the demise of the USSR in 1991, Russia‟s decades-long grip over Central Asia weakened 
substantially, and soon this once-exclusive Russian influence sphere attracted attention from other external 
actors, which saw several opportunities. An early interest in the energy-rich region came from American and 
European oil giants, such as Chevron and BP, which was soon accompanied by an emerging interest from China, 
Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan and the U.S., all of whom had historical ties with and/or geopolitical stakes in 
Central Asia. Turkey was motivated by geographic proximity, economic opportunity, as well as religious and 
cultural connections. For China, it was access to new markets and energy resource that mattered most, but also 
its intention to avoid spill-over of Central Asia‟s resurgent Turkic nationalism into the adjacent Chinese province 
of Xinjiang, a predominantly Turkic-Muslim area. Iran was interested in economic opportunities and cultural 
ties, especially with Tajikistan. For more details, see e.g. De Cordier, 2007; Roy, 2009. 
188
 This label arose based on the observation that the growing external interest in Central Asia is reminiscent of 
the 19th-century „Great Game‟ between Victorian Britain and tsarist Russia. For more details on the „New Great 
Game‟, see e.g. Djalili & Kellner, 2006; Hatipoglu, 2006; Kaushik, 2007; Kavalski, 2007a; Menon, 2003; 
Swanström, 2005. 
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influence. [...] I think it‟s not a matter of securing the energy resources only - it‟s really a 
matter of engaging with these [Central Asian] countries. [...] If we don't engage with these 
countries, these countries will turn eastwards and turn to Russia and China. And I think it‟s 
highly important that [Central Asians] also look very strongly towards Europe.”189  
Central to the outcome of the regional power games is the role of the Central Asian 
countries themselves. Indeed, rather than being mere pawns on the Central Asian chess board, 
the Central Asian states themselves engage in offsetting the external actors out against each 
other in order to reap the maximum benefit of these power games.
190
 This is in fact the basis 
of the so-called „multi-vector foreign policies‟ of the Central Asian countries, which summon 
the governments to cooperate with a diverse group of external partner countries.
191
 Perceived 
as a tool to safeguard their sovereignty,  the idea of following a „multi-vector foreign policy‟ 
emerged in the 1990s as a way to avoid future overreliance and strong dependence on one 
particular external partner, i.e. Russia at the time. This foreign policy approach is based on the 
principle of treating all external partners as equals and thus of not selecting or favouring 
certain partners above others. In practice, the Central Asian regimes have come to apply this 
„multi-vector foreign policy‟ in a very pragmatic, utilitarian way, seeking to maximise the 
benefits of their cooperation with external actors. Turkmenistan has been somewhat of an 
exception in the region. That is, in pursuit of full independence of external involvement, it has 
maintained a position of „positive neutrality‟ in its international relations. This explains, inter 
alia, why the country did not seek to join regional organisations, such as the SCO and CSTO, 
and is only an associate member of the CIS, the post-Soviet regional organisation founded 
right after the collapse of the USSR to reunite all post-Soviet states (apart from the three 
Baltic countries).
192
 Of course, Turkmenistan‟s neutrality in international affairs is strongly 
linked to the severe isolationism that late President Niyazov dragged his country into under 
his dictatorial rule. Whilst maintaining Turkmenistan‟s position of „positive neutrality‟, new 
Turkmen President Berdymukhammedov has ended the country‟s decade-long isolationism 
and is increasingly adopting a „multi-vector foreign policy‟, following the example of his 
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 See “Central Asia: EU Commissioner Seeks Closer European Ties”,  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 
January  2007, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074059.html>. 
190
 Cf. the above example of the U.S. transit base at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan 
191
 Author‟s interviews at the Diplomatic Mission of Kazakhstan to the EU in Brussels on 4 February 2008, at 
the Diplomatic Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the EU in Brussels on 5 February 2008, at the Diplomatic Mission of 
Uzbekistan to the EU in Brussels on 11 February 2008 and at the Diplomatic Mission of Tajikistan in Brussels 
on 20 March 2008. 
192
 Turkmenistan is a member of one regional organisation, notably the Economic Cooperation Organisation 
(ECO), which it joined in 1992, along with the other four Central Asian states. 
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fellow Central Asian rulers.
193
 In recent years, the country has indeed been pursuing a very 
pragmatic approach, especially in relation to its gas sales and gas exploitation (see below).
194
  
In terms of the implications for the EU‟s power in the region, the multi-vector 
approach of the Central Asian states is in effect a double-edged sword. On the one hand, their 
pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy provides the EU with a certain amount of leverage 
over the Central Asian countries. Indeed, the latter‟s interest to cooperate more closely with 
the EU is inherently - though not entirely - linked to their intention to establish 
counterweights to the dominance of Russia and China and hence reduce their dependence on 
these two powers. If the Central Asian states want to continue to use their enhanced 
cooperation with the EU as a counterweight to scale back Moscow and Beijing‟s dominance 
in the region, they have no choice but to try and stay on relatively good footing with Brussels. 
Crucially, the fact the Central Asian republics resort to the EU to establish a counterweight 
suggests that they perceive the Union as a „major actor‟, powerful enough to counterbalance 
the involvement of the other major actors, i.c. Russia, China, and to a lesser extent, the U.S. 
On the other hand, however, the EU‟s leverage over the Central Asian states is conditioned by 
this very same policy, in that it essentially constitutes a pragmatic, utilitarian approach, aimed 
at maximising the governments‟ short-term benefits. Above all, this translates into a 
considerable level of unpredictability and unreliability on the part of the Central Asian partner 
countries, and complicates the prospect of a fully stable bilateral relationship (see below). 
This has most noticeably been the case in the area of energy relations, which is subject to 
intense competition, in particular between Russia, China, Iran and the EU. A case in point is 
Turkmenistan‟s on-and-off readiness to supply gas directly to the EU. Ever since he came to 
power in early 2007, Turkmen President Berdymukhammedov has been giving the EU mixed 
signals by making assurances that its country will deliver gas to the Union whilst being 
reluctant to officialise any such commitments. The Turkmen stance is motivated by two 
factors. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, Turkmenistan has become very preoccupied 
with diversifying its energy partners in order to reduce its dependence on Russia for selling 
gas. Among other things, the Turkmen regime has been pressing Russia‟s national gas 
company, Gazprom, to pay higher prices for Turkmen gas by threatening to sell gas directly 
to other partner countries, including to EU member states (see e.g. Spechler & Spechler, 2008). 
This approach has already paid off, with Gazprom in 2007 accepting a 30 per cent increase in 
gas prices, despite an earlier contract with Turkmenistan fixing the price of Turkmen gas until 
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 Author‟s interview at the Diplomatic Mission of Turkmenistan to the EU in Brussels on 13 March 2008. 
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 It is important to note that Turkmenistan only wants to sell gas „at its borders‟, which complicates prospects 
of gas imports for partner countries that do not border Turkmenistan, such as the EU member states. Author‟s 
interview at the Diplomatic Mission of Turkmenistan to the EU in Brussels on 13 March 2008. 
                                                               - 158 - 
 
2009. The prospect of Turkmenistan selling gas directly to the EU market is very worrying for 
Gazprom, as the company is heavily reliant on the income of its gas sales to European 
countries (see e.g. Feklyunina, 2008). It is clear that Turkmenistan has emerged as the big 
winner, even more so since it simultaneously managed to pull off two lucrative agreements on 
the construction of direct gas export pipelines to Iran and China (which opened in late 2009 
and early 2010 respectively). On the other hand, Turkmenistan is fully aware of the uncertain 
fate of the planned EU energy corridor - i.e. Nabucco
195
 and its feed pipe, the Trans-Caspian 
gas pipeline -, which is to transport Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Europe across the Caspian 
Sea without transit through Russia and Ukraine. In the absence of full certainty on the 
construction of the new energy corridor, Turkmenistan seems hesitant to sign any official gas 
supply agreements and contracts with the EU side.
196
 In the mean time, however, 
Turkmenistan is taking pragmatic use of this self-created uncertainty over gas exports as a 
bargaining chip in its relations with the EU, Russia and other interested energy partners 
(Denison, 2008: 101-2; Endicott, 2009).  
Another illustrative example of how the multi-vector foreign policy approach of the 
Central Asian states has proved to be a double-edged sword for the EU‟s power in the region 
is Uzbekistan‟s position towards the EU sanctions imposed on Tashkent following its heavy-
handed crackdown on the protests in Andijan in 2005. As already pointed out, following the 
May 2005 events, the Uzbek regime quickly found support with its Chinese and Russian 
counterparts. This support was only further reinforced when the EU decided in October 2005 
to impose a series of sanctions on the regime to „punish‟ it for its violent handling of the 
peaceful protests at Andijan, as well as for its unwillingness to allow for an independent, 
international inquiry into the events and the heightened repression of civil society by the 
Uzbek government in the months following the uprising in Andijan. While the sanctions 
drove Uzbekistan further towards Russia and China and largely failed to achieve the intended 
goals (see below), they nevertheless revealed that Uzbekistan cannot afford disrupting all ties 
with the EU, not only because the EU is a significant trade partner and donor of the country, 
but also because the regime is wary of being dominated by Russia and China, and hence 
needs the EU to counterbalance the latter‟s influence. Interestingly, even the U.S. took 
advantage of the frosty relations between the EU and Uzbekistan. As one interviewee 
explained, after the Americans had been forced to close down their military base in Karshi 
Khanabad, they quietly stayed in the background, happily letting the EU do the „dirty work‟, 
whilst slowly undertaking diplomatic efforts to re-establish friendly relations with 
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 If fully constructed, Nabucco will be a 3,300-kilometer-long gas pipeline, which will run from Azerbaijan via 
Turkey into Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and ending in Austria. 
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 Author‟s interview at the Diplomatic Mission of Turkmenistan to the EU in Brussels on 13 March 2008. 
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Tashkent.
197
 Moreover, although the Uzbek regime only undertook minor steps to meet the 
demands set by the EU to lift the sanctions, it strongly resented being „targeted‟ by the EU 
and did not want to become an international „pariah‟ (Hall, 2008: 80; Olcott, 2007). The 
regime‟s rapprochement to Russia and China should therefore be seen as an attempt both to 
avoid being internationally isolated and to frustrate the EU, notably by pointing out to 
Brussels that the government could rely on the support of its other partners - which in addition 
had no problems with the regime‟s stance on human rights and democracy - and by 
threatening to break all contact with the EU if Brussels did not lift the sanctions.
198
 The 
Uzbek regime also repeatedly stated that it did not like to be preached to
199
, or to use the 
words of an interviewee of Uzbekistan‟s MFA quoting Winston Churchill, “I love to learn but 
I hate to be taught”.200 Paradoxically, this very same argument also applies to the country‟s 
position towards China and Russia, since the Uzbeks are very concerned with safeguarding 
their sovereignty and hence resent any attempts by Russia and China - or any other powerful 
external actor for that matter - to intervene in the country‟s domestic affairs. In short, this 
indicates that Uzbekistan was playing bluff poker towards the EU. Indeed, in the last ten years 
or so, Tashkent‟s relations with Russia have never been very stable, mostly out of fear of 
being run over by Moscow. In addition, Russia considers Kazakhstan as the region‟s 
powerhouse as well as its main strategic ally in Central Asia, which strongly irritates 
President Karimov, still clinging onto his firm belief that Uzbekistan is Central Asia‟s natural 
leader. China, in turn, arouses even more suspicion in Tashkent, which is extremely wary of 
China‟s growing control over the region‟s natural resources and economic infrastructure (see 
e.g. Hall, 2008: 80).  
To sum up, the EU appears to have acquired leverage over Central Asia in the security 
and (geo)strategic field. That is, in these two closely-related domains, the EU derives TNPO1 
respectively from its security-related capabilities vis-à-vis the region (including via technical 
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 Author‟s interview at the OSCE office in Tashkent on 2 May 2008. By 2008-2009, the Americans harvested 
the fruits of their efforts, as they managed - be it under NATO‟s hat - to regain access to the Uzbek territory in 
view of logistically supporting NATO‟s mission in Afghanistan. 
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 This point (i.e. that the Uzbek government could rely on the support of its other partners - which had no 
problems with its stance on human rights and democracy - and that it threatened to break all contact with the EU 
if Brussels did not lift the sanctions) was reiterated very clearly during the author‟s interview at the Uzbek MFA 
in Tashkent on 2 May 2008, just three days after the EU Foreign Ministers decided at a meeting of the GAERC 
in Luxemburg against lifting the sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan (see more below).  
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 To give an example, Uzbek Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov stated at the EU Troika - Central Asia Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Astana in late March 2007 that his government did not intend to “explain ourselves to 
anyone”, adding that the EU-Uzbek situation cannot be that of a “pupil and a lecturer”. See Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, “EU In Tashkent For Intensive Talks On Human Rights Situation”, 3 April 2007, 
<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347531.html>. 
200
 Author‟s interview at the Uzbek MFA in Tashkent on 2 May 2008. The interviewee specified that he had 
used this quote during his visit to the UK Foreign Office in London around the same time of the GAERC 
meeting in Luxemburg (on 29-30 April 2008) in order to express the Uzbeks irritation at any extension of the 
sanctions. The UK was one of the main supporters of keeping the sanctions regime imposed on Uzbekistan. 
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assistance programmes such as BOMCA and CADAP), and from the Central Asian countries‟ 
recognition of the EU as a geostrategic player, whom the respective regimes perceive as being 
powerful enough to counterbalance the dominance of Russia and China. However, while the 
EU is indeed exercising (geo)strategic power on the Central Asian chessboard, the rules of the 
game appear to be conditioned by the Central Asian states themselves. This is clearly 
reflected in the pragmatism with which the regimes pursue their „multi-vector foreign policy‟ 
(and the ensuing unpredictability of their behaviour), which reveals to be a double-edged 
sword for the efforts of the EU - and of other external powers - to expand its leverage over the 
countries of Central Asia. 
 
 
5.5. Concluding remarks 
 
In presenting the empirical examination of the EU‟s TNPO1 over Central Asia, the above 
outline has sought to explore to what extent material factors contribute to the EU‟s TNPO. 
These material factors encompass the EU‟s position in the region as a leader in trade and 
investment, the EC‟s considerable provision of development and financial aid to the five 
states and the Union‟s (geo)strategic and security-related capabilities vis-à-vis the region. 
Arguably the largest asymmetry in terms of TNPO1 is in the field of trade, with the EU 
constituting the region‟s first trade partner while most Central Asian countries take up only a 
fraction of the EU‟s total market share. This also applies to investment relations. Indeed, 
although the EU is increasingly competing with other major sources of foreign investment, in 
particular China, the Central Asian states are dependent on the EU for the inflow of 
investments, especially in view of their economies‟ need of diversification. Nevertheless, 
there are limits to the Central Asian republics‟ dependence on the EU in the economic and 
trade field and to the extent to which the EU can rely on its economic and trade capabilities in 
order to exert leverage over the five countries. Two factors stand out. On the one hand, EU-
Central Asia trade is dominated by hydrocarbons, an area in which the EU has significantly 
less leverage, up to the point where its bilateral energy relations with Central Asia are 
increasingly characterised by asymmetric interdependence in favour of the latter. On the other 
hand, the trade-related commitments of the Central Asian republics - i.e. made under the 
PCAs, the GSP regime and their WTO accession process - have often failed to translate into 
actual progress or implementation.  
 A seemingly mixed picture emerged from the section‟s exploration of the EU‟s aid 
delivery to Central Asia in 2002-2006. In outlining the EC‟s provision of technical and 
financial assistance, the section found that the EU‟s aid delivery to the region achieved some 
                                                               - 161 - 
 
notable successes. The largest successes were obtained in the area of regulatory reform in the 
administrative and legal spheres. Yet, the successes were offset by a number of setbacks and 
several deficiencies. In particular, limited institutional capacity and lack of political will on 
the side of the Central Asian governments very often hampered the impact of the assistance in 
the longer run, including the actual implementation of the initiated reforms. Moreover, the 
assistance had its own shortcomings, especially in terms of the aid responsiveness and 
flexibility of TACIS, the main instrument.  
Perhaps more surprisingly, the chapter also found that the EU appears to have leverage 
over Central Asia in the „hard‟ areas of security and (geo)strategic power politics. On the one 
hand, the EU derives TNPO1 from its security-related capabilities vis-à-vis the region, 
including via technical assistance programmes such as BOMCA and CADAP. On the other 
hand, the EU also draws power from the Central Asian countries‟ recognition of the EU as a 
geostrategic player, whom they perceive as being powerful enough to counterbalance the 
dominance of Russia and China. However, while the EU is indeed exercising (geo)strategic 
power on the Central Asian chessboard, the rules of the game appear to be conditioned by the 
Central Asian states themselves. This is clearly reflected in the pragmatism with which the 
regimes pursue their „multi-vector foreign policy‟, which has proved to be a double-edged 
sword for the attempts of the EU - and of other external powers - to expand its leverage over 
the countries of Central Asia. 
Irrespective of the limits encountered by the EU in exercising influence over the 
region by relying on material resources, it can be concluded that the EU through its control 
over the material structure, i.e. TNPO1, has established itself as a power to be reckoned with 
by the Central Asian republics. Moreover, the mere fact that the EU is Central Asia‟s main 
donor and trade partner and a significant source of incoming investment implies the existence 
of considerable material asymmetries in favour of the EU, which provide the Union with a 
certain amount of leverage over the region. Of course, it is important to add that this leverage 
varies in strength across the five countries and across the different aspects of material 
structure. Among other things, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were found to be most dependent 
on EU aid, whereas the EU‟s impact in the trade and investment areas appeared strongest in 
the case of Kazakhstan. The EU‟s geostrategic leverage, in turn, revealed to be roughly 
similar throughout the region. 
With respect to the analytical dimensions identified in the TNPO toolbox, it is clear 
that the EU‟s TNPO1 over Central Asia is located predominantly within the 
„intergovernmental‟ sphere and almost exclusively follows a rationalist logic of action. 
Interestingly, the EU‟s control over the material structure is not fully EU-driven and agent-
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based, but also encompasses some „purely structural‟ features. Indeed, the EU also draws 
considerable „passive‟ influence from the fact that the Central Asian republics perceive the 
EU as a major international trade power as well as a (geo)strategic actor, powerful enough in 
their eyes to counterbalance the dominance of Russia and China. In this respect, it is worth 
highlighting that our exploration of the EU‟s leverage over Central Asia demonstrated the 
usefulness of (neo)realist insights in capturing several aspects of the EU‟s TNPO1 over the 
region, in particular the „hard power‟ aspects, i.e. security-related and geostrategic power.201 
To conclude, some preliminary evidence was found, which indicated that the EU‟s market 
power over the Central Asian countries encapsulates a number of specific purely structural 
mechanisms of EU impact, most notably „externalisation‟ and „competition‟ (governance), 
occurring both in their intergovernmental and transnational forms (cf. TNPO toolbox, see 
Figure 1, p.51). This will be explored in greater detail in the section covering TNPO overlap. 
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 For a good discussion of the „great power competition‟ in Central Asia from a realist and neorealist 
perspective, see Menon & Ziegler, 2008. 
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Chapter 6  - The EU’s TNPO2 over Central Asia  
 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, alongside material factors, TNPO is also composed of 
institutional elements, which make up the second parameter of TNPO, TNPO2. This chapter 
presents the empirical examination of the EU‟s TNPO2 over Central Asia. In particular, it 
explores the extent to which the EU effectively exercises power over the Central Asian states 
through its control over institutional factors. The chapter is divided into two parts, which 
respectively cover the two subcomponents of TNPO2, i.e. its micro-level and its macro-level. 
As such, the first part of the chapter explores the different forms of institutionalised 
cooperation and dialogue established between the EU and the five Central Asian republics. 
The second part, in turn, examines the extent to which EU draws influence over the five 
countries from its predominant position within particular international institutions or regimes. 
As with the empirical exploration of TNPO1, the chapter focuses mostly on the Pre-Strategy 
period, notably 2001-June 2007, whilst already offering some insights into events and 
relations taking place in the Post-Strategy period. 
 
6.1. The EU‟s TNPO2micro over Central Asia 
 
The different forms of institutionalised cooperation and engagement captured by the micro-
level of TNPO2, or TNPO2micro, include both formal, contractual (including treaty-based) 
formats of institutionalisation established as part of the EU‟s relations with the Central Asian 
states, and less formal and less integrated (including ad hoc) formats of institutionalisation, 
often held at the bureaucratic or technocratic level rather than at the high political level. 
However, as noted in Chapter 3, although an unmissable part of TNPO, TNPO2micro hardly 
exists on its own. Indeed, more often than not, it tends to interact with TNPO1 and/or TNPO3, 
and predominantly occurs in the overlap with either one or both of the other two TNPO 
structures. Therefore, this section contains only few references to and applications of the 
analytical mechanisms from the TNPO toolbox. For analytical applications of TNPO2micro,  we 
thus refer to the sections covering TNPO1-2, TNPO2-3 and TNPO1-2-3, which make ample use of 
the TNPO toolbox.  
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6.1.1. Formal institutionalised dialogue  
 
To begin with, at the highest formal level of institutionalisation, each Central Asian state is 
linked contractually to the EU through an individual PCA or TCA framework.
202
 Because the 
PCA with Tajikistan was signed only in 2004, the agreement came in force only recently, 
notably on 1 January 2010. As mentioned above, the delay in signing the PCA was largely 
due to the civil war that held the country hostage in 1992-1998. Between May 2005 and 
December 2009, an interim trade agreement between the EU and Tajikistan was in force, 
which governed all trade and trade-related matters of the bilateral cooperation as envisaged in 
the PCA.
203
 Until December 2009, nearly all other aspects of the bilateral cooperation were 
formally governed under the framework of the TCA signed with the then USSR back in 1989 
and endorsed by Tajikistan by exchange of letter in 1994. Relations with Turkmenistan are 
still governed by this TCA, as EU concerns over the country‟s poor internal political situation 
have halted the ratification process of the PCA signed with Turkmenistan in 1998 (see 
Chapter 4).
204
 These concerns have been expressed most noticeably by the European 
Parliament and the EU Member States.
205
 As mentioned earlier, for the same reasons, the 
ratification of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters signed with 
Turkmenistan was suspended until April 2009, when the Council and the European 
Commission persuaded the European Parliament to unblock the ratification process despite 
only a very limited improvement of the country‟s internal political situation.206 The 
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 PCA between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Kazakhstan, O.J. 
1999, L 196, signed 23 January 1995 and in force since 1 July 1999, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21999A0728(02):EN:NOT, accessed on 30 March 2010; 
PCA between the European Communities and their Member States and the Kyrgyz Republic, O.J. 1999, L 196, 
in force since 1 July 1999, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999 
D0491:EN:HTML, accessed on 30 March 2010; PCA between the European Communities and their Member 
States and the Republic of Uzbekistan, O.J. 1999, L229, in force since 1 July 1999, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21999A0831(01):EN:HTML, accessed on 30 March 
2010; PCA between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Tajikistan, 
COM(2004) 521 final, in force since 1 January 2010; Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and the European Atomic Energy Community and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Trade and 
Commercial and Economic Cooperation, signed on 18 December 1989. 
203
 Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Matters between the European Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the Republic of Tajikistan, OJ L 340, in force from May 2005 until December 
2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22004A1116(01):EN:HTML, accessed 
on 30 March 2010. 
204
 PCA between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Turkmenistan, COM 
(97) 693 final, signed in May 1998, not yet in force. 
205
 For more details on this, see e.g. Bossuyt, 2010. 
206
 For this reason, the European Parliament‟s approval of the interim agreement provoked severe criticism from 
human rights and other advocacy groups concerned with the country‟s poor record of human rights. The 
Parliament, together with other EU actors, responded to the criticism by stating that the EU could act more 
forcefully and put more pressure on the regime regarding respect for human rights once the bilateral agreement 
was in force. See e.g. European Parliament official website, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2006-
0085&language=EN#title4, accessed on 4 July 2010. 
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ratification process was fully completed in July 2009. The interim agreement is expected to 
enter into force by the end of 2010.
207
 The PCAs with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan have been in force since 1 July 1999 for an initial period of ten years. In 
accordance with the legal terms of the PCAs (see supra), the three agreements were 
automatically renewed in July 2009 for another period of ten years, as none of the Parties 
unilaterally expressed their willingness to end the respective agreements. At the EU-Kazakh 
Cooperation Council meeting of 17 November 2009, the two Parties adopted a Joint 
Statement calling for the review of the 1999 PCA in view of updating the current provisions 
or establishing a new agreement (Council, 2009c). Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have also 
expressed their interest in extending the scope of cooperation under their current PCAs with 
the EU, but have not yet officialised their wishes to do so. 
 Pursuant to the PCAs, formal institutionalised dialogue takes place between the EU 
and the PCA partner countries at four different levels. At the highest political level, there is 
the Cooperation Council, which is responsible for supervising the implementation of the PCA 
and discussing bilateral cooperation based on the PCA from a general perspective. The 
Council is composed, on the one hand, of senior members of the government of the partner 
country concerned - usually headed by the (vice-)Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime 
Minister or other Minister - and, on the other hand, of members of the Council of the EU and 
of the European Commission - headed by the (vice-)Minister of Foreign Affairs of the EU 
Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU (cf. Art. 18 TEU).
208
 The 
Cooperation Council is held annually, meeting alternately at the Council of the EU in 
Brussels and at the MFA - or other Ministry - of the partner country concerned. The Kazakh 
delegation to the eighth EU-Kazakhstan Cooperation Council in Brussels, for instance, which 
took place on 18 July 2006, was led by Kazakhstan‟s then Minister of Agriculture 
Akhmetzhan Smagulovich Yessimov (Council, 2006). In turn, the Kyrgyz delegation to the 
ninth EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council meeting, which took place in Brussels on 13 
February 2007, was headed by Daniar Toktogulovich Usenov, the then First Vice Prime 
Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic (Council, 2007e). The meeting was chaired by Gernot Erler, 
                                                 
207
 Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Matters between the European Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the Republic of Turkmenistan, OJ L 340, signed on 2 December 1998 and to 
enter in force in 2010. 
208
 Art. 18 TEU stipulates that the Presidency of the Council of the EU is responsible for representing the EU in 
all matters related to the CFSP, in particular holding the political dialogue with the partner countries and partner 
organisations. It should be noted that the Lisbon Treaty - entered into force in December 2009 - introduced some 
changes to the institutional representation related to foreign affairs. With respect to political dialogue, including 
the Cooperation Council meetings, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
is now the leading representative and decides who chairs the meetings at the EU side. If s/he is withheld from 
chairing a meeting due to other commitments, s/he delegates the role of chairperson to the EU Member State 
holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU. See more below. 
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Minister of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, President of the Council of 
the EU at the time. The EU side further included Robert Cooper, Director General for 
External and Politico-Military Affairs of the Council Secretariat, Hugues Mingarelli, acting 
Deputy Director General for External Relations, thus representing the European Commission, 
and Álvaro Mendonça e Moura, ambassador of the Permanent Representation of Portugal to 
the EU, who represented the incoming Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU 
(ibid.). To give yet another example, the ninth EU-Uzbekistan Cooperation Council meeting, 
which took place in Brussels on 14 September 2009, was chaired by Frank Belfrage, the State 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, then President of 
the Council of EU, and Vladimir Norov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan.
209
 
Next, at senior civil servant level, there is the Cooperation Committee, which meets once a 
year to discuss the PCA implementation agenda and progress from a more detailed angle. It 
consists of senior civil servants of the government of the partner country and of senior 
bureaucrats of the Council of the EU and the European Commission.  
In addition, at technical-bureaucratic level, the Cooperation Committee is assisted by 
expert Sub-Committees, which are composed of technocrats who hold issue-specific 
discussions related to the implementation of the PCA. The PCAs in force with Central Asian 
partner countries tend two encompass two subcommittees, covering notably „Justice and 
Home Affairs‟ (JHA) and „Trade, Investment, Energy and Transport‟ (TIET) respectively. In 
the case of Kazakhstan, the former sub-Committee is called „Justice, Liberty and Security‟ 
(JLS) Sub-Committee. The first session of the EU-Kazakhstan JLS Sub-Committee took place 
in Astana in November 2002. The fifth session, for instance, which took place in December 
2006, was organised by the Prosecutor General‟s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
located in Astana. At around the same period, Astana also hosted meetings in the framework 
of the TIET Sub-committee. The EU-Uzbekistan JHA Sub-Committee, in turn, met for the 
first time in Tashkent in July 2002. Specific technical aid was allocated to Uzbekistan under 
TACIS to assist the government in preparing and organising meetings held in the framework 
of the PCA. This support consisted primarily of strengthening Uzbekistan‟s PCA Secretariat 
and of assisting the country‟s MFA and other government institutions involved in the 
implementation of the PCA and in the organisation of the EU-Uzbek Cooperation Council, 
Committee and Subcommittees meetings. In autumn 2005, however, the GAERC decided to 
partially suspend the PCA as part of the sanctions to be imposed on the Uzbek regime (see 
above). In concrete, this meant that the EU-Uzbekistan Cooperation Committee and its 
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 See press release of the meeting, 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/110087.pdf>. 
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subcommittees were to be suspended until the Uzbek side would show sufficient progress 
towards meeting the criteria set by the EU for lifting the sanctions (Council, 2005b). The 
Cooperation Council was the only formal dialogue setting that remained in place. As 
Uzbekistan reacted very angrily towards the EU‟s punitive measures, diplomatic relations 
between the EU and Uzbekistan virtually came to a standstill. Among other things, this 
resulted in the European Commission experiencing a hard time in implementing its on-going 
technical assistance projects in the country. Despite only minor Uzbek progress towards 
meeting the criteria set by the EU, the GAERC decided to lift the suspension of the political 
and technocratic dialogue meetings during its review of the sanctions on 14 May 2007 
(Council, 2007a). An important factors behind this decision was the Uzbeks‟ readiness to 
enter into a „human rights dialogue‟ with the EU.210 Indeed, at the seventh meeting of the EU-
Uzbekistan Cooperation Council, which took place in November 2006, Uzbekistan agreed in 
principle to begin a „dialogue‟ with the EU on human rights in the framework of the PCA 
European Union (2007a: 22). Consequently, after exploratory talks with the Uzbek side in 
Tashkent in December 2006, the GAERC decided in spring 2007 to establish a „Human 
Rights Dialogue‟ with Uzbekistan, which was to take place under the auspices of the PCA‟s 
JHA Sub-Committee (ibid.). As a result, the committee was renamed „Subcommittee on 
Justice, Home Affairs, Human Rights and related issues‟ (ibid.). The first formal EU-
Uzbekistan Human Rights Dialogue was held in Tashkent in early May 2007 (see more 
below), shortly before the GAERC‟s next review of the sanctions on 14 May 2007. 
Finally, at parliamentary level, there is the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee 
(PCC). The PCC provides a forum for political dialogue between Members of the European 
Parliament and members of the national Parliament of the partner country concerned. One of 
the roles of the PCCs is to review the implementation of the PCA. The Committees are 
entitled to request information from the respective Cooperation Councils, to which they can 
also make recommendations. The PCCs meet once a year, alternately at the European 
Parliament in Brussels or Strasbourg and at the Parliament of the partner country. Meetings of 
the EU-Kazakhstan PCC, for instance, took place, inter alia, at the Majilis - i.e. the Lower 
House of the Kazakhstani Parliament - in Astana in May 2005, at the European Parliament in 
Brussels on 29-30 May 2006 and at the European Parliament in Brussels on 11 July 2007.
211
 
Meetings of the EU-Uzbekistan PCC took place, inter alia, in Strasbourg in May 2002. As 
pointed out by International Crisis Group, “these committees offer a formal structure in which 
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 See e.g. Reuters AlertNet, “EU welcomes Uzbek move on rights dialogue”, 23 April 2007, 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L23296048.htm. 
211
 Author‟s interview at the European  Parliament in Brussels on 11 July 2008; author‟s interview with the 
Assistant of the Deputy Chairman of the Mazhilis in Astana on 25 May 2008. Also European Parliament (2006). 
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members of the European and the national parliaments can exchange information and discuss 
questions of political and economic cooperation arising within the framework of the PCAs” 
(2006: 19-20). The EU side is represented by members of the „Delegation to the EU-
Kazakhstan, EU-Kyrgyzstan and EU-Uzbekistan Parliamentary Cooperation Committees, and 
for relations with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Mongolia‟.212 Before the entry into force of 
the PCA with Tajikistan, so-called „Interparliamentary Meetings‟ (IPMs) toke place with the 
country, which are now replaced by PCC meetings. IPMs continue to be held with 
Turkmenistan. Importantly, the Soviet-era TCA, which is still the main legal framework for 
relations with the country, also provides for formal bilateral dialogue, notably in the form of 
the „Joint Committee‟, which is held annually between senior officials from Turkmenistan 
and from the European Commission. The tenth meeting of the EC-Turkmenistan Joint 
Committee, for instance, took place in Brussels on 4 June 2009. The 8th and last meeting of 
the EC-Tajikistan Joint Committee, which is now replaced by the Cooperation Council, was 
held in Dushanbe on 25 November 2008.  
 Apart from the PCAs, the ITAs and the TCA, the EU has a number of additional 
agreements and other formal arrangements in place with the Central Asian countries. These 
include three nuclear-related agreements concluded between Kazakhstan and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom): an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear 
Safety, an Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Controlled Nuclear Fusion, and an 
Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.
213
 These agreements 
also provide for institutionalised dialogue between the two sides, mainly in the form of 
Coordination Committees at technocrat level. In summer 2006, for instance, the first meeting 
of the „Coordination Committee‟ established under the Agreement on Cooperation in the 
Field of Controlled Nuclear Fusion took place in the National Nuclear Centre in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan. In addition, the EU and Kazakhstan signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) in the Field of Energy. In view of extending cooperation in the area of energy, the 
MoU, signed in December 2006, establishes two road maps, i.e. one on energy security and 
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 Now that the PCA with Tajikistan has entered into force, the name of the standing Delegation has slightly 
changed, as there are now also PCC meetings held with Tajikistan. For meeting documents of the Delegation, 
see <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/organes/dcas/dcas_meetinglist.htm>. It is worth 
noting that the parliamentary delegation evolved from the Delegation for Relations with the Republics of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, which created a working group for Central Asia in 1993. A year later, the 
European Parliament established a Delegation for Relations with Central Asia and Mongolia. 
213
 The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Safety was signed in July 1999 and came into force in 
June 2003; the Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Controlled Nuclear Fusion was concluded in 
November 2002 and entered into force in April 2004; the Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy was signed in December 2006 and became operational on 1 September 2008. See 
<http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/eu_kazakhstan/political_relations/agreements/index_en.htm>, last 
accessed 9 November 2009. 
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one on industrial cooperation.
214
 The arrangement foresees regular meetings at technocrat 
level aimed, inter alia, at approximating Kazakhstan‟s energy regulations to those of the EU. 
More recently, the EU also signed a MoU on energy issues with Turkmenistan and a MoU on 
cooperation in the field of transport network development with Kazakhstan (see also Chapter 
6).  For an overview of the textiles and steel agreements concluded with Central Asian partner 
countries, see section 5.1. (above). 
 Alongside formal dialogue at bilateral level, the EU also has a number of 
institutionalised dialogue settings in place with the Central Asian republics at regional and 
multi-country level. Most prominently, there are the meetings of the „EU Troika - Central 
Asia‟215, which are held at least once a year at foreign ministerial level, alternately in the EU 
and in Central Asia. Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the EU 
side was formally headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the EU Member State holding 
the Presidency of the Council of the EU, a role that is now in the hands of the High 
Representative (Art. 18 TEU & Art. 18 TFEU). However, the latter actually tends to delegate 
this function back to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the EU Member State concerned when 
s/he is withheld from attending the meeting due to commitments elsewhere. The EU side is 
further represented by senior officials of the Council Secretariat, including the EU Special 
Representative for Central Asia, and the European Commission. Before the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU delegation to the meetings also tended to include representatives of 
the previous and the incoming Presidency. The Central Asian partner countries, in turn, are all 
five represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs (or Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs). 
In this respect, it is important to stress that the EU-Central Asia dialogue setting is quite 
unique, in that it is the only institutionalised forum in the region that involves the full 
participation of all five Central Asian republics and reunites the five countries at such a high 
political level. Indeed, none of the existing regional organisations in the area - e.g. CSTO, 
CIS, SCO - include the involvement of all five Central Asian states, due mainly to 
Turkmenistan‟s reluctance to join these organisations as a full member. As such, the meetings 
of the EU Troika - Central Asia have of course not gone unnoticed in the countries that head 
those „rival‟ regional organisations, most notably Russia and China. The origin of this 
regional political dialogue setting with the Central Asian states, which became fully 
formalised with the launch of the EU Strategy in June 2007, goes back to a follow-up 
initiative to the visit to the region of then Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten in 
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 To consult the text of the MoU, see <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/international_cooperation/doc/ 
mou_kazakshtan_en.pdf>, accessed on 31 March 2010. 
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 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this regional political dialogue setting is called „EU-Central 
Asia Ministerial Meeting‟.  
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March 2004. At the time, the European Commission sought to create a regular political 
dialogue with the Central Asian countries at regional level with the aim of establishing an 
informal forum that could gather the five states around one table and “contribute to building 
confidence and mutual trust between them” (International Crisis Group, 2006: 18-20). At the 
same time, the Commission sought to create this regional dialogue format to support the 
regional assistance programming planned under the 2002-2006 Regional Strategy Paper. 
Preliminary meetings were organised at political director level, including in Bishkek in 
December 2004. The first official round of the regional political dialogue was held in Almaty 
in summer 2005; the second round took place in Brussels in December 2005. There was 
another meeting at the level of political directors in April 2006 and at the level of ministers in 
June 2006, both in Almaty (ibid.). In these first rounds, discussion focused on a number of 
issues of common concern, including trade and economic cooperation, justice and home 
affairs (migration and drug trafficking), environment, water and energy management and 
terrorism (Matveeva, 2006: 90-91). On the fringes of the meetings, the European Commission 
tried, though not always successfully, to hold informal bilateral talks concerning domestic 
political and human rights issues, including with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (ibid.). The 
next meeting of the EU Troika - Central Asia, held in Astana in March 2007, i.e. during 
Germany‟s Presidency of the Council of the EU, focussed on prospective enhanced 
cooperation under the forthcoming EU Strategy for a Partnership with Central Asia, which 
was then being finalised through a concerted effort made by Germany‟s MFA, DG Relex and 
the EUSR for Central Asia. The eventual document of the EU Strategy was presented to the 
five Ministers of Foreign Affairs concerned at the subsequent session of the EU Troika - 
Central Asia forum, which was held at the Reichstag - right underneath the glass dome - in 
Berlin on 30 June 2007, the final day of Germany‟s Presidency.  
 Another regional dialogue that the EU initiated with countries in Central Asia is the 
Caspian-Black Sea Energy dialogue, better known as the „Baku Process‟ or „Baku Initiative‟, 
formally launched at the first Ministerial Conference on Energy Cooperation in Baku, 
Azerbaijan, in November 2004. The central aim of the Baku Initiative is to promote regional 
energy cooperation and progressive integration of the regional energy markets between the 
EU and the littoral states of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, which include the Central 
Asian states Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The process also involves the participation of the 
states‟ neighbouring countries, which include the Central Asian countries Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. At the same time, the EC sought to give a new impetus to the EC-
funded regional programmes INOGATE and TRACECA, which were brought together under 
the framework of the Baku Process. Following the Ministerial Conference, four working 
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groups of experts were established in accordance with the four key areas of cooperation as 
agreed upon by the participants of the conference: (i) harmonising the legal, regulatory and 
institutional framework between the respective energy markets and the EU; (ii) enhancing the 
safety and security of energy production, transportation and supplies, (iii) embarking on 
energy efficiency policies and programmes in view of sustainable development; and (iv) 
enhancing the attraction of funding for new infrastructures and project facilitation
216
 (see 
more below). The second Energy Ministerial Conference was held in Astana in November 
2006. Along with the other littoral states of the Caspian Sea and the littoral states of the Black 
Sea and their respective neighbouring countries
217
, the five Central Asian republics met up 
with senior officials from the European Commission, the EU Presidency, EU Member States, 
EU candidate countries, the EIB, the EBRD and the World Bank. Russia also attended the 
meeting, notably as an observer. Among other things, it was decided to maintain regular 
meetings of the four working groups of experts, particularly in view of implementing the  
Energy Road Map agreed in Astana.
218
 In addition, it was decided to strengthen the role of the 
INOGATE Technical Secretariat in Kiev and its regional offices in Central Asia (Almaty) and 
the South Caucasus (Tbilisi). Following the conference, the working groups developed Action 
Plans to implement the multilateral Energy Road Map.  
 
6.1.2. Informal and/or ad-hoc institutionalised dialogue  
 
Compared to the formal dialogue mechanisms, the range of informal and ad-hoc types of 
institutionalised cooperation between the EU and the Central Asian countries appears a lot 
more extensive, and - not surprisingly - involves a much wider spectre of actors, including 
non-governmental actors. In the latter case, as we shall see in the sections covering TNPO2-3 
and TNPO1-2-3, the main mechanisms that capture this type of TNPO2micro are domestic 
empowerment and transnational social learning.  
Most of these informal and/or ad-hoc dialogue settings are established in the 
framework of the EC‟s assistance programmes in the region. In this regard, it is important to 
highlight that in the initial phase of the TACIS programme, technical assistance to the Central 
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 See website of the European Commission, Regional Cooperation, Baku Initiative, 
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  The littoral states of the Black and Caspian Seas are the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Republic of 
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 See “Ministerial Declaration on Enhanced Energy Cooperation between the EU, the Littoral States of the 
Black and Caspian Seas and their Neighbouring Countries”, Astana, Kazakhstan, 30 November 2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/international_cooperation/doc/2006_11_30_astana_conclusions.pdf, 
accessed on 5 April 2010. 
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Asian partner countries was managed primarily through a „top down‟ approach. This was, on 
the one hand, a result of the governments‟ limited sense of „ownership‟ and, on the other, of 
their insufficient institutional capacity (European Commission, 2007a: 20). In order to 
enhance coordination of the assistance between the EC and the national authorities and 
increase the latter‟s ownership of the assistance, the EC soon decided to establish National 
Coordination Units (NCUs) within the governments, supported by EC-funded technical 
assistance. Uzbekistan‟s NCU, for instance, was established in 1992. Until July 2000, it was a 
joint Uzbek-EC institution, after which the NCU became an institution of the Uzbek 
Government, supported by an advisory team of European and local experts.
219
 In cooperating 
closely with the NCUs, TACIS became increasingly based on a dialogue-driven approach in 
an attempt by the EC to guarantee that the assistance programming would better address the 
diverging needs and priorities of the Central Asian partner countries. This is reflected most 
noticeably in the assistance delivered under the 2002-2006 Strategy Paper and the related 
Indicative Programmes and Annual Action Plans, although national government often still 
expressed concerns about their perceived lack of ownership, in particular with respect to the 
regional programming. For each of the five countries, the TACIS priorities were defined by 
taking into account both the EC‟s cooperation objectives and the countries‟ own policy 
agenda. In 2002-2006, the NCUs played a key role in enabling the governments to participate 
more effectively in the programming of the EC‟s technical assistance. In preparation of the 
2002-2004 and 2005-2006 Indicative Programmes, for instance, the Uzbek NCU each time 
transmitted summaries of Uzbek national policy in selected areas to the EC, ensuring 
alignment of EC and Uzbek priorities.
220
 In turn, in view of implementing the Annual Action 
Programmes, which identify projects to be financed by the EC, the Uzbek NCU each time 
gathered preliminary proposals from Uzbek Ministries and Agencies, conducted a pre-
selection of the proposals, and prepared project fiches together with the potential 
beneficiaries, which it then sent off to the EC for consideration.
221
 At regional level, joint 
meetings of the TACIS National Coordinators and corresponding governmental bodies took 
place in order to further closer cooperation with the governments of partner countries on 
implementation of the EC assistance programmes (European Commission, 2007a: 22). 
 Next to this kind of semi-formal bilateral and regional dialogue held during the 
preparation phase of the programming and ahead of the implementation of the projects, there 
exists a wide range of dialogue settings created under the EC assistance that occur mostly on 
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an ad-hoc basis, i.e. for the duration of the projects concerned. Indeed, as is clear from the 
overview given in section 5.3. above, EC assistance programmes in Central Asia rely to a 
large extent on the transmission of know-how through the provision of policy advice, 
consultancy, training sessions, seminars, info sessions etc. In essence, all of these „assistance 
tools‟ are based on ad-hoc dialogue between EU and Central Asian interlocutors, aimed at 
information-sharing and exchange of „know-how‟ (cf. „communication‟ and „social learning‟, 
see TNPO toolbox, p.51). Participants in the dialogue may include governmental and/or non-
governmental actors (cf. intergovernmental social learning and transnational social learning, 
see TNPO toolbox, p.51). Projects targeted at stimulating political openness and enhancing 
the role of civil society organisations often seek to facilitate and encourage dialogue between 
state and non-state actors in the partner country, although there are also a great deal of 
projects that involve non-governmental actors only (cf. domestic empowerment, see TNPO 
toolbox, p.51). This applies especially to projects implemented under EIHDR and IBPP. The 
latter programme aims, inter alia, at reinforcing Central Asian civil society organisations to 
enable them to participate in the decision-making process in their countries. The main goal of 
IBPP is to foster citizens‟ initiative and to strengthen the capacity of NGOs, not-for-profit 
professional organisations and local and regional authorities active in the social sector and in 
all areas relevant to civil society support as well as business partnership.
222
 A case in point is 
an EC project in Kyrgyzstan implemented in 2005-2006, which aimed at organisational and 
individual capacity-building of local human rights actors (again cf. domestic empowerment, 
see TNPO toolbox, p.51). The main activities of the project consisted of awareness-raising 
and training in view of human rights organisational capacity building: human rights tools, 
campaigning, awareness-rising and public relations, human  rights education, advocacy, 
monitoring and social activism.
223
 Additional examples - among numerous others - include a 
„civic education for youth‟ project implemented in Tajikistan and a project aimed at capacity-
building of a Kyrgyz young lawyers‟ association.  
A more recent EC assistance programme that involves a great deal of ad-hoc dialogue 
and specifically relies on information sharing and exchange of know-how between European 
and Central Asian business intermediary actors is the „Central Asia Invest‟ Programme. 
Aimed at promoting sustainable economic development of SMEs in Central Asia, the specific 
objective is to strengthen the role and competences of Central Asian Business Intermediary 
Organisations, such as Chambers of Commerce, in increasing their capacity to support SMEs 
and to influence policies in favour of micro- and small-scale companies. To that purpose, the 
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projects involve close cooperation between European Business Intermediary Organisations 
and counterpart organisations in Central Asian countries, whose staff, inter alia, receives 
skills training and attends seminars organised by their European partner organisation.
224
 
In turn, a particular type of governmental policy advice involving ad-hoc dialogue is 
so-called Twinning. However, in Central Asia, only one project has so far been implemented 
using Twinning, notably a TACIS project implemented in 2005-2006, which aimed at 
Twinning the Spanish and Greek Ombudsman offices with their counterpart in Kazakhstan. 
The twinning element implied sharing European best practice in the organisation and 
implementation of the institution of the Ombudsman.
225
 As noted by several interviewees 
from the European Commission, despite the EU‟s intention to use this assistance tool more 
widely in the region and despite substantial interest from both the EU side and the Central 
Asian partner countries in working through Twinning arrangements, Twinning is currently off 
limits for use in Central Asia due to unforeseen legal restrictions of DCI, the EC‟s new 
assistance instrument introduced in the region in 2007.
226
 Nevertheless, there are still 
numerous EC projects that have been and are being implemented in the region, which involve 
similar kinds of ad-hoc dialogue aimed at institutional and administrative capacity-building 
and development through „information exchange‟ and sharing of European best practice (see 
more below). 
A final series of ad-hoc dialogue held between the EU and the Central Asian countries 
is initiated by the European Parliament, rather than by the European Commission. To begin 
with, the Parliamentary Delegation to the region frequently meets to discuss topical issues 
regarding the Central Asian partner countries. In this context, the Delegation
227
 often invites 
representatives from the national parliaments, from the embassies or from opposition groups 
of the Central Asian states in order to exchange views on key issues of mutual concern 
(International Crisis Group, 2006: 19-20). These interparliamentary meetings serve above all 
to „socialise‟ the third country parliamentary representatives into the EU‟s parliamentary 
practices and customs, as well as the principle of liberal democracy, including parliamentary 
democracy (cf. social learning, see TNPO toolbox, p.51). In November 2005, for instance, the 
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European Parliament invited Kazakh government and opposition representatives, international 
NGOs and journalists to a hearing on the political climate in the run-up to the presidential 
election a month later (ibid.).  
The Delegation may also send ad-hoc fact-finding missions to the region to evaluate 
important events or the general political climate. For instance, a fact-finding mission was sent 
to Kyrgyzstan in spring 2005 to assess the situation following the toppling of President 
Akaev. Another example includes the fact-finding mission sent to Turkmenistan in June 2006 
to evaluate the political climate, inter alia, in view of ratifying the planned ITA with the 
country. During the visit, the parliamentary delegates asked the Turkmen regime to allow 
international observers to the local Turkmen elections in July and December 2006, and raised 
their concerns with the poor human rights situation. Apparently, a meeting with the Foreign 
Minister scheduled to last one hour eventually took six hours. The President, however, 
declined to meet with the delegates. The visit followed the approval by the European 
Parliament‟s Foreign Affairs Committee of the ITA signed with Turkmenistan, which - as a 
next step - had to be ratified by the Parliament and subsequently approved by the Council. 
The parliamentary visit to Turkmenistan left a deep impression on the delegates, shocked by 
the hard reality of the country‟s repressive political climate. This was to have major 
implications for the ratification prospects of the ITA.
228
 In October 2006, the Parliament‟s 
International Trade Committee voted against further consideration of the trade agreement with 
Turkmenistan, stating that the ITA should only be re-considered when the Turkmen regime 
showed sufficient progress towards improving its human rights record. This counts as one of 
the few instances where the EU, and in casu the Parliament, attempts to exert influence on a 
third country through „conditionality‟ rather than „socialisation‟ (see TNPO toolbox, p.51). 
Another activity of the European Parliament in the region involves election 
observation. Indeed, it often sends over a parliamentary delegation to monitor elections, as 
during the historic presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and the equally historic 
parliamentary elections in the country in October 2010. In addition, the European Parliament 
calls for reforms in the region by adopting resolutions on developments in Central Asia (cf. 
Art. 21 of TEU). The Parliamentary resolution adopted on 16 March 2006, for instance, 
deplored the fact that two prominent Kazakh opposition figures had died in the three months 
following President Nazarbayev‟s re-election and asked for the matter to be put on the agenda 
of the PCC of May 2006 (International Crisis Group, 2006: 20). 
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6.1.3. Physical presence on the ground 
 
TNPO2micro also includes the physical presence of the EU in the Central Asian partner 
countries. This concerns both the long-term presence and activities of the Commission 
delegations (i.e. EU delegations from 2010 onwards), the EU Special Representative and 
embassies of EU Member States, and the occasional presence of such EU actors as the EU 
Troika (attending formal meetings) and EU Commissioners (e.g. through formal visits).  
As already noted, the European Commission has been represented in the region since 
1994, when it opened a Delegation office in Almaty, then capital of Kazakhstan. In 
accordance with the provisions in the Maastricht Treaty relating to the CFSP, the EC 
Delegations (EU Delegations under TFEU) are not only responsible for implementing EC 
assistance and commercial policy, but also for the political representation of the European 
Community. Hence why the heads of the EC Delegations have the rank of ambassador and are 
accredited as the official representatives of the EC to the government of the partner 
country.
229
 The Commission has also been represented in the region through a local ECHO 
office, which opened in Dushanbe in 1992 to offer humanitarian support to war-struck 
Tajikistan (see above). Almost a decade after the launch of the Delegation office in Almaty, 
the EC opened a regionalised office in Bishkek and Dushanbe, notably in 2002, in order to 
address the EC‟s palpable underrepresentation in the region. In June 2007, the head office of 
the Delegation moved to Astana, the new capital of Kazakhstan. The office in Almaty, which 
is located a few thousand miles closer to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan than Astana, was turned 
into a regionalised office, responsible for a specific number of assistance matters, including 
the financing and contracting. The gradual delegating of implementation and decision-making 
competences from the head office in Kazakhstan to the regionalised offices in Bishkek and 
Dushanbe positively affected the impact of the EC‟s assistance, including the ability to reach 
out to the local stakeholders. Indeed, the presence of a EC Delegation office in the three 
countries appeared to have a strong motivating effect on the local stakeholders, including both 
governmental and civil society actors, who started to feel more involved in the assistance 
process. Likewise, the presence in the field of the Project Managers from the EC Delegation 
offices has added value to the assistance delivery, as they participate intensively in everyday 
project life, activities and events. In Uzbekistan, the EC opened A „Europe House‟ in 
Tashkent in September 2002, among other things, to enhance the visibility of EU assistance 
provided to Uzbekistan. The office has no diplomatic status and is managed by a Coordinator, 
assisted by local staff. The Europa House serves as a liaison office for the implementation of 
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the EC assistance programmes in Uzbekistan. It cooperates closely with the Uzbek NCU. It 
does so in accordance with the protocol of understanding signed with the Uzbek Government, 
which covers the role of the NCU and that of the Europa House in the planning and 
implementing of the projects under the TACIS programme (now DCI) in Uzbekistan. In 2008, 
a Europa House was opened in Ashgabat. The office has similar goals and institutional terms. 
In 2010, the regionalised offices of the EC Delegation in Bishkek and Dushanbe as well as the 
head office in Astana became fully-fledged EU Delegations, each managed by an EU 
ambassador and assisted by both local and European staff. Staff numbers have grown 
considerably compared to five years or so ago. The EU now plans to open an EU Delegation 
in Tashkent and Ashgabat.  
The presence of the EU Member States is also an important aspect of TNPO2micro, 
given that the embassies of EU Member States are required to cooperate with the EC 
Delegations (now EU Delegations) in view of their joint responsibility in carrying out the 
CFSP. Indeed, the EC Delegations and the Member States‟ diplomatic missions in EU partner 
countries are required to “cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions 
adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented” (Art. 20 TEU).230 They are 
required to “step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments 
and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 20 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community” (ibid). Close cooperation occurs in particular between 
the EC Delegation and the diplomatic mission of the EU Member State holding the 
Presidency of the Council. Indeed, when a Member State is holding the EU Presidency, then 
its embassies in Central Asia have a leading role in steering EU relations with the region as 
part of their CFSP duties under the mandate of the EU Presidency (cf. Art. 18 TEU). If the 
Member State concerned is not represented in Central Asia, then another Member State - 
normally the country that is to assume the next Presidency - is asked to take up the role of 
„Acting EU Presidency‟.231 Germany, for instance, before taking over the EU Presidency in 
January 2007, represented Austria in the first half of 2006 and Finland in the second half of 
2006 as local EU Presidency in a number of Central Asian states. In turn, France did the same 
for Portugal and Slovenia in the second half of 2007 and the first half of 2008 respectively, 
before assuming the EU Presidency itself in the second half of 2008.
232
 Germany is the only 
EU Member State to have an embassy in all five countries, followed by France and the UK, 
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which hold the second largest diplomatic representation in the region. Interestingly, the new 
Member States from Central and Eastern Europe are also relatively well-represented in 
Central Asia. Kazakhstan, not surprisingly, hosts the largest number of diplomatic missions of 
EU Member States, many of which were opened in light of the country‟s economic boom in 
the early and mid-2000s. A full overview of the EU‟s diplomatic representation in Central 
Asia, including all embassies of the Member States, is enclosed in Appendix 6. According to 
several interviewees from EU Member State embassies as well as from the EC Delegation in 
Astana, cooperation between the Delegation and the Member State embassies has improved 
markedly over the last few years and closely follows the provisions laid down in Articles 18 
and 20 of TEU.
233
 Interestingly, the cooperation in some cases reflects the different views 
among the Member States as to their readiness to support and implement EU-level foreign 
policy activities. As such, those that belong to the group of „reluctant‟ Member States, 
including some of the larger Member States such as France, openly state that their primary 
attention in the partner countries concerned still goes to the pursuit of their national interests. 
The French ambassador to Kazakhstan even stated that he finds it a „nuisance‟ to have to deal 
with the responsibilities that his embassy is given under the CFSP and that he would much 
rather spend all his attention to pursuing French national interests in Kazakhstan.
234
 Yet, it 
should be noted that this view was not shared by all interviewees from the French diplomatic 
missions in the region.
235
 Moreover, the French diplomatic missions in Central Asia, 
including the embassy in Astana, were reportedly praised for their effective and dedicated 
management of EU-level activities during the French Presidency of the Council in the second 
half of 2008.
236
 In this respect, it is important to highlight that cooperation in Central Asia 
between the EC Delegations and the Member State embassies was lifted to a higher level 
during the German Presidency in the first half of 2007. Several interviewees pointed to the 
increased number of meetings organised by the local German embassies and their excellent 
briefing to the fellow European embassies of the diplomatic developments and state of affairs 
in the countries concerned.
237
 It is clear that the cooperation between the EC Delegations and 
the Member State embassies in Central Asia has contributed significantly to the institutional 
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possibilities to effectively represent the interests of the EU in the Central Asian countries. Via 
their enhanced cooperation, they seem to have improved the coordination of their activities in 
relation to the CFSP, including through the coordinated sharing of the various assessments 
and policy recommendations flowing back from and to the Commission, Council and the 
Member States. In addition, the EC Delegation and its (former) regionalised offices function 
as a venue for meetings, activities and press conferences relating to affairs that involve the EU 
as a whole. They also serve as the contact points for joint EU cultural activities, such as the 
annual European Film Week and the celebration of Europe Day in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. It is interesting to point out that the EC Delegation in Astana is based in the 
same building as most EU Member State embassies to Kazakhstan, which often also function 
as embassies to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, such as the Belgian and the Dutch embassies. 
Needless to say, this has a facilitating impact on the level of cooperation and coordination. 
Conversely, coordination between the head office of Delegation in Kazakhstan and the 
regionalised offices in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan long appeared to be rather troublesome. 
Indeed, in the mid-2000s, the head office - then led by Adriaan Van der Meer - pursued a 
strict centralised control, thereby keeping a firm grip over any issues from the regionalised 
offices involving decision-making and refusing to delegate important tasks to them, up to the 
point where many staff members felt uncomfortable about the high level of centralisation. 
Moreover, this negatively impacted upon the effectiveness of the assistance delivery: the strict 
control procedures were time-consuming and the stakeholders in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
complained that the head office in Kazakhstan was not sufficiently in touch with the reality on 
the ground.
238
 Although some officials appear reluctant to confirm this „on the record‟, the 
strict control was in fact fully down to ambassador Van der Meer, the Head of the Delegation, 
who - as a result - was not exactly regarded as a beloved person in the regionalised offices, 
and who reportedly also kept a strict hierarchy within the head office itself.
239
 Things indeed 
changed for the better once Van der Meer left office early 2008 to take on a job elsewhere, 
with the regionalised offices gaining substantially more decision-making power and the 
atmosphere soon lightening up in the head office.
240
 It is not clear whether or not Van der 
Meer had been forced to leave office. 
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 An inherent aspect of the EU‟s TNPO2micro over the region is the position of the 
EUSR for Central Asia, currently held by the French diplomat Pierre Morel, who took over 
from the Slovak Jan Kubis in October 2006.
241
 A year earlier, the Council had decided to 
create the post of EU Special Representative for Central Asia (cf. in accordance with Article 
18(5) TEU). As mentioned in Chapter 4, the appointment of an EUSR for Central Asia 
signalled the acknowledgement by the EU that it had to respond to its growing interests in this 
vast region, where the Union remained underrepresented and short of diplomatic activity. The 
creation of the post in July 2005 thus served as a first step to strengthen the EU‟s political 
engagement with and visibility in the region. In concrete, the mandate of the EUSR consists 
of coordinating the EU‟s activities in the region as well as further developing the EU‟s 
Central Asia policy in close cooperation with the Council. In this context, interviewees from 
the EC Delegations and Member State diplomatic missions in Central Asia reported that the 
EUSR keeps in close contact with them and comes to visit them from time to time.
242
 
Moreover, in representing the EU in the region, the mission of the EUSR is to strengthen the 
Union‟s diplomatic ties with the Central Asian states and other relevant actors operating in the 
region, including regional organisations such as CSTO and SCO. The main office of the 
EUSR is based in Brussels, where he is supported by two political advisors and from where 
he travels on a regular basis to the region. On the ground, he is represented by a local office 
located in Almaty. The office, which is based on the premises of the EC regionalised office, is 
staffed with a political advisor and a secretary. Current EUSR Pierre Morel has been very 
active, not least with regard to the drafting and implementation of the EU Strategy for Central 
Asia.
243
 On the whole, he has contributed substantially to enhancing the EU‟s visibility in the 
region and has been very helpful in expanding and deepening the areas of cooperation. To 
give an example, during the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in spring 2010 Pierre 
Morel was one of the first international diplomats to arrive in the country to discuss the 
situation with several stakeholders and offer possible EU support. Moreover, he has met up 
several times with the current Presidents of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, i.e. the most 
authoritarian leaders in the region and also the EU‟s „toughest‟ Central Asian partners, to 
discuss bilateral cooperation, including issues related to human rights. At the same, however, 
Pierre Morel - along with the Council Secretariat - has been criticised by MEPs and human 
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rights organisations for being too lenient with respect to the countries‟ poor record of 
democratisation and human rights, specifying that he appears more concerned with pursuing 
the EU‟s stability and security goals, including energy interests, than with pursuing normative 
goals related to democratisation and human rights.
244
 
 A final element that needs to be covered regards the occasional presence in the region 
of high-level EU actors, such as the EU Troika (when attending formal meetings) and EU 
Commissioners (e.g. through formal visits). This is obviously a more ad-hoc form of 
institutionalised cooperation, but it is nevertheless worth highlighting as it contributes to the 
EU‟s visibility and presence in the region, in particular at the diplomatic level. Next to the 
framework of the Cooperation Council meetings and EU Troika-Central Asia meetings, high-
level EU actors often travel to the region on official EU visits to the partner countries or on 
the occasion of national or international high-level meetings organised by the governments. 
As mentioned earlier, this used to be quite different, with only a handful of EU officials 
travelling to the region until the mid-2000s, when Chris Patten‟s visit to Central Asia marked 
a first step towards reversing this trend for the better. In autumn 2006, then German Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier went on a visit to all five republics in preparation of the 
EU‟s Strategy for the region. He did so in close consultation with the then Finnish Presidency 
of the EU and the European Commission. During his five-day trip, Steinmeier held talks with 
government representatives, including on human rights and rule of law issues, and met 
representatives of civil society and of the political and cultural communities of the countries. 
Steinmeier was accompanied by a delegation of European companies - mostly from the 
energy and infrastructure sectors -, who was to participate in a European-Central Asian 
business forum in Astana. About six months later, in March 2007, Steinmeier travelled back 
to the region, along with fellow Member State Foreign Ministers and senior EU officials, 
including External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, to promote the 
forthcoming EU Strategy at the EU Troika-Central Asia meeting in Astana (see above). 
Following the launch of the EU Strategy in June 2007, the EU Troika travelled five times to 
the region, each time to another republic, to discuss the implementation of the Strategy. The 
first visit in the series of five took place in September 2007 under the Portuguese Presidency; 
the last visit was in spring 2008 under the Slovenian Presidency (Council of the European 
Union & European Commission, 2008). The first visit was to Uzbekistan, with whom 
relations at the time were still edgy due to the EU sanctions imposed on the regime. That said, 
the fact that the EU troika decided to visit Uzbekistan first was probably not a coincidence, 
even less so since the success of the EU Strategy for Central Asia depended to a large extent 
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on the participation of Uzbekistan: the country is not only the most populous state, but it is 
also the only country that borders all other four Central Asian states. During the visit in 
September 2007, the EU delegation
245
 spoke to several senior Uzbek officials, including the 
Prime Minister, the Secretary of the National Security Council, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the First Deputy Minister of Justice. About a 
month after the troika‟s visit to Uzbekistan, High Representative Javier Solana in his turn also 
travelled to Central Asia, where he visited Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. His 
three-day visit to the region served to further foster political dialogue at the highest political 
level and support the implementation of the EU Strategy. Solana‟s spokeswoman explained 
that “the best way to signal that the region is important for us and that we want to deepen this 
strategic dialogue is to pay a visit”.246 In motivating Solana‟s selection of those three 
countries, she added that Solana had “chosen [the] three countries for several reasons - he 
already saw the ambassador of Uzbekistan in New York, so that is a point, and he has been in 
contact, well, regularly with the Tajik president. Therefore we think it's a good selection 
because the timeline is not long”.247 High-level EU visits to the region were clearly no longer 
a rarity, as yet a month later, i.e. mid-November 2007, it was the turn of Energy 
Commissioner Andris Piebalgs to fly over to the region for bilateral talks on energy 
cooperation. Piebalgs only visited Turkmenistan, where he discussed the terms of potential 
trade in gas with his Turkmen counterpart. Next, in April 2008, External Relations 
Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner returned to the region for talks with Tajikistan on the 
further development of the bilateral relationship. During the visit, she expressed EU solidarity 
with the country after the extremely cold winter, which had provoked a humanitarian crisis - 
for which Tajikistan had received aid through ECHO. In sum, it is clear that high-level EU 
visits to the region gradually multiplied from 2005-2006 onwards, with the inception of the 
EU Strategy providing a further trigger for EU visits to Central Asia. The increased number of 
high-level visits to the region since the launch of the EU Strategy will be further covered in 
Chapter 9. 
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6.2. The EU‟s TNPO2macro over Central Asia 
 
This section explores the EU‟s TNPO2macro over Central Asia, i.e. the second subcomponent 
of TNPO2. As mentioned, TNPO2macro is located at the macro-level of international relations, 
rather than at the more case-specific institutional micro-level of bilateral or bi-regional 
relations captured by TNPO2micro. In particular, it regards the power that the EU derives over 
the Central Asian countries from its dominant position within international regimes and 
institutions, a proposition that draws on the historical institutionalist point that asymmetries of 
power arise from the way in which institutions work. The section will start by exploring the 
EU‟s TNPO2macro over the Central Asian states with regard to the WTO, where the EC is 
prominently represented as a single actor. It will focus in particular on Kazakhstan‟s 
accession to the WTO. Next, the section will examine the EU‟s TNPO2macro in the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which has been very active in Central 
Asia. Subsequently, the section will explore the EU‟s TNPO2macro in organisations where the 
Union is not a member
248
 but is represented by all or nearly all of its Member States. The 
focus will be on the OSCE and the Council of Europe, organisations of which the Central 
Asian republics are either members or partners, or which they aspire to join in the near or 
distant future.  
 
6.2.1. The EU‟s TNPO2macro over Central Asia: the case of the WTO 
 
As pointed out in section 5.2. (above), Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian state that has 
already joined the WTO. The other four states have either started the preparation process for 
accession, notably Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, or are preparing their application 
for membership, notably Turkmenistan. While Kazakhstan has already advanced significantly 
within the accession process, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan still have a long way to go, hampered 
mostly by limited progress in liberalising their domestic economies. As already noted, WTO 
accession is a key goal of the EU‟s trade relations with and assistance to the Central Asian 
countries. The EU‟s influential voice within the WTO, together with its enormous trade 
power, enables the Union to encourage non-member countries of the WTO to apply for 
membership and start the preparation process for accession. In this regard, the EU‟s influence 
is strongest during the preparation phase of the accession process. Kazakhstan‟s ongoing 
accession process is a case in point. Having applied for WTO membership in 1996, 
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Kazakhstan has been involved in the accession process for quite a long time. However, this is 
not particularly striking given that WTO accession requires transition countries such as 
Kazakhstan to deal with a great deal of difficult reforms and adjustments, which can be very 
time-consuming. Kazakhstan also wanted to avoid getting into the same situation as 
Kyrgyzstan. The fact that the latter wanted to rush its accession - Kyrgyzstan acceded to the 
WTO in less than two years and four months - implied that it ended up agreeing to 
concessions that turned out not to be in its interest and making commitments that went far 
beyond its institutional and administrative capacity. In the case of Kazakhstan, progress in 
preparing for accession has also been hampered by the government‟s limited knowledge and 
know-how about trade policy-making, which the Kazakh side itself acknowledges.
249
 
Together, these factors explain why the EU has provided substantial technical assistance for 
legislative institutional reform and administrative assistance in support of the accession 
requirements. That said, the latter have in fact to a significant extent been set by the EU itself 
in its capacity as a key member of the Working Party formed to steer Kazakhstan‟s accession. 
The members of the Working Party play a major role in the accession of new members, as the 
latter have to negotiate the terms of their admission to the WTO bilaterally with each of the 
Working Party members. Acceding countries are expected to demonstrate their readiness to 
fulfil the common obligations established by all of the WTO agreements. In addition, they are 
expected to provide schedules of concessions in the areas of tariffs, agriculture, services, and 
trade-related investment measures (see e.g. UNESCAP, 2001). It is in this part of the process 
that key members of the Working Party, most notably the EU and the U.S., can exercise a 
considerable amount of leverage over the applicant, i.c. Kazakhstan. This applies especially to 
the EU, which - being Kazakhstan‟s primary trade partner - can afford itself to be strict and 
demanding with respect to the country‟s preparation.  Moreover, bilateral negotiations with a 
Working Party member are concluded by signing a bilateral accession protocol. This entire 
process prompts applicant countries to continue informal discussions with the Working Party 
members - in particular with important members such as the EU and the U.S. - to anticipate 
possible concerns and evaluate the overall level of support for its accession. Since the start of 
the accession process, Kazakh trade officials have indeed regularly been meeting with the EU 
officials involved in the evaluation of Kazakhstan‟s accession in order to discuss the state of 
affairs and the EU‟s possible concerns.250 In addition, Kazakh trade officials have often 
consulted DG Trade regarding further explanation and specification of some of the accession 
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requirements that the EU had set. Their requests for information tend to be related to trade-
related issues that are highly technical, which the Kazakh government was struggling to get a 
grasp of.
251
  
The Working Party for Kazakhstan's accession to the WTO consists of 32 WTO 
members.
252
 By the 10th session of the Working Party in April 2008, Kazakhstan had 
completed bilateral agreements with most of the members, and chances were high that the 
U.S. and the EU - the „toughest and most demanding negotiating partners in Kazakhstan‟s 
accession process - would soon accept the terms agreed with Kazakhstan on its accession and 
declare their satisfaction with Kazakhstan‟s preparation. Kazakhstan‟s accession thus seemed 
very near.
253
 However, before the EU had the chance of holding a final round of bilateral talks 
and putting its final stamp on Kazakhstan‟s accession process, Kazakhstan‟s accession was 
suddenly taken off rails when the country agreed in 2009 to establish a customs union with 
Russia and Belarus, which entered into force in 2010. This decision confirmed earlier 
observations that Kazakhstan‟s “WTO accession is complicated by its entanglement in a 
wider political and economic complex emerging from Russian pre-eminence and its claims to 
such pre-eminence in the former Soviet Union” (Hindley, 2008). From the beginning, 
Kazakhstan‟s WTO accession was poised to be a politically sensitive matter for Russia (cf. 
Ukraine and Georgia‟s accession to the WTO), which would not easily tolerate its closest ally 
in Central Asia to join the WTO before its own accession to the organisation (see e.g. 
Hindley, 2008). This point was even further confirmed when Russia announced after the 
formation of the customs union that it intended to accede to the WTO jointly with Kazakhstan 
and Belarus, much to the frustration of the members of the Working Parties - not least the EU 
- that had already spent so much time and effort on the preparation of Russia and 
Kazakhstan‟s individual accession process. As Hindley (2008) explains, Moscow‟s regional 
economic diplomacy is “driven in substantial part by a desire to maintain its grip on the 
former Soviet republics by establishing ever closer economic and, where possible, 
institutionalised ties with them”. Nevertheless, Russia‟s intention to accede jointly did not 
further materialise, with the three countries deciding to enter the WTO separately after they 
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realised that their diverging levels of preparation (Belarus in particular is lagging behind 
compared to Russia and Kazakhstan) would complicate matters. Hence, after a brief period of 
panic, irritation and frustration at DG Trade, it now seems that the EU can still go ahead with 
putting its final mark on Kazakhstan‟s WTO accession process, as the country is proceeding 
with the accession process individually. In the mean time, Kazakhstan has already held 
several informal and formal talks with the EU again. 
 
 
6.2.2. The EU‟s TNPO2macro over Central Asia: the case of the EBRD 
 
Created in 1991, the EBRD‟s goal is to aid post-communist countries‟ transition from a 
centrally planned economy towards an open, market-oriented economy and to encourage 
private and entrepreneurial initiatives in the countries. In particular, it finances investments 
and supports private sector development. As such, the EBRD is currently active in 29 
countries from the former Soviet bloc, including in the Central Asian republics. In 2006, its 
investments and activities were divided between the financial sector (45%), the corporate 
sector (30%), infrastructure (17%) and energy (8%).
254
 The Bank only allows investments to 
be made as far as they meet the requirements of transition impact, additionality and sound 
banking principles.
255
  
The Bank‟s membership encompasses the European Community, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and 61 national governments, including all 27 EU Member States. 
Not surprisingly, the EU is the EBRD‟s largest shareholder, with a total share (and part in the 
vote) of  63 per cent.
256
 The EC is represented by a Governor and an Alternate Governor, as 
well as by an Executive Director and an Alternate Director on the Board of Directors. While 
the latter is entrusted with the direction of the EBRD‟s general policies and activities, the 
Board of Governors is in hold of the Bank‟s real powers and directs major tasks to the Board 
of Directors. Most grant funds for technical assistance projects come from the EC, which also 
co-finances investments. In 1996-2006, the EC donated over EUR 3.6 billion in grant funds 
and co-financing, including for nuclear safety.
257
 Through its operations, the Bank ensures to 
promote EU norms and standards, in particular EU environmental standards. Moreover, the 
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EC and the EBRD have been cooperating through joint projects and activities in a variety of 
sectors, including in the areas of energy, municipal and environmental infrastructures, SME 
support and nuclear safety. In addition, the EU will benefit even further from enhanced 
cooperation with the Bank in favour of the Union‟s involvement in Central Asia, as it signed a 
tripartite Memorandum of Understanding with the EBRD and the EIB for “joint financing of 
projects of significant interest to the EU”, in particular in the area of infrastructure.258 
Strengthened EU interaction with the EBRD and EIB is in fact one of the goals set out in the 
EU Strategy for Central Asia. EIB activity in Central Asia will focus mostly on the energy 
sector and the environment and include energy supply and energy transport projects under 
TRACECA and INOGATE (Council, 2006c). Priority areas are municipal utilities, which will 
encompass projects regarding district heating water supply and waste disposal, and 
sustainable energy, which will include projects regarding efficient electricity 
transmission/distribution, energy efficiency and renewable energy (European Commission, 
2007a). In sum, these final cases of „institutionalised cooperation‟ can be regarded as 
instances of TNPO1-TNPO2macro, in that the EU manages to attract financial assistance from 
these partner institutions for projects in Central Asia, which in effect are implemented to 
serve its (own) interests in the Central Asian countries. 
 
6.2.3. The EU‟s TNPO2macro over Central Asia: the case of the OSCE 
 
According to Warkotsch (2007b),  the OSCE is the West‟s most important human rights and 
democracy promoter in the Central Asian republics. Even so, he notes that in Central Asia the 
organisation has not managed to reach the same successes in state building and 
democratisation as it did in other parts of the ex-USSR and in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Warkotsch 2007a). This is readily acknowledged by senior OSCE officials.
259
 Former OSCE 
Secretary General, Wilhelm Höynck, for instance, rates the OSCE‟s record in Central Asia 
“mixed at best” (Höynck, 2003: 311). As former constituent parts of the Soviet Union, the 
Central Asian acquired membership of the OSCE by default in 1992. They just had to 
voluntarily confirm their wish to join the organisation, but as pointed out by Matveeva (2006: 
69-71), it is unclear whether the governments had full comprehension of the implications of 
their membership, which implied making firm commitments to human rights and democratic 
standards. Failure to show respect for these standards is consistently denounced, in particular 
through statements by fellow OSCE members at the Permanent Council in Vienna. As we will 
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see in the section covering TNPO overlap, OSCE member states from the EU - i.e. those that 
are holding the EU Presidency - are very active in denouncing violations of OSCE standards 
by means of such declaratory statements. The impact of such declaratory diplomacy on the 
Central Asian governments is on the whole relatively minor, but it nevertheless has a 
substantial symbolic effect on the regimes, not least since most Central Asia governments are 
eager to enhance their international legitimacy (see more below).  
Since the accession of the Central Asian states to the OSCE, the region has hosted a 
broad OSCE portfolio, ranging from electoral monitoring and protection of minority rights to 
rule of law, environment and small arms control (Matveeva, 2006: 69-71). OSCE offices were 
opened in each country to implement and supervise the projects under the diverse portfolio. 
OSCE monitoring of national elections, however, soon became a controversial issue for the 
authoritarian regimes in the region, whose parliamentary and presidential elections received 
bad ratings from OSCE observers. While the OSCE experienced some notable successes in 
the region, such as its initiatives regarding support for minorities and education in 
Kyrgyzstan, it struggled to contribute to the countries‟ political modernisation. In Kazakhstan, 
for instance, the organisation‟s assistance in the development of new legislation faced many 
difficulties, and has rarely translated in effective implementation (Melvin, 2009b: 379). 
Moreover, the OSCE field missions increasingly faced opposition from the local regimes, wary 
of the organisation‟s meddling in their internal affairs. Even in Kyrgyzstan, for instance, 
where the OSCE national office - based in Bishkek - had played a positive role in the 
aftermath of the Tulip Revolution in March 2005, inter alia by assisting the organisation of 
the presidential elections in July 2005, the country‟s MFA in 2006 decided to reduce the 
OSCE‟s mandate, limiting it to economic and social matters and suspending its security and 
political action fields (ibid.). Similar restrictions were imposed on the mandates of the 
national OSCE offices in other Central Asian states. By far the furthest restrictions were 
imposed by the Uzbek government, notably in the aftermath of its violent crackdown on the 
Andijan protests in 2005. The OSCE was paying an expensive bill for its call for an 
independent inquiry into the events, as the Uzbek regime responded to the call by reducing 
not only the mandate of the national OSCE office but also its financial means.
260
 As noted by 
Matveeva, “in such circumstances it is hard to be strategic, and the [field missions] [have] 
been diverted into more projects and less politics” (2006: 69-71). At the same time, Russia 
was turning the organisation into a „battleground between the East and West‟, thereby 
virtually causing an „existential crisis‟, by rallying other former Soviet states to join its efforts 
to scale down the „human dimension‟ activities of the OSCE, and in particular, the 
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organisation‟s electoral monitoring mandate. This conflict played a major role in the EU‟s 
decision to support Kazakhstan‟s bid for the 2009 Chairmanship of the OSCE. Irrespective of 
this, Kazakh diplomats lobbied hard with their European counterparts to rally their support for 
the Kazakh bid (Dave, 2008: 43-44). The acceptance of Kazakhstan‟s bid at an OSCE 
Ministerial meeting in December 2007 eventually required a compromise to be concluded 
between Russia and the U.S., whereby Kazakhstan was offered the 2010 - instead of the 2009 
- Chairmanship of the organisation.
261
 Given the geostrategic complexities and contentions 
underlying the OSCE‟s state of affairs and Kazakhstan‟s limited progress in meeting its 
OSCE commitments to human rights and democratic standards, it was clear that the country‟s 
chairmanship was going to be a tough challenge for the organisation. Fully aware of this, the 
EU was quick to assume a leading role in offering the country assistance in preparation of its 
OSCE Chairmanship, which the Kazakh government took ample use of.
262
 Assistance 
focussed mostly on capacity building, inter alia, through training sessions of officials. 
Simultaneously, the EU used these meetings with Kazakh officials to remind the government of 
the commitments that it had made in December 2007 upon its award of the Chairmanship. The 
Kazakh regime realised that if it was to make the most of the historic opportunity of the 
Chairmanship it would need the support and active engagement of the EU to succeed in the 
challenge of chairing the OSCE (Melvin, 2009b: 378). Russia, from its side, was not pulling 
back and held an active dialogue with the Kazakh government on concrete and common agendas 
for its Chairmanship. The EU realised that Kazakhstan‟s Chairmanship - despite the major 
challenges - was a strategic opportunity to encourage further political modernisation not only in 
Kazakhstan but in entire Central Asia given the country‟s emerging leadership role and external 
orientation in the region. For the Kazakh regime, the EU has become increasingly significant not 
just as a leading economic partner but also as a source of inspiration for the country‟s economic, 
social and political modernisation (see e.g. Melvin, 2009b: 375). In addition, President 
Nazarbaev has become increasingly eager to gain international legitimacy for his management of 
the country. Given these contexts, Kazakhstan viewed OSCE chairmanship as a natural 
extension of its ambitious intention to promote a European form of socio-economic development 
as set out in President Nazarbaev‟s „Path to Europe‟ (see more below).263   
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6.2.4. The EU‟s TNPO2macro over Central Asia: the case of the Council of Europe 
 
The OSCE and the Council of Europe generally apply as Europe‟s traditional democracy 
promoters (see e.g. Bale, 2008: 388). Apart from some overlap in the scope of the two 
institutions, there are a number of institutional similarities between them. Like at the OSCE, 
the EU is represented at the Council of Europe (CoE) by all its 27 Member States. In their 
turn, the latter are also represented through their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who participate 
in the CoE‟s Council of Ministers. Importantly, like at the OSCE, the EU Member States 
always strive to reach a common EU position on the matters discussed and managed at the 
CoE. In addition, like the OSCE, the CoE also has a Parliamentary Assembly. Unlike the 
membership of the OSCE, however, the CoE is limited to European countries, which means 
that countries fully situated outside of the European continent cannot join the Council, which 
currently has 47 members. Although the CoE is formally separate from and independent of 
the EU, several projects are conducted jointly with the EU (see below). The central aim of the 
COE is to promote parliamentary democracy, human rights and the rule of law both within 
and beyond the borders of its members, and “if possible, to set pan-European standards for 
them” (Bale, 2008: 388). To that purpose, the CoE supervises nearly 200 binding treaties and 
conventions, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, which is overseen by the European Court of Human Rights. More 
recently, the CoE has been providing assistance to post-communist states - including Central 
Asian countries - to incorporate human rights and protection of minorities into their domestic 
reform agendas (ibid).  
Located partly in Europe,  Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian state eligible to take 
full part in all the CoE bodies. An early move by Kazakhstan to approach the CoE already 
came in 1995, followed in 1997 by the Kazakh Parliament‟s request for „special guest‟ status 
with the Parliamentary Assembly. In 1999, the Kazakh Parliament requested „observer status‟ 
with the Parliamentary Assembly.
264
 However, neither of the requests were granted. The 
Assembly stated that the country was not yet advanced enough in its political modernisation 
and lacked the required commitment to democratic reform and respect for human rights. By 
the time that the Assembly announced its decision, Kazakhstan itself regretted having made 
the requests, as the Kazakh regime came to understand that it would have to make several far-
reaching commitments if the requested status were granted, commitments it was in fact 
unwilling to make.
265
 About ten years later, Kazakhstan has still not been granted observer 
status with the Parliamentary Assembly, but has achieved progress in fulfilling the 
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requirements.
266
 Moreover, in April 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly signed a cooperation 
agreement with the Parliament of Kazakhstan, which allows Kazakh members of parliament 
to regularly attend the Assembly sessions. In addition, the Kazakh government cooperates 
with the CoE‟s „Commission for Democracy through Law‟, better know as the Venice 
Commission, where it holds observer status. This Commission is an advisory body of the 
CoE, composed of independent experts in the field of constitutional law. The CoE is now 
increasingly encouraging Kazakhstan to apply for fuller integration into the workings of the 
CoE, such as becoming a full member of the Venice Commission, based on the conviction 
that this would provide an impetus for the country‟s political modernisation, including for 
constitutional reform. Kazakhstan, from its side, shows interest in strengthening its relations 
with the CoE, including in acceding to certain CoE conventions.  
While Kazakhstan has an observer status with the Venice Commission, Kyrgyzstan is 
a full member of the Commission (as the body is open to non-European countries since 2002). 
Moreover, although not a member, the Uzbek government also cooperates with the Venice 
Commission, notably since the EU invited the legal advisory body to establish projects in the 
Central Asian states as part of the EU‟s „Rule of Law Initiative‟, launched under the EU 
Strategy for Central Asia. Since then, the Venice Commission has been active in the entire 
region. Irrespective of this, the EU is well-represented in the Commission; while most of its 
legal experts are from EU Member States, the European Commission has a special status with 
the Venice Commission and participates in its plenary sessions. The Venice Commission 
focuses mainly on conducting evaluations of draft constitutions and constitutional 
amendments; sometimes, it assesses related legislation, such as minority or electoral law.
267
 
The Commission formulates such legal opinions following requests from either the 
participating states or the other bodies of the CoE. Its opinions, however, are not binding but 
are nevertheless influential. Before starting its work under the EU‟s Rule of Law initiative, 
the Venice Commission thus cooperated in Central Asia only with Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, where its work focused on the main constitutional bodies. Among other things, it 
offered legal opinions on constitutional reform and draft laws to the election code, law on 
ombudsman and judicial reform. However, as noted by Isaacs, the Commission‟s “work in 
Kyrgyzstan was affected by the chaotic constitutional aftermath of the „Tulip revolution‟, 
while in Kazakhstan cooperation was limited to seminars and conferences on these issues” 
(2009: 2). The Commission‟s work in the region recently expanded, mostly because of its 
cooperation with the EU under the EU‟s Rule of Law initiative, which involves all five 
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countries. As Isaacs observes, the frequency and depth of the Venice Commission‟s recent 
activities in the region “vary from country to country and reflect the political realities of 
dealing with issues related to rule of law in some Central Asian states” (2009: 3). The 
Commission has, for instance, undertaken fact-finding missions to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
and attended a conference on judicial reform in Kazakhstan (ibid.). In Uzbekistan, in the 
framework of the EU‟s Initiative for the Rule of Law, the Venice Commission organised two 
seminars on the implementation of habeas corpus in the country's legal system. The 
Commission currently seems most active in Kyrgyzstan, where it recently offered several 
legal opinions and organised a number of conferences on the principles of the rule of law and 
the separation of powers (ibid.). In the aftermath of the removal of former President Bakiev, 
the Provisional Government of the Kyrgyz Republic invited a delegation of the Venice 
Commission to visit Bishkek and meet with representatives of the Provisional Government 
and members of the Working Group on the drafting of the Constitution and the Constitutional 
Council. In April 2010, the Provisional Government had asked the Venice Commission to 
assist it in its efforts to draft a new Constitution. The Commission adopted its legal opinion on 
the Kyrgyzstan draft Constitution in June 2010.
268
  
In sum, it can be concluded that the EU relies on the CoE in order to supplement - or 
strengthen if you like - its own efforts to promote human rights, democratic reform and rule of 
law in the Central Asian countries. In effect, this testifies not simply to an instance of 
TNPO2macro but rather to an instance of overlap of TNPO2macro with TNPO3. 
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6.3. Concluding remarks 
 
The above outline has sought to highlight to what extent institutional factors need to be taken 
into account when considering the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. Whether at the macro-level 
of international relations (TNPO2macro) or at the more case-specific institutional micro-level of 
EU bilateral or bi-regional contractual relations (TNPO2micro) with the Central Asian 
countries, it is clear that the EU derives a significant amount of leverage from institutional 
factors. With respect to TNPO2micro, the chapter demonstrated that the EU‟s bilateral and 
regional relations with the countries have grown to be considerably institutionalised. This 
applies both in terms of formal contractual (including treaty-based) formats of 
institutionalisation and in terms of less formal and less integrated (including ad-hoc) formats 
of institutionalisation, which mostly involve the bureaucratic/technocratic level or societal 
level rather than the high political level. The level of institutionalisation, however, varies 
across the five countries, depending mostly on the legal basis of the cooperation. As such, 
relations with Kazakhstan appear to be institutionalised most densely, followed by the EU‟s 
cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Bilateral ties with Turkmenistan, in 
turn, are rather moderately institutionalised. Hence, assuming that the denser the institutional 
relationship between the EU and a country is, the larger the EU‟s TNPO2micro over the country 
will be, we can draw the provisional conclusion that the EU‟s micro-institutional power is 
largest in the case of Kazakhstan, but rather limited in the case of Turkmenistan, while 
relatively dense in the other three countries. 
Next, the chapter indicated that the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia also comprises 
institutionalised dialogue and cooperation through a web of - sometimes overlapping - 
international organisations and institutions, most notably the WTO, the EBRD, the OSCE and 
the CoE. The section highlighted the extent to which the EU manages to draw influence over 
the Central Asian countries through its influential representation in these international bodies. 
Also at the macro-level, the degree of institutionalisation differs between the five countries. 
Clearly, the EU wields by far the largest amount of TNPO2macro over Kazakhstan. Next is 
Kyrgyzstan, followed by Tajikistan. The EU‟s TNPO2macro over Uzbekistan, in turn, is 
moderate, but is denser than the Union‟s macro-institutional ties with Turkmenistan, where its 
TNPO2macro is rather limited. In this regard, it is important to highlight the limits encountered 
by the EU‟s TNPO2macro over the countries, which include factors that are either endogenous 
or exogenous to the Central Asian states. A significant factor is the strong competition that the 
EU faces in the region from China and Russia, which have their own share of TNPO2macro 
over the Central Asian republics, except for Turkmenistan, which does not participate in the 
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regional organisations led by these two „rival‟ powers. Another aspect that curtails the EU‟s 
macro-institutional power, and in particular in the case of the OSCE, is the Central Asian 
regimes‟ suspicion of and aversion to external meddling in their „domestic affairs‟, especially 
in areas that could directly affect the societal status quo in their countries. This explains, inter 
alia, why the OSCE field missions in the region have been facing considerable opposition 
from the local governments, which decided to cut their budgets and mandates. 
Irrespective of these „countervailing‟ factors, the chapter already pointed to a number 
of instances of interaction between TNPO2 and the other two TNPO structures, notably 
TNPO1-2macro (cf. EBRD/EIB) and TNPO2macro-3 (cf. CoE, but also OSCE). In this respect, it is 
worth recalling that TNPO2, and particularly TNPO2micro, tends to interact - more often than 
not - with TNPO1 and/or TNPO3, up to the point where TNPO2micro hardly occurs on its own. 
Empirical illustrations of this are provided in Chapter 8, which deals specifically with TNPO 
overlap. 
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Chapter 7 - The EU’s TNPO3 over Central Asia  
 
In addition to material and institutional factors, the EU‟s TNPO is also composed of 
ideational factors, which make up the third and final TNPO structure, TNPO3. As the 
ideational structure, TNPO3 encompasses such intangible factors as beliefs, values, norms, 
identity and legitimacy. In other words, TNPO3 is ideational in the sense that it takes ideas, 
normative interpretations and mental constructs seriously and regards them as causally 
important in their own right. This chapter presents the empirical exploration of the EU‟s 
TNPO3 over Central Asia. In particular, it examines the extent to which the EU effectively 
exercises power over the Central Asian states through its control over such ideational factors.  
The chapter begins by exploring the EU‟s „magnetic pull‟ in Central Asia, which 
encompasses a variety of aspects, ranging from the magnetic pull of EU-style prosperity and 
stability to the attraction of EU culture, norms and standards. While the EU‟s magnetic 
attraction stems mostly from the Union‟s „presence‟, rather than from its intentional agency, 
(cf. purely structural TNPO3), the section will also highlight the extent to which norms and 
values are spread through conscious efforts by the EU ( cf. agent-based TNPO3). A final 
aspect that the section will examine, is the „image‟ of the EU in Central Asia, and in 
particular, the symbolic power of its image. In doing so, it will explore, inter alia, the Central 
Asian attitudes - both popular and elite attitudes - about Europe. As with the above empirical 
explorations of TNPO1 and TNPO2, the chapter focuses mostly on the Pre-Strategy period, 
notably 2001-June 2007, whilst already offering some insights into events and relations taking 
place in the Post-Strategy period. 
 
7.1. The EU‟s „magnetic pull‟ in Central Asia 
 
One particular aspect of the EU‟s TNPO3 over the Central Asian countries is the Union‟s 
magnetic pull vis-à-vis the five states. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the EU‟s magnetic pull 
stems from its presence, rather than from its intentional agency, and thus largely constitutes a 
purely structural form of impact. The aspect of magnetic pull is probably best captured in 
Nye‟s concept of soft power, which encapsulates the extent to which an international actor, 
i.c. the EU, gets what it wants through attraction, rather than through coercion and payment, 
arising from the appeal of its culture, political ideals and policies (Nye, 1990, 2004). In the 
case of Central Asia, this „magnetic pull‟ of the EU rests on the passive leverage that it draws, 
inter alia, from its attractive single market and its success as a regionally - economically and 
politically - integrated group of liberal democracies. On the one hand, as covered in section 
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5.2., a considerable amount of the EU‟s market power over Central Asia is based on the 
attraction of the single market. This is particularly well-captured by notions of „external 
governance‟, most notably the mechanisms of „externalisation‟ and „competition‟, which 
occur both in their intergovernmental and transnational forms (cf. TNPO toolbox, see Figure 
1, p.51). This aspect will be further explored in the section covering overlap between TNPO1 
and TNPO3. On the other hand, the EU‟s appeal in Central Asia also stems from its success as 
a regionally - economically and politically - integrated group of liberal democracies. This 
success does not only give it a certain amount of legitimacy and credit with its Central Asian 
partner countries, but it also makes it a model of development, although not necessarily the 
preferred model and not necessarily a model to be followed in all respects. The question is 
thus whether and to what extent the Central Asian republics share the EU‟s beliefs in regional 
cooperation and integration, economic liberalisation and liberal democracy based on fair 
societal representation and respect for human rights as universally valid ideas about the good 
political order. The answer is relatively straightforward: all five countries perceive the EU as 
the most successful form of regionalism, as well as the ideal and most successful model to 
guarantee economic welfare, modern statehood and democracy. However, they do not 
perceive it as necessarily the best model for their own states.
269
 Indeed, while they find the 
EU inspirational as a model in a number of governance areas, including sustainable 
development, higher education and market liberalisation, they equally - if not more - find 
inspiration with alternative models, including for constitutional democracy and state-society 
relations. As skillfully pointed out by then Kazakh Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin addressing 
the NATO security forum in Astana in June 2009, the Kazakh government may well be 
interested in adopting the „European model‟ on issues such as civil society, energy 
exploitation and transport, technology and environment policies; however, it is not “[the 
Kazakhs‟] task to mechanically apply experiences of other regions but rather to creatively 
reconsider alternative models and gradually develop our own unique regional architecture”.270 
In legitimising the states‟ course of development, Central Asian officials never fail to point to 
the unique geographical „position‟ of the region located at a crossroads between Europe and 
Asia, as well as to their lingering post-soviet legacy, which - in their view - make that their 
countries require a different model of development than that of the EU, or any other region 
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 E.g. author‟s interviews at the Diplomatic Mission of Kazakhstan to the EU in Brussels on 4 February 2008, 
at the Diplomatic Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the EU in Brussels on 5 February 2008, at the Diplomatic Mission of 
Uzbekistan to the EU in Brussels on 11 February 2008, at the Diplomatic Mission of Turkmenistan to the EU in 
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 Source: “Nato woos Kazakhstan at security forum”, EUObserver, 26 June 2009. 
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for that matter.
271
 Moreover, in response to Europeans‟ insistence on political and economic 
reforms European-style, they also like to stress the need for „gradualism‟ and „strict control‟ 
in their countries‟ development and state-building process, referring to the fact that their 
countries only recently gained independence and had no democratic tradition, in contrast to 
the centuries-long road that the EU Member States had to walk before reaching their current 
level of development, statehood and democratisation.
272
 As pointed out by Kreikemeyer & 
Zellner (2007): 
 
In 1991, the five newly independent states in Central Asia had neither a tradition of state-
building nor of democracy. Their political culture, partly inherited from the Soviet system but 
partly a product of traditionalism could not but add strong authoritarian and clannish flavour to 
the transition. A process of re-traditionalisation was characterised by a strengthened role for 
traditional institutions, which could provide social comfort to the population in the absence of 
any reasonable state policy in this sphere. [...] For the local leaders the issue of sovereignty 
was the most precious prize they won after the demise of the USSR. Closely linked to that was 
the interest in maintaining power, i.e. control over vast streams of revenue in the political 
economy. Under conditions of a neo-patrimonial society, this meant the tight informal control 
over revenue streams (energy, customs, privatisation, etc.) to ensure proper patronage 
networks and the full control over key appointments. [...] In each of the Central Asian states 
this has had the consequence of a break-down of the social contract. Governments are 
unresponsive to the needs and desires of the population. The emphasis of state-citizen relations 
is on coercion and co-optation, not constituency building. 
 
In sum, this implies that the initial expectation in Brussels and Europe‟s capitals of a 
relatively linear development in Central Asia from economic liberalisation through 
democratisation to democratic consolidation has not occurred. Instead, the region has 
experienced an emergence of strong autocratic presidentialism with neo-patrimonial 
structures, based on patronage networks and clan politics (Collins, 2009; Franke et al, 2009; 
Ishiyama, 2002). Some states have arguably evolved to „enlightened autocracy‟, notably 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent Tajikistan, which have relatively open 
societies and which oppose heavy-handed repression (Bowyer, 2008; Denison, 2009; Melvin, 
2009a).  
When referring to alternative models of development to the European model, the 
Central Asian regimes normally mean the Russian model of „enlightened autocracy‟ based on 
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the principle of „sovereign democracy‟. The attraction of Russia‟s model is most clearly 
reflected in Kazakhstan‟s political system. As Bowyer (2008) explains, it is based on a strong 
president complemented by a dominant „super party‟, i.e. Nur-Otan, or Fatherland‟s Ray of 
Light, in the national parliament “as the result of „competitive‟ though well-managed 
elections”. In the August 2007 parliamentary elections, the party captured all the seats via the 
new all party-list system. Still, unlike the situation in Uzbekistan, the two parliamentary 
Chambers, the Senate and the Majilis, i.e. the Lower House, are far more than mere puppets 
of the president. As Bowyer (2008) specifies, the members of parliament are “well-educated 
individuals who lobby for the regions of the country they represent and the needs and 
concerns of their local constituents”.  
Moreover, rather than promoting the „language of democracy‟, the ruling elites in 
Central Asia promote a discourse of „stability‟, stemming from their claim that their countries 
are still at an early stage of state- and nation building. In this regard, they contend that 
economic development is the first anchor of stability, as a necessary precursor to progress on 
democratic reforms (Kreikemeyer & Zellner, 2007). Hence why all five countries stress that 
priority should be given in their cooperation with the EU to the field of economic 
development much more than to democratisation and human rights. In defending the 
importance of stability, local leaders even go as far as publicly associating a quick transition 
to western-style democracy with chaos and instability. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
commonly use the lengthy chaos and instability in Kyrgyzstan following the Tulip revolution 
as an example of the „risks‟ and „dangers‟ of advancing democratic transformations in the 
region. Hence why they publicly present the recent colour revolutions in post-Soviet states as 
producing democratic back-sliding rather than as solving problems. As noted by Dave, “the 
state-regulated media skilfully portray the „colour revolutions‟ in the near abroad as a popular 
outpouring against economic discontent and which has only exacerbated lawlessness. Such 
propaganda has had a considerable effect in inoculating the ordinary people „against political 
change‟ to support „stability‟ and in equating democracy with social unrest and Western 
propaganda” (2008: 61). In this regard, it is important to note that the Kyrgyz revolution 
increased suspicion among the ruling elites in the region towards the U.S. and EU agendas of 
democratisation, and triggered a region-wide backlash in democratisation trends, leaving an 
even narrower space for autonomous political action. Among other things, registration 
procedures for both local and Western NGOs were tightened.
273
 Partly as a result of this, civil 
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society organisations have increasingly turned to areas that are less politically sensitive, such 
as health, migration and poverty reduction. 
At the same time, however, the governments continue to pay lip service to EU 
demands for democratic reform and political modernisation, up to the point where they have 
integrated such „façade behaviour‟ towards values-based democracy and other EU norms into 
their relationship with the EU. The Uzbek regime, in particular, likes to boast to EU officials  
with its (entirely superficial) top-down democratisation policy, referring inter alia to the 
country‟s civil society (which is fully state-run and tightly controlled) and its political 
pluralism (with all the parties in parliament being established by the President).
274
  
  Nevertheless, it would be far too exaggerated to conclude that the ruling elites do not 
have a genuine interest in adopting certain elements of the „European model‟. All five 
countries do maintain an interest in taking on some EU rules, standards, norms and practices, 
although largely in non-political or less politically sensitive areas, such as tax law, customs, 
budget control, environmental standards and higher education (cf. Bologna agreement). This 
is above all the case in Kazakhstan, as exemplified most clearly with the state‟s „Path to 
Europe‟ programme (see more below). It is even the case in Turkmenistan, where the gradual 
opening of the country following the sudden death of President Niyazov revealed that the new 
leadership is interested in adopting certain elements of the „European model‟, in particular in 
the fields of higher education, renewable energy, transport, technology and sustainable 
development. As covered in Chapter 3, there are a number of specific mechanisms that 
capture such domestically-driven pathways of Europeanisation. Indeed, such mechanisms as 
„unilateral emulation‟, „imitation‟ and „lesson-drawing‟ (see TNPO Toolbox in Figure 1, p.51) 
grasp the ways in which third country governments may be induced, independently of 
deliberate EU action, to adopt EU norms and standards or adapt existing rules and policies to 
those of the EU. Considered as the „ideal type‟ of voluntary rule transfer (in contrast to more 
coercive forms, such as conditionality), „lesson-drawing‟ occurs in reaction to domestic 
dissatisfaction with current policies in the target country, which induces policy-makers or 
societal actors to learn from the experiences in the EU. Europeanisation is based then on their 
perception that the EU rules are appropriate solutions to their domestic problems 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 20-21). This is close to the mechanism of 
„communication‟, which Bauer et al. (2007) define as “a governance mode that brings about 
change as a result of voluntary information exchange and mutual learning between policy-
makers in EU-sponsored networks”. In Central Asia, this kind of lesson-drawing from EU 
practices and regulations occurs mostly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where government 
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officials are regularly found to contact the local EC Delegation office or the EC headquarters 
in Brussels to ask for information and/or advice regarding specific EU policies or regulations, 
sometimes even asking for an expert on the matter to be sent over.
275
 As noted, Kyrgyzstan 
does this also through the CoE, where it has asked the Venice Commission to offer legal 
opinions on draft laws (see above). Moreover, the Kyrgyz Parliament has solicited the advice 
and assistance of the European Parliament as part of a deliberate attempt to „learn‟ from EU 
parliamentary experience.
276
 In Kazakhstan, in turn, policy advice and information from the 
EU is even requested by the Prime Minister‟s Cabinet and President‟s Administration.277 The 
fact that Kazakhstan was found to solicit the EU‟s advice most is to a significant extent 
because all Central Asian countries Kazakhstan‟s domestic situation and level of development 
comes closest to that of the CEECs.
278
  
What happens next in the lesson-drawing process is a thorough  review by the policy-
makers of the examined EU policies and rules, making a prospective evaluation of their 
„transferability‟, i.e. whether these could operate effectively in the domestic context of their 
states. „Unilateral emulation‟, in turn, can be viewed as a specific kind of lesson-drawing. 
Regulatory adaptation occurs then because third country governments or societal actors 
perceive an EU rule as superior and adopt it in order to deal more efficiently with domestic 
issues. In other words, the domestic policy-makers become favourable - independently from 
EU action - to convergence or compliance with a EU norm or rule, because they perceive it as 
an effective remedy to an inherently domestic need or policy challenge and believe that 
compliance or convergence will improve their domestic situation (cf. logic of 
appropriateness). Given the „difficult‟ context of Central Asia, it is not straightforward to 
judge the extent to which national governments adopt a specific EU norm or rule because they 
genuinely believe it will advance the domestic situation in that policy area. Nevertheless, 
cases can be found where this was effectively the motivation underlying the adoption - or 
perhaps better the „selective adoption‟ - of a specific element of a EU policy or regulation. A 
case in point is the adoption of EU standards on food quality and food safety. In Kyrgyzstan, 
for instance, the government has asked the EC for guidance on food safety standards and 
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accreditation systems.
279
 As highlighted by Lavenex and Uçarer, there are different degrees 
and forms of emulation (2004: 422). The most complete form of adaptation is „copying‟ and 
involves “full transfer of policy principles, instruments, programmes and institutional 
structures”, with „inspiration‟ being at the other end of the adaptation scale (ibid.). A related 
notion is „imitation‟, which involves a degree of adaptation higher than inspiration but lower 
than copying. In Central Asia, the most common type is probably inspiration. In any case, 
emulation by Central Asian policy-making usually involves a „selective‟ adoption - rather 
than a full adoption - of specific elements of the EU policies, typically following a thorough 
evaluation of the transferability to the domestic context. The fact that the adoption tends to be 
selective also points to the observation that Central Asian government officials examine other 
options and that in other issue-areas they may select non-EU rules as the most appropriate 
remedy to their domestic policy problem. Moreover, as with adoption of EU rules and norms 
as a result of „social learning‟, i.e. based on intentional EU action (see more below), adoption 
of EU rules and norms as a result of lesson-drawing has not always tended to translate in to 
actual implementation in the Central Asian countries, quite on the contrary.
280
 Obviously, this 
„implementation gap‟ raises serious question marks with respect to the „actual‟ impact of the 
appeal of these elements of EU norms and policies in these countries in the longer run. 
Particularly interesting in terms of the EU‟s appeal as a governance model is the extent 
to which the Central Asian states may - or may not - be drawn to its model of regional 
cooperation and integration. As mentioned, the Central Asian regimes recognize the EU as the 
most successful model of regional cooperation and integration. However, they do not perceive 
it as the best model in terms of their own integration into regional cooperation frameworks, 
mostly because of the regimes‟ obsessive concern with safeguarding their countries‟ national 
sovereignty. As such, the Central Asian states are reluctant to enter into any form of regional 
integration that goes beyond intergovernmental decision-making and strongly oppose any 
form of economic integration beyond the level of a customs union.
281
 Turkmenistan, in its 
turn, is hesitant towards any form of regional integration, as evidenced by the fact that it is a 
member of only one regional cooperation organisation, namely the Economic Cooperation 
Organisation (ECO), in contrast to the other four states, which are all members of several  
regional cooperation organisations, most notably the SCO, CSTO, CIS and the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsec) (see e.g. Abdrakhmanova, 2008; Collins, 2009). 
Uzbekistan, however left the latter organisation in 2008, confirming the country‟s reluctance 
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to „sacrifice‟ its national sovereignty, in casu in favour of greater influence of the region‟s 
dominant power, Russia (see e.g. Collins, 2009). In this regard, it is worth noting that Russia 
initiated - and continues to dominate - virtually all the above-mentioned regional cooperation 
organisations (see e.g. Boonstra, 2008a). Moreover, the specific idea of regional cooperation 
between the five Central Asian states has not gained much attraction. On the one hand, the 
countries do not all equally share the EU‟s perception of Central Asia as a region in its own 
right, despite their shared historical, cultural and linguistic (cf. Turkic) background and 
geographical position. On the other hand, the few attempts that have been made at 
establishing a Central Asian regional cooperation organisation, mostly initiated by Kazakh 
president Nazarbaev, failed in the face of Uzbekistan‟s envy of and irritation at Kazakhstan‟s 
strong economic growth and recent emergence as the region‟s leading country, at the expense 
of Uzbekistan, which still perceives itself as the region‟s natural leader. In fact, there also 
remains strong suspicion between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, based largely on historic feuds, 
and between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Hence, the extent of lesson-drawing from the „EU 
experience‟ in this domain is rather limited. However, while we can rule out any major EU 
impact of domestically-driven mechanisms on regionalisation processes within Central Asia, 
this does not apply to EU-driven attempts at regionalisation in Central Asia. Indeed, we have 
already observed instances of EU-driven impact on regional cooperation among the five 
Central Asian states, including through the EU‟s regional assistance initiatives, such as 
BOMCA, CADAP, INOGATE and TRACECA, and even more so, through the EU-initiated 
regional political dialogue forum, i.e. the EU Troika-Central Asia format of foreign 
ministerial meetings, which is unique in that it is the only political dialogue forum that gathers 
all five Central Asian states around the table at such a high political level. 
In considering the „lesson-drawing‟ aspect of the EU‟s TNPO3 over Central Asia, it is 
important to also consider the EU‟s appeal at societal level. Nevertheless, the attraction of the 
EU among the Central Asian population appears somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, a 
considerable amount of attraction stems from the so-called „European dream‟ and „European 
way of living‟. This typically reflects the high level of prosperity and quality of life associated 
with the EU, including high living standards and efficient social welfare systems, which have 
prompted many Central Asians to migrate to the EU. In addition, the appeal of the EU also 
derives from its a legacy of peaceful relations and successful reconciliation, as well as the 
non-repressive nature of the European societies and governments. In as far as a endogenous 
and independent civil society and political opposition movement have emerged in the region, 
considerable numbers of these societal groups have turned to the European model for 
inspiration and lesson-drawing. As pointed out in Chapter 3, such  mechanisms as „societal 
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lesson-drawing‟, „societal imitation‟ and „societal inspiration‟ capture how local societal 
actors may be drawn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction with the domestic status quo. 
They favour a certain EU rule or norm because they perceive them as a solution to their 
domestic problems and an improvement of the status quo (cf. logic of appropriateness). Yet, 
their room for manoeuvring remains limited in the face of strict government control of their 
movement and an fairly hostile media climate (see above). Moreover, secular, western-
oriented societal groups in Central Asia do not necessarily represent society as a whole. 
Indeed, since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, the countries in the region have 
witnessed an erosion of the secular values in society. As noted by Olcott (2007), “[o]verall, 
the spread of traditional values, be they national-cultural, traditional-religious or fundamental 
religious, has proceeded far more rapidly than the spread of western „civic cultural‟ values”. 
This is particularly the case of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It 
applies much less to Kazakhstan, whose society was perhaps more russified under soviet rule 
than the other countries, but more importantly, whose society has largely co-opted general 
western or secular values. Hence, apart from Kazakhstan, identification with Europe among 
Central Asia‟s societies tends to be weak, as is their knowledge of the European liberal-
democratic model of society and politics. As highlighted by Melvin, “Central Asians are not 
genetically or culturally averse to democracy, but it is important to be realistic about the 
conditions under which democratisation can emerge. Poor societies, with little prospect of 
significant socio-economic change in the near and medium term, are not strong candidates for 
a deep-seated and sustainable process of democratisation” (2009a: 128). Kazakhstan, 
however, provides a different prospect. In contrast to its Central Asian neighbours, 
Kazakhstan has witnessed the emergence of a middle class, which enjoys a western-style 
quality of life (see e.g. Daly, 2008). Although wide sections of Kazakh society are still 
experiencing low levels of prosperity and even poverty, based on the income of its lucrative 
hydrocarbons sales, the country is likely to continue to generate wealth, redistributed among 
the population. This suggests “the emergence of socio-economic conditions more conducive 
to democratisation in the decades ahead” (Melvin, 2009a: 129). Moreover, despite the lack of 
genuine democratisation and any signals from the Kazakh leadership to progress in that 
direction any time soon, ambitious initiatives such as the government‟s Path to Europe 
programme
282
 and its OSCE Chairmanship, as well as its self-profiling as a „Eurasian‟ nation-
state, indicate Kazakhstan‟s intention to move closer to Europe and “emulate European social 
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and economic development in important ways” (Melvin, 2009a: 129, also see Dave, 2008; 
Melvin, 2009b).  
 
7.2. The EU‟s intentional diffusion of norms and values in Central Asia 
 
Next to domestically-driven processes of Europeanisation, norms and values are also spread 
in Central Asia through conscious efforts by the EU (cf. agent-based structural power). As 
mentioned, this duality is captured in Manners‟s (2002) concept of normative power, which 
depicts the EU as a changer of norms in international relations based on combination of its 
very existence and conscious agency, notably by projecting its internally shared principles 
and norms onto its external partners. When it comes to pinpointing the norms and principles 
propagated by the EU, Manners (2002: 240) identifies four „core‟ norms, which form a central 
part of the EU‟s vast body of laws and policies, namely peace, democracy, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms, as set out in article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and incorporated in the EU‟s various external policies and strategies. 
In addition, Manners designates four „minor‟ norms, i.e. social progress, combating 
discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (ibid.). As a regionally 
integrated system of liberal democracies, the EU essentially represents three key elements, 
namely regionalism, regulated transnational markets and democratic constitutionalism (Cf. 
Schimmelfennig, 2007). Drawing on Schimmelfennig (2007), which departs from the 
proposition that Europeanisation consists of “the external projection of internal solutions”, the 
question is then whether and to what extent the EU deliberately exports to Central Asia (i) its 
constitutional norms, (ii) its model of regionalism and (iii) its “multilaterally managed 
regulatory framework for liberal markets” - or „neoliberal economic model‟.  
However, while the dissemination of EU norms, values and standards is conceived 
here as an ideal type of TNPO3, in practice, the deliberate export of these three EU-models is 
usually channelled through the provision of material incentives (overlap between TNPO1 and 
TNPO3), such as financial assistance and enhanced market access, and/or through the 
institutionalised cooperation framework established with the Central Asian countries (overlap 
between TNPO2 and TNPO3). As we shall see in the section covering TNPO overlap, these 
processes of EU norm export are captured, inter alia, by such mechanisms as „conditionality‟ 
and „social learning‟ (see TNPO toolbox in Figure 1, p.51).  
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7.3. The EU‟s image and symbolic power in Central Asia 
 
A final aspect of the EU‟s TNPO3 over Central Asia concerns the Union‟s image and 
symbolic power in the region. As noted in Chapter 3, on the whole, the EU seems to have a 
rather benevolent and non-threatening image compared to other international powers, 
including Russia, China and the U.S. Moreover, the Union is increasingly accepted around the 
globe as a source of authority on several public policy issues. As pointed out by Holden, 
“[s]ignificant here is that many do not perceive it as an actor in the sense that major states are 
viewed, thus its own webs of control have tended to elicit less paranoia and resistance than 
these other actors” (2009: 188-9). This section will show that these insights largely 
correspond to the image that the EU enjoys in the Central Asian republics. In doing so, it will 
also explore the Central Asian attitudes - both popular and elite attitudes - about Europe. 
Importantly, in considering the symbolic power of the EU‟s image in Central Asia, it seems 
more useful to refer to „Europe‟ rather than to the EU. Of course, as a geographic term 
„Europe‟ encapsulates much more than the EU. However, for most people in Central Asia, 
having only very little knowledge about the EU as a political community in its own right, both 
terms have come to represent one and the same symbolic reality.  
To begin with, contrary to the Central Asian attitudes about the United States, Central 
Asians have mostly positive assumptions about the EU, in particular about the EU‟s role at 
the international stage. To some extent, Central Asian „suspicion‟ towards America goes back 
to the time of the Cold War and the bipolar international climate. However, suspicion in 
Central Asia about American foreign policy increased dramatically in the aftermath of the 
American invasion and subsequent occupation of - fellow muslim - Iraq in 2003 (see e.g. 
Schatz, 2008; Schatz  & Levine, 2009).
283
 Moreover, the Central Asian governments are 
sensitive to claims at home that cooperation with the U.S. spoils the countries‟ image in the 
eyes of their traditional allies, most notably Russia, China and fellow Islamic countries.
284
 In 
contrast, the EU is perceived as a more neutral and benevolent external actor.
285
 In this sense, 
one could argue that the EU enjoys a number of comparative advantages in relation to other 
external actors, which help strengthen its influence in the region (see e.g. De Pedro, 2009). As 
highlighted by Shairbek (2009), this perception of the EU as a relatively neutral player, 
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combined with its experience on regional cooperation, has allowed it to gain the thrust of the 
Central Asian governments to act as a neutral „arbiter‟ and „mediator‟ on pressing regional 
issues that the governments themselves have repeatedly failed to resolve between each other, 
most notably water management and hydro-energy issues. The major line of contention 
concerns the use of the rivers, which the upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - 
which need to exploit the rivers for the production of hydro-energy -, refuse to share 
unconditionally with the downstream countries, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, 
which are dependent on the rivers for agricultural purposes. Also more generally in Central 
Asia, the EU‟s reputation as a benevolent and non-competitive actor generates trust and grants 
the Union a higher level of legitimacy compared to other external actors (see e.g. de Pedro, 
2009: 131-133). Moreover, its fairly positive reputation in the region is something that the EU 
is keen to use as an asset in its relations with the Central Asian states. Hence why the EU 
avoids presenting itself in the region as a „competitor‟ in the so-called New Great Game (see 
above). Nevertheless, as pointed out above, the EU is still subject to considerable criticism 
from the ruling elites, who particularly dislike the „lecturing tone‟ that the EU tends to put on 
when addressing its Central Asian partner countries (cf. Uzbek reference to quote by Winston 
Churchill, see above). In particular, the EU‟s insistence on the need for democratic reform and 
improvement of human rights often leads the Central Asian regimes to accuse the EU of using 
double standards in its relations with the republics.
286
  
 A final element that needs addressing is the popular attitudes towards Europe in the 
region. As already mentioned, the „European way of living‟ and  so-called „European dream‟ 
appeal to Central Asian societies, in particular to the „urban dwellers‟, who associate Europe 
with a high level of prosperity and quality of life, including high living standards and efficient 
social welfare systems. Related to this, European merchandise is very much desired in Central 
Asia, where European products enjoy a very good reputation, based on the perception that 
they are generally of very high quality and standard. Conversely, Chinese merchandise, 
although more affordable to the low-income Central Asian societies, on average has a rather 
poor reputation. Moreover, European culture appears to be linked to a certain level of 
„Romanticism‟ among Central Asians, including among Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, who 
tend to associate Europe with cities like Paris and Rome, and often seem to be drawn to 
French romantic symbols and ideals, such as love and beauty. Interestingly, France also 
appears to have a particular attraction on Central Asia‟s ruling elites, including on Kazakh 
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president Nazarbaev, who famously found considerable inspiration for his country‟s 
constitution with the French Constitution. 
 
 
7.4. Concluding remarks 
 
To summarise, the above outline highlighted to what extent ideational factors need to be taken 
into account when considering the EU‟s TNPO. Overall, the findings presented above reveal a 
rather mixed picture of the EU‟s TNPO3. On the one hand, the chapter did not find evidence 
of strong ideational attraction to the EU‟s norms, values and principles related to liberal 
democracy, including human rights, rule of law and good governance. Clearly, these results 
suggest that such ideational factors do not constitute an important determinant of the EU‟s 
TNPO over Central Asia. In understanding this „limit‟ to the EU‟s power over the region, the 
section again pointed to a number of „countervailing‟ factors, including the virtually inherent 
authoritarian nature of Central Asian politics, and  related to this - the attraction to alternative 
models of development, most notably the Russian model, and the traditional fabric of Central 
Asian society. To some extent, however, Kazakhstan appeared to be an exception, offering 
better prospects for European-style development and democratisation.  
On the other hand, the chapter found that the EU enjoys a relatively positive reputation 
as a more neutral actor in Central Asia, which gives it more credit compared to other external 
actors. Moreover, despite several findings suggesting a limited EU impact in the normative 
sphere, the section remarked that the dissemination of EU norms and standards studied in the 
section is an ideal type of TNPO3. Indeed, in practice, the deliberate export of EU norms and 
standards is usually channelled through the provision of material incentives (overlap between 
TNPO1 and TNPO3), such as financial assistance and enhanced market access, and/or through 
the institutionalised cooperation framework established with the Central Asian countries 
(interaction between TNPO2 and TNPO3). This final remark brings us to the next chapter, 
which focuses specifically on the extent to which the EU‟s power over Central Asia may also 
derive from the interaction between the TNPO structures. 
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Chapter 8 - The EU’s TNPO overlap over Central Asia 
 
As already apparent from the above three chapters, there seems to be considerable interaction 
between the three TNPO structures. Indeed, while TNPO1, TNPO2 and TNPO3 can be 
considered the material, institutional and ideational structures in their purest forms, in 
practical terms, they are often found to interact with each other. This is particularly true for 
TNPO2micro(institutional), which is present in two different overlaps, notably in 
TNPO2micro(institutional)-3(ideational) and TNPO1(material)-2micro(institutional)-3(ideational). Before starting our 
empirical exploration of the interaction between the structures, it is useful to reiterate the 
analytical distinction between the „logic of consequentiality‟ and the „logic of 
appropriateness‟, which helps to understand the mechanisms of impact underlying the 
different types of overlap. As such, TNPO1(material)-3(ideational) falls mostly within the former 
logic, which maintains that political outcomes are brought about by strategically calculating 
actors seeking to maximise given interest. Conversely, TNPO2(institutional)-3(ideational) can be best 
explained by the latter logic, which upholds that outcomes are based on value-based 
judgements of norms as either appropriate or inappropriate behaviour. Moreover, it is also 
important to bear in mind that overlap between the structures testifies to a combination of 
purely structural and agent-based structural power.  
 
8.1. TNPO1(material)-2(institutional) 
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, instances of TNPO1-2micro are rather rare, as the overlap between 
those two structures is nearly always bound to interact with TNPO3. To clarify, by and large, 
TNPO1-2micro encompasses the extent to which EU aid constitutes a direct intervention in the 
Central Asian countries‟ domestic structures and to which the assistance ensures contact 
between the respective Parties, thereby establishing relationships between the EU and the 
Central Asian countries that become institutionalised in one way or other. In practice, 
however, such direct EU intervention hardly ever occurs without deliberate attempts by the 
EU to push through domestic reforms that are inspired by EU practices or draw on the EU 
model. In short, TNPO1-2micro thus appears to be inherently linked to TNPO3. Some scattered 
instances of TNPO1-2micro may be observed where this is not the case, but these are very rare 
and will not be covered in the present chapter. In contrast to TNPO1-2micro, overlap between 
TNPO1 and TNPO2macro is more easily observable and does not necessarily interact with 
TNPO3. Nevertheless, compared to the other types of TNPO overlap, TNPO1-2macro is still only 
a minor case of overlap, and will therefore be dealt with only briefly in the present chapter. 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 3, instances of TNPO1-2macro appear largely confined to the 
security realm, although not exclusively. The most common cases of overlap between TNPO1 
and TNPO2macro occur in instances where the EU relies upon regional security organisations to 
gain more influence over third countries in the security domain. This also applies to the case 
of Central Asia, where the EU relies on two groups of regional security organisations to 
increase its influence over the region. On the one hand, there is the OSCE and NATO, two 
regional security organisations in which the EU is represented itself, although indirectly, i.e. 
through a substantial membership of EU member states. On the other hand, there are the 
„rival‟ regional security organisations, in casu the SCO, which includes Russia, China, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and the CSTO, which includes  Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Belarus. As the former case of 
TNPO1-2macro is covered in detail in section 6.2 (above), we will focus here on the latter case. 
What is so interesting about this instance of TNPO1-2macro, is that it consists of the EU 
approaching these „rival‟ security organisations with the request of entering into a some kind 
of cooperation. In other words, the EU has sought to engage with the SCO and the CSTO - 
and to a lesser extent with the CIS - to secure some kind of cooperation, whether in the form 
of ad-hoc political dialogue or in the form of actual joint activities.
287
 The main goal of such 
engagement attempts by the EU is to balance the influence of these organisations in the 
security domain, and in particular to balance the influence over the Central Asian countries 
wielded by the dominant member countries within the respective organisations, i.e. Russia 
and China. This engagement with the SCO and the CSTO is conducted mostly by the EUSR 
for Central Asia, Pierre Morel, whose mandate stipulates the maintaining of contacts with 
these regional organisations. The engagement established so far does not go beyond ad hoc 
pragmatic cooperation on matters of common concern, which suggests a preference of the EU 
for occasional dialogue with these organisations over deep institutionalised cooperation.  
Outside of the security domain, the EU engages on a regular basis with EURASEC, 
the Eurasian Economic Community, which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. However, a much more important case of TNPO1-2macro outside of 
the security realm concerns a regional institution in which the EU itself is represented, namely 
the EBRD. As mentioned in section 6.2.2, which covers the EU‟s TNPO2macro in the case of 
the EBRD, the EU manages to attract financial assistance from the EBRD for projects in 
Central Asia that are in effect implemented to serve its (own) interests in the Central Asian 
countries. In addition, the EU will benefit even further from enhanced cooperation with the 
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EBRD in favour of the Union‟s involvement in Central Asia, as it signed a tripartite 
Memorandum of Understanding with the EBRD and the EIB for joint financing of projects of 
significant interest to the EU, in particular in the area of infrastructure (see above). As noted, 
strengthened EU interaction with the EBRD and EIB is in fact one of the goals set out in the 
EU Strategy for Central Asia. EIB activity in Central Asia will focus mostly on the energy 
sector and the environment and include energy supply and energy transport projects under 
TRACECA and INOGATE (see above).  
 
 
8.2. TNPO1(material)-3(ideational) 
 
The overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3 encompasses the interaction of material and 
ideational factors. As outlined in Chapter 3, TNPO1-3 largely follows a rationalist perspective, 
which assumes that third country actors adhere to a „logic of consequentiality‟. Put 
differently, all instances of TNPO1-3 are brought about by strategically calculating actors 
seeking to maximise given interest. TNPO1-3 is manifested in a number of ways. Most 
typically, it covers the EU‟s diffusion of ideas, principles and norms through its provision of 
material incentives, such as market access and financial assistance (cf. Manners‟s notion of 
„transference diffusion‟, see Chapter 3). Insofar as such EU assistance packages offer tangible 
material benefits to partner countries, norm adaptation and rule compliance may occur as a 
result of a positive cost-benefit assessment by the third countries. That is, when offered the 
possibility of assistance, the latter weigh up the costs and benefits of the proposed or required 
norm adaptation in view of their material interests and political preferences. Accordingly, 
they comply with the EU‟s rules and norms if the domestic adaptation costs are smaller than 
the benefits of the material rewards (cf. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier‟s external incentives 
model). Material reinforcement mechanisms can also be used indirectly through the 
transnational channel to mobilise societal actors (e.g. human rights NGOs or corporate actors) 
in the target state to put pressure on their government to change its policy and adapt to the 
suggested community norms and rules (cf. domestic empowerment). 
The overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3 largely constitutes agent-based structural 
power, as the overlap derives mostly from conscious EU agency. Yet, there are cases where 
the overlap between the two structures testifies to structural power that is purely structural in 
nature. As captured by the market and the competition modes of governance (see toolbox in 
Figure 1, p.51), it concerns cases where the EU‟s impact on third countries derives from the 
„presence‟ of its internal market rather than from its conscious actions. Governments or 
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societal actors are induced to adapt domestic policies and regulations to those of the EU. 
Following a rationalist logic of action, they do so because ignoring or violating the EU‟s rules 
and regulations would entail net costs (cf. negative externality). For instance, if foreign 
companies want to enter the EU‟s market, they may have no choice but to adopt EU rules or 
standards (e.g. product standards). 
A final type of overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3 occurs entirely via the 
transnational channel and is even more indirect than in the case of domestic empowerment 
through material reinforcement, in that the agency does not lie at the level of the EU, but at 
that of European companies. The overlap perceives foreign direct investment (FDI) from 
European businesses as a form of people-to-people contacts through which EU norms and 
best practices are promoted. In other words, this final type of TNPO1-3 encompasses the 
extent to which FDI from European companies allows for „transnational socialisation‟ (see 
toolbox in Figure 1, p.51) of domestic work force into EU labour and social rights as well as 
the European business environment and technological excellence, thereby exposing local 
labour force to European working conditions as well as to EU business practices, including 
participation in decision-making, accountability and transparency. 
In the remainder of this section, we explore whether and to what extent the above-
mentioned types of TNPO1-3 apply to the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. 
 A first instance of TNPO1-3 that can be observed is the EU‟s deliberate export of 
norms and rules to the Central Asian countries through its provision of material incentives. In 
particular, the EU channels the dissemination of norms and rules in Central Asia through the 
provision of technical and financial assistance and - although to a lesser extent - through trade 
incentives, i.e. the prospect of enhanced market access. As highlighted above, technical and 
financial assistance provided under the auspices of EU funded assistance programmes in 
Central Asia comprise a variety of activities, ranging from investment in transport 
infrastructure and energy efficiency, to food security aid and support to civil society, as well 
as to assistance in legal drafting on customs law, in budgetary control, and higher education 
etc. In financing and implementing this wide range of assistance activities in the Central 
Asian countries, the EU encourages specific institutional and legal reforms of the countries‟ 
domestic frameworks in accordance with the EU‟s own regulatory frameworks. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, if successful, this „export‟ of regulatory norms and EU-modelled practices is 
functionally convenient for the EU. That is, transposing the acquis, whether in full or in part, 
contributes to the establishment of a favourable regulatory climate in the recipient country, 
therefore facilitating direct foreign investment by European firms and encouraging the mutual 
liberalisation of markets (see Chapter 3). A case in point is the EU‟s assistance to the region 
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in the energy domain. In view of safeguarding its energy security, the EU is increasingly 
encouraging far-reaching rules-based governance reforms in neighbouring energy producing 
and transit countries - including Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - modelled on the EU‟s 
internal energy market and governance rules (Youngs, 2007: 2). The EU does so in order to 
“extend transparency, efficiency and certainty beyond the EU‟s frontiers - crucial to helping 
the long term investments necessary for our energy security” (Ferrero-Waldner, as quoted in 
Youngs, 2007). The Baku initiative (see section 6.1) testifies to this overall aim. As pointed 
out by Youngs, it is aimed at “driving energy sector reform in the [Caspian] region, around 
EU regulatory standards - once again using Europe‟s internal market as a template” (2007: 3). 
In this regard, the EU has already provided considerable funding and investment for energy 
infrastructure development in the Caspian Sea region. Similarly, the INOGATE programme 
serves already to modernise and develop energy transport infrastructure in the region, 
including in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
Insofar as the EU‟s assistance packages offer tangible material benefits to the Central 
Asian partner countries, rule adoption and norm convergence by the governments may occur 
as a result of a positive cost-benefit assessment. That is, when offered the possibility of 
assistance, the latter weigh up the costs and benefits of the proposed or required norm 
adaptation in view of their material interests and political preferences. Accordingly, they 
comply with the EU‟s rules and norms if the domestic adaptation costs are smaller than the 
benefits of the material rewards. In the case of the CEECs, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2005) found that there is a marked difference in the readiness to adopt a EU rule or norm 
between, on the one hand, democratic norms, i.e. the general EU rules of liberal democracy 
and, on the other, general acquis rules. As the authors point out, the differences can be 
explained mainly with the costs that a government incurs if it adopts the EU rule 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 210-214). This finding also largely applies to the case 
of Central Asia, where incumbent governments are much more reluctant to converge with EU 
rules of democracy and human rights than with general EU acquis rules, such as customs and 
taxation regulations or environmental standards. Indeed, the Central Asian ruling elites will 
only adopt a EU rule if they are certain that it will not erode their domestic power, and thus 
only if the costs of convergence do not outweigh the benefits.  
Material reinforcement mechanisms can also be used through the transnational 
channel, that is, to mobilise societal actors in the target state, such as human rights NGOs and 
corporate actors, to put pressure on their government to change its policy and adapt to the 
suggested community norms and rules (cf. domestic empowerment). As highlighted in section 
6.1, the EU offers a considerable amount of civil society support in the Central Asian 
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countries, including through its EIDHR programme and its Institution Building Partnership 
programme (IBPP), TEMPUS (for higher education) and the Managers Training Programme. 
For domestic empowerment based on transnational reinforcement to be effective, it follows 
that the costs of putting pressure on the government should be smaller than the expected 
community rewards (Schimmelfennig, 2005). Therefore, as Schimmelfennig concluded in his 
study of the CEECs, the main channel of international reinforcement in these countries was 
intergovernmental, because “societies [were] too weak vis-à-vis the states, and electorates are 
too volatile, to serve as effective agents” of domestic change through material reinforcement 
(2005: 828). As is clear from the outline in Chapter 7, this is even more the case in the Central 
Asian states, most of which are far more authoritarian and repressive than the former 
candidate states in Central and Eastern Europe. This applies in particular to Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where societies are not strong enough to oppose or challenge 
the ruling elites and where electorates have no genuine opportunity to vote for „change‟. 
Moreover, civil society is kept firmly in check, and in most Central Asian countries only so-
called GONGOs are currently allowed to operate, which stands for „Government-organised 
Non-governmental organisation‟. 
Yet, this does not mean that we should rule out any constructive impact of EU civil 
society assistance in the Central Asian countries. Indeed, even in a repressive societal 
environment such as Uzbekistan, EU civil society projects manage to make a difference, 
although - for all means and purposes - not to a major extent.
288
 A case in point are the EU‟s 
community development projects in Uzbekistan, where the EU‟s approach for cooperation at 
the non-state level has become increasingly centred on finding „soft‟ entry points for the 
empowerment of societal groups. This approach was introduced especially in light of the 
„difficult EC assistance climate‟ following the Andijan events and the EU‟s imposition of 
sanctions, in which even the title of the TEMPUS project “Capacity Building for Independent 
Learning in Higher Education in Uzbekistan” sounded slightly provocative for the Uzbek 
regime. One example of a successful community development project is the IBPP project 
“Choices for Youth”, which was implemented in Uzbekistan in 2005-2006 and which 
involved the direct and indirect participation of a local youth-oriented GONGO (there are 
currently no independent domestic NGOs in Uzbekistan), a German NGO and municipal 
authorities. The project aimed at increasing the capacity of and coordination between local 
organisations and local government as well as to strengthen the skills of young people and 
give them orientation for career development.
289
 An additional aim was to enhance youth 
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knowledge related to the prevention of drug abuse and HIV/AIDS infections. While the first 
goal appeared rather challenging to achieve given the suspicion in Uzbekistan towards both 
decentralisation and state-society cooperation, the other two components of the project proved 
to be fairly successful. The local governments concerned were satisfied that their youngsters 
were kept off the streets, which meant criminality decreased. More importantly, however, the 
young people concerned attended the training and info sessions en masse, as they became 
very favourable to the interactive and participatory manner in which the training and info 
sessions were organised by the European project leaders, a teaching method that the 
youngsters had so far not been familiarised with.
290
 As such, through organising training 
activities that were not considered „politically‟ sensitive to the ruling elites, the EC managed 
to nevertheless induce a form of „empowerment‟ - limited though it may be - of a crucial 
societal group in a country where close to 40 per cent of the population is below 16.  
A similar „soft entry point‟ approach underlies the EU‟s SME development initiatives 
in the region. While aimed at fostering SME development, many of the EU‟s initiatives in this 
domain at the same time also target domestic empowerment of corporate actors vis-à-vis 
government. A case in point is the IBPP project “Strengthening the institutional capacities of 
the Almaty Chamber of Commerce as a service and representation” implemented in 
Kazakhstan in 2007-2009 with a budget of almost EUR 2 million.
291
 In fact, this project 
reflects the intention and set-up of the EC‟s programme CA-Invest, a programme targeted 
specifically at SME development in Central Asia through the establishment of cooperation 
links between European and Central Asian business intermediary actors, such as Chambers of 
Commerce and entrepreneurial associations.
292
 The underlying goal of CA-Invest, the first 
phase of which started in 2007, is domestic empowerment of corporate actors in Central Asia 
vis-à-vis their governments, based on capacity-building by and information exchange with 
European partner organisations. 
Another aspect of the EC‟s assistance to Central Asia that suggests the importance of 
indirect pathways of domestic empowerment is its increasing focus on education and 
vocational training. In Uzbekistan, for instance, the European Training Foundation (ETF), in 
cooperation with the EC, helps to set up national vocational education and training (VET) 
policy. This long-term EC project combines policy development and capacity building in 
VET, involving all stakeholders of VET reform, i.e. national policy making, regional 
development planning and local vocational colleges (European Training Foundation, 2009). 
                                                 
290
 Ibid. 
291
 Information retrieved from the website of the (former) EC Delegation to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, <http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla>. 
292
 See e.g. author‟s interview at the Regionalised EC Delegation to Kyrgyzstan in Bishkek on 14 May 2008. 
                                                               - 215 - 
 
However, due to the required participation of Uzbek authorities, progress in the reforms 
depends to a large extent on the willingness of the government to participate. As noted by the 
European Training Foundation (2009) with respect to the first phase of the project, Uzbek 
governmental involvement in “specific ETF activities has been discontinuous, especially in 
the national qualifications framework project where the country actively participated in some 
activities, only to drop out later on”. This implied that only part of the expected results were 
achieved and that eventual impact on the policy agenda of the country was limited.  
In a similar vein to the VET projects, but at a much larger scale, there is the EC 
programme for higher education reform, TEMPUS, in addition to the Erasmus Mundus 
programme for exchange of students and lecturers. While the TEMPUS programme is 
generally quite popular in the region, including in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, progress on 
higher education reform has been slow, constrained mostly by the scant experience of policy 
coordination and the very centralised nature of policy- and decision making in the countries, 
with decisive measures being taken only at the highest policy levels. Hence, this does not 
chime with the bottom-up approach that Tempus projects rely upon, which require active 
local partners - both universities and government bodies -, who as a pre-condition need to be 
able to communicate and must have a sense of initiative as well as some project definition and 
management capacities (European Commission, 2004). Yet, despite these restraints, it is 
important to note that all five countries show a significant interest in modernising their higher 
education systems in accordance with the European model as set out in the Bologna 
Declaration, with Kyrgyzstan even intending to join the Bologna process (Jones, 2010; 
Mouraviev, 2008). This is based mainly on their belief that the European model of higher 
education offers the best remedy for the improvement of their domestic higher education 
systems (cf. lesson-drawing). At the same time, the EC is actively promoting the Bologna 
Process in the Central Asian states, inter alia, through info sessions and seminars for 
government officials, but also - of course - through TEMPUS (cf. social learning). 
Importantly, as highlighted in Chapter 3, reinforcement mechanisms can also operate 
through the anonymous market. These are cases of TNPO1-3, which testify to purely structural 
EU impact. That is, it concerns cases where the EU‟s impact on the Central Asian countries 
derives from the „presence‟ of its internal market rather than from conscious EU actions, as 
captured is by the market and the competition modes of governance (see TNPO toolbox in 
Figure 1, p.51). There are indeed numerous instances in which Central Asian governments or 
societal actors are induced to comply with EU regulatory standards and norms, including 
quality and safety standards, and environmental standards. Most commonly, they do so 
because ignoring or violating these EU‟s rules and regulations would entail net costs (cf. 
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negative externality). A case in point is when Central Asian producers and/or legislators 
experience the necessity to adopt EU product standards as a result of competitive pressures 
(cf. the notion of „competition‟ in Figure 1, p.51). Moreover, if Central Asian producers want 
to export to the EU‟s market, they often have no choice but to adopt specific EU rules or 
standards that relate to the sector or product range in question. As their products have to meet 
the product standards applicable to the single market, the size - and hence attractiveness and 
benefits - of the market induces Central Asian export companies to adopt the EU product 
standards concerned.
293
 However, given the limited levels of development in countries like 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, local producers often do not have the means to adapt to the EU 
norms and standards, as this adaptation usually requires investment in expensive advanced 
technology and logistical infrastructure. Moreover, the governments in turn may lack the 
financial means and technological know-how to allow for monitoring and supervision systems 
of norm compliance, which hand out labels and certificates to companies complying to the 
EU norms and standards that the government seeks to introduce.
294
 As such, the EU often 
provides tailor-made technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in order to help the 
governments establish such infrastructure required for the supervision and monitoring of local 
producers‟ compliance with a newly adopted EU norm. A specific area in which the EU offers 
substantial technical assistance to this end is the food sector. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the 
EC has been implementing several projects targeted at helping the government establish 
advanced control systems for food companies‟ compliance with EU food quality and food 
safety standards, including the building of labs equipped with high-tech measurement 
systems.
295
  
 
8.3  TNPO2micro/macro(institutional)-3(ideational) 
 
In constituting the interaction between institutional and ideational factors, TNPO2-3 regards 
the extent to which „institutions matter‟ as the site for socialisation through dialogue. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, this type of overlap can be observed at both the micro-institutional 
and macro-institutional level, although it occurs predominantly at the former level. In essence, 
TNPO2micro-3 encompasses modes of rule transfer and/or norm diffusion based on EU-initiated 
processes of communication and social learning. In contrast to the overlap between TNPO1 
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and TNPO3, which adheres by and large to a logic of consequences, overlap between 
TNPO2micro and TNPO3 follows a logic of appropriateness, which upholds that outcomes are 
based on value-based judgements of norms as either appropriate or inappropriate behaviour. 
As such, overlap between TNPO2micro and TNPO3 captures how third country actors 
internalise EU norms not because they calculate the consequences of the norm adaptation - as 
in the case of TNPO1-3 -, but because they feel that norm conformance is „the right thing to 
do‟. EU socialisation efforts can be seen as attempts to “teach” partner countries the ideas and 
norms underlying the EU‟s policies in order to persuade them that these norms and values are 
appropriate, and encourage them to internalise the projected norms and rules 
(Schimmelfennig, 2009) (cf. „social learning‟). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the theoretical 
mechanism underlying processes of socialisation suggests that, through constructive dialogue, 
the socializee (i.e. the third country) is persuaded by the legitimacy of the socialiser‟s (i.e. the 
EU) interpretations of the world and changes its identity and interests accordingly (Checkel, 
2005: 812; also see Warkotsch, 2009: 252). As the outsider fully internalises the projected 
norm, norm diffusion through persuasive action is assumed to be more sustainable than norm 
compliance resulting from strategic calculation, which might end when the incentive 
structures changes (Checkel, 2005: 813; Warkotsch, 2009: 252).  
Importantly, these processes of EU norm export do not only involve domestic 
governmental actors but may also be targeted at local societal actors. The mechanisms of 
„transnational socialisation‟ and „transnational social learning‟ (see TNPO  toolbox in Figure 
1, p.51) help to capture how the dialogue venues set up, inter alia, under the EU‟s democracy 
promotion policy instance serve to socialise and persuade members of society, instead of 
members of the regime. As Adamson clarifies, the aim is to “convince the local population of 
the benefits of creating independent civil society organisations and interest groups, and 
attempt to socialise members of society [...] to prioritise such issues as human rights concerns, 
press freedom, and other components of liberal democracy” (2003: 22).  
It is also relevant to note that TNPO2micro-3, in the form of rule transfer and norm 
diffusion based on EU-initiated processes of communication and social learning, constitutes 
agent-based structural power, as those dialogue processes of socialisation are driven 
consciously and deliberately by the EU. This makes it fully distinct from behavioural 
adaptation as a result of „lesson-drawing‟ or „unilateral policy emulation‟ (see Figure 1, p.51). 
They do not occur in the overlap, but fall entirely under TNPO3 and reflect a purely structural 
type of structural power, as norm compliance is induced by domestic factors rather than by 
pro-active EU norm promotion. 
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In what follows, this subsection will explore the extent to which overlap between 
TNPO2 and TNPO3 occurs in the case of EU-Central Asia, looking both at the micro-
institutional and the macro-institutional level.  
As has already become apparent from the empirical explorations above, the EU‟s 
assistance and cooperation with Central Asia - both at governmental and societal level - relies 
to a large extent on processes of socialisation, implemented through the various formal and 
informal patterns of regular institutionalised communication, as well as through the physical 
presence of the EU in the Central Asian countries (cf. Manners‟s notion of overt diffusion). 
Moreover, the EU resorts to the instrument of socialisation both for its promotion of liberal 
norms, i.e. democracy, human rights, good governance and rule of law, and for its 
transference of „acquis‟ rules. As noted by Youngs with respect to the EU‟s democracy 
promotion, the “EU‟s strategy [is] characterised by an aim to develop deeply institutionalised 
patterns of dialogue and cooperation as means of socialising political elites into a positive and 
consensual adherence to democratic norms” (2001b: 193 & 195). According to Youngs, “the 
socialisation approach is designed to create opportunities for „imitation and demonstration 
effects‟ and starts with very modest expectations of introducing the vocabulary of democracy 
into domestic discourse and inducing elites to at least pay lip service to democracy” (Youngs, 
2001a: 359). Put differently, by including the issue of democracy in institutionalised 
relationships, the EU puts the issue on the table. As can be observed in the EU‟s relations 
with Central Asia, this approach is applied in the EU‟s attempts at diffusing other liberal 
norms, most notably human rights, rule of law and good governance. At the highest political 
level, this can be observed most noticeably in the bilateral Cooperation Councils held with 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and since 2010, with Tajikistan, and - much more so 
- in the bilateral human rights dialogues that the EU holds with each of the five countries. At a 
bureaucratic/technocratic level, this can be observed most noticeably in the bilateral 
Cooperation Committees and Sub-committees, as well as in the numerous forums of ad-hoc 
institutionalised dialogue established during and for the implementation of the EC‟s bilateral 
and regional assistance programmes. In addition, socialisation practices can also be observed 
at interparliamentary level, i.e. in the annual bilateral PCC meetings with members of the 
Central Asian national parliament. At societal level, in turn, efforts at socialising local actors 
through dialogue can be observed in a wide variety of civil society assistance programmes, 
including IBPP, Managers‟ Training Programme, CA-Invest and EIDHR.  
In all of these dialogue venues, exposure to and familiarisation with EU regulatory 
procedures or normative principles is built in. In this light, EU socialisation efforts can be 
seen as attempts to “teach” partner countries the ideas and norms underlying the EU‟s policies 
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in order to persuade them that these norms and values are appropriate, and encourage them to 
internalise the projected norms and rules (Schimmelfennig, 2009) (cf. „social learning‟). 
There are, for instance, numerous examples of projects where the EU engages in socialisation 
processes by organising exchange programmes bringing Central Asian actors - both 
governmental and societal - on short-term trips to EU Member States, where the invited 
officials/civil servants or NGOs/corporate actors visit partner organisations, as well as by 
funding conferences, seminars and partnership programmes. This approach is used 
particularly in the BOMCA and CADAP programmes.
296
 Moreover, as Adamson notes with 
respect to EU democracy promotion through civil society assistance, the aim is to “convince 
the local population of the benefits of creating independent civil society organisations and 
interest groups, and attempt to socialise members of society [...] to prioritise such issues as 
human rights concerns, press freedom, and other components of liberal democracy” (2003: 
22). 
However, somewhat problematically given the context of Central Asia is that - 
according to Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier - third country internalisation of the projected 
norms - following a logic of appropriateness - depends on the extent to which the country 
identifies with the EU - as the formal embodiment of a European international community -, 
and the extent to which it perceives the projected rules and norms as appropriate in light of 
this collective identity (2004: 667). As highlighted in Chapter 7, identification with EU liberal 
norms tends to be relatively weak in the case of Central Asia, both at the societal and at the 
governmental level (see e.g. Warkotsch, 2006; 2009). This may shed some light on the 
observation that EU socialisation attempts in the normative-ideational sphere in Central Asia 
do not appear to yield the intended results in the sense that they did not have a noticeable 
impact on the democratisation process, which in Uzbekistan, among others, arguably has 
reached a dead end (see e.g. De Pedro, 2009; Emerson, 2009). A particular constraint in 
relation to socialisation of civil society, in turn, is that - as Adamson (2003) notes - the EU‟s 
civil society policy in Central Asia pays overwhelming attention to secular NGOs of the 
western advocacy type, which is only one section of civil society in the region, and thus 
points to a narrow identification by the EU of indigenous civil society. Moreover, the EU 
often feels constrained in its civil society promotion actions in Central Asia, in the sense that 
it frequently has no choice but to cooperate with GONGOs and civil society organisations that 
engage in non-political services only.
297
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Despite all odds, there are instances of successful social learning processes of officials 
and civil servants, in particular in Kazakhstan. Nourzhanov (2010), for instance, finds 
evidence of some “behavioural adaptation” to EU democratic norms among the Kazakh 
power elite, who have engaged with various socialising agencies “frequently, willingly, and 
productively”. According to Nourzhanov (2010), this is mainly because of the sufficient 
degree of “demobilisation” in Kazakhstan, which allows state-elites both the leverage and the 
room to manoeuvre the domestication of international standards. This is in line with 
Freyburg‟s (2010) observation that EU attempts at socialisation are more likely to have 
impact if the officials in question have been involved in transnational exchanges, such as an 
education stay in a western democracy or regular use of western media (cf. social and 
communication linkage). Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3, one type of transgovernmental 
cooperation that appears particularly suited for socialising officials from authoritarian states 
into democratic modes of governance is Twinning. As noted, Twinning an EU assistance 
instrument that establishes transbureaucratic cooperation between a sub-unit of public 
administration in an EU member state and the equivalent institution in a partner country (see 
Freyburg, 2009, 2010). As Freyburg (2009) clarifies, the aim of Twinning is to offer the 
administrative expertise and (technical) know-how of European practitioners to third state 
public administrations. In practice, this implies attempting to trigger attitudinal change in the 
administrative culture of the partner countries by building up intensive working relations 
through which third country practitioners are exposed to key democratic rules and decision-
making practices inherent to European bureaucracies, including public participation 
transparency and accountability. Although there has so far been only one EU Twinning 
project in Central Asia - due to legal restrictions in the EC assistance instrument used in the 
region-, it is worth noting that the social learning process underlying this project, i.e. the 
Twinning of the Ombudsman Office of Kazakhstan with its counterpart offices in Spain and 
Greece, was particularly effective, reaching virtually all the intended results.
298
 
        As a final aspect in exploring TNPO2-3, the remainder of this subsection considers the 
kinds of overlap occurring at the macro-institutional level. As highlighted in Chapter 6, the 
EU does not only engage in bilateral and regional dialogue with the Central Asian states, but 
also in multi- and plurilateral dialogue, including at the WTO, the OSCE and the CoE, where 
the EU attempts - and quite often succeeds -  to gain a central position in order to establish 
forms of global or regional governance favourable to its values and modes of operation. The 
EU‟s ability to use the WTO as an instrument to spread its regulatory system is perhaps most 
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concretely exemplified in the case of the WTO accession process. As outlined in section 6.2, 
as a member of the working party set up for guiding the accession process of Kazakhstan, the 
EU has considerable leverage over the country, which as a requirement for accession has no 
choice but to alter parts of its domestic legal and economic institutional frameworks in 
accordance with EU demands raised in the pre-accession talks.
299
  
As highlighted above, even in the OSCE and the CoE, where the EU itself is not a 
member of the organisation, but is represented by all or nearly all its member states, it 
attempts to use the institution as a multilateral dialogue venue for diffusing its values and 
norms in Central Asian countries.
300
 At the OSCE, for instance, one way in which the EU 
attempts to do so is by conferring prestige or shame upon the Central Asian member countries 
of the organisations in response to their norm compliant or norm violating behaviour. Indeed, 
through EU declarations at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, made by the rotating EU 
Presidency, the EU frequently resorts to „symbolic sanctioning‟ through public condemnation 
of OSCE norm violating behaviour of Central Asian member countries. Examples include EU 
condemnation of unfair elections, such as the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan in 2007 
(Council, 2007h) and in Tajikistan in 2010 (Council, 2010e), and the presidential elections in 
Uzbekistan in 2007 (Council, 2007g), flagrant human rights violations, such as the 
prosecution of human rights defenders (Council, 2009d) and restrictions on media freedom 
(Council, 2007i; Council, 200f) and internet usage (Council, 2009e)
301
. In turn, examples of 
public praise declared by the EU at the OSCE include positive comments on Kazakhstan‟s 
state programme „Path to Europe‟ (Council, 2008f) and on the abolition of the death penalty 
in Uzbekistan (Council, 2008h). The impact of such declaratory diplomacy on the Central 
Asian governments is on the whole relatively minor, but it nevertheless has a substantial 
symbolic effect on the regimes, not least since most Central Asia governments are eager to 
enhance their international legitimacy. It is worth noting that the EU also resorts to such 
praise and symbolic sanctioning of the Central Asian regimes through its own institutional 
venues, namely through „Presidency Declarations‟ and CFSP „Common Positions‟. Examples 
include the Declaration by the Presidency condemning the unfair court case of Mr Iskandarov 
in Tajikistan (Council, 2006d) and the Declaration by the Presidency condemning the unfair 
presidential elections in Tajikistan in November 2006 (Council, 2006e). As a final point, it is 
important to highlight that, in its bilateral cooperation with and assistance to the Central Asian 
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states, the EU often links the projected rules and norms with the corresponding or overarching 
international ones, such as those from the OSCE and the UN. It does this, inter alia, in its 
environmental assistance projects in the region, where the EU helps the countries to comply 
with the Kyoto Protocol and the Aarhus Convention, among other things. Interestingly, as 
some scholars have observed in the ENP region, this „linking‟ to other international standards 
and norms increases the legitimacy of the projected rules and norms, and has proved to 
contribute to the likelihood of adaptation (Freyburg et al., 2009; Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2004: 668). 
 
 
8.4. TNPO1(material)-2(institutional)-3(ideational) 
 
This section explores the instances of overlap that occur between all three TNPO structures. 
Although this final type of TNPO overlap may also apply to the macro-institutional level of 
TNPO2 rather than to the micro-institutional level, this section only focuses on instances of 
overlap applying to the micro-institutional level, and thus only outlines overlap between 
TNPO1, TNPO2micro and TNPO3. In the most basic - and most comprehensive - respect, 
TNPO1-2-3 captures the extent to which EU cooperation agreements with the Central Asian 
states - i.e. the PCAs and TCA - establish institutionalised relationships and offer options for 
the provision of technical and financial assistance, which in turn serve to diffuse norms and 
values and/or to export parts of the acquis into the legal orders of the partner countries. In the 
same context, it also captures how these EU agreements offer options for the formalised 
incorporation of conditionality, which also serve to diffuse norms and values and/or to export 
parts of the acquis into the legal orders of the partner countries. Conditionality is incorporated 
in the EU‟s relations with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan through the 
essential elements clause in the respective PCAs with the four countries. The clause stipulates 
that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law are essential elements of the 
cooperation agreement, as both an objective and a condition of the institutionalised 
relationship. In case of violation of the essential elements, the legal terms of the PCAs permit 
the EU to take appropriate measures, such as suspension or termination of the agreement. As 
mentioned above, in 2005, the EU decided to impose a series of sanctions on the Uzbek 
regime following the country‟s heavy-handed response to the peaceful protests in Andijan in 
May 2005, which the EU considered as a serious violation of the country‟s commitment to 
human rights. The sanctions included an arms embargo, a partial suspension of the PCA, and 
a EU visa ban for a number of senior diplomats and officials. On the one hand, the sanctions 
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were effective in the sense that they had a strong symbolic impact in the sense that the regime, 
which does not like to be a pariah, felt targeted and isolated. However, on the other hand, this 
sentiment did not trigger substantial compliance with the EU requirements and conditions set 
for lifting the sanctions. Apart from making a few concessions, such as the release of a few 
political prisoners, the Uzbek regime refused to give in to EU demands. In other words, for 
Uzbekistan, the costs of compliance, i.e. losing grip on the domestic power base, outweighed 
the benefits, i.e. lifting of the sanctions. The EU, in its turn, while long divided over the need 
to keep the sanctions in place, gradually gave in to pressure from Germany - concerned with 
the possible negative impact on the fate of its military base in Uzbekistan - to lift all the 
sanctions (Council, 2008b) despite any considerable improvement in the domestic human 
rights situation in Uzbekistan (see e.g. Bossuyt, 2010). This seems to join up with the 
observation by several authors that, despite the essential elements clause, a consistent use of 
political conditionality in the EU‟s external relations appears to be overshadowed by security 
and stability concerns (Youngs, 2004; Crawford, 2005; Warkotsch, 2006). Indeed, apart from 
the pressure to keep the German military base, the EU also needed Uzbekistan in view of the 
planned implementation of the EU Strategy, which simply could not work without 
participation of Uzbekistan, which holds a central position within the region (see above). 
Moreover, the EU Strategy in fact strongly reflects the EU‟s conclusion that more positive EU 
engagement is required with the region‟s authoritarian regimes, not least with Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, if the intended strategic, economic and values-based goals of the Strategy are 
to be achieved. Hence, the eventual decision by the Council to lift the sanctions imposed on 
Uzbekistan despite the absence of noticeable improvement should also been in the context of 
an increasing EU preference for „constructive engagement‟ with the region, as the German 
Presidency of the EU termed it at the time.
302
  
On the whole, it can be observed in Central Asia that conditionality - as a distinct EU 
policy tool - is not efficient to promote liberal norms in the region. Indeed, as evidenced in the 
case of Uzbekistan, even in the face of strong punitive measures in response to norm 
violation, the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia are too concerned with safeguarding their 
own survival for agreeing with democratic reforms, which they perceive as too great a risk, as 
they would erode their domestic power base. However, this finding does not undo the 
observation that the EU is still able to promote democracy in the Central Asian republics.  
Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 3, to compensate for the limits and failures of the EU‟s 
traditional democracy promotion policy, the EU increasingly resorts to a more indirect way of 
transferring democratic principles in its external relations, i.e. through transgovernmental 
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cooperation at the sectoral level. This alternative, more indirect model of democratisation, 
termed „democratic governance promotion‟ (see e.g. Freyburg et al., 2009), constitutes a 
distinct type of TNPO1-2-3. Here the overlap is based on the assumption that the “intensifying 
web of association relations between the EU and the Central Asian countries introduces a new 
form of democracy promotion through sectoral cooperation” (cf. Chapter 3). As already 
mentioned, the EU uses Twinning projects not only to export parts of the acquis, and thus to 
approximate domestic legal and administrative standards to those of the EU, but also to 
expose third country officials to democratic modes of governance. This indirect use of 
Twinning for democratisation purposes should be seen within a wider EU approach aimed at 
promoting democracy in a more indirect fashion, notably through transgovernmental, 
technical cooperation at the sectoral level, or as Freyburg et al. put it, “through the „back-
door‟ of joint problem-solving” (2009: 917). As such, democratic governance promotion 
differs from traditional democracy promotion in that it is targeted at the level of sectoral, 
bureaucratic policy-making rather than at the level of the general polity and political 
institutions, including elections, parties and parliament (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 18). This 
subtle diffusion of democratic norms of governance, common to administrative policy-
making practices in western liberal democracies, can also be observed in the case of Central 
Asia, where an increasing number of EC projects implemented at the 
bureaucratic/technocratic/civil servant level attempt to familiarise the participants to such 
European administrative policy-making practices as horizontal and vertical accountability, 
transparency and stakeholder and general participation.
303
 The underlying assumption is that 
democratisation of sectoral governance - as stimulated indirectly through transgovernmental 
sectoral cooperation - may spill over into the country‟s general polity “by inculcating 
democratic values, norms and habits on societal and bureaucratic actors and creating a 
demand for far-reaching democratisation of the entire political system” (Schimmelfennig, 
2009: 19). However, the extent to which this spill-over effectively takes place in the Central 
Asian countries is difficult to assess and beyond the scope of the present thesis.  
Within the literature, EU democratic governance promotion falls within the emergent 
strand of EU external governance, where it tends to be used alongside the notion of „network 
governance‟, which constitutes a another type of TNPO1-2-3. In concrete terms, it captures the 
extent to which the EU manages to export material acquis rules through transgovernmental 
cooperation at the sectoral level. The network mode of governance differs significantly from 
policy transfer through conditionality, although both modes are used to approximate the 
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Central Asian countries‟ legal and administrative standards to those of the EU. Whereas 
„governance by conditionality‟ is hierarchical in the sense that it works through a vertical 
process of command, where the EU transfers predetermined, non-negotiable rules, „network 
governance‟ allows for the extension of norms and rules in a process-oriented, horizontal, 
voluntaristic and inclusionary manner (Lavenex, 2008: 941-3). Moreover, as the actors 
involved are experts and technocrats, who are not guided by their country‟s national interests, 
policy transfer through network governance resorts to a de-politicisation of cooperation. This 
point largely corresponds with Magen‟s observation that in promoting domestic reform that 
might be politically sensitive, the EU attempts to avoid or lower suspicion among the 
governing elites by using depoliticised, technocratic phrasing, and in particular the legalistic 
language of the acquis (Magen, 2007: 390-1). In short, the EU increasingly couches 
politically sensitive reforms in „low politics‟ terms. In the case of Central Asia,  instances of 
network governance can be found in the policy areas of transport, energy and environment. A 
case in point is the policy framework of TRACECA and INOGATE (see above), which offers 
the „ideal‟ setting for such horizontal extension of EU regulatory norms in the areas of 
transport and energy infrastructure through the subtle creation of „joint regulatory structures‟ 
through network governance (European Commission, 2008a: 170-190). INOGATE, for 
instance, is specifically targeted at harmonisation of the partner countries‟ legal and technical 
standards with those of the EU, the integration of energy systems, and the modernisation of 
existing infrastructure or development of new infrastructure in accordance with EU safety 
standards. However, similar to the situation in ENP countries (cf. Lavenex & Wichmann, 
2009), a major constraint for EU attempts at network governance in Central Asia is the lack of 
mutual trust between the stakeholders and the EU partners, as well as institutional 
incompatibilities, to the extent that in practice there is no real co-owned cooperation between 
the EU side and the Central Asian partner countries involved.
304
 In turn, this points to an issue 
that was raised earlier, i.e. the so-called implementation gap observed with respect to EU-
inspired legislation. Indeed, in many cases where a EU rule is adopted and incorporated into 
domestic legislation, this is not accompanied by actual implementation of the rule (cf. above). 
To conclude, it is useful to consider a case of overlap between TNPO1, TNPO2 and 
TNPO3 that occurs entirely via the transnational channel and that is even more indirect than in 
the cases of domestic empowerment through material reinforcement mentioned above, in that 
the agency does not lie at the level of the EU, but at that of European companies. As 
introduced in Chapter 3, it concerns a type of overlap that perceives FDI from European 
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businesses in third countries, in casu in Central Asia, as a form of people-to-people contacts 
through which EU norms and best practices are promoted. In other words, this final type of 
TNPO1-3 encompasses the extent to which FDI from European companies allows for 
„transnational socialisation‟ (see TNPO toolbox in Figure 1, p.51) of Central Asian work 
force into EU labour and social rights as well as into the European business environment and 
technological excellence. That is, through FDI from European enterprises, local labour force 
are exposed to European working conditions as well as to EU business practices, including 
participation in decision-making, accountability and transparency. As such, the overlap rests 
on the assumption that the presence of European firms in the Central Asian countries 
produces spill-over effects to improve the socio-economic climate from the bottom-up, and 
thus expand EU influence through the indirect export by European companies of the EU‟s 
technical excellence and its socio-economic model (see e.g. Denison, 2009; Peyrouse, 2009a). 
While it is not straightforward to assess the actual spill-over effect of these European FDI 
activities onto the Central Asian socio-economic environment, it is true that many European 
firms
305
 active on the Central Asian markets work with local labour force, offering them 
European-style in-house training, treating them in accordance with European social and 
labour rights, and familiarising them with EU corporate life.
306
 As highlighted in Chapter 3, 
this type of TNPO1-3 is particularly relevant as a complementary - or even alternative - 
mechanism of European norm diffusion in such „difficult‟ environments as Central Asia, 
where there is limited impact not only of traditional top-down mechanisms for the diffusion of 
liberal norms, including political conditionality, but also of liberal norm dissemination from 
the bottom-up, i.e. through direct civil society assistance (see above). How then is this type of 
TNPO1-3 exactly manifested? To begin with, in working with local labour force in their 
Central Asia-based plants, many European companies share their advanced knowhow and 
technical excellence and efficiency (which compose in fact their key comparative advantage 
vis-à-vis local companies and companies from Russia and China, the main European 
commercial competitors in Central Asia). In addition, the European investors export their 
preoccupation with social capital.
307
 As clarified by Peyrouse, this preoccupation reflects the 
European corporate philosophical credo, associated with the European quality of life, that “the 
greatest wealth of a country or a company stems from its development of human potential, not 
only its profit-making ability” (2009a: 13). Denison specifies the content and implications of 
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the EU preoccupation with social capital, indicating that “[European] companies build into 
their commercial offers the norms and tools of long-term political and social development, 
through comprehensive packages of targeted training, education and welfare provision with 
clear linkages and impact beyond the [business] sector” (2009: 10-11). Denison expounds on 
the long-term, reformist effects of the export of these EU best practices for the domestic or 
local socio-economic climate in the Central Asian countries, and suggests that the companies‟ 
contribution might even transcend the development of a more efficient local labour force, 
planting the seeds of a middle-class “likely to engender broader social progress” (ibid.).  
 
 
8.5. Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has sought to outline the extent to which the EU derives power over Central Asia 
from the interaction between the three TNPO structures. Again, the examination of EU impact 
yielded a mixed picture. To start with, as far as deliberate export of EU norms and values to 
the region is concerned, the outline demonstrated that this is channelled either through the 
provision of material incentives (overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3), such as financial 
assistance and enhanced market access, or through the institutionalised cooperation 
framework established with the Central Asian countries (overlap between TNPO2 and 
TNPO3). However, in most of these instances of overlap, only limited evidence was found of 
strong impact of the EU in terms of behavioural change or adaption on the Central Asian side. 
Indeed, whether through the provision of material incentives or via the use of socialisation, 
deliberate diffusion of EU norms and rules appears to achieve only limited results.  
However, the chapter found more successful processes of Europeanisation in Central 
Asia among those cases of overlap that are based on domestically-driven mechanisms, i.e. that 
occur independently of EU deliberate action. With respect to the overlap between TNPO1 and 
TNPO3, this concerns in particular those instances of impact captured by the market and the 
competition modes of governance: cases where the EU‟s impact on third countries derives 
from the „presence‟ of its internal market rather than from EU conscious actions. In these 
instances, Central Asian actors adopt EU rules or norms because ignoring or violating them 
would entail net costs (cf. negative externality). 
In turn, the outline of TNPO1-2-3 pointed to the limits of the use of conditionality in the 
Central Asia to export EU norms and rules, whilst revealing the advantages of more indirect 
ways of transferring liberal norms as well as material acquis rules. In particular, it 
demonstrated that the promotion of norms and principles in Central Asia works better through 
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transgovernmental cooperation at the sectoral, bureaucratic/technocratic level than through 
direct political leverage at the intergovernmental level based, inter alia, on conditionality. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that it is not always straightforward to trace 
distinct patterns of overlap between the TNPO structures, as it may be difficult to detect the 
exact boundaries of the overlap. For instance, it is often hard to distinguish TNPO2-3 from 
TNPO1-2-3 and vice versa. By the same token, it is very difficult to observe TNPO1-2micro, as 
the overlap between those two structures is nearly always bound to interact with TNPO3. 
Given the apparent difficulties to trace the overlap between the three TNPO structures, the 
results of the empirical exploration of TNPO overlap presented above should therefore be 
regarded as tentative rather than definitive, and as indicative rather than exhaustive. 
 
 
 
8.6. Conclusion 
 
As the first step in the empirical exploration of the thesis‟s working hypothesis, Chapters 5, 
6, 7 and 8 sought to examine the extent to which the EU wields TNPO over Central Asia, in 
particular for the period 2001-2007. In concrete terms, these four chapters aimed to explore to 
what extent the EU‟s power over the Central Asian republics in 2001-2007 effectively derived 
from the Union‟s control over a combination of material, institutional and ideational 
structures and the interaction between them. In doing so, the chapters drew extensively on the 
TNPO toolbox established in Chapter 3 in order to trace and examine intergovernmental and 
transnational mechanisms of EU impact across the three structures. 
Chapter 5 presented the empirical examination of the EU‟s TNPO1 over Central Asia. 
The chapter found that the EU‟s TNPO1 over Central Asia derives in particular from its 
position in the region as a leader in trade and investment, its considerable provision of 
development and financial aid to the five states and its (geo)strategic and security-related 
capabilities vis-à-vis the region. However, despite finding sufficient evidence of significant 
control over the material structure, the chapter also pointed to a number of „obstacles‟ and 
„limits‟ encountered by the EU‟s TNPO1 over Central Asia. This applies particularly to the 
EU‟s aid delivery to the region. Indeed, despite a number of notable successes of the EU‟s 
assistance in 2002-2006, including in the area of regulatory reform in the administrative and 
legal spheres, the successes were offset by a number of setbacks and several deficiencies. In 
particular, limited institutional capacity and lack of political will on the side of the Central 
Asian governments very often hampered the impact of the assistance in the longer run, 
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including the actual implementation of the initiated reforms. Moreover, the assistance had its 
own shortcomings, especially in terms of the aid responsiveness and flexibility of TACIS, the 
main instrument. In turn, with respect to the EU‟s geostrategic influence in the region, while 
the chapter demonstrated that the EU is exercising considerable (geo)strategic power on the 
Central Asian chessboard, the rules of the game appear to be conditioned by the Central Asian 
states themselves. This is clearly reflected in the pragmatism with which the regimes pursue 
their „multi-vector foreign policy‟, which has proved to be a double-edged sword for the 
attempts of the EU - and of other external powers - to expand its leverage over the countries 
of Central Asia. 
Chapter 6, in turn, covered the EU‟s TNPO2 over the Central Asian states, 
highlighting the extent to which institutional factors need to be taken into account when 
considering the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. The chapter showed that the EU derives a 
significant amount of leverage from institutional factors, both at the macro-level of 
international relations (TNPO2macro) and at the more case-specific institutional micro-level of 
EU bilateral or bi-regional contractual relations (TNPO2micro) with the Central Asian 
countries. With respect to TNPO2micro, the chapter demonstrated that the EU‟s bilateral and 
regional relations with the countries have grown to be considerably institutionalised. This 
applies both in terms of formal contractual (including treaty-based) formats of 
institutionalisation and in terms of less formal and less integrated (including ad-hoc) formats 
of institutionalisation, which mostly involve the bureaucratic/technocratic level or societal 
level rather than the high political level. The level of institutionalisation, however, varies 
across the five countries, depending mostly on the legal basis of the cooperation. As such, 
relations with Kazakhstan appear to be institutionalised most densely, followed by the EU‟s 
cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Bilateral ties with Turkmenistan, in 
turn, are rather moderately institutionalised. In addition, the chapter indicated that the EU‟s 
TNPO over Central Asia also comprises institutionalised dialogue and cooperation through a 
web of - sometimes overlapping - international organisations and institutions, most notably 
the WTO, the EBRD, the OSCE and the CoE. The chapter highlighted the extent to which the 
EU manages to draw influence over the Central Asian countries through its influential 
representation in these international bodies. Moreover, it found that the degree of 
institutionalisation also differs at the macro-level. As such, the EU wields by far the largest 
amount of TNPO2macro over Kazakhstan. Next is Kyrgyzstan, followed by Tajikistan. The 
EU‟s TNPO2macro over Uzbekistan, in turn, is moderate, but is denser than the Union‟s macro-
institutional ties with Turkmenistan, where its TNPO2macro is rather limited. In this regard, it is 
important to highlight the limits encountered by the EU‟s TNPO2macro over the countries, 
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which include factors that are either endogenous or exogenous to the Central Asian states. A 
significant factor is the strong competition that the EU faces in the region from China and 
Russia, which have their own share of TNPO2macro over the Central Asian republics, except 
for Turkmenistan, which does not participate in the regional organisations led by these two 
„rival‟ powers. Another aspect that curtails the EU‟s macro-institutional power, and in 
particular in the case of the OSCE, is the Central Asian regimes‟ suspicion of and aversion to 
external meddling in their „domestic affairs‟, especially in areas that could directly affect the 
societal status quo in their countries.  
Subsequently, Chapter 7 presented an empirical exploration of the EU‟s TNPO3 over 
Central Asia, highlighting to what extent ideational factors need to be taken into account 
when considering the EU‟s TNPO. Overall, the findings revealed a rather mixed picture of the 
EU‟s TNPO3. On the one hand, the chapter did not find evidence of strong ideational 
attraction to the EU‟s norms, values and principles related to liberal democracy, including 
human rights, rule of law and good governance. The results suggested that such ideational 
factors do not constitute an important determinant of the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. In 
understanding this „limit‟ to the EU‟s power over the region, the chapter again pointed to a 
number of „countervailing‟ factors, including the virtually inherent authoritarian nature of 
Central Asian politics, and related to this - the attraction to alternative models of 
development, most notably the Russian model, and the traditional fabric of Central Asian 
society. To some extent, however, Kazakhstan appeared to be an exception, offering better 
prospects for European-style development and democratisation. On the other hand, the 
chapter found that the EU enjoys a relatively positive reputation as a more neutral actor in 
Central Asia, which gives it more credit compared to other external actors.  
Chapter 8 outlined the extent to which the EU derives power over Central Asia from 
the interaction between the three TNPO structures. Again, the examination of EU impact 
yielded a mixed picture. To start with, as far as respect to deliberate export of EU norms and 
values to the region is concerned, the outline demonstrated that this is channelled either 
through the provision of material incentives (overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3), such as 
financial assistance and enhanced market access, or through the institutionalised cooperation 
framework established with the Central Asian countries (overlap between TNPO2 and 
TNPO3). However, in most of these instances of overlap, only limited evidence was found of 
strong impact of the EU in terms of behavioural change or adaption on the Central Asian side. 
This suggested that - whether through the provision of material incentives or via the use of 
socialisation - deliberate diffusion of EU norms and rules appears to achieve only limited 
results. However, the chapter found more successful processes of Europeanisation in Central 
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Asia among those cases of overlap that are based on domestically-driven mechanisms, i.e. that 
occur independently of EU deliberate action. With respect to the overlap between TNPO1 and 
TNPO3, this concerns in particular those instances of impact captured by the market and the 
competition modes of governance: cases where the EU‟s impact on third countries derives 
from the „presence‟ of its internal market rather than from EU conscious actions. In these 
instances, Central Asian actors adopt EU rules or norms because ignoring or violating them 
would entail net costs (cf. negative externality). In turn, an examination of TNPO1-2-3 pointed 
to the limits of the use of conditionality in the Central Asia to export EU norms and rules, 
whilst revealing the advantages of more indirect ways of transferring liberal norms as well as 
material acquis rules. In particular, it demonstrated that the promotion of norms and 
principles in Central Asia works better through transgovernmental cooperation at the sectoral, 
bureaucratic/technocratic level than through direct political leverage at the intergovernmental 
level based, inter alia, on conditionality. 
With regard to the thesis‟ aim to offer a more holistic understanding of the EU‟s 
power over the Central Asian republics, it is clear that the TNPO framework has enabled us to 
trace and explore the various aspects of EU influence over the Central Asian states. Put 
differently, the TNPO model (see Figure 2, p.89) has allowed us to study the EU‟s power in 
Central Asia through an alternative lens, identifying, among other things, instances of EU 
power that may appear less obvious when examined through the predominant models used to 
study the EU‟s relations with Central Asia. Moreover, the TNPO toolbox (see Figure 1, p.51) 
provided a very helpful analytical reference point to trace and explore the various mechanisms 
of EU impact on the Central Asian countries. In particular, the quadruple distinction between 
(i) logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences, (ii) intergovernmental and 
transnational, (iii) EU-driven and domestically-driven, and (iv) agent-based and purely 
structural, mechanisms of EU impact, allowed us to approach the empirical case in a holistic 
manner, providing a structurally integrative account of the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. 
Importantly, it also allowed us to trace considerable differences of the EU‟s TNPO across the 
five Central Asian states. In particular, the difference appears to lie in the diverging 
combination between the five countries of the material, institutional and ideational structures 
that the EU controls, with the EU‟s control over particular structures (and particular overlap) 
being weaker in some Central Asian countries compared to other Central Asian countries. 
At the same time, however, the empirical study pointed to the need to integrate an 
additional aspect into the TNPO analysis, i.e. countervailing factors. Indeed, the empirical 
examination confirmed the need, as anticipated in Chapter 4, to take „contextual‟ factors into 
account, as it revealed the existence and impact of countervailing forces that mediate the EU‟s 
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TNPO over the Central Asian countries. Indeed, although we found abundant evidence of EU 
TNPO, we came to the conclusion that the EU‟s TNPO is hampered - possible weakened - by 
the intervening effects of a series of internal and external countervailing forces, such as the 
authoritarian nature of the Central Asian regimes and their suspicion of and aversion to 
external meddling in their „domestic affairs‟, especially in areas that could directly affect the 
societal status quo in their countries. 
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Chapter 9 – Exercise and reinforcement of the EU’s TNPO over Central Asia 
 
Europa ist ein gefragter Modernisieringspartner in Zentralasien. 
[Europe is a popular modernisation partner in Central Asia.] 
 
Pierre Morel, EU Special Representative for Central Asia, in an interview with  
the German monthly e-magazine Zentralasien-analysen (July 2010, issue 31-32) 
  
9.1. Introduction  
 
Now that we have examined the extent to which the EU derives power over Central Asia from 
its control over the three TNPO structures and the interaction between them, we can move on 
to implement the two remaining two steps of our empirical exploration of the thesis‟s working 
hypothesis, which are each covered in a separate section in the present chapter. As such, the 
first part of the chapter, which covers Step 2 of the empirical exploration, considers the EU‟s 
launch of a new partnership with Central Asia, hypothesised in the thesis as a specific 
outcome of the exercise of EU TNPO over the Central Asian republics, which testifies to the 
EU‟s ability to obtain a favourable outcome at the relational level of its relations with the EU 
region (see Figure 3, p.93). In doing so, the first part of chapter will outline the EU‟s Strategy 
that underlies this new partnership with Central Asia, thereby discussing the relevance of the 
Strategy in relation to the EU‟s TNPO accumulation vis-à-vis the region. The second part of 
the chapter, in turn, which covers Step 3 of the empirical exploration, seeks to examine 
whether and to what the extent the implementation of the partnership initiative enhances the 
EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia, allowing the EU to gain more influence at the structural level 
of its relations with the region (see Figure 3, p.93), inter alia by shaping further the terms of  
cooperation in such fields as economic and investment relations, transport, energy, human 
rights and democratisation, the environment and education. 
However, it is important to note that these two remaining parts of the empirical 
exploration will not be as in-depth and extensive as the empirical analysis conducted under 
Step 1. Instead, they offer a more résumé-like and concise empirical examination, and hence 
are less analytically conclusive compared to the empirical exploration offered in Chapters 5, 
6, 7 and 8, which constitute the more substantial part of the thesis‟ empirical work.  
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9.2. Translation of TNPO into a concrete outcome: the EU‟s partnership with Central Asia 
 
9.2.1. Introduction 
 
This section presents the second step in our empirical exploration of the thesis‟s working 
hypothesis. In particular, it considers the EU‟s launch of a new partnership with Central Asia, 
hypothesised in the thesis as a specific outcome of the exercise of EU TNPO over the Central 
Asian republics, which testifies to the EU‟s ability to obtain a favourable outcome at the 
relational level of its relations with the EU region (see Figure 6). To this end, the section 
offers a structured outline of the EU‟s Strategy that underlies the new partnership with Central 
Asia, discussing the relevance of the Strategy in relation to the EU‟s TNPO accumulation vis-
à-vis the region. 
 
Figure 6: Step 2 of 3 of the thesis’s empirical exploration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.2.2. The EU & Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership 
308
 
 
Theorised in the thesis as a concrete outcome of the exercise of EU TNPO over the Central 
Asian republics (see Figure 6), the EU‟s launch of a new partnership with Central Asia in 
June 2007 testifies to Union‟s ability to obtain a favourable outcome based on its TNPO over 
the five countries, which we examined in Chapters 5-8. Established with the aim of 
strengthening bilateral and regional ties between the EU and the five Central Asian states, the 
partnership initiative is a non-binding, informal commitment made between the two sides to 
enhance their cooperation, in particular in areas of common concern. As such, the partnership 
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is an end in itself, a long-term objective, as is indicated in the EU Strategy
309
 (Council, 
2007b). However, the partnership is in essence a process that was - for the most part - 
unilaterally initiated by the EU, with only a relatively minor level of consultation taking place 
with the five Central Asian partner countries ahead of the official launch of the EU Strategy in 
June 2007. Consultations took place, inter alia, during subsequent visits to the region by the 
EUSR, the rotating EU Presidency and the EU Troika, as well as during the EU Troika-
Central Asia meeting in Astana in March 2007 (see above). The goal of these consultations 
was mainly to verify the identification in the draft strategy of the areas of common interest to 
both sides (see more below). It was only following the launch of the EU Strategy that the 
Central Asian side became more involved in the direction and steering of the new partnership, 
inter alia through the establishment of bilateral Priority Papers, which set out the „bilateral‟ 
priority areas per country, as well as the appointment by each Central Asian partner 
government of a national coordinator, who is responsible for the implementation of the 
Strategy at country level. Moreover, the EU Strategy, which establishes the strategic basis and 
framework of the partnership, is a EU document, not a Central Asian document. This lack of 
„ownership‟ ahead of the launch of partnership - and to a significant extent also following its 
launch - did not go unnoticed in the Central Asian capitals and is one of the reasons why the 
Kazakh government subsequently launched its „own‟ strategic document for its bilateral 
relations with the EU, the so-called „Path to Europe‟.310  
Yet, the relative lack of ownership did not really compromise the EU‟s ability to rally 
the five states behind its ambitious partnership proposal. On the contrary, the fact that it 
managed to unilaterally push through this initiative suggests that the five countries were 
genuinely interested in enhancing cooperation with the EU and enter into an extensive 
partnership. More importantly, it also suggests an element of power asymmetry in the 
relations between the two sides in favour of the EU. This bring us back to the working 
hypothesis, and in particular, to the proposition that the launch of the partnership with Central 
Asia is a concrete outcome of the EU‟s exercise of TNPO over the Central Asian republics. 
To explore the viability of this proposition, the remainder of this section will offer a 
structured outline of the EU‟s Strategy, whilst discussing the relevance of the Strategy in 
relation to the EU‟s exercise of TNPO vis-à-vis the region. 
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9.2.2.1. The EU Strategy in general  
 
In concrete terms, the EU Strategy provides an overall framework for strengthening EU 
relations with Central Asia, aiming in particular at the establishment of a long-term 
partnership with the region. In doing so, the strategy builds firmly on previous achievements 
in EU relations with the countries of Central Asia, in particular on the results obtained under 
the implementation of the EU‟s assistance programmes and the formal agreements concluded 
with the five partner countries. Moreover, in defining the EU‟s priorities for enhanced 
cooperation with Central Asia, the strategy spells out cooperation areas that are of common 
interest to the EU and the region. As such, the strategy remains faithful to the „regional‟ focus 
of cooperation introduced under the EC‟s Central Asia Strategy Paper for 2002-2006 (see 
Chapter 5). This indicates that the EU continues to perceive Central Asia as a region in its 
own right, and therefore believes that the five countries would thus benefit from regional 
cooperation, which - as noted - is still at a premature stage, not only because of personal feuds 
between presidents vying for regional leadership, among other factors, but also because of the 
fact the countries themselves do not all equally share the EU‟s perception of Central Asia as a 
regional entity.
311
 At the same time, however, while maintaining an overall regional focus, the 
strategy emphasises that bilateral cooperation under the partnership will be tailored to the 
specific needs and requirements of each Central Asian republic. This shows that the strategy 
effectively acknowledges the „faults‟ of the EU‟s past assistance to the region, which did not 
sufficiently account for the diverging levels of development between the five states (see 
Chapter 5). Building on the cooperation framework introduced under the EC‟s Central Asia 
Strategy Paper for 2002-2006, the strategy identifies a bilateral and a regional component of 
cooperation, with the latter component aimed predominantly at addressing common regional 
challenges and cross-boundary issues that specifically require a regional or plurilateral 
approach, such as water/river management and energy and transport infrastructure 
development, as well as border management and anti-drugs trafficking. The strategy therefore 
also prescribes the formal establishment of a bi-regional political dialogue forum, which in 
essence means the formalisation of the EU Troika-Central Asia dialogue format, which up 
until 2007 was an informal setting. This regional dialogue forum is also aimed at fostering 
confidence-building and mutual understanding between the five states in view of dealing with 
common problems at regional level. In this regard, the Strategy specifically states that the 
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“EU can offer experience in regional integration leading to political stability and prosperity” 
(Council, 2007b: 6).  
 
9.2.2.2. Seven priority areas of cooperation 
 
The EU Strategy identifies seven priority areas for enhanced cooperation with Central Asia, 
reflecting several common concerns and interests. These priority areas are (i) promotion of 
human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratisation, (ii) facilitation of education 
of Central Asia‟s youth, (iii) promotion of economic development, trade and investment, (iv) 
enhancement of energy and transport links, (v) fostering of environmental sustainability and 
water management, (vi) border management, drugs and human trafficking, and (vii) 
development of intercultural dialogue. 
 The first priority area outlined in the EU Strategy is the promotion of human rights, 
the rule of law, good governance and democratisation (Council, 2007b: 12). It is worth noting 
that while listed as the first priority area for enhanced cooperation, it is doubtful whether the 
Central Asian regimes attribute the same level of importance to this area. As stated in the 
Strategy, the EU believes that “a stable political framework and a functioning economy 
depend on the rule of law, human rights, good governance and transparent, democratic 
political structures” (ibid.). To that end, the document announces that the EU will “step up 
support for the protection of human rights and for the creation and development of an 
independent judiciary, thus making a sustainable contribution to the establishment of 
structures based on the rule of law and international human rights standards” (ibid.). A 
particular initiative that the EU proposes in this regard is the establishment of a regular 
bilateral human rights dialogue with each of the Central Asian states (ibid.), based on the 
format of the dialogue that was already in place with Uzbekistan. In addition, the Strategy 
states that the EU will financially support and steer a Rule of Law Initiative, and will 
cooperate with the OSCE, the CoE and the UN in the field of justice (ibid.). 
The second priority area presented in the EU Strategy is the improvement of education 
in the region, which it describes as an “investment in the future” (Council, 2007b: 15). In 
explaining the relevance of the priority area, the Strategy states that “good education is 
essential for opening up [the youth‟s] future opportunities” (ibid). In order to “help adapt 
these countries‟ education systems to the needs of the globalised world”, the EU will establish 
a European Education Initiative for Central Asia. This Initiative will focus on all levels of 
education. It will assist the improvement of primary school education, secondary school 
education, and vocational education and training, while enhancing higher education 
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cooperation, notably via academic and student exchanges under the new Erasmus Mundus 
facility and TEMPUS (ibid). In addition, the EU will support the creation of regional 
education centres and cooperate closely with the OSCE Academy in Bishkek (Council, 
2007b: 16). 
The promotion of economic development, trade and investment constitutes the third 
priority area outlined in the EU Strategy. In this area, the EU Strategy calls for the removal of 
trade barriers between the Central Asian republics, and announces that the EU will continue 
to support WTO accession for the four countries that are not yet WTO members (Council, 
2007b: 16). The document also states that the EU will work towards improved access for 
Central Asian products to EU markets through the renewed EU Generalised System of 
Preferences. Moreover, the EU will foster the creation of a regulatory and institutional 
framework for an improved business and investment environment, in particular by developing 
public-private partnerships, and assist the countries‟ attempts at economic diversification. In 
order to “make better use of Central Asia‟s economic potential, not least through improved 
regional cooperation”, the EU will promote the development and expansion of the regional 
infrastructure in the fields of transport, energy and trade, notably under INOGATE, as part of 
the Baku Initiative, and TRACECA, which will received funds from both DCI and ENPI 
(Council, 2007b: 17). 
Related to this is the fourth priority area outlined in the EU Strategy, the enhancement 
of energy and transport links. The document states that “both the EU and Central Asia have a 
paramount interest in enhancing energy security as an important aspect of global security” 
and points to their “common interest in diversifying export routes, demand and supply 
structures and energy sources” (Council, 2007b: 18). In this context, the strategy notes that a 
“market-based approach linked to a transparent, stable and non-discriminatory regulatory 
framework guarantee the best prices and opportunities for all stakeholders” (Council, 2007b: 
19). Therefore, the EU will, inter alia, conduct an enhanced regular energy dialogue with the 
Central Asian states, based on the Energy Charter and bilateral MoUs on Energy issues, and 
“lend them political support in developing a new energy transport corridor from the Caspian 
Sea via the Black Sea to the EU” (ibid.) 
 The fifth priority area outlined in the EU Strategy concerns environmental 
sustainability and water management. With respect to water, the document explains that the 
connection of the five countries through cross-boundary rivers, lakes and seas, a regional 
approach requires a regional approach for the protection of these resources. In particular the 
strategy points to the need for “an integrated water management policy (“upstream and 
downstream solidarity)” (Council, 2007b: 21). In addition to safeguarding of fair access to 
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water, the EU wants to provide help in the areas of forest management and vulnerability to 
climate change and natural disasters. The strategy announces that an EU-Central Asia 
dialogue on the environment, launched in Spring 2006, will provide the basis for joint 
cooperation efforts in the area (Council, 2007b: 22). 
 The sixth priority area presented in the EU Strategy is common threats and challenges. 
In addressing these, the strategy announces that the EU will give greater support to the 
countries‟ fight “against corruption, drug trade, human trafficking, illegal trade of weapons 
from and to Afghanistan and organised crime” (Council, 2007b: 26). In doing so, it will, inter 
alia, increase its support for the development of modern border management in Central Asia, 
which is essential for creating secure borders and hence for combating regional crime, 
including drug trade and extremism.  
The seventh and final priority area is intercultural dialogue. According to the strategy, 
the “diversity of religions and centuries-old traditions of peace and tolerance constitute a 
valuable heritage in Central Asia” (Council, 2007b: 26). Building on this heritage, the EU 
intends to promote respect for freedom of religion and foster dialogue within civil society. 
 
 
9.2.2.3. Relevance in relation to TNPO accumulation 
 
In outlining the EU Strategy, it is import to discuss the relevance of the Strategy and proposed 
partnership in relation to the EU‟s accumulation of TNPO over Central Asia. To do so, this 
subsection will focus on what appears the key instrument for enhancing cooperation with 
Central Asia, „constructive engagement‟.  Indeed, as a red line throughout the strategy, 
„dialogue‟ appears essential to the overall approach underlying the EU‟s partnership initiative, 
which suggests that the EU intends to rely in particular on its TNPO2 over Central Asia, i.e. 
its control over the institutional structure of its relations with Central Asia. In terms of 
TNPO2micro, for instance, the EU wants to introduce a regular Energy dialogue, a rule of law 
dialogue, a human rights dialogue (including a civil society forum) and an EU-Central Asia 
dialogue on environment, as well as formalise the existing EU Troika-Central Asia political 
dialogue. Moreover, on the ground, the EU‟s presence will be expanded through the 
establishment of a EC Delegation (now EU Delegation) in each of the five countries, as well 
as an increase in coordination between the Member State embassies and the EC Delegations 
(now EU Delegations). Clearly, these initiatives will provide important opportunities for the 
EU to strengthen its control over the micro-institutional structure in its relations with the five 
countries. In terms of TNPO2macro, in turn, the EU intends to extend cooperation with the 
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OSCE, the CoE and various UN bodies. In addition, the strategy clearly announces that the 
EU will seek engagement with such regional organisations as the CSTO, SCO and EurAsec in 
order to hold regular and ad-hoc dialogue. In short, the EU also seems eager to strengthen its 
control over the macro-institutional structure in its relations with the Central Asian countries. 
 The proposed „constructive engagement‟ with Central Asia also appears to be relevant 
for the overlap between TNPO2 and the other two TNPO structures.  Particular opportunities 
for strengthening the EU‟s management of the interaction appear to lie with the mechanisms 
of „socialisation‟ and „social learning‟ (TNPO2-3), which the Strategy seems to attribute 
considerable importance to. For instance, the document explicitly states that the EU “can offer 
experience [to Central Asia] in regional integration leading to political stability and 
prosperity” (Council, 2007b: 6). Similarly, the Strategy highlights that “good governance, the 
rule of law, human rights and democratisation” are “areas where the EU is willing to share 
experience and expertise” (Council, 2007b). In addition, it notes that “lessons learnt from the 
political and economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe can also be offered” 
(ibid.). Importantly, the strategy also foresees Twinning and seconding staff between EU and 
Central Asian administrations or companies, which it considers “an essential part of EU 
cooperation with Central Asia in order to introduce EU-wide best practices in connection with 
Community legislation.” (Council, 2007b: 10). It will be interesting to see whether and to 
what extent these socialisation- and social learning-based initiatives will allow for a more 
effective dissemination of EU norms, rules and standards. 
 
9.2.3. Concluding remarks 
 
To summarise, it is clear that the Strategy represents an ambitious EU project, signaling a 
clear intention to substantially upgrade relations with Central Asia. It seeks to do so across a 
specific number of areas, including human rights, rule of law, good governance and 
democratisation; education; economic development, trade and investment, energy and 
transport links; environmental sustainability and water management; border management, 
drugs and human trafficking; and intercultural dialogue. The consistent and sustainable 
implementation of the Strategy will be a key indicator for the EU‟s and Central Asia‟s 
political resolve to upgrade their relations. In this context, one particular challenge in 
implementing the strategy, however, is the unavoidable clash between the EU‟s interest in 
enhanced engagement on security and energy issues and its goal of increased cooperation on 
human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratisation, areas that remain politically 
sensitive in Central Asia.  
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As  regards the relevance of the Strategy and proposed partnership in relation to the 
EU‟s accumulation of TNPO over Central Asia, the section highlighted that the EU appears 
particularly keen to strengthen its TNPO2 over Central Asia, i.e. its control over the 
institutional structure of its relations with Central Asia. This applies both to micro-
institutional level and the macro-institutional level of its relations with the Central Asian 
countries. Moreover, it indicated that the strategy offers relevant opportunities for 
strengthening the EU‟s management of the interaction of TNPO2 with the other two TNPO 
structures. In this respect, the Strategy appears to attribute considerable importance to an 
enhanced use of „socialisation‟ and „social learning‟ (TNPO2-3), which may offer promising 
opportunities for a more effective dissemination in Central Asia of EU norms, rules and 
standards. 
 
 
9.3. Reinforcement of the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia 
 
9.3.1. Introduction 
 
This section covers the third and final step of the empirical exploration of the thesis‟s working 
hypothesis. In concrete terms, it seeks to examine whether and to what the extent the 
implementation of the partnership initiative enhances the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia, 
allowing the EU to gain more influence at the structural level of its relations with the region 
(see Figure 7), inter alia, by shaping further the terms of the cooperation in such fields as 
economic and investment relations, transport, energy, human rights and democratisation,  
environment and education. 
 
 
Figure 7: Step 3 of the thesis’s empirical exploration  
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However, since the EU Strategy was launched fairly recently, the thesis is faced with 
an empirical limitation in that at this early stage, notably only three years after the launch, the 
question of whether the EU Strategy reinforces the Union‟s leverage cannot yet be fully 
assessed. Therefore, the empirical exploration presented in this section should be viewed as a 
preliminary assessment rather than a fully conclusive examination. While we are being 
realistic about what the Strategy can achieve in a short time, we also seek to avoid assessing 
the impact purely in terms of the degree to which the Strategy is being implemented.  
In order to explore whether the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia has strengthened based 
on the implementation of the strategy, the section draws on official documents, including, the 
first and second evaluations of the implementation of the Strategy issued jointly by the 
Council and European Commission respectively one year and three years after the launch of 
the Strategy (Council of the European Union & European Commission, 2008; 2010), as well 
as independent assessments by scholars and observers (see e.g. Boonstra & Hale, 2010; De 
Pedro, 2009; Hoffmann, 2010; Melvin & Boonstra, 2008; Melvin, 2008d). 
 
 
9.3.2. Exploration of the implementation process 
 
As noted above, following the launch of the EU Strategy in June 2007, National Priority 
Papers were established bilaterally with each of the five Central Asian countries in order to 
identify the common priority areas for the cooperation. In addition, all five Central Asian 
states appointed a National Coordinator responsible for strategy implementation. In March 
2008, the Slovenian Presidency of the EU convened in Brussels the first meeting between the 
EU Senior Officials Troika and the Central Asian National Coordinators for discussions on 
the implementation of the EU Strategy. Since then, the forum has become the institutionalised 
body for the joint EU–Central Asia follow-up on the implementation of the Strategy.  
 In terms of the budget made available for the implementation, the European 
Commission allocated EUR 750 million for the period 2007-2013 (European Commission, 
2007a). These funds are for the projects and programmes implemented under the EC‟s 
Regional Strategy Paper for 2007-2013, which constitutes a more concrete embodiment of the 
EU Strategy, in particular with respect to the financial and technical assistance proposed 
under the Strategy (ibid.). In this regard, it is important to note that the EU Strategy is a joint 
initiative between the Commission and the Council. As such, the EU Strategy foresees 
increased coordination between the two institutions. This also means that apart from the 
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assistance provided under the EC‟s programmes for Central Asia, there is now also substantial 
assistance provided by the EU Member States, which allocate their own funding to this 
additional assistance. The National Priority Papers, for instance, include a list of planned EC 
assistance projects, followed by a list of EU assistance initiatives that will be implemented by 
EU Member States.
312
 The Member State activities thus complement the assistance offered by 
the EC, joining up neatly with the main proposals outlined in the Strategy and are focused 
mostly on education, rule of law, democratisation, border management and environment. In 
the area of rule of law, for instance, France and Germany have assumed responsibility to lead 
the implementation of the Rule of Law initiative introduced by the strategy.
313
 Other Member 
States, in turn, have followed suit for other key initiatives proposed in the strategy. This also 
implies that the embassies of the Member States are now more involved in maintaining EU 
relations with the region. For instance, at the ambassadors level, a regional meeting of EU 
Heads of Mission now convenes annually in Central Asia. In 2008, this meeting was 
convened by the French Presidency of the EU at the French embassy in Tashkent. Moreover, 
the Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for regularly reviewing progress in 
implementing the Strategy. Hence their release of joint progress reports, which they submit 
bi-annually to the European Council. An additional source of funding for the implementation 
of the strategy comes from IFIs, most notably the EIB and the EBRD, which are called upon 
for the implementation of a number of specific assistance goals, including the development of 
large infrastructure projects (see Chapter 5). 
 As highlighted in section 9.2, dialogue and engagement appear to be the key 
instruments underpinning the Strategy, suggesting that the EU seeks to enhance its 
socialisation efforts in the region. In the past three years, the EU has indeed significantly 
upgraded its institutional links with the Central Asian countries across a wide range of areas. 
Apart from the annual regional political dialogue at Foreign Minister level and the existing 
dialogue under the framework of the PCAs, the EU now also holds regular dialogue under the  
„European Education Initiative‟, the „EU Rule of Law Initiative‟ and the Environment 
Initiative. Moreover, the EU now maintains a regular „Human Rights Dialogue‟ with each of 
the Central Asian states, which includes a civil society forum. Discussions include issues 
related to media freedom, child protection, freedom of assembly and women's rights. In 
addition, there is also regular dialogue on energy issues, mostly in the framework of the Baku 
Initiative and the bilateral MoUs on Energy signed with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. These 
dialogue forums are not limited to the level of senior officials, but also involve the 
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 It should be noted that these National Priority Papers are not publicly available and are hence not referenced.  
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 See Fact Sheet of „European Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia‟, available at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/factsheet_law_en.pdf>. 
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participation of civil servants. The „European rule of law initiative‟, for instance, is designed 
to foster judicial reform by dialogue at a political as well as an expert level and long-term 
cooperation projects between Central Asia and European institutions.
314
 The dialogue on 
energy between the Central Asian states and the EU involves both technical discussions at 
expert level and political consultations over the development of new pipeline routes and 
transportation networks to transport Kazakh and Turkmen energy resources to the EU market.  
However, while the initiatives outlined above point to a considerable enhancement of 
relations, several of these initiatives have their deficiencies (see e.g. Melvin & Boonstra, 
2008: 8-9; De Pedro, 2009; Hoffmann, 2010). With respect to the human rights dialogues, for 
instance, it remains unlikely that such „superficial‟ discussions with ruling elites in 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan can effectively increase EU influence in the area of democracy 
and human rights in the highly authoritarian countries. Indeed, despite the regular human 
rights dialogue, the regimes in these two countries have proved to excel at outwitting the EU 
on important issues such as the monitoring of human rights. This finding joins up with the 
challenge that the EU faces in the region in balancing its security and energy interests with its 
goals in the normative sphere, including democratisation and – perhaps not surprisingly - 
human rights (see e.g. Cooley, 2008: 1181). In addition, the implementation has so far 
focused predominantly on cooperation at the level of government officials and has not yet 
sufficiently allowed for an active involvement of civil society, national Parliaments, local 
authorities and other important stakeholders. Another final important shortcoming is that the 
implementation of the EU Strategy - despite the considerable increase in funding – still lacks 
the resources required to have a major tangible impact on the ground in Central Asia, 
commensurate with the ambitious goals set out in the strategy. 
 
 
 
9.3.3. Concluding remarks 
 
Three years on from the launch of the EU Strategy, it is clear that the EU has made significant 
progress in strengthening its ties with Central Asia. Importantly, the Central Asian countries 
have continued to show considerable interest in the EU‟s partnership initiative, as reflected, 
inter alia, in their participation in all the initiatives proposed and implemented under the EU 
Strategy, including in key areas such as education, rule of law, water and environment. 
Moreover, all Central Asian states now engage with the EU in a structured Human Rights 
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 European Commission, EU Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia, 28 November 2008, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/docs/factsheet_law_en.pdf, accessed on 12 October 2010. 
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Dialogue. Political dialogue, in general, has intensified to a considerable extent. In addition, 
the strategy implementation visibly benefits from increased involvement of the Council, as 
reflected, inter alia, in the considerable contribution of several EU Member States to the 
implementation of the strategy, as well as from enhanced coordination both between the 
Council and the Commission, and between the EU actors and the Central Asian stakeholders. 
To what extent these „enhancements‟ effectively „reinforce‟ the EU‟s TNPO over the region, 
however, is more difficult to evaluate, not least since the strategy was launched only three 
years ago. 
At the same time, however, the section observed that the implementation of the 
strategy is confronted with some significant shortcomings, which again pointed to the 
occurrence of countervailing factors, which impact negatively upon the empowering feedback 
effect of the concrete outcome obtained - i.e. the launch of the partnership with Central Asia -, 
and as such constrain the potential subsequent reinforcement of the EU‟s TNPO over the 
region. The shortcomings include, inter alia, the limits of the bilateral human rights dialogues 
as a forum for genuine socialisation of authoritarian ruling elites into more respect for human 
rights, and the challenge that the EU faces in the energy-rich and geo-strategically important 
region in balancing its security and energy interests with its goals in the normative sphere, 
including democratisation and - perhaps not surprisingly - human rights. In addition, the 
implementation has so far focused mostly on cooperation at the level of government officials 
and has not yet sufficiently allowed for an active involvement of civil society, national 
Parliaments, local authorities and other important stakeholders. Another important 
shortcoming is that the implementation of the EU Strategy - despite the considerable increase 
in funding - still lacks the resources required to have a major tangible impact on the ground in 
Central Asia, commensurate with the ambitious goals set out in the strategy. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
As a way of concluding the thesis, this last chapter draws some general conclusions and final 
considerations. In doing so, it outlines the principal theoretical insights and empirical 
findings. It concludes with a brief consideration of the main strengths and shortcomings of the 
thesis, followed by a presentation of avenues for future research. 
 
Theoretical insights 
 
The thesis challenged the consensual scholarly expectation of low EU impact in Central Asia 
by arguing in favour of using a structurally integrative approach to the study of the EU‟s 
influence over the region. The thesis claimed that the predominant theoretical perspectives are 
not sufficient to grasp the full extent to which the EU‟s influence over the Central Asian states 
constitutes - like in many other cases of the EU‟s relations with third countries - a complex 
and multi-faceted process that encompasses structural dimensions. In particular,  it contended 
that the prevailing approaches are too narrowly focused on (i) neorealist concepts of power, 
such as the possession of economic and military capabilities or on (ii) concepts and issues 
initially developed to study the EU‟s influence in Central and Eastern Europe (a region that 
apart from its communist past bears only remote resemblances with Central Asia) and/or (iii) 
on the normative aspects of the EU‟s involvement in Central Asia, in particular the promotion 
of democracy and human rights. By focusing predominantly on narrow, micro-level factors, 
those theoretical perspectives risk overlooking less obvious aspects of the EU‟s power, 
including structural aspects, and thus underestimating the EU‟s leverage in the region.   
 
Therefore, the thesis explored an alternative working hypothesis, assuming that the EU‟s 
power is less clearly delineated and observable (and measurable) than predominant scholarly 
discussions of the EU‟s engagement with the region allow. In particular, the thesis claimed 
that a more structurally integrative and holistic approach is needed to understand the EU‟s 
power in the region. However, rather than rejecting the theoretical perspectives on which the 
existing studies draw, the thesis appreciated their strengths and distilled elements that it found 
wanting when it comes to understanding the EU‟s power over Central Asia. Accordingly, 
whilst disapproving of an overly parsimonious approach and maintaining that on their own 
the predominant approaches have insufficient explanatory value in relation to the object of 
inquiry, the thesis incorporated aspects of the respective perspectives in its attempt to develop 
a more structurally integrative explanatory model.   
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Central to the doctoral research was the premise that analyses of power need to distinguish 
between and account for both the relational and the structural level on which power is exerted. 
In responding to this need and in view of the theoretical concerns identified above, the 
doctoral research introduced a conceptual tool, which it termed „transnational power over‟. 
Inspired by debates in IPE, in particular new realist and critical IPE perspectives, and 
combining these views with insights from neorealist, neo-institutionalist and constructivist 
approaches to EU external relations, the concept of TNPO is an analytically eclectic notion, 
which helps to assess the degree to which, in today‟s globalised and interdependent world, the 
EU‟s power over third countries derives from a combination of material, institutional and 
ideational structures, making it difficult for the EU‟s partners to resist the EU‟s initiatives or 
to reject its offers. The element of „transnational‟ is a crucial part of the TNPO concept in that 
the notion assumes that power, whether intentional or unintentional, active or passive, can be 
transnational in nature.  
 
In challenging the predominant expectation of low EU impact in Central Asia, the thesis 
hypothesised that the EU‟s ability to rally the Central Asian republics behind its ambitious 
partnership initiative testifies to the EU‟s power projection over the region. This power 
projection draws on the EU‟s influential position across a combination of material, 
institutional and ideational structures. The EU‟s power, in turn, is reinforced through the 
course of the implementation of the EU‟s partnership initiative. The main purpose of the 
thesis was, then, to both develop conceptually and explore the empirical applicability of this 
TNPO framework; and in so doing examine concretely to what extent the EU‟s power over 
Central Asia effectively derives from a combination of material, institutional and ideational 
structures (as posited by the TNPO approach), enabling the EU to conclude the partnership, 
and the extent to which this has in turn reinforced the EU‟s power over the region. 
 
Conceptually, the TNPO concept was further developed, defining it as the extent to which A 
wields power over B through A‟s control over a constitutive mix of three structures and the 
interaction between them. For the purposes of exposition, these structures were referred to as 
TNPO1(material, TNPO2(institutional) and TNPO3(ideational). 
 
In order to trace and assess transnational and intergovernmental mechanisms of EU impact 
across the three TNPO structures and their respective overlap, the thesis constructed a 
toolbox, which centres on four analytical distinctions: (i) EU-driven versus domestically 
driven mechanisms, (ii) mechanisms based on rationalist logics of action versus mechanisms 
following constructivist logics of action, (iii) agent-based versus purely structural 
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mechanisms of TNPO, and (iv) transnational and intergovernmental mechanisms of EU 
impact. 
 
Empirical findings 
 
The main findings of the empirical exploration of the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
The empirical examination of the EU‟s TNPO1 over Central Asia found that the EU‟s control 
over the „material structure‟ vis-à-vis the region derives in particular from its position in the 
region as a leader in trade and investment, its considerable provision of development and 
financial aid to the five states, as well as its (geo)strategic and security-related capabilities vis-
à-vis the region. However, despite finding sufficient evidence of significant control over the 
material structure, the thesis also pointed to a number of „obstacles‟ and „limits‟ encountered 
by the EU‟s TNPO1 over Central Asia. This applies particularly to the EU‟s aid delivery to 
the region. Indeed, despite a number of notable successes of the EU‟s assistance in 2002-
2006, including in the area of regulatory reform in the administrative and legal spheres, the 
successes were offset by a number of setbacks and several deficiencies. In particular, limited 
institutional capacity and lack of political will on the side of the Central Asian governments 
very often hampered the impact of the assistance in the longer run, including the actual 
implementation of the initiated reforms. Moreover, the assistance had its own shortcomings, 
especially in terms of the aid responsiveness and flexibility of TACIS, the main instrument. In 
turn, with respect to the EU‟s geostrategic influence in the region, while the thesis 
demonstrated that the EU is exercising considerable (geo)strategic power on the Central Asian 
chessboard, the rules of the game appear to be conditioned by the Central Asian states 
themselves. This is clearly reflected in the pragmatism with which the regimes pursue their 
„multi-vector foreign policy‟, which has proved to be a double-edged sword for the attempts 
of the EU - and of other external powers - to expand its leverage over the countries of Central 
Asia. 
 
The empirical exploration of the EU‟s TNPO2 over the Central Asian states, in turn, 
highlighted the extent to which institutional factors need to be taken into account when 
considering the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. This section showed that the EU derives a 
significant amount of leverage from institutional factors, both at the macro-level of 
international relations (TNPO2macro) and at the more case-specific institutional micro-level of 
EU bilateral or bi-regional contractual relations (TNPO2micro) with the Central Asian 
countries. With respect to TNPO2micro, the section demonstrated that the EU‟s bilateral and 
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regional relations with the countries have grown to be considerably institutionalised. This 
applies both in terms of formal contractual (including treaty-based) formats of 
institutionalisation and in terms of less formal and less integrated (including ad-hoc) formats 
of institutionalisation, which mostly involve the bureaucratic/technocratic level or societal 
level rather than the high political level. The level of institutionalisation, however, varies 
across the five countries, depending mostly on the legal basis of the cooperation. As such, 
relations with Kazakhstan appear to be institutionalised most densely, followed by the EU‟s 
cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Bilateral ties with Turkmenistan, in 
turn, are rather moderately institutionalised.  
 
In addition, this section indicated that the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia also comprises 
institutionalised dialogue and cooperation through a web of - sometimes overlapping - 
international organisations and institutions, most notably the WTO, the EBRD, the OSCE and 
the CoE. The section highlighted the extent to which the EU manages to draw influence over 
the Central Asian countries through its influential representation in these international bodies. 
Moreover, it found that the degree of institutionalisation also differs at the macro-level. As 
such, the EU wields by far the largest amount of TNPO2macro over Kazakhstan. Next is 
Kyrgyzstan, followed by Tajikistan. The EU‟s TNPO2macro over Uzbekistan, in turn, is 
moderate, but is denser than the Union‟s macro-institutional ties with Turkmenistan, where its 
TNPO2macro is rather limited. In this regard, it is important to highlight the limits encountered 
by the EU‟s TNPO2macro over the countries, which include factors that are either endogenous 
or exogenous to the Central Asian states. A significant factor is the strong competition that the 
EU faces in the region from China and Russia, which have their own share of TNPO2macro 
over the Central Asian republics, except for Turkmenistan, which does not participate in the 
regional organisations led by these two „rival‟ powers. Another aspect that curtails the EU‟s 
macro-institutional power, and in particular in the case of the OSCE, is the Central Asian 
regimes‟ suspicion of and aversion to external meddling in their „domestic affairs‟, especially 
in areas that could directly affect the societal status quo in their countries.  
 
Next, the empirical exploration of the EU‟s TNPO3 over Central Asia demonstrated the extent 
to which ideational factors need to be taken into account when considering the EU‟s TNPO. 
Overall, the findings revealed a rather mixed picture of the EU‟s TNPO3. On the one hand, 
the section did not find evidence of strong ideational attraction to the EU‟s norms, values and 
principles related to liberal democracy, including human rights, rule of law and good 
governance. The results suggested that such ideational factors do not constitute an important 
determinant of the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. In understanding this „limit‟ to the EU‟s 
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power over the region, the section pointed to a number of „countervailing‟ factors, including 
the virtually inherent authoritarian nature of Central Asian politics, and related to this - the 
attraction to alternative models of development, most notably the Russian model, and the 
traditional fabric of Central Asian society. To some extent, however, Kazakhstan appeared to 
be an exception, offering better prospects for European-style development and 
democratisation. On the other hand, the section found that the EU enjoys a relatively positive 
reputation as a more neutral actor in Central Asia, which gives it more credit compared to 
other external actors.  
 
Subsequently, the empirical examination outlined the extent to which the EU derives power 
over Central Asia from the interaction between the three TNPO structures. Again, the 
examination of EU impact yielded a mixed picture. To start with, as far as deliberate export of 
EU norms and values to the region is concerned, the outline demonstrated that this is 
channelled either through the provision of material incentives (overlap between TNPO1 and 
TNPO3), such as financial assistance and enhanced market access, or through the 
institutionalised cooperation framework established with the Central Asian countries (overlap 
between TNPO2 and TNPO3). However, in most of these instances of overlap, only limited 
evidence was found of strong impact of the EU in terms of behavioural change or adaption on 
the Central Asian side. This suggested that - whether through the provision of material 
incentives or via the use of socialisation - deliberate diffusion of EU norms and rules appears 
to achieve only limited results. However, the section found more successful processes of 
Europeanisation in Central Asia among those cases of overlap that are based on domestically-
driven mechanisms, i.e. that occur independently of EU deliberate action. With respect to the 
overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO3, this concerns in particular those instances of impact 
captured by the market and the competition modes of governance: cases where the EU‟s 
impact on third countries derives from the „presence‟ of its internal market rather than from 
EU conscious actions. In these instances, Central Asian actors adopt EU rules or norms 
because ignoring or violating them would entail net costs (cf. negative externality). In turn, an 
examination of TNPO1-2-3 pointed to the limits of the use of conditionality in the Central Asia 
to export EU norms and rules, whilst revealing the advantages of more indirect ways of 
transferring liberal norms as well as material acquis rules. In particular, it demonstrated that 
the promotion of norms and principles in Central Asia works better through 
transgovernmental cooperation at the sectoral, bureaucratic/technocratic level than through 
direct political leverage at the intergovernmental level based, inter alia, on conditionality. 
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As a second step in the empirical exploration of the working hypothesis, the thesis focused on 
the EU Strategy. It concluded that the EU Strategy represents an ambitious EU project, 
signaling a clear intention to substantially upgrade relations with Central Asia. It seeks to do 
so across a specific number of areas, including human rights, rule of law, good governance 
and democratisation; education; economic development, trade and investment, energy and 
transport links; environmental sustainability and water management; border management, 
drugs and human trafficking; and intercultural dialogue. The consistent and sustainable 
implementation of the Strategy will be a key indicator for the EU‟s and Central Asia‟s 
political resolve to upgrade their relations. In this context, one particular challenge in 
implementing the strategy, however, is the unavoidable clash between the EU‟s interest in 
enhanced engagement on security and energy issues and its goal of increased cooperation on 
human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratisation, areas that remain politically 
sensitive in Central Asia.  
As regards the relevance of the Strategy and proposed partnership in relation to the EU‟s 
accumulation of TNPO over Central Asia, the thesis highlighted that the EU appears 
particularly keen to strengthen its TNPO2 over Central Asia, i.e. its control over the 
institutional structure of its relations with Central Asia. This applies both to micro-
institutional level and the macro-institutional level of its relations with the Central Asian 
countries. Moreover, it indicated that the strategy offers relevant opportunities for 
strengthening the EU‟s management of the interaction of TNPO2 with the other two TNPO 
structures. In this respect, the Strategy appears to attribute considerable importance to an 
enhanced use of „socialisation‟ and „social learning‟ (TNPO2-3), which may offer promising 
opportunities for a more effective dissemination in Central Asia of EU norms, rules and 
standards. 
As a third and final step in the empirical exploration of the working hypothesis, the thesis 
concentrated on the implementation of the EU Strategy. This section found that in the three 
years since the launch of the EU Strategy, the EU has made significant progress in 
strengthening overall relations with Central Asia. Importantly, the Central Asian countries 
have continued to show considerable interest in the EU‟s partnership initiative, as reflected, 
inter alia, in their participation in all the initiatives proposed and implemented under the EU 
Strategy, including in key areas such as education, Rule of Law, water and environment. 
Moreover, all Central Asian states now engage with the EU in a structured Human Rights 
Dialogue. Political dialogue, in general, has intensified to a considerable extent. In addition, 
the Strategy implementation visibly benefits from increased involvement of the Council, as 
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reflected, inter alia, in the considerable contribution of several EU Member States to the 
implementation of the strategy, as well as from enhanced coordination both between the 
Council and the Commission, and between the EU actors and the Central Asian stakeholders. 
To what extent these „enhancements‟ effectively „reinforce‟ the EU‟s TNPO on the region, 
however, is more difficult to evaluate, not least since the strategy was launched only three 
years ago. 
At the same time, however, the section observed that the implementation of the strategy is 
confronted with some significant shortcomings, which again pointed to the occurrence of 
countervailing factors impacting negatively upon the empowering feedback effect of the 
concrete outcome obtained - i.e. the launch of the partnership with Central Asia, thus limiting 
the possible reinforcement of the EU‟s TNPO over the region. The shortcomings include, 
inter alia, the limits of the bilateral human rights dialogues as a forum for genuine 
socialisation, and the challenge that the EU faces in the - predominantly authoritarian - region 
in balancing its security and energy interests with its goals in the normative sphere, including 
democratisation and - perhaps not surprisingly - human rights. In addition, the implementation 
has so far focused mostly on cooperation at the level of government officials and has not yet 
sufficiently allowed for an active involvement of civil society, national Parliaments, local 
authorities and other important stakeholders. Another important shortcoming is that the 
implementation of the EU Strategy - despite the considerable increase in funding - still lacks 
the resources required to have a major tangible impact on the ground in Central Asia, 
commensurate with the ambitious goals set out in the strategy. 
 
Usefulness of the TNPO framework in relation to the theoretical proposition 
 
With regard to the thesis‟ aim to offer a more holistic understanding of the EU‟s power over 
the Central Asian republics, it is clear that the TNPO framework enabled us to trace and 
explore the various aspects of EU influence over the Central Asian states. Put differently, the 
TNPO model has allowed us to study the EU‟s power in Central Asia through an alternative 
lens, identifying, among other things, instances of EU power that may appear less obvious 
when examined through the predominant models used to study the EU‟s relations with 
Central Asia. Moreover, the TNPO toolbox provided a very helpful analytical reference point 
to trace and explore the various mechanisms of EU impact on the Central Asian countries. In 
particular, the quadruple distinction between (i) logic of appropriateness and logic of 
consequences, (ii) intergovernmental and transnational, (iii) EU-driven and domestically-
driven, and (iv) agent-based and purely structural, mechanisms of EU impact, allowed us to 
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approach the empirical case in a holistic manner, providing a structurally integrative account 
of the EU‟s TNPO over Central Asia. Importantly, it also allowed us to trace considerable 
differences of the EU‟s TNPO between the individual five Central Asian states. In particular, 
the difference appears to lie in the diverging combination - between the five countries - of the 
material, institutional and ideational structures that the EU controls, with the EU‟s control 
over particular structures (and particular overlap) being weaker in some Central Asian 
countries compared to other Central Asian countries. 
 
At the same time, however, the empirical study pointed to the need to integrate an additional 
aspect into the TNPO analysis, i.e. countervailing factors. Indeed, the empirical examination 
confirmed the need - as anticipated in Chapter 4 - to take „contextual‟ factors into account, as 
it revealed the existence and impact of countervailing forces, which mediate the EU‟s TNPO 
over a third party, in casu the Central Asian countries. Indeed, although we found abundant 
evidence of EU TNPO, we came to the conclusion that the EU‟s TNPO is hampered - 
possible weakened - by the intervening effects of a series of countervailing forces (CF).  
 
On the one hand, the CF relate to internal factors, i.e. intrinsic to the EU, such as the fact that 
the European Commission is a slow, bureaucratic actor, or the fact that EU competence on 
Central Asian affairs is a shared competence and hence subject to impact from disagreement 
between the EU Member States based on their diverging preferences (cf. the case of the 
Uzbek sanctions and Germany‟s preference – against the preference of other Member States - 
to lift the sanctions because of its military base in Uzbekistan). On the other hand, CF relate 
to external factors, i.e. extrinsic to the EU. The group of external CF consists of factors that 
are intrinsic to the third party, in casu the Central Asian states, but also factors that are 
extrinsic to them. To illustrate, external CF may relate to the authoritarian nature of the 
Central Asian regimes, which is intrinsic to the countries. In turn, another external CF may be 
the strong competition from Russia and China that the EU is confronted with in Central Asia. 
Importantly, internal and external CF can be seen to interact. 
 
As indicated in Chapter 9, CF can also affect the feedback effect, i.e. the extent to which the 
desired outcome (obtained at the relational level), in casu the launch of the partnership with 
Central Asia, reinforces the EU‟s TNPO over the other actor(s), in casu Central Asia. In other 
words, the degree of the TNPO reinforcement depends not only on how (un)favourable the 
concrete outcome (obtained at the relational level) - in casu the launch of a partnership with 
Central Asia - is for the EU but also on the possible intervention of countervailing factors in 
the feedback phase - in casu during the implementation of the partnership initiative -, which 
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may limit the degree of reinforcement of the EU‟s TNPO over the other actor(s), in casu the 
Central Asian partner states. 
 
Figure 8: Refinement of TNPO framework: the inclusion of countervailing factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By adding the aspect of CF, we now know how the EU‟s exercise or accumulation of TNPO 
may be limited by the intervention of countervailing forces. As depicted in Figure 8, CF can 
affect the exercise of TNPO either „before or after‟, or „both before and after‟ the 
achievement of a concrete outcome, in casu the launch of the partnership with Central Asia. 
In the former case, CF limit or constrain the EU‟s ability to translate its TNPO into an 
effective outcome, i.e. the launch of the partnership. In the latter case, CF limit or constrain 
the EU‟s ability to implement the arrangement, and, as such limit the reinforcement of the 
EU‟s TNPO over the region. In other words, CF can operate both on the relational and on the 
structural level. CF limit the EU‟s TNPO, and as such affect the Union‟s ability to translate its 
TNPO into a desired outcome, the feedback effect of which might in turn be negatively 
affected by CF, limiting the (potential) reinforcement of the EU‟s TNPO. 
 
Main strengths & shortcomings of the thesis 
 
In terms of the key contributions of the thesis, the doctoral research generated new theoretical 
perspectives and provided fresh empirical findings to the literature on EU-Central Asia 
relations. In particular, it contributed to the development of the theoretical debate on the EU‟s 
power over the region, arguing in favour of using a structurally integrative approach. In 
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addition, given that several of the theoretical concerns addressed by this study also apply to 
the literature of European integration, and particularly EU external relations, at large, it is 
hoped that the thesis will also induce new insights into the scholarly understanding of other 
cases and areas of the EU‟s external relations, a contribution that would build on and position 
itself alongside the works of Holden (2009), Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008) and Lavenex 
(2008), among others. 
 
At the same time, there are also some shortcomings that need to be acknowledged. To begin 
with, there are of course limitations to the detail of argument that a study of this scale can 
make. Moreover, the thesis, admittedly, does not systematically use the TNPO model and 
TNPO concept in the second and third steps of the empirical exploration of the thesis‟s 
hypothesis, largely because of space concerns. That said, this shortcoming offers an 
interesting opportunity for future research.  
 
Avenues for future research 
 
As mentioned, Steps 2 and 3 of the empirical exploration of the thesis‟s working hypothesis 
are implemented in Chapter 9, but not as in-depth and extensively as the empirical analysis 
conducted under Step 1 and offered in Chapters 5-8, which constitute the more substantial 
part of the thesis‟s empirical work. Therefore, one opportunity for future research is to apply 
in full these two final steps of the empirical exploration of the thesis‟s working hypothesis. 
The main purpose of the research would then be to examine not so much to what extent the 
EU‟s power over Central Asia derives from a combination of material, institutional and 
ideational structures (Step 1), but rather to what extent the EU‟s TNPO has enabled the EU to 
conclude the partnership (Step 2), and to what extent the implementation of the partnership 
has in turn reinforced the EU‟s power over the Central Asian countries (Step 3). 
 
Another avenue for future research might be to use the TNPO model to examine the EU‟s 
influence over other third countries/regions. Indeed, given that several of the theoretical 
concerns addressed by this study also apply to the literature of European integration at large, 
and particularly the literature of EU external relations, the theoretical model presented in this 
thesis might be applied in future research to induce new insights into the scholarly 
understanding of other empirical cases and areas of the EU‟s external relations. The TNPO 
model could be used, for instance, to assess the EU‟s influence vis-à-vis the Middle East and 
Northern Africa (MENA) region or vis-à-vis countries in sub-Sahara Africa. 
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Appendix 1: Overview of most frequently used secondary sources 
 
                                                 
315
 Apart from drawing on articles from these two scholarly journals, numerous other academic sources were 
called upon. As will become clear in the empirical chapters of the thesis, the academic sources derive from a 
wide range of publications.  
316
 This is the bi-weekly journal of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Program Joint Center. 
317
 EUCAM is an 18-month joint project of the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo 
Exterior (FRIDE) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). The initiative focuses on the EU-Central 
Asia Strategy, and is supported by several EU member states and civil society organisations.  
Media sources: 
 
EUObserver 
 
European Voice 
 
EurActiv 
 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
                                                                                                                          
EurasiaNet.org 
 
Ferghana.ru 
 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting 
 
Times of Central Asia 
 
Silk Road Intelligencer 
 
http://euobserver.com/ 
     
http://www.europeanvoice.com/ 
    
http://euractiv.com/ 
 
http://www.rferl.org/ 
http://www.eurasianet.org/ 
 
http://enews.ferghana.ru/ 
    
http://www.iwpr.net/ 
     
http://www.timesca.com/ 
   
http://silkroadintelligencer.com 
Academic sources:
315
 
 
Central Asia and the Caucasus: Journal of Social and Political Studies 
 
Central Asian Survey 
Reports and briefings from NGOs and research institutes: 
 
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst
316
 
 
Zentralasien-Analysen 
 
 
EU Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM)
317
 
 
 1) EUCAM Watch  
 2) EUCAM Policy Brief 
 
International Crisis Group 
 
Human Rights Watch 
 
Freedom House 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
 
European Centre for International Political 
Economy (ECIPE) 
 
 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/index.php 
 
http://www.laender-
analysen.de/zentralasien/ 
 
http://www.eucentralasia.eu/ 
 
 
 
 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
 
http://www.hrw.org/ 
 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
 
http://www.ceps.eu/ 
 
http://www.ecipe.org/ 
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Appendix 2: Interview material 
 
 
A2.1. List of interviews by country and city 
  
 
 
Location Institution/organisation
318
 represented by interviewee Date 
 
GER - Berlin 
 
Federal Foreign Office, Central Asia Division 
 
30/10/07 
 
BEL - Brussels 
 
Diplomatic Mission of Kazakhstan to the EU 
 
04/02/08 
 
Diplomatic Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the EU 
 
05/02/08 
 
Diplomatic Mission of Uzbekistan to the EU 
 
11/02/08 
 
EuropeAid Cooperation Office, D/1, Projects Section 
 
16/02/08 
 
Federal Foreign Office of Belgium: 
 
- Department of External Action of the EU 
 
- Division of Bilateral Relations with Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia 
 
 
18/02/08 
 
Office of the EUSR for Central Asia, Brussels-based 
political advisor to the EUSR for Central Asia 
 
 
19/02/08 
 
EuropeAid Cooperation Office, D/1, Central Asia 
coordinator 
 
 
26/02/08 
 
Diplomatic Mission of Turkmenistan to the EU  
 
13/03/08 
 
Greek Representation to the Political and Security 
Committee of the Council of the EU 
 
 
20/03/08 
 
Diplomatic Mission of Tajikistan to the EU  
 
20/03/08 
 
European Commission, DG Trade, „Central Asia, 
South Caucasus & Belarus‟ desk 
 
 
09/04/08 
 
Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 
External Relations Office, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia Desk 
 
 
19/06/08 
                                                 
318
 For a limited number of interviews, the interviewees‟ function or position within the institution or 
organisation is added. Also note that, in three cases, the interview involved not one but two or three 
interviewees. In all three cases, notably the Belgian Federal Foreign Office, the European Parliament and the 
Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two or three interviewees represented either different departments within 
the same institution or different divisions within the same department. Especially in the case of the European 
Parliament and the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the cross-departmental and cross-divisional representation 
of the interviewees allowed me to retrieve very valuable data and gain substantial insights into the subject 
matter. For instance, in the case of the interview at the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the threatening and 
fairly harsh tone of the interviewee from the Department of Analysis and Strategy of Foreign Policy was 
markedly offset by the much milder and positive tone of the interviewee from the Europe Department, whose 
pro-European answers contradicted – albeit implicitly - the anti-European responses of his colleague. 
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European Parliament: 
 
- External Relations Policy Department, 
„Ukraine, South Caucasus, Central Asia & Iran‟ 
desk officer 
 
- Interparliamentary Relations office, 
administrator at Non-Europe desk 
 
- Committee on Foreign Affairs, shadow 
rapporteur of the Parliament‟s Report on the 
EU Strategy for a New Partnership with Central 
Asia 
 
 
11/07/08 
BEL - Antwerp 
 
Vice-President of Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
of Kazakhstan (Interview held during interviewee‟s 
visit to the Chamber of Commerce of Antwerp) 
 
 
17/06/10 
 
UZB - Tashkent 
 
National University of Uzbekistan, Associate Professor 
of World Politics  
 
 
28/04/08 
 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
 
29/04/08 
 
Europa House, chief coordinator 
 
01/05/08 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
 
- Europe Department 
 
- Department of Analysis and Strategy of Foreign 
Policy 
 
 
02/05/08 
 
OSCE national office 
 
02/05/08 
 
Embassy of France 
 
06/05/08 
 
KYR - Bishkek 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Economic 
Department 
 
 
08/05/08 
 
Regionalised Delegation of the European 
Commission
319
 to KYR, Projects section 
 
 
08/05/08 
 
OSCE Academy, Director 
 
 
08/05/08 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Relations 
with the West, Division of Relations with the EU 
 
 
12/05/08 
 
Regionalised Delegation of the European Commission 
to KYR, Political and Economic Section 
 
 
14/05/08 
 
Regionalised Delegation of the European Commission 
to KYR, Projects Section 
 
 
14/05/08 
                                                 
319
 It is important to note that the three Delegations of the European Commission in Central Asia have become 
EU Delegations since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in december 2009. 
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Regionalised Delegation of the European Commission 
to KYR, Chargé d‟Affaires 
 
 
14/05/08 
 
Development & Cooperation in Central Asia
320
 
 
15/05/08 
 
Agence de Coopération technique et Développement
321
  
 
16/05/08 
 
Regional office of the EU‟s Border Management 
(BOMCA) and Drug Action Programmes (CADAP) in 
Central Asia, Regional Programme Manager 
 
 
16/05/08 
 
KAZ - Almaty 
 
Regional Office of the Delegation of the European 
Commission to KAZ, KYR and TAJ, Political and 
Economic Section 
 
 
19/05/08 
 
Regional Office of the EUSR for Central Asia, Political 
advisor to the EUSR for Central Asia 
 
 
20/05/08 
 
Embassy of France
322
 
 
22/05/08 
 
University of Al-Farabi, Professor at the Faculty of 
International Relations, Department of Regional 
Studies and World Economy 
 
 
22/05/08 
 
UNESCO, Culture Officer 
 
23/05/08 
 
KAZ - Astana 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of European  
Cooperation  
 
 
26/05/08 
 
Embassy of Belgium to KAZ, KYR & TAJ 
 
27/05/08 
 
European Business Association of Kazakhstan, local 
office
323
 
 
 
27/05/08 
 
National Parliament of KAZ, Assistant of the Deputy 
Chairman of the Mazhilis
324
 
 
 
27/05/08 
 
Delegation of the European Commission to KAZ, KYR 
& TAJ, Political and Economic section 
 
 
28/05/08 
 
Delegation of the European Commission to KAZ, KYR 
& TAJ, Project manager of trade and SMEs projects in 
KAZ 
 
 
28/05/08 
                                                 
320
 „Development & Cooperation in Central Asia‟ (DCCA) is a Central Asian development NGO based in 
Kyrgyzstan, which has received EU funding for a number of its projects and  actively participates in dialogue 
schemes organised by and at the EC Delegation in Bishkek. 
321
 The „Agence de Coopération technique et Développement‟ (ACTED) is a French development NGO. In 
Central Asia, ACTED is active in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Some of its projects in Central Asia 
are funded by the EU. 
322
 The Head Office of the Embassy of France to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is based in Astana, but was 
originally located in Almaty, the former capital of Kazakhstan. However, some of the office space in Almaty is 
still being occupied, inter alia by the cultural section and consular service of the Embassy. In Bishkek, France 
has established an antenne diplomatique, which serves as the local Kyrgyz office of the Embassy. 
323
 The headquarters of the European Business Association of Kazakhstan (EUROBAK) is based in Almaty. 
324
 The Mazhilis is the name of the House of Representatives of the Parliament of Kazakhstan. 
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Embassy of France to KAZ & KYR 
 
29/05/08 
 
Embassy of the Netherlands to KAZ, KYR & TAJ 
 
30/05/08 
 
Delegation of the European Commission to KAZ, KYR 
& TAJ, Acting Head of Delegation 
 
 
30/05/08 
 
A2.2: Attendance of seminars and roundtables with high profile speakers:
 325
 
 
Location Event & guest speakers Date 
 
 
BEL - Brussels 
 
 
ECIPE seminar: “Kazakhstan and the WTO: Foreign 
Economic Diplomacy and CIS Integration into the 
World Economy” 
 
-Zhanar Aitzhanova, Deputy Minister for Industry and 
Trade of Kazakhstan, and chief negotiator in 
Kazakhstan‟s WTO accession talks 
 
-Bolat Akchulakov, Deputy Minister for Energy and 
Mineral Resources of Kazakhstan 
 
-Roderick Abbott, Former Deputy Director General of 
the WTO and Former EU ambassador to the WTO 
 
-Brian Hindley, Senior Fellow of ECIPE 
 
-Signe Ratso, Director of the DG Trade Unit for WTO 
Affairs, OECD and Food Related Sectors 
 
-Dr. Svante Cornell, Head of the Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Programme 
 
 
 
 
26/03/08 
 
 
BEL - Brussels 
 
 
CEPS event “Engaging Central Asia: The European 
Union‟s New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia” 
 
-Pierre Morel, EU Special Representative for Central 
Asia  
 
-Neil J. Melvin, Senior Fellow, CEPS, and Reader in 
Conflict Analysis, Department of Politics and IR, 
Brussels School of International Studies/University of 
Kent 
 
-John Stroehlein, senior researcher, International Crisis 
Group, Brussels 
 
 
 
30/06/08 
 
 
UK - Reading 
 
 
Keynote address organised by the Centre for Euro-
Asian Studies of the University of Reading: 
“Kazakhstan‟s Path to Europe Programme” 
 
-H.E. Ambassador Kairat Abusseitov, Kazakh 
Ambassador to the UK  
 
 
 
11/03/09 
                                                 
325
 The written notes taken during these events have been used as empirical data for the thesis. Notes were taken 
only when keynote speakers addressed matters of direct relevance to the issues under investigation in the 
dissertation. Transcriptions of the notes are available on file. 
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UK - London 
 
Seminar organised by the Centre of Contemporary 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, SOAS, London, “The 
„how to‟ of EU engagement in Uzbekistan since 2005: 
a tale of two projects” 
 
-Dr. Daniel Stevens, former project leader of TEMPUS 
project in Uzbekistan & former leader of commis-
sioned assessments of EC projects in Uzbekistan 
 
28/01/10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A2.3:  Questionnaire used for interviews with Central Asian government officials: 
 
 
In all interviews conducted with government officials from the Central Asian republics, the 
questionnaire presented below was supplemented with a number of issues unique to the 
context of the Central Asian country in question. Moreover, as the nine-month process of 
interviewing went on, questions were added to the questionnaire, while others - less relevant 
ones - were dropped. Therefore, the questionnaire is only indicative and serves to suggest the 
type of questions asked to this particular group of interviewees. 
 
2.3.1. Questions on the perception of the EU: 
 
1) Does your government/country feel closer to the EU since the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements of the Union?  
 
2) How does your government/country perceive the EU? Is the Union different from 
other important international actors (Russia, US, China, India, …)? If  so, why and to 
what extent? 
 
3) Could the EU be considered as a „model‟? If so, in what way?  (cf. a model in terms 
of norms and standards of governance, a model in terms of economic development, 
quality of life, level of freedom of the citizens,…) 
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2.3.2. Questions on the EU Strategy for A New Partnership with Central Asia: 
 
4) What was your government‟s reaction/response to the EU‟s initiative to launch the 
Strategy? Does your government want closer cooperation with the EU? If so, why, 
and to what extent? How important is enhanced cooperation with the EU for your 
country? 
 
 5) Does your government feel that a higher presence of the EU in Central Asia is 
necessary? 
 
6) What does your government think of the way in which the Strategy was 
drafted/prepared? To what extent was your government engaged/involved in the 
preparation process? 
           
7) What does your government think of the Strategy and its achievability? (the 
contents of the document, the goals that it sets out, …). Which proposed areas of 
(enhanced) cooperation do you particularly favour and/or dislike? 
           
8) What does your government think of the way in which the Strategy was presented 
to your government and the other Central Asian states? 
 
9) What does your government think so far of the implementation process of the 
Strategy, including the level of involvement of your country? 
 
2.3.3. Questions on the three constituent elements of TNPO - TNPO1, 2 & 3: 
 
10) What does your government think of the EU‟s past and ongoing cooperation with 
and involvement in your country as well as in Central Asia as a whole? In such 
spheres as financial/cooperation aid (TACIS, BOMCA, TRACECA, …), trade, 
energy, FDI, formal and informal (political dialogue), education (Erasmus Mundus, 
Tempus, …), human rights and rule of law? 
 
11) In what areas does your government want to cooperate (more) with the EU? In 
what areas does your government want to see (enhanced) EU involvement? In trade, 
FDI, financial and/or development aid, energy sphere, adoption of EU (production, 
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quality, …) standards, formal and informal (political) dialogue, rule of law, water 
management, drugs control, counter-terrorism, development, support of SMEs, …? 
 
12) What do you think of the mandate of the EUSR for Central Asia? Does the EUSR 
play a positive role in the EU‟s relations with Central Asia? If so, in what way? 
       
13) Where do you think that the EU‟s main strengths and main weaknesses lie?  
 
14) What does your government think of the values that the EU promotes? Does your 
country/government feel familiar with such values and norms as of democracy, peace, 
rule of law, multilateralism, civil society, …? 
 
15) How does your country feel identity-wise towards the EU? Can you identify with 
people from Europe? 
 
16) What does your government think of the EU‟s „Neighbourhood Policy‟? Would 
your country like to become a beneficiary of that policy programme? 
 
2.3.4. Questions on cooperation with other external actors (Russia, the U.S., China, etc.): 
 
17) What does your government think of its past and ongoing cooperation with such 
external actors as Russia, India, the U.S. and China? 
 
18) Does your country want to strengthen its ties with these external actors? If so, to 
what extent, and in what fields? 
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Appendix 3: Theoretical insights 
  
A3.1: Dominant and other dimensions of foreign policy 
 
Source: Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008: 20) 
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A 3.2: Mechanisms of EU impact beyond the EU member states 
Source: Schimmelfennig (2007) 
Source: Schimmelfennig (2009) 
 
Note: direct = EU-driven; indirect = domestically-driven 
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Appendix 4: Map of Central Asia 
Copyright © 2010 Fabienne Bossuyt 
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Appendix 5: Economic and trade data of the Central Asian republics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
326
 Source: EBRD, available at  http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/cs/country.htm, last accessed on 04.05.09. 
327
 This is based on the KOF „Index of Globalisation 2009‟, which draws on figures of 2006. Available at 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2009.pdf, last accessed on 04.05.09. 
                                                               - 298 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
- 299 - 
 
Appendix 6: EU diplomatic representation in Central Asia  
 
Source: International Crisis Group (2006); author‟s own data collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
